This article was downloaded by: [Bilkent University] On: 03 July 2015, At: 07:11 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG Turkish Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20 A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88] Ömer Aslana a Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey Published online: 15 Sep 2014. Click for updates To cite this article: Ömer Aslan (2014) A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88], Turkish Studies, 15:3, 519-535, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2014.956425 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.956425 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions 5 1 0 2 y ul J 3 0 1 1 7: 0 at ] y sit r e v ni U nt e k Bil [ y b d e d a o nl w o D TurkishStudies,2014 Vol.15,No.3,519–535,http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.956425 A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88] O¨MER ASLAN 5 DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandPublicAdministration,BilkentUniversity,Ankara,Turkey 1 0 2 uly ABSTRACT NotwithstandinghisenormousinfluenceonthegrassrootsoftheTurkishnation- J alistmovementinitsIslamicturninthe1970s,SeyyidAhmetArvasi,astaunchnationalistand 3 0 apiousMuslimatthesametime,hasremainedanunderstudiedintellectual.Hisoeuvreisleft 1 largely unexplored. He is either too simply associated with Tu¨rk-˙Islam Sentezi [Turkish- 1 7: Islamic Synthesis] or treated as if the sole outcome of his intellectual labor was his three- ] at 0 vboylsutmudeyTinu¨grkc-r˙IistliacmallUy¨lhkiu¨ssvu¨ie[wTsuroknisthh-eIsplaamrtiiccuIldaerails]s.uTehoisfTaurtrikcilsehsneeaktisotnoarliesmmeadnydthIisslasmitunaetxiouns sity basedonhiswritingsintheirentirety. r e v ni U Introduction nt e WhenNationalistActionParty(Milliyetc¸iHareketPartisi,MHP)wascriticizedbya k Bil newspaper columnist for racism, a leading Turkish nationalist tried to counter the y [ chargebyreferringtoSeyyid[Sayyid]1AhmetArvasi,whoclaimedthatherejected b d racismandprofessedtobe,atoneandthesametime,aferventTurkishnationalistand de aMuslim.2Arvasi,however,isscarcelyknownoutsidenationalistcirclesinTurkey. a nlo Overwhelming portionofwhathasbeenwritten abouthimisbiographies andeulo- w gies.3ThedearthofscholarlyworkonArvasi4isstrikinggiventheacknowledgment o D of the influence he wielded through his Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨ [Turkish-Islamic Ideal, TII] formulation on the Turkish nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s.5 ThescantattentionpaidtoArvasicanbeexplainedbytheunevenemphasisaccorded toTurkish-IslamicSynthesis[TIS]developedandpropagatedbytheAydınlarOcag˘ı [Intellectuals’ Hearth]. This lopsided focus subsumed Arvasi under the all-too-easy rubric of TIS. In the only monograph on Arvasi, for example, Copeaux treated the TIIand TISas identical andregarded Arvasias a TIS ideologue.6The unwarranted relianceinoccasionalwritingsonsolelyhisbookTu¨rk-I˙slamU¨lku¨su¨,acollectionof Arvasi’s newspaper columns, at the expense of the sizable rest of his entire CorrespondenceAddress:O¨merAslan,DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandPublicAdministration,Bilkent University,06800Bilkent,Ankara,Turkey.Email:[email protected] #2014Taylor&Francis 520 O¨.Aslan intellectuallabordoesnothelpthecaseeither.Hence,thefirstobjectiveofthispaper is to unearth the TII from the deadweight of TIS. This would help dispel the mon- opoly TIS clamped on variations of Turkish nationalism and Islam nexus in Turkey in the second half of the 20thcentury. The following objective of this paper emanates from Arvasi’s dilemmas as an ideologue with loyalties to both the nation and the ummah, which appear to be morecompetingthancomplementary.7Tryingtokeephisallegiancestobothentities ArvasiputhimselfinasituationwherehehadtoanswerthequestionaMuslimArab nationalist hadposed some decades earlier: Is itpossible for one of usto bea loyal nationalist and a sincere Muslim, at one and the same time? Is there a fundamental contradiction between Arab nationalism in its precise scientific sense and true Muslim feeling? Does a contradiction and opposition lie in our saying “This man is a nationalist Muslim” or “This man is a Muslim nationalist,” as when we say, 15 “This man is an atheist believer” or “He is a religious atheist’...?”8 Arvasi did 0 2 not hesitate to answer this question in the negative. But did he experience any y ul tension between these loyalties? If he did, how did he resolve the conflict between J 3 Islam as a universal religion and nationalism as a particular phenomenon? Did he 0 1 fall into any contradiction while demonstrating compatibility between Islam and 1 7: nationalism? Didhisloyalty to the ummahamount to Islamism? 0 at Theoveralldiscussionaroundthesequestionshassignificantbearingsonthelatest ] debates on the issue of religion and nationalism nexus in nationalism studies. A y sit growing number of scholars argue against the replacement model today, which r ve describestherelationshipbetweenreligionandnationalismasonewhereinnational- ni ism replaces religion.9 Instead, researchers in this field opt for adopting a more U nt nuanced approach and seek modes of religion and nationalism connection.10 One e k of these modes common to both Turkish nationalism and Arab nationalism (to its Bil both qawmiyya and wataniyya varieties) is parochialization of Islam. “Much of the [ y emotional power of nationalism in the Muslim world comes from the capacity of b d national movements to parochialize Islam and channel the force of Muslim faith e d into national commitments.”11 Because Arvasi follows the same path and Turkifies a o nl Islam,albeitforthesecondtimeandonreligiousgroundthistime,thispapercautions w against discarding the replacement model. o D Arvasi and Islamic Turn in Turkish Nationalism SeyyidAhmetArvasiwasbornin1932inDog˘ubeyazıt,Ag˘rıinEasternAnatolia.His father Abdu¨lhakim Arvasi, a public servant at the Turkish customs, should not be confused with famous Naqshbandiyya muse Sheikh Seyyid Abdu¨lhakim Arvasi (1865–43), a later spiritual guide to famous Turkish poet and Islamist thinker Necip Fazıl Kısaku¨rek.12 Notwithstanding his ethnic Arab origins, Arvasi was an ardent Turkish nationalist. His unofficial affiliation with the MHP must have been a few years before the 1969 General Convention of the Republican Villager Nation Party (Cumhuriyetc¸i Ko¨ylu¨ Millet Partisi, CMKP), a precursor to the MHP. He was involved in the intra-party debate concerning the new official emblem of Turkish MuslimBetween Islamism and Turkish Nationalism 521 the party before that convention and picked the three crescents when Alparslan Tu¨rkes¸, the party’s leader, asked his opinion.13 His very first book, The Principles ofAdvancedTurkishNationalism(I˙leriTu¨rkMilliyetc¸ilig˘inin˙Ilkeleri),waspublished inNationalAction(MilliHareket)in1965.MoreimportantwasArvasi’scontribution totheexpansionoftheIslamictoneinTu¨rkes¸’sdoctrineofNineLights(DokuzIs¸ık). Hewrotecolumnsunderthetitle“Tu¨rk-I˙slamU¨lku¨su¨”inHergu¨n,theparty’sofficial print, as well as in U¨lku¨cu¨ Kadro.14 Teaching at ˙Istanbul Atatu¨rk Institute of Edu- cation (I˙stanbul Atatu¨rk Eg˘itim Enstitu¨su¨), a then Idealist stronghold, had put Arvasi inside “the first circle of the movement.”15 Arvasi officially joined the MHP in 1979 after being selected to MHP’s General Executive Board (Genel I˙dare Kurulu) upon his nomination by his Islam-leaning fellows without his prior knowledge.16Withthesefacilitatorsathisdisposal,though,Arvasiwasmostlyinflu- ential at the grassroots level.17 5 1 WhenArvasijoinedtheMHP,Islamhadalreadystartedtobecomepubliclymore 0 2 visible in Turkey. As is well known, the early Republican elite wanted to create a y ul national identity on secular foundations, namely common language and history.18 J 3 Islam,bythesametoken,wastobepushedbacktotheabsoluteprivacyofindividual 0 1 conscience.19TheearlyKemalistelite,partlyinthefootstepsofnationalistideologue 1 7: ZiyaGo¨kalp,20soughtanationalizedreligiona`laProtestantnationsoftheWestafter 0 at the Reformation. Go¨kalp had wanted the Qur’an and the adhan (Islamic call for ] prayer) to be read in Turkish. If not the actual prayer, he wished that hutbas y sit (sermons)andinvocationsreadinthemosquewouldbeinTurkish.21Followingonly r ve some of Go¨kalp’s suggestions, the Republic upended the Caliphate, adopted the ni Latin alphabet, founded the Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to Turkify and U nt “etatise religion”22 solicited Turkish translations of Qur’an and made Turkish the e k language of call for prayer and sermons. The ultimate objective of this essentially Bil top-down exercise in nation building was to construct a secular Turkish nation,23 [ y whose citizens would believe in a “personal religion.”24 After Ataturk’s death, the b d hitherto suppressed or marginalized groups started to come to the fore. One of these e d groups, the Racist–Turanist stream in Turkish nationalism dominated the nationalist a o nl discourse in the 1940s and the 1950s. Their criticism of official nationalist position w was notdirectedagainst the secular natureof Kemalistnationalismthough;theyonly o D wantedtomakeitmoreradicalandmoreexclusionaryagainstnon-Turkishraces.25 Themultipartydemocracyperiodofthe1950smarkedtheeraofIslamicrevival.26 Inthefaceofamightyoppositionafterthetransitiontomultipartysystemin1946,the rulingCHPreevaluateditspolicyonreligion.TheDemocraticPartygovernmentfol- lowing the 1950 elections allowed pilgrimage and the call for prayers to be read in Arabicagain.Qur’anreadingsoverthestateradiostartedandformerlyelectivereli- gioncoursesbecamemandatoryunlesstheparentsfiledapetitionforexemption.The budget allocated for the Directorate of Religious Affairs increased. The number of I˙mam Hatip schools rose.27 This made at least some Turkish nationalists realize thatTurksblendedsowellwithIslamforthelast12centuriesthatsecularnationalism ofeithertheearlyRepublicaneraortheracist/Turanistsfailedtowinheartsofordin- ary Turks. 522 O¨.Aslan Thetrajectoryofthe“NationalDoctrine:NineLights”(MilliDoktrin:DokuzIs¸ık) asexpressedfirstin1960byAlparslanTu¨rkes¸mightgiveaninterestingwaytofollow thismomentousdiscursiveshiftinTurkishnationalism.WhenTu¨rkes¸firstannounced thisdoctrineasguidanceforTurkishnationalism,Moralism(Ahlakc¸ılık)asoneofits nine principles was very brief and lacked a single reference to Islam.28 The more Islamic-oriented nationalists inside the party such as Ahmet Er, Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi,ErolGu¨ngo¨r,andAhmetBu¨yu¨kKarabacakconsideredthedoctrineasunsa- tisfactorytobeamoralcompassfortheIdealistYouth.29Withcontributionsbythese names, Moralism principle accentuated Islam’s role in the formation of Turkish morals in later editions.30 There were other manifestations of the Islamic turn in the MHP. In a preelection speech delivered on radio on behalf of the CKMP, Ahmet Er called the Turkish nation, the Army of God, which had always “com- manded the good and forbidden the evil,” to awaken and re-fulfill its historic 15 mission.31 Only four years after taking over the CKMP in August 1965, Tu¨rkes¸ 0 2 and his friends changed the name of their party to Nationalist Action Party as well y ul as its emblem from gray wolf to “Three Crescents” in its 1969 Convention. In the J 3 runuptothe1977elections,Tu¨rkes¸announced“Turkishnationalismwithaspiritual 0 1 content” as the MHP worldview. Nationalism, it was claimed, was subordinate to 1 7: Islam.32 Tu¨rkes¸ himself performed the Hajj little before the 1977 general elections. 0 at One of the promises the party made in its 1977 election declaration was “saving ] the ‘Turkish pride and consciousness and Islamic morality and virtues’ from any y sit abuse anddamage andletting it live in men’s hearts.”33 r e v ni U Uneasiness with Arvasi Inside theMHP nt ke WhenTu¨rkes¸seizedcontroloftheCMKPhewasyetdistanttowardIslam.34Despite Bil theincreasingtoneofIslaminhisrhetoric,inthefollowingyears,Tu¨rkes¸stillthought [ y thateventhoughtheyarenotagainsttheideaofareligiousidealperse,Islamisnot b d thecauseoftheirstruggle.35Itshouldbekeptinmindthat,incontrasttoTu¨rkes¸and e d theMHP,ArvasiwasalreadywritingpoemswithIslamictonesyearsbeforebecom- a nlo ing known around nationalist circles.36 Arvasi’s Islamic orientation created some w troubles for him inside the party administration. The cold shoulder Arvasi is said o D to have been given inside the party elite in the wake 1977 elections37 might have been due to his support for the publication of Nizam-ı Alem weekly. S¸ura (Consul- tation), an Islamist weekly, condemned all nationalisms, whether it is Kurdism, Turkism or Arabism. It suggested the Sharia as the only path to salvation.38 Nizam-I Alem came out in 1979 with a near-Islamist discourse to respond to these andotheranti-nationalistdenunciationsexpressedbySebil(thePath)andS¸uraweek- lies by the motto of“Mu¨slu¨manların ˙Ittihadı” (the Union of Muslims).39 Its second issue announced Idealists’ opposition to the interest rate.40 It also issued a call for contributions to the weekly from all Muslims. Among the intellectuals and writers pieces solicited from were Mehmet S¸evket Eygi (an Islamic writer/columnist), Necip Fazıl Kısaku¨rek [arguably the most influential Islamist of the time, also a big influence on Arvasi], Ahmed Davudog˘lu (an Alim educated at Al-Azhar), and Turkish MuslimBetween Islamism and Turkish Nationalism 523 Sezai Karakoc¸ (a famous Islamic poet and a major influence on Idealists).41 The weekly became a stage where pieces by Bediu¨zzaman Said Nursi, some local sheikhs from the Southeast and, of course, Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi were published. The impact of the weekly was enormous. UponitspublicationsomeAkıncısexpressedtheireuphoriabecausetheseparation between the Akıncıs and U¨lku¨cu¨s would end now.42 However, the MHP Tribunal Commission [MHP Divan Kurulu] closed down Nizam-I Alem. This caused a serious discord between Arvasi and Tu¨rkes¸.43 Arvasi decided to resign from the party but was persuaded to stay.44 Given the gradual deepening of the rift between the Islamizing grassroots and the statist and more secular party elite, the trouble Nizam-IAlemcausedfortheMHPwasnotsurprising.Whenthepartyeliterealized thattheycouldnolongercontainthedegreeofIslamizationamongtheIdealists,they startedaprocessofinternalcleansing.45Thisassessmentissupportedbythefactthat 15 Tu¨rkes¸hadalsobannedotherweeklieswithasimilaremphasisonIslam.46Afterthe 0 2 1980 coup d’etat, Arvasi became one of those prosecuted in the MHP and Idealist y ul Foundations Case (MHP ve U¨lku¨cu¨ Kurulus¸lar Davası). He continued to root for J 3 the MHP after he exited the jail but he tellingly wrote not in an Idealist outlet but 0 1 in more nationalist-conservative Tu¨rkiye Gazetesi until his death in 1988. 1 7: 0 at ] y Turkish-Islamic Synthesis sit r ve Islam’s return to Turkish nationalism was partly a consequence of changes in the ni international system. With the dawn of the Cold War and the looming communist U nt threat,theTurkishrightdeemedIslamadearassettotapinto.Againstthebourgeon- e k ingcommunist/atheistthreatthattheyperceivednationalistsofvariousstripesheldon Bil to Islam so as to make a common front. The institutional backdrop to “Turkish- [ y Islamic Synthesis” rested on this conjuncture. One of the first associations founded b d was Association of Turkish Nationalists (Tu¨rk Milliyetc¸iler Derneg˘i) founded in e d 1950–51 and the Club of the Enlightened (Aydınlar Kulubu¨) in 1961. Aydınlar a o nl Kulu¨bu¨ became a platform for discussion between nationalists and the more Islam- w orientednationalist.47TurkishHearths(Tu¨rkOcakları)wasfoundedin1965.Scien- o D tific Seminary of Nationalists convened in 1967 and sought ways to find common groundbetweennationalists.In1968,theIdealistHearts(U¨lku¨ Ocakları)wasestab- lished.TheSecondScientificConventionoftheNationalists(Milliyetc¸ilerI˙lmiKur- ultayı)gatheredin 1969attheMTTB’s(Milli Tu¨rk TalebeBirlig˘i-NationalTurkish StudentsUnion)Hall.48Thedeclarationofthatconventionlaidoutsomegroundwork ofthemesthatadecadelaterwouldcometocharacterizetheTIS:“Turkishnationwas pickedbyGodtoshepherdallothernationsandTurksembracedIslambecauseitwas most congruent with their national character.”49 Finally, Hearth of the Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocag˘ı), the loci of the TIS, was founded in 1970. The aim of the Hearth was to unite the nationalists against the “rampant left.” In order to reach a compro- mise among Turkists and more conservative-minded nationalists, TIS based on a watered down version of Islam was developed.50 524 O¨.Aslan InanattempttocreateacommonideologyinTurkey,Turkish-IslamicSynthesis aimed at achieving solidarity between conservatives and Turkish nationalists, gath- ering all ethnic groups in Turkey under the umbrella of Turkish nationalism. The TIS rested on the idea that “Turkish Islam” was one of the foundations of national unity.51 TheHearthexpandeditssphereofinfluenceatthestatelevelafterthe1980coup d’e´tat.ItwasprivilegedenoughtopresentitsdraftconstitutiontotheNationalSecur- ityCouncilin1982whennooutsideinstitutionwasallowedtomakeanyproposals forthenewConstitution.Itissuedacallfor“NationalConsensuses”in1986andwas able to have its ideas accepted in the “National Culture Report” the State Planning Organization prepared. Thus, the Hearth managed to influence national education andnationalculturepoliciesthroughtheiraffiliatedbureaucratsattheStatePlanning Organization (Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilatı) and the Supreme Institution of Atatu¨rk 15 Culture, Language and History (Atatu¨rk Ku¨ltu¨r Dil ve Tarih Yu¨ksek Kurumu).52 0 2 An official report on national culture program stipulated that state’s culture policy y ul should re-rest on and protect “national culture” formed by true Central Asian J 3 values and Islam.53 Nevertheless, neither Islamists nor Leftists were happy with 0 1 the official sanction givento TIS ideology.54 1 7: TISmaintainedabasicargument:IslambecameaninseparableelementofTurkish 0 at identity over ages. Since pre-Islamic Turks had a monotheistic religion, they ] believed in the aftermath, were fond of justice and order and respected moral y sit codes and family, Islam provided the “perfect dress for the Turkish body.”55 r ve However, the role cut for Islam in the TIS remains subject to the charge of instru- ni mentaluseof religion bynationalistsas expressed byGreenfeld.56AlthoughÇetin- U nt saya claimed that “Intellectuals’ Hearth” followed Ziya Go¨kalp’s thinking on ke religion and ˙Ibrahim Kafesog˘lu and Muharrem Ergin [as two leading exponents of Bil the TIS] considered Islam as indispensable in thinking about Turks’ national [ y culture,57 Kafesog˘lu and Ergin’s writings say otherwise. ˙Ibrahim Kafesog˘lu, the b d firstPresidentoftheIntellectuals’Hearth,arguedbackin1957Tu¨rklerveMedeniyet e d thatthekindofIslamTurksneededinthefuturewasanIslamshornofsomeworn- a nlo out ideas and hurafas (“unlawful” religious innovation).58 Islam can satisfy Turks’ w needforareligionaslongasitremaineda“matterofindividualconscience.”59Heis o D also careful to point out that since the time Turkishness and Islam began to syn- thesize Turks never founded an Islamic State because Turks kept their pre-Islamic Turkish understanding of sovereignty, social rights, and toleration in religious life, land regime and the military character for their states.60 According to Muharrem Ergin, after the past ages of religions, it is now the age of cultures. “In the age of nationalisms, religions’ pressure on other elements of culture disappears...Reli- gions now take their true place as one [but not the dominant] of elements of Turkishculture.”61TheproponentsofTISquicklyarguethatsomepre-Islamicprac- tices of Turks were major contributions to Islam. In terms of women rights, for instance, they maintain, “Islam learned from Turks’ more advanced principles.”62 One therefore feels that Islam in the TIS is accommodated only as “an additional motivation” for nationalism.63 Turkish MuslimBetween Islamism and Turkish Nationalism 525 Arvasi and Turkish-Islamic Ideal SeyyidAhmetArvasisharestheviewoftheTISonthehistoricalrootsoftheTurkish nationandinseparabilityofIslamandTurkishness.Afterall,despiteallhisobjections totheusageoftheword“Synthesis”ArvasicontinuedtouseTu¨rk-I˙slamSentezi,even ifonlyforstrategicreasons.64Arvasileavesnodoubtthathehadaprimordialistview oforiginsofnationalismandnations.Forhim,“historyisahistoryofnations.”Maps showingnationsallaroundtheworldarenotamodernphenomenon;theyhavebeen so since the ancient ages.65 Arvasi does not think that nations are constructed, inventedorimaginedentities.“Nationshavealwaysbeenaroundandhistoryconsists of nations’ adventures and relations. Both history, ethnology, and sociology have proved that nations and nationalisms are objective realities.”66 Arvasi finds the origins of the Turkish nation in Central Asian steppes, where a nation with “small 5 bodiesand wide foreheadswere riding horses around2500 or 1700 BC.”67 1 0 NotwithstandingthesesimilaritiesbetweentheTISandArvasi,thereremainssome 2 y significantnuancesbetweenthem.Tostartwith,theIntellectuals’Hearthstartedasan ul J eliteclub.Itdidnotconnectwiththegrassrootsnationalistmovement.“Thegrassroots 3 0 wassoatoddswiththemembersoftheHearthovertheirelitismandpoliticalfickle- 1 1 ness that, in some protests, copies of Ortadog˘u [Middle East] newspaper, wherein 07: membersoftheHearthwrote,weresetonfire.”68SeyyidAhmetArvasi,nevertheless, at was a modest teacher for many years in distant corners of the country, held in high ] y esteem in the eyes of the grassroots. Arvasi allocated a great amount of time and rsit space to spread Islamic morality and Islamic prayers among the U¨lku¨cu¨ youth.69 It e v ni isnotfornothingthereforethatArvasiwasneitheroneofthefoundersoftheAydınlar U Kulu¨bu¨ [Intellectuals’Club]noramongthosewhofrequentedituponitsfounding.70 ent ThefactthatsecularismwaskeptintactandnevercompromisedintheTIS71increased k Bil itsacceptabilityatthestatelevelafterthe1980coupd’e´tat.However, Arvasinever [ praises Turks for contributing to Islam in terms of secularism. In his view the sole y b yardstick whereby the rest of the components of Turkish culture are either allowed d e or rejected can be Islam. He argues that everything, secular and sacred, inherited d oa fromthepre-IslamicTurkishcustomsmustgothroughthefilterofIslam’shighercom- wnl mandsandprohibitions.Onlythen,forinstance,Turkishto¨recanbemaintained.72In Do brief,unlikeKafesog˘luandErgin,whotookIslamasauxiliarytoTurkishnationalism, ArvasideclaresIslamasthesuperior-system(u¨st-sistem). ArvasiembracedIslamasatotallifestyle.73HeevenwroteI˙lm-iHal,aMuslim’s guideforaneverydaylife,theknowledgeofcorrectMuslimbehavior.Inmajoroppo- sitiontoKafesog˘lu,whoarguedthat“Turkishnationalismisnotracismbutitisnot about a religious cause either,”74 Arvasi made Turks’ raison d’etre defending the cause of Islam on earth. Arvasi’s usage of the word U¨lku¨ [Ideal] in “Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨”alreadypointsataholyIdealfortheTurks.ThisIdealconsistsoftwointer- related missions: I˙’lay-ı Kelimetillah, defense of the superiority of the Qur’an, and Nizam-ı Alem, making God’s commands and standards of measure reign supreme in the world.75 It may be claimed, however, that these missions Arvasi assigns the Turkish nation is what a nationalist would do. It only marks a “missionary 526 O¨.Aslan chosenness” for the Turkish nation. In other words, Arvasi does not stray from the nationalistcredowhenhesuggeststhattheTurkishnationisentrustedwiththereli- gious task of protecting and expanding the Islamic realm.76 As correct as this interpretationisweshouldstillbearinmindthatneithertheMHPnorthechiefpro- ponents of the TIS ideology could ascribe a religiousideal to Turkish nationalism. Arvasi, an Islamist? IfArvasi’semphasisonIslamwentwaybeyondthelimitedrolecutforIslaminthe TISformulation,woulditthenberighttoconsiderArvasianIslamist,asmanycame to be suspicious of him inside the top MHP elite? Here too Arvasi’s views do not allow an easy answer. While he sounds like an archetype Islamist in certain aspects, his staunch nationalism, views on racism and objection against intermar- 5 1 riages among Turksand non-Turks make it hardto describe him anIslamist. 0 2 ItisconsensusthatthoughIslamismisamodernideology.77Islamismisa“politi- y ul calideologyarticulatingtheideaofthenecessityofestablishinganIslamicgovern- J 3 ment,understoodasgovernmentwhichimplementstheshari’a(Islamiclaw).”78Itis 0 1 claimedthatwhatdistinguishes“Islamists”from“Muslims” isthattheyarenotsat- 1 7: isfiedwithIslamplayingaroleonlyattheindividuallevel.Theywantreligiontobea at 0 factor at the community and state levels as well.79 Thus, Islamists declare absolute ] sovereignty of God and demand the implementation of Shari’a, God’s law, as the y sit Constitution of the state. They also view nationalism as a Western contrivance to r ve divide and rule Muslims, hence anobstacle before the revival of the Caliphate.80 ni Truly, Arvasi impresses his readers as an Islamist when he argues that Islam U nt already defended modern human rights such as religious freedom, safety of life e k andpropertyXIVcenturiesagoduringtheProphet’slifetimeandthatProphet’sfare- Bil wellsermonwasalreadyadeclarationofhumanrights.81Then,hetoodeclaresthat [ y sovereigntybelongstoGod.Yet,hedoesnotdeemdemocracyasabreachofGod’s b d sovereignty.ForGod’ssovereigntyrealizesitselfonearththroughpopularlyelected e d officials.PopularsovereigntyisthemediumforGod’ssovereigntytoreignonearth. a o nl Aslongas“thebelieverselecttheirowngovernmentofficialsbasedontheirownwill, w inthelightofhigherprinciplesthattheybelieve,exaltandwanttoliveunder”democ- o D raciescreatenotroubleinfrontofGod’ssovereignty.Ifboththeruledandtheruler obey the commands and principles God revealed, there will be no hegemony or sovereignty of either over the other.82 Yet, Islamists rarely, if they ever do, defend nationalism. For most Islamists, nationalism is the means to partition the ummah into nation-states.83 Yet again, Arvasi was a proud nationalist as fervent as to declare that “he would have been a Turkish nationalist even if he was born with the same mental faculties in North Africa.”84 And like most Turkish nationalists he too felt as compelled as other nationalists in the Muslim world to establish his bonafideswithIslam.85Arvasipursuedathree-prongedapproachtoproveIslamicity of nationalism: he presented “evidence” from an array of verses in the Qur’an, selected Hadith and Prophet’s companions. Arvasi assumes the mantle of authority to interpret some ayahs in Surah Hujurat86 and Romans to justify nationalism.87