SHOPPING FOR BOMBS SHOPPING FOR BOMBS Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network G O R D O N C O R E R A 2006 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2006 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Corera, Gordon. Shopping for bombs : nuclear proliferation, global insecurity, and the rise and fall of the A. Q. Khan network / Gordon Corera. p. cm. ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530495-4 (cloth) ISBN-10: 0-19-530495-0 (cloth) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. Security, International. 3. Khan, A. Q. (Abdul Qadeer), 1936– I. Title. JZ5675.C67 2006 623.4'5119092—dc22 2006012510 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper In memory of Bernard Corera This page intentionally left blank Contents Taranto—October 2003 ix Introduction xi Part 1 RISE CHAPTER 1 Roots 3 CHAPTER 2 The Bomb 33 Natanz—February 2003 57 CHAPTER 3 Iran—From Import to Export 59 Chagai Hills—May 1998 82 CHAPTER 4 North Korea—Pyongyang and Back 86 Jordan—August 1995 103 CHAPTER 5 The Network Expands—The Libya Deal 106 Part 2 FALL CHAPTER 6 Picking up the Trail 129 Washington, DC—September 2001 152 CHAPTER 7 Watching 155 London—March 2003 174 CHAPTER 8 Dealing with Gadaffi 176 New York—September 2003 195 CHAPTER 9 Confronting Musharraf—Dealing with Khan 196 vii viii CONTENTS Kuala Lumpur—November 2003 217 CHAPTER 10 Unraveling the Network 219 EPILOGUE The Spread 241 Notes 253 Acknowledgments 275 Index 277 TARANTO, ITALY October 4, 2003 ITWASJUSTAFTERMIDNIGHT when the BBC China made its unscheduled stop. It would be gone again in two hours. The German Secret Ser- vice had contacted the ship’s owners in Hamburg, Germany, asking for help. The owners radioed the vessel as it passed through the Suez Canal instructing it to change course. “Don’t ask any questions,” the captain was told. Waiting in the cold night air, the team at the dock in Taranto knew they would have to work fast to identify five forty-foot cargo containers by serial number and then remove them from amongst the more than two hundred on board. The BBC China had to resume its voyage without anyone knowing what had hap- pened. Its ultimate destination was the Libyan capital Tripoli. The containers’ journey had begun in August in a factory in Malaysia. A close-knit team working between America’s CIA and Britain’s Intelligence Service received a tip-off in mid-September that a consignment of important goods had arrived at the bustling hub of Dubai’s free-trade zone where they would be loaded onto a tramp steamer. By the time the team had identified the boat as the BBC China, it had already left port. After a frantic search, it was found slowly snaking its way through the Suez Canal. From then on, the ship was closely watched. But until the containers were finally prised open at the port in Italy, the tension was palpable amongst those involved in the operation. What if they were filled with soft toys? The interception of the BBC China had come after a difficult, even depressing summer for the small team working jointly be- tween America’s Central Intelligence Agency and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (formally known as SIS although often known as MI6). Over the previous years, they had pieced together a pic- ture of an unprecedented global black market, supplying the most deadly nuclear technology to some of the world’s most dangerous states. They had watched and waited for an opportunity to break the network but it had proved frustratingly difficult and slow. Mean- while, the network was still churning out more sensitive material and looking for more customers. Then in the spring of 2003, a golden opportunity seemed to have arisen when MI6 was contacted by one of the network’s customers who wanted to talk. But by the ix