Simplified Afghanistan provincial map Afghanistan Provincial Map FIXING A FAILED STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN GILLES DORRONSORO © 2009 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees. For electronic copies of this report, visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 202-483-7600 Fax: 202-483-1840 www.CarnegieEndowment.org Contents Acknowledgments 5 Summary 7 Introduction 9 The Failure of the Counterinsurgency 13 Strategy and the Loss of the Pashtun Belt Comparison and Its Limits 14 The Flaws in the Counterinsurgency Strategy 15 Helmand as a Test Case 17 Resources: The Coalition Is Near the Breaking Point 23 Reallocating the Resources for a New Strategy 27 Secure, Reallocate, and Reorganize 31 Conclusion: Reorganizing the Coalition 35 Notes 37 About the Author 41 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 43 Acknowledgments This report was written after a trip to Afghanistan (Kabul, Nangarhar, Mazar-i Sharif, Kunduz, and Kandahar) in August 2009. I am grateful to George Perkovich for his remarks on the first draft. I am also sincerely grateful to the people who were kind enough to share their time and information. Among them were Sergiy Sobistiyanskyy (UNAMA), Ehsan Zahine, Masood Karokhel (TLO), Lorenzo Deslegues (Transparency), Claire Billet and Luc Mathieu (journalists), Scott Bohlinger (Anso) in Mazar-i Sharif, and all those who under the current conditions prefer to remain anonymous. I also wish to thank Roland Besenval and Philippe Marquis (DAFA) for their always friendly accommodation. Summary The failure of the U.S. and British strategy as demonstrated by the summer 2009 offensive in Helmand province is accelerating the development of two potentially disastrous scenarios in Afghanistan. First, the war is spreading to the North, which had been relatively quiet beforehand. Second, the Afghan government continues to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the population, especially among Pashtuns. As a result, even if the right number of Afghan forces existed, a quick “Afghanization” of the war is not a realistic goal. Given that the Taliban are woven into the fabric of the Pashtun countryside in the South and East and therefore cannot be removed, the current U.S. strategy inevitably involves high casualties for few results. Instead, the International Coalition, with its limited resources and diminishing popular support, should focus on its core interests: preventing the Taliban from retaking Afghan cities, avoiding the risk that al-Qaeda would try to reestablish sanctuaries there, pursue a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in the North, and reallocate its civilian aid resources to places where the insurgency is still weak. That way, they can make a difference. Ethnicities and Taliban Presence in Afghanistan