T . G This study has been undertaken as the fi rst ever joint research publication . between defence institutions in Denmark and Pakistan. Given the N i development in international security politics in the last few years, it is fair to e l s argue that both Denmark and Pakistan are at a point where future security e challenges require a development of policies and strategies. Though the n , roles of Denmark and Pakistan respectively are different in nature, a lot of M commonalities in conceptual thoughts and actions were found between the .H two countries at all levels. The book at hand gathers a number of lessons . S identifi ed from Afghanistan and Pakistan with the objective of promoting y e sustainable regional peace building and developing military and civilian d cooperation strategies for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. & D . Authors: V e s Thomas Galasz Nielsen, major in the Danish Army te and master of art student at King’s College London, is n s currently assigned as a military analyst at the Danish k o Institute for International Studies, an independent Danish v think-tank. Previously assignments include Chief Danish Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Staff Element in 2009 to 2010 at the British Brigade Headquarters in Helmand, Afghanistan, syndicate leader S Sharing Experiences in at the Royal Danish Defence Academy in military strategy, and various h a military assignments in the Danish Defence Staff and in units up to Brigade r Afghanistan and Pakistan level. in g Mahroona Hussain Syed is a sociologist and a Ph.D. EC By Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Mahroona Hussain Syed & David Vestenskov xo fellow in the Department of Government and Public Policy u p n at the National Defence University, Pakistan. Besides et re regular contributions to local journals and books, she is ir ein the author of ‘The Nature of Dependency in the Socio- ns Economic Development of Pakistan: An Exploratory Study ceurg into the Compulsive and Voluntary Dependency Affecting se n Pakistan’s Socio-Economic Development’ (2010). Currently she is working as inc y Research Associate at Institute of Strategic Studies and Research Analysis A a (ISSRA), National Defence University, Pakistan. fn gd h C ao nu David Vestenskov is a consultant at the Royal Danish in st Defence College with an emphasis on Afghanistan and e t Pakistan. His analytical work and research have primarily art ne focused on security developments in Central Asia and the rr ao Maniddd lbeo Eoaksst ownh.i cHh ish ec aulrsroe nhta sw pourkb licsohmedp rsieseves rarel asertaicrclehs, ndrism international networking and project implementation P: a in the areas of international security issues, counterinsurgency and k counterterrorism, as well as regional peace building. i s t a n Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan By Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Mahroona Hussain Syed & David Vestenskov 2015 Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Mahroona Hussain Syed & David Vestenskov © Royal Danish Defence College All rights reserved. Mechanical, photographic or other reproduction or photocopying from this book or parts thereof is only allowed according to agreements between The Danish Defence and CopyDan. Any other use without written consent from the Royal Danish Defence College and Pakistan’s National Defence University is illegal according to Danish law on intellectual property right. Excepted are short extracts for reviews in newspapers or the like. Copenhagen September 2015 Royal Danish Defence College Ryvangs Allé 1 DK-2100 Copenhagen Denmark Tel.: 3915 1515 Editors in chief: D ean Ole Kværnø RDDC & Major General Noel I. Khokhar HI(M), NDU Printed in Denmark by Rosendahls A/S Frontpage photos: Top: Danish soldiers from ISAF 6 conducting CIMIC work with local Afghans in Helmand 2008. Archive: Danish Defence. Below: Pakistani Armed Forces in Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2011). Archive: ISPR Layout: Bent-Ole Kure ISBN: 978-87-7147-118-2 Number printed: 400 Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House 2 COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Contents Foreword .............................................................................................................5 Abbreviations .....................................................................................................7 Introduction .......................................................................................................9 Project outline and study objective ............................................................11 Analytical framework ...................................................................................13 Methodology and criteria for selecting respondents for data collection .14 Contextual and analytical scope .................................................................15 Entering Afghanistan: Historical overview, the stages of the ISAF mission, and understanding the basics of COIN and the opponent ..........................17 Abstract ........................................................................................................17 Preface .........................................................................................................17 Recent history of Afghanistan’s government .............................................18 Juridical foundation for the missions in Afghanistan ................................21 The Danish troop contribution in Helmand ................................................23 Danish tasks in Helmand ............................................................................25 Understanding the basics of countering insurgents and terrorists ..........27 COIN principles and laws ............................................................................28 Using Galula’s theories in a contemporary conflict – countering insurgents ....................................................................................................28 Operational framework: The eight steps ....................................................30 The insurgency: The Taliban from 2001 to 2005 ......................................31 The Taliban from 2005 to 2014 .................................................................32 ISAF challenges with Taliban ......................................................................33 Counter-militancy operations in Pakistan: Through the prism of COIN and CT ...............................................................................................................35 Abstract ........................................................................................................35 Preface .........................................................................................................35 Explaining the context: Pakistan’s geostrategic compulsions ..................35 Pakistan’s share in the war on Terror ........................................................39 Pakistan’s approach seen through the prism of COIN ..............................41 Pakistan decides to eliminate terrorism and militancy from its soil ........50 Concluding remarks ...................................................................................55 Counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan ..............................................57 Abstract ........................................................................................................57 counterinsurgency ...............................................................57 Insurgency motivations ...............................................................................63 Perception of Counterinsurgency tools .............................................................................66 3 Contents Tools crowded out ........................................................................................75 Counterproductive effects ...........................................................................78 Counterterror operations in Pakistan ............................................................82 Abstract ........................................................................................................82 Perception of the opponent ........................................................................82 Perceptions of counterinsurgency ..............................................................89 Insurgency motivations ..............................................................................91 Counterinsurgency tools ...........................................................................100 Tools crowded out ......................................................................................109 Counterproductive effects .........................................................................112 Conclusion ......................................................................................................114 Understanding the lessons identified ......................................................114 Appendix 1 - Complete list of lessons identified .........................................119 COIN operations in Afghanistan ...............................................................119 CT and CM operations in Pakistan ...........................................................124 Appendix 2 – Questions for the respondents..............................................132 Appendix 3 – Transcriptions of interviews from Pakistan ........................133 Appendix 4 – Transcriptions of interviews from Denmark ........................153 Bibliography ...................................................................................................346 Interviews ...................................................................................................354 4 COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Foreword Considering the nature and gravity of the events related to 9/11, the coun- terinsurgency efforts followed by the U.S./NATO drawdown in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s ongoing war against domestic militancy and terrorism, the states involved in these colossal efforts stand enriched with varied experi- ences and deeper insights into issues that confronted all stakeholders in the Post 9/11 period till 2014. Therefore, a need was felt in Denmark and in Pakistan to share such experiences in collaboration, for the benefit of our two countries as well as for others in the international community. Conse- quently, researchers from both the RDDC and NDU have collaborated to bring forth the book at hand. Priority within both of our institutions has been given to this academic, research-based book, in order to share the experiences gained by people from the two countries who have been and are carrying out Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism operations in their respective areas of responsibility and operations in an open, frank and comprehensive manner. As was hoped for, the interviewees offered candid views, while expounding upon their experiences, concerns and suggestions, which led to many shared lessons identified all throughout the process. We extend our profound gratitude to all the respondents, who offered insightful viewpoints for this research. It is hoped that people from different segments of both societies, especially gov- ernmental, political and military leadership circles, think tanks, universities, media and other stakeholders will find this book to be a first drop of rain that opens further avenues for joint cooperation amongst countries, especially when it comes to exploring opportunities in the field of academic research. The objective of this book has been twofold. First, the project upon which this book is founded was initiated in order to create and develop academic connections between Danish and Pakistani research institutions and establish common ground for joint research within the area of security studies. Second, this book analyses Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to identify lessons that might potentially be implemented in future operations, on both the Danish and the Pakistani sides, and thereby have a strategic impact on the political level, as well as in a military operational context. The first objective was reached by connecting the National Defence Uni- versity in Pakistan to the Royal Danish Defence College and the Danish 5 Foreword Institute for International Studies in the spring of 2014. Researchers from the three institutions had earlier met in November 2013 and drew up the research guidelines for this book, which was approved by the National De- fence University Pakistan and the Royal Danish Defence College and also from the Danish Ministry of Defence, and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which have jointly funded the project. The second objective to be reached with the book at hand, and our hope, is that the book will not only add to the field of security studies but also promote joint research projects for sharing experiences between academic military institutions across borders, regions, and continents. In the end, we feel that there is a need to critically analyse the emerging situation in this region and discover proactive approaches to forestall issues that could generate the menaces of internal strife, terrorism, militancy, and insurgency. The lessons identified by the authors are many, but whether they will be internalised will be up to political and military decision makers. However, we are convinced that the results, as well as the cooperative process, are of such a character that they should be addressed when future strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are developed, be it domestically or internationally. Dean Ole Kværnø, RDDC & Major General Noel I. Khokhar HI(M), NDU 6 COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Abbreviations 3D: Deterrence, Dialogue, and Development ANA Afghan National Army ANP: Afghan National Police ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces AO: Area of Operations ARTF: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation COIN: Counterinsurgency CT: Counterterrorism CM: Counter-militancy DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies EU: European Union FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas FC: Frontier Corps FOB Forward Operating Base HTA: Human Terrain Analysis HUMINT Human Intelligence HQ: Headquarters IDP: Internally Displaced Person IED: Improvised explosive device ISAF: International Security Assistance Force IS: Islamic State ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan’s premiere intelligence service) ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria JPEL Joint Prioritized Effects List LoC: Line of Control NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDU: National Defence University NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations NW: North Waziristan OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom RC SW: Regional Command South West PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team RDDC: Royal Danish Defence College TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban) 7 Abbreviations UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations UNAMA: United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMOG: United Nations Military Observers Group UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution U.S.: United States (United States of America) USA: United States of America 8 COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Introduction The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror1 by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geo- graphical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments’ decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare – counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO’s core prin- ciple2 of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach3 and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy’s strongholds – primarily the city of Kabul.4 At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil.5 Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the of- fensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. (1) ‘Text of George Bush’s Speech | U.S. News | The Guardian’ <http://www. theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13> [accessed 9 September 2015]. (2) Article 5 in: NATO, ‘NATO - The North Atlantic Treaty’, 1949. (3) Antulio Joseph Echevarria and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute, ‘Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine-- Again!’, 2002 <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23661>. (4) ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ ([Arlington, Va.] : U.S. Army, 2001). (5) Catherine Dale, ‘War in Afghanistan Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress’ ([Washington, D.C.] : Congressional Research Service, 2009). 9