J. Carfax Publishing Religion, State & Society, Vo!. 31, No. 2, 2003 • Tilylor&FrancisGroup The Politicisation of Islam in Postsoviet Central Asia* SHIRIN AKINER In the late 1980s most Central Asians were still deeply secular in outlook, a legacy of 70 years of communist rule. Yet from the bottom up, as well as from the top down, there was an impetus for enhancing the role of Islam in society. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these pressures increased, stimulated by internal as well as external developments. The mobilisation of factions with different political agendas, and different visions of Islam, set in motion a complex dynamic of action and reaction. Increasingly, as the Central Asian states became integrated into the international community, so their responses to Islam began to resemble those that are found in other parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East. Common features include the cooptation and control of Islam by ruling elites, and opposition to such regimes by radical Islamist groups. A similar model is being created in Central Asia today, where competition between these forces - government and Muslim opposition - has resulted in proliferating outbreaks of confrontation. This has led to fears that Central Asia will become a new centre of terrorism and that militant Islamists from abroad will find a ready welcome here. Consequently, Islam - or more precisely, the contestation of Islam - has come to be regarded as a security issue. This paper traces the emergence of these tensions. Soviet Background During the Soviet era Islam was severely persecuted and its infrastructure almost I totally destroyed. During the Second World War a small, state-controlled, Muslim I hierarchy was reestablished and some of the formal elements of religious observance were permitted to reappear. Yet there was no abatement of the campaign to secularise society and to replace religious belief by 'scientific atheism'. The result was that by the 1980s Islam had become more a marker of cultural and ethnic identity than an active spiritual commitment for most Central Asians. The chief manifestations of allegiance to the faith at this period were the celebration of religious ceremonies connected with rites of passage, such as (male) circumcision, marriage and burial. Also, there was widespread observance of folk traditions, such as pilgrimages to the graves of holy men and the performance of associated rituals to secure divine *A n earlier version of this paper was published as S. Akiner (2002) 'Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia: contested territory', in Andrea Strasser, Siegfried Haas, Gerhard Mangott and Valeria Heuberger (eds), Zentralasien und Islam/Central Asia and Islam (Hamburg, Deutsches Orient-Institut,2002). ISSN 0963-7494 printlISSN 1465-3975 online/03/020097-26 © 2003 Keston Institute DOl: 10.1080/0963749032000074880 98 Shirin Akiner assistance and protection. In popular understanding such practices were considered to be in keeping with Muslim belief, but in fact were syncretic accretions. Knowledge of Islamic doctrine, of prayers, and even of the basic Muslim profession of faith ('There is no God but God and Muhammed is His Prophet') was limited to a small number of predominantly elderly individuals (Ro'i, 2000; Akiner, 1996, pp. 107-16). In the 1980s, however, there was an Islamic resurgence. The impetus for this came from two directions. One was a revivalist movement. Located mainly in rural areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, particularly the Fergana valley, it mostly took the form of clandestine circles of disciples who congregated around a local teacher respected for his piety and Muslim learning. Such groups were characterised by scholastic conservatism. They were harassed and spasmodically punished by the state authorities. The most prominent figure in this movement was the renowned scholar Muhammad Hindustani Rustarnov (Haji Domla). Born in Kokand in about 1892, he began his religious education at an early age; during the First World War he went to Afghanistan and later to India. He returned to Uzbekistan in 1929 and thereafter endured several years of persecution. In 1947 he moved to Dushanbe, where he died in 1989. His many disciples included clerics from the official Muslim establishment (Muminov, 1999, pp. 77-83). In the 1970s some of his younger followers began to call for an active struggle to cleanse society of its 'impurities' (including such heretical practices as pilgrimages to the saints of holy men). The most influential representatives of this tendency were Rahmatulla Qari Allama and Abduvali Qari Mirzoyev (both from the Fergana valley). A bitter schism opened up between the 'purists' (known as mujaddidiyya ('renewers'» and the conservatives (Babadjanov and Kamilov, 2001, pp. 195-216). The former were dubbed 'Wahhabis', first by their opponents and then more generally in the Soviet press, thereby insinuating that there was a treasonous link to a foreign power (a link which was not proven and almost certainly did not exist at this period). 1 It is difficult to judge the impact of these revivalist groups, whether purist or conservative in orientation, on society at large. They are said to have attracted 'masses' of followers, but whether this indicates hundreds or thousands of believers is not clear. Yet the very fact that they existed was in itself significant. Only the initiated would have been able to follow the intricacies of their doctrinal disputes, but they did generate a new interest in Islamic thought. Parallel to this development was the change in official policy towards Islam. During the period of perestroika (the second half of the 1980s) the government began to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the religious establishment in response to two quite different concerns. One concern was the need to manage the nascent 'Islamic threat'. The perception of Islam as a potential menace was to some extent inspired by the writings of western scholars, who frequently stressed that the rapid demographic growth of the Soviet Muslim population would endanger the stability of the Soviet Union and might even bring about its dissolution.2 The threat perception was fuelled, too, by apprehension that 'fundamentalist' movements might be imported into Central Asia from Iran and Afghanistan. The Soviet government's strategy for dealing with this situation in the 1980s was very different from what it might have been in an earlier period: now, instead of increased repression, there was a concerted effort to work with the official Muslim institutions to promote 'Central Asian' orthodoxy. Much emphasis was placed on the historic tradition of Islam in the region, as witnessed by the works of great medieval scholars such as al-Bukhari and at-Tirmizi. The explicit message was that Central Asians should be proud of their own form of Islam. They did not need to imitate others: on the contrary, they could act as exemplars for Muslims in other Postsoviet Politicisation of Islam 99 countries.3 The other concern for the Soviet authorities at this time was the urgent need to improve economic performance. The state was suffering a systemic crisis, but the full scale of the problems had not yet become apparent and blame was largely laid on human failings, particularly on corruption, fraud and other malpractices. In an attempt to change the moral climate, religious leaders were coopted to help fight these social ills. In Central Asia, as part of this policy, Islam began to be presented in a positive light, with much emphasis on its ethical values. To help spread this message, many mosques were opened (more in 1989-91 than at any time in the previous seven decades) and there was a dramatic rise in the availability of religious literature and facilities for the study of the Quran. The result of this overt government support gave the Muslim official hierarchy greater public visibility, as well as increased influence in society. This policy of accommodation towards Islam was marked by the promotion of younger men (several in their early thirties) to leading positions in the official Muslim institutions. These included Muhammad Sadyk Muhammad Yusuf Hoja-ogli (known less formally as Muhammad Sadyk or Mamayusupov) to head the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Akbar Turajonzade to head the Tajik branch of the administration, Ratbek Nysanbai-uly to head the Kazakh branch and Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah to head the Turkmen branch. Such men had received a thorough training in Islamic scholarship in Soviet madrassahs, and in religious institutions abroad. Products of the postwar period, they were loyal Soviet citizens, but also devout Muslims. They were firmly committed to the twin aims of increasing knowledge and practice of Islam among the population at large, and also to giving the faith a greater public role in society. This generation of Muslim leaders did not see (or were not prepared to discuss) a possible contradiction between their goals and those of the secular authorities. Rather, they seized the opportunity to appropriate the space that had been opened up by the change in official attitudes in order to pursue their own agendas. Some of these new clerics (for example, Muhammad Sadyk) were disciples of so-called 'Wahhabi' teachers (Muminov, 1999, pp. 77-83). Moreover, like the 'Wahhabis', one of their priorities was the promotion of 'purist', orthodox Islam, cleansed of the superstition and syncretic accretions that characterised the religious practice of the majority of the population. Thus, the interests of members of the official Muslim hierarchy and ofthe unofficial 'Wahhabis' converged. Working in different spheres, within different organisational frameworks, their efforts were often complementary. Yet any form of collaboration was still of necessity surreptitious, since the government regarded the 'Wahhabis' with suspicion and hostility: It must be stressed that the developments outlined above - the change in govern ment policy, the growing influence of official and unofficial Muslim organisations - were very tentative and lasted little more than a couple of years, from the late 1980s to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. They were generally welcomed by the public at large, but there was too little time for any real transformation to take place. By the end of the Soviet era there was widespread consensus that Islam must play a greater role in society, but there was no real concept as to what that role should be. There was also no debate as to how Islamic precepts should be interpreted and implemented in contemporary conditions. In fact, for the overwhelming majority of the population, Islam was still primarily understood (and observed) in terms of tradition and symbol (Akiner, 1996). Only in Tajikistan was the picture somewhat different. The head of the official Muslim administration, Qazi Turajonzade, made an energetic attempt to reintroduce a 100 Shirin Akiner Muslim discourse into public life. His aim was not to create an Islamic state (on more than one occasion he stressed that that was not a realistic goal, since so few Tajiks had any real knowledge of the faith). Rather, his mission was to train the teachers and I clerics who could educate the masses. Working within the framework of Soviet law, he founded an Islamic Institute in Dushanbe (1990); he also succeeded in publishing numerous booklets on Islam and opening over a hundred community mosques (Akiner, 2001, pp. 28-33). It was, too, in Tajikistan that the first (and to date only) Islamic political party was established in Central Asia. This was the Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP) of Tajikistan. It began as an offshoot of the all-Union Islamic Rebirth Party, which was founded in Astrakhan' (on the Volga) in June 1990. However, the Tajik party soon began to follow an independent course; it was formally registered by the Tajik authorities in October 1991. Thus, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, in this one republic Islam was not only beginning to play a significant role in public life, but was also operating with a degree of autonomy that was not to be found elsewhere in the region. Postsoviet Islam When the Central Asian states gained independence at the end of 1991 there was much speculation, within the region and abroad, as to the possible impact of the 'Islamic factor' on politics and society. In Tajikistan the government and the Islamist faction, led by the IRP, were soon locked in conflict, triggering the outbreak of civil war in mid-1992. This seemed to many to be proof positive that a wave of rampant 'Islamic fundamentalism' had been unleashed in the region. This, however, was an oversimplification. Islam was undoubtedly a factor in the conflict, but by no means the sole cause. Rather, it was an aggravating feature in the struggle for national supremacy that broke out between the different regional groupings as soon as Moscow's grip weakened. The conflict continued sporadically for five years. It was formally brought to a close in June 1997, when a peace treaty was signed by the warring factions. Despite the shortcomings of this agreement, and the imperfect manner in which it was implemented, nevertheless up to the present it has remained in force. This has permitted a certain amount of political and economic restructuring to take place; some independent political parties have (re-)gained registration, including the Islamic Rebirth Party (Abdullaev and Barnes, 2001; Akiner, 2001, pp. 51-62). Fears that the Tajik conflict might spread to neighbouring states have not been realised. Nevertheless, the theory that the 'Islamic factor' is the key to the politics of Central Asia is still widely held. Yet any serious debate of the issue is greatly impeded by the fact that very little concrete information is available. In the few instances where field research has been carried out, it has been based on relatively small samples. There are huge regional variations in the historical experience of Islam, as well as in contemporary socio-economic indicators (for example, levels of urbanisation, rates of demographic increase, educational standards, geographic mobility and ethnic heterogeneity). Consequently it would be misleading to make sweeping generalisations on the basis of such a narrow range of evidence. To complicate matters further, researchers who have worked in the same area, at approximately the same period, often come to very different conclusions. Given these problems, it is virtually impossible to gain a comprehensive overview of the situation. Nevertheless, some common trends can be identified, though they vary in scope and intensity from state to state, and also from area to area within a single state. They represent an evolution of the tendencies that emerged in the 1980s, but in a more Postsoviet Politicisation of Islam 101 intense and segmented form. They fall into three main categories; these can be described as 'traditional' Islam, 'government-sponsored' Islam and 'radical' Islam. Traditional Islam The term 'traditional' Islam is used here to describe the conservative, overall rather passive attitude to religion that continues to characterise the outlook of the great majority of Central Asian Muslims. As most observers would agree (including fellow Muslims from abroad), Islam here is still perceived more as an ethnic definition than as a religious allegiance. There is a strong sense of obligation 'to maintain the traditions of our forefathers'. This may be expressed in a variety of ways, encompassing different degrees of religious observance. For a few, it involves a strict performance of the prescribed rituals, but most tend to affirm their Islamic identity in a more cursory, symbolic fashion. Moreover, there is still great attachment to popular practices which, though understood as being Islamic, are contrary to orthodox teachings. Yet whatever the level or form of active participation in religion, the emphasis tends to be on preserving continuity rather than searching for enlighten ment, or for a deeper understanding of the faith. Actual knowledge of the religion, with few exceptions, remains limited. This situation may be changing, albeit slowly. In the immediate aftermath of independence there was a great upsurge of enthusiasm for mosque construction. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, there were only 34 mosques open for worship in 1987, but almost 1000 in 1994; in Uzbekistan in the same period the number rose from 87 to some 3000.5 The same phenomenon was to be observed in the other Central Asian states. Moreover, many Muslim schools and madrassahs were opened and courses were provided for children and adults in the study of Arabic, the Quran and related religious topics (Akiner, 1996; Trofimov, 1996). The physical closeness of places of worship encouraged people to attend services on a regular basis and in the early 1990s mosque congregations grew rapidly. By about 1994, however, the novelty was beginning to wear off and a marked drop in attendance was to be observed throughout the region. Since then, there appears to have been a gradual recovery, particularly in the south (notably the Fergana valley and southern Kazakhstan). Some researchers claim that this is happening mainly in villages, among males in the 17-25 year-old age group. Others insist that it is more typical of traders and businessmen in urban areas - that is, the emerging entre preneurial class. University students are also said to be showing an interest in the faith (Olimova, 1999; Zhorobekova, 2000; Tabyshalieva, 2001). There are no corroborated statistics available on this trend, so it is impossible to judge how strong or how widespread it is, but that there is some shift in this direction seems to be beyond dispute. Government-Sponsored Islam 'Government-sponsored' Islam in postsoviet Central Asia is a continuation of the attempt to coopt religion to serve the needs of the state that marked official policies towards Islam in the late 1980s. Today the Constitutions of all the Central Asian countries enshrine the principle of the division of religion and state. Yet throughout the region Islam has been elevated to a status akin to that of a state ideology. This seems to have been prompted by the conviction that unless urgent action was taken to fill the ideological vacuum left by the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism (which 102 Shirin Akiner possibly had more support in Central Asia than elsewhere in the Soviet Union), anarchy would follow. Consequently, in all the Central Asian states an immediate campaign was set in motion to emphasise the role of Islam as an integral component of the national heritage, and likewise of the ethical foundation of the state. This message was conveyed through the teachings of Muslim clerics, as well as through the pronouncements of senior political figures and editorial and documentary features in the mass media. In Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan this dual ethical-national signifi cance was made explicit when the presidents swore their respective oaths of office on both the Constitution and the Quran. On a personal level, the heads of state (all former Communist Party members who came to power under Soviet rule) have been at pains to establish Muslim credentials. This has included fulfilling the 'lesser' (umrah) pilgrimage to Mecca.6 President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan at first eschewed an emphatic endorsement of Islam. However, he too eventually began to adopt an overtly pro-Islamic stance. One indication of this is the inscription on the imposing new mosque in Almaty (former capital of Kazakhstan) proclaiming that the construction was undertaken 'on the initiative and with the personal support of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan'. More forthrightly still, in an interview in 1999 he explained 'We are Sunni Muslims and must follow this path'. As one Kazakh commentator pointed out, when the head of state makes such a pronouncement it takes on the force of a political directive - a violation of the principle of freedom of conscience that is guaranteed in the Constitution.7 Since independence, new laws on religion and on religious associations have been passed in the Central Asian states. The law adopted in Uzbekistan in 1998 is regarded as the most restrictive. However, the draft amendments that are currently under consideration in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan propose measures that are almost equally severe. Political parties of a religious orientation are proscribed everywhere except in Tajikistan, where in mid-1999, in the run-up to parliamentary elections, the Islamic Rebirth Party, outlawed in 1993, was again legalised. In all five states, religious communities must be officially registered by the authorities. If not, they are likely to be prosecuted, and to suffer personal harassment as well as the confiscation or destruction of community property. Most of the so-called 'nontraditional' faiths (meaning those that have only recently been introduced into the region) have experienced great difficulties in securing registration; insofar as they operate at all, their activities are regarded as illegal, and therefore criminal. The form of Islam favoured by the Central Asian governments of today is based on the teachings of orthodox Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. However, the sphere of application is strictly limited. There is little question, for example, of introducing elements of shariah law (Muslim canon law) into the legal framework of these states. The main concern, at government level, is to promote 'good' Islam, which, it is implied, is beneficial to the development of the state; and to banish 'bad' Islam, which represents a threat to stability. To underline this last point, frequent reference is made to Tajikistan and Afghanistan where, it is alleged, the spread of 'bad' Islam has brought misery and suffering. Yet there is no public debate in any of the Central Asian countries as to where, and on what basis, the dividing line should be drawn between the acceptable and the unacceptable. Thus men who grow beards (a traditional Muslim sign of piety) are regarded with suspicion, particularly in Uzbekistan (where they run the risk of summary arrest). Why these manifestations, which are in keeping with orthodox Muslim practice, should be labelled 'extremist', while other aspects of Islamic Postsoviet Politicisation of Islam 103 behaviour should be encouraged, is not discussed. In Uzbekistan it is President Karimov who has taken the lead in defining Islam, thus subsuming the role of religious authority.8 Elsewhere the situation is more nebulous. Superficially there appears to be scope for public discussion of such issues in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, media outlets in these states are governed by a strong element of self-censorship, which ensures that such coverage as there is of religious issues will reinforce 'acceptable' interpretations of Islam.9 The institutional control of Islamic activities in Central Asia today largely follows the Soviet model. However, whereas under Soviet rule there had been a unified, over arching administration for all the Muslims of the region (the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan), separate national administrations, each headed by a mufti, were established in the early 1990s.1O The Muftiate is responsible for administering Muslim affairs within the state, and maintaining formal contacts with Muslims abroad. The work of the Muftiate is closely monitored by a Committee or Council for Religious Affairs, a body that serves as the interface between the government and the religious communities (yet another Soviet-era survival). The interests of Muslims as well as of adherents of the other established faiths - chiefly Orthodox Christianity and Judaism - are officially represented in this body. The 'nontraditional' faiths such as Baha'is, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, are regarded with suspicion and given little opportunity for official representation. In Turkmenistan the Muftiate and the Committee have virtually merged into a single entity, as the chairman of the latter body is the deputy mufti, while the mufti is deputy chairman of the Committee. The Muftiate is responsible, amongst a number of other functions, for the formal examination and registration of Muslim clerics. Unregistered preachers are liable to criminal prosecution. The ostensible aim of registration is to disbar unqualified individuals from holding religious posts. This is indeed a serious issue. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, it was estimated that a third of all those who applied for registration in 1999 lacked the most basic level of religious training. At the same time, however, registration also enables the state authorities to keep a close check on the ideological orientation of the religious establishment. Clerics who hold views that do not conform to the official line, or who are felt to be lacking in loyalty to the government, can be excluded from the system. This is a common occurrence in Uzbekistan (the registration test there includes questions on President Karimov's works). The most extreme example of government control over the Muslim establishment is in Uzbekistan. The last mufti of the Soviet era, Muhammad Sadyk, who initially enjoyed wide popular support, was forced from office in the wake of accusations of 'Wahhabi' sympathies, as well as of financial improprieties. In 1993 he went into voluntary exile. Since then, the official Muslim hierarchy has been relegated to a subordinate role, remarkable chiefly for its unquestioning support of government policies. Elsewhere in the region state control of the religious establishment is also increasing, though it is still well below the Uzbek level. In Kazakhstan, for example, in June 2000 President Nazarbayev played an influential, albeit indirect, role in the choice of the new mufti. The former mufti, Ratbek Nisanbai-uly (1990-2000), was removed from his post following persistent allegations of venality and incompetence. Whatever shortcomings he may have had in this direction (and it is a matter that is open to question) he had at least received some degree of training in Islamic scholar ship. By contrast, the new mufti, Absattar Derbesaliyev, has had little formal religious education. A graduate in Kazakh language and literature, he studied Arabic for a few 104 Shirin Akiner years at the Oriental Institute in Moscow; thereafter he followed an academic career in Almaty until his appointment as counsellor in the Kazakh embassy in Saudi Arabia. Not all Kazakh Muslims are happy with this degree of state intervention.11 However, in some circles in Kazakhstan, as also in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, there are signs that the relinking of religious and secular authority is coming to be regarded as an acceptable arrangement. I' Kyrgyzstan has, to date, shown a fairly consistent commitment to maintaining the independence of the religious establishment. This appeared to falter in December 1996 when covert government pressure resulted in the ousting of Mufti Kimsanbai-aji Abdurahman uulu (elected in 1993), a cleric who had a large following within the Muslim community, but was suspected by some of 'Wahhabi' leanings. He was replaced by Abdysatar-ajy, an older, less independent-minded figure. Unexpectedly, Kimsanbai-aji was suddenly reinstated as mufti on 6 April 2000, following rumours that his successor's son had been involved in 'fundamentalist' activities in southern Kyrgyzstan. In retrospect it would appear that the role of the government in these manoeuvrings was not so much (or at least not only) a matter of policy on religious affairs, but rather of factional in-fighting. Senior clerics are supported by informal networks of regional and ethnic elements, which are in turn linked to cliques within the government. Thus changes of personnel in the religious hierarchy often reflect the ascendancy/eclipse of a particular faction in the wider political arena. Radical Islam The third trend in Central Asian Islam, here categorised as 'radical', embraces a J) loose grouping of activists who want to purge Islam of the distortions that have been introduced over time. They are collectively referred to as 'Wahhabis', a term that today, as during the Soviet era, is a generic expression of abuse rather than a literal description of religious affiliation. The purging of radical elements from the state controlled Muslim bodies (notably in Uzbekistan) has broken the tacit alliance that existed at the end of the Soviet period between the 'purists' and the official religious hierarchy. This has left the former in a very vulnerable, isolated position. They have reacted by adopting a stance that is aggressively antagonistic, their ire targeted equally against debased folk interpretations of Islam as well as compromised govern ment-sponsored Islam. For its part, the official hierarchy is now implacably ranged against the radicals. By contrast, the traditionalists are regarded with greater equanimity. Thus, since independence there has been a tactical realignment amongst the Muslims, with the traditionalists and the representatives of government institutions reaching a degree of accommodation, united by their opposition to the radicals. From the early 1990s onwards the radical trend has been gaining ground. In Tajikistan, as mentioned above, it was one of the factors that led to the outbreak of the civil war. Elsewhere in the region the main expression of radical Islam has been the emergence of clandestine groups, based in Uzbekistan and adjacent areas of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. There are no reports of Islamist movements in Turkmenistan, which could either mean that they do not exist, or that they are suppressed more effectively than elsewhere. It is impossible to set a figure either to the number of individuals who are involved, or to the number of separate groups. Names of some of these groups have appeared in various sources from time to time, but with almost no background information. 14 Where it is possible to trace the biographies of the leaders, likewise the genealogy of Postsoviet Politicisation of Islam 105 their ideas, it is obvious that they emanate from Soviet-era revivalist circles. The first such group to acquire wide notoriety was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. It was 15 formed around 1996 under the leadership of Tahir Yoldashev and Jumabai Khojiyev. It appears to have had greater coherence and sense of purpose than any previous formations (and it may indeed have attracted members from some of the earlier groups). It was based predominantly in the Fergana valley, and the great majority of its members were Uzbeks. The movement was also active in southern Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan, where it was said to find support among local Uzbek minorities. From the outset it seems to have accepted the need for armed conflict in order to attain its objectives. Government counter-terrorist operations caused many of its members to flee the country in the late 1990s (see the section 'Terrorism and Repression' below). They thereupon established camps in Afghanistan and, allegedly, Tajikistan (though the Tajik authorities deny this). In 2001 there was apparently a move to rename the party the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, but this does not appear to have been implemented. Likewise in the mid-1990s a very different, and potentially far more powerful, radical element appeared. This was Hizb ut-Tahrir (transliterated in various forms and usually translated as the Liberation Party). A transnational Islamist organisation, it was created in 1953 in Jerusalem;16 it soon attracted a substantial following in Jordan and spread to other countries in the Middle East, North Africa and eventually South East Asia. However, in several countries it was banned as a dangerously subversive 17 organisation and its members were imprisoned. The current headquarters of the movement are not known, though it is credibly suggested that they are based in the United Kingdom. It is not known how it is funded, but it appears to have a highly developed infrastructure. It produces numerous publications and has an impressive internet presence. According to statements on the official website 'Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam'. Its aim is to bring the worldwide Muslim community back to an Islamic way of life, in an Islamic society administered according to the shariah rules, under the umbrella of the Khilafah State (that is, the Caliphate). Membership of the party is open to men and women, 'Arab or non-Arab, white or coloured, since it is a party for all Muslims'. It calls for an intellectual as well as a political struggle 'against the Kufr [disbelieving - S.A.] colonialist states which have domination and influence on the Islamic countries' and likewise 'against the rulers in the Arab and Muslim countries, by exposing them, taking them to task ... whenever they disagreed with the rules of Islam, and acting also to remove their regimes so as to establish the Islamic rule in its place' (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2003). The fIrst Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets reportedly appeared in Tashkent in 1992-93, but the movement does not seem to have established a definite presence in the city until 1995 (Ponomarev, 1999, p. 5). Thereafter it used its established strategy to progress 'from only approaching individuals to ... the culturing of individuals in circles to build the body of the Party and increase its members, and produce Islamic person alities that are capable of conveying the da 'wah [invitation to Islam - S.A.] and rushing forward into the intellectual and political struggle'. The Hizb ut-Tahrir interpretation of the thoughts and rules of Islam are disseminated 'through lessons, lectures, and talks in the mosques, centres and common gathering places, and through the press, books and leaflets' (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2003). The fIrst emissaries of Hizb ut Tahrir in Central Asia seem to have been of Jordanian origin (Ponomarev, 1999, pp. 4-5), but anecdotal evidence suggests that there were also several Pakistanis. Uzbekistan has, to date, been the primary focus of their activities. This is evidenced not only by their energetic missionary work and concomitant success in attracting 106 Shirin Akiner adherents (by some estimates, now numbering around 80,000), but also by the attention paid to Uzbekistan on the official Hizb ut-Tahrir website. Several of the documents posted there contain excoriating attacks on the U zbek government and in particular on President Karimov, who is depicted as an arch-enemy of Islam.18 According to information supplied by the Uzbek law enforcement agencies the organisational structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan consists of seven levels, starting from the novice and progressing upwards to the leader; the nuclear cell consists of up to five people (Ponomarev, 1999, p. 5). Since 2001 the Hizb ut-Tahrir website has referred to Uzbekistan as a wilaya (province), presumably of an imagined worldwide Islamic state. It is impossible, given the dearth of reliable information, to establish whether or not Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are in any way linked. Initially they were quite separate organisations, but in the late 1990s there were rumours to suggest that some degree of rapprochement had taken place. This would not be surprising, since their goals are similar. Both movements believe that the governments and the government-sponsored Muslim administrations are corrupt and spiritually bankrupt. They believe that society as a whole is in need of moral regeneration and that this can be achieved only by a full and genuine return to Muslim values within the framework of an Islamic state. This has prompted accusations that they are plotting to overthrow by force the government and the constitutional system of the country. Consequently they are regarded as terrorists and enemies of the state. In Uzbekistan this has led to mass arrests of those who are suspected of belonging to, or sympathising with, either Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There have also been widespread reports of assault and torture of those in custody; several Muslim clerics, among them the imams (religious leaders) of some of the major mosques in Tashkent and other cities, have disappeared without explanation. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent in Kazakhstan, there has been a similar trend of increased repression of alleged 'Islamic fundamentalists' (Amnesty International, 2001). It is difficult to judge the validity of the allegations of terrorist plots to overthrow the government, since statements from official sources, likewise reports in the mass media, are heavily biased against any expression of dissident opinion. Representatives of human rights organisations (local and international) insist that many of those who have been arrested are not guilty of any crime. They point out that although Hizb ut Tahrir publications advocate an Islamic system of government, this is to be achieved by nonviolent means; theoretically, this could be said to fall within the constitution ally permitted limits of freedom of expression in each of the Central Asian states. However, this argument cannot be advanced in defence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, since the available evidence indicates that this is a militant organisation that is prepared to use force to seize power. Terrorism and Repression The geographic centre of Islamist activity in Uzbekistan is Namangan, a densely populated Uzbek ob/ast' in the Fergana valley with a reputation, even during the Soviet period, for being a bastion of Islam. A party of Islamic activists called Ado/at (Justice) was created in 1991, chiefly (it is alleged) with the aim of combating crime. During the presidential elections of at the end of that year it staged demonstrations calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. The party apparently received some support from the authorities and there were even reports that President Karimov