REASONABLY TRADITIONAL Self-Contradiction and Self-Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre’s Account of Tradition-Based Rationality Micah Lott ABSTRACT Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of tradition-based rationality has been the subjectofmuchdiscussion,aswellastheobjectofsomerecentchargesof inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl,andJohnHaldanewhichattempttoshowthatMacIntyre’saccount of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre’s account of tradition-based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claimstowhichhisownaccountofrationalitydenieslegitimacy,andthus MacIntyre’s account is self-referentially incoherent. In response to criti- cisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develophispositiontotakethecurrentcriticismsintoaccountwithoutal- teringthefundamentalaspectsofhispictureofrationality.Inresponseto thechargeofself-referentialincoherence,itisarguedthatthechargerests onamistakenunderstandingofMacIntyre’spositionandofthenatureof justification.Indealingwiththesearguments,theauthorhopestonotonly vindicateMacIntyre’saccountofrationalityagainstthechargesofsomeof its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments bothforandagainstrelativismandhistoricism. KEY WORDS: tradition-based rationality, MacIntyre, relativism, self- reference,justification THIS PAPER EXAMINES ALASDAIR MACINTYRE’S ACCOUNT of tradition-based rationality in light of several claims that his account is inconsistent. One of the primary goals of this paper is to clarify both MacIntyre’s positionandtheclaimsofhiscritics.Anadditionalgoalistoconsiderhow IwouldliketothankNanceyMurphyandKeithCoxforhelpfulcommentsonearlierdrafts ofthispaper. JRE30.3:315–339.(cid:1)C 2002JournalofReligiousEthics,Inc. 316 JournalofReligiousEthics MacIntyremightrespondtothesecriticismsandhow,insomeinstances, he might clarify or further develop his own position in order to take thesecriticismsintoaccount.Intheprocessofdoingthis,Ialsohopeto shedsomelightonthegeneralnatureofargumentsbothforandagainst historicismandrelativism. Although the chief focus of MacIntyre’s work has been the area of ethicsandpracticalrationalityandhisconcernswithrationalityingen- eralseemtohavearisenfromhismorespecificinterestsinmoralenquiry, thefocusofthispaperisonMacIntyre’saccountofrationalityingeneral andnotaslimitedtopracticalrationality.ThroughoutthispaperIcon- sideranumberofMacIntyre’sworks,withthecentraltextbeingWhose Justice? Which Rationality? (WJWR). At the risk of downplaying shifts in MacIntyre’s views over the last two decades, I attempt to present as sympathetically as possible MacIntyre’s views on reason and tradition asformingaconsistentwhole. The order of the paper is as follows: I begin by briefly surveying MacIntyre’s view of reason and tradition. I then outline a criticism of this view recently made by Jennifer Herdt. I begin with Herdt because I take her conclusion regarding MacIntyre—that his position is self- contradictory at its core—to be the most extreme of the charges of in- consistency brought against him. Upon examination, however, I find that the precise nature of Herdt’s criticism is not clear, and that her argument to the effect that MacIntyre’s position contradicts itself can be characterized in two different ways, which make for two distinct typesofcriticismofMacIntyre’sposition.Withthisdistinctioninhand, I next examine arguments against MacIntyre made by Peter Mehl and John Haldane and conclude that their arguments can be best under- stood as criticisms of the first type. After considering how MacIntyre mightrespondtothesecriticisms,IreturntoHerdt’sargumentandsug- gestitcaninfactbestbecharacterizedasacriticismofthesecondtype. IthenshowhowHerdt’sargumentrestsonconfusionbetweentheratio- naljustificationoftradition-basedclaimsontheonehand,andthetruth ofthoseclaimsontheother. 1. MacIntyre on Reason and Tradition 1.1 Rationalenquiryastradition-dependent The central contention of MacIntyre’s account of rationality is that rationalenquirytakesplaceonlywithinatraditionofenquiry.Thus,all rational enquiry is tradition-dependent. As MacIntyre says in WJWR, “Thereisnostandingground,noplaceforenquiry,nowaytoengagein thepracticesofadvancing,evaluating,accepting,andrejectingreasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradi- tionorother”(MacIntyre1988,350).InAfterVirtue,MacIntyreexplains Self-ContradictionandSelf-Reference 317 what he means by tradition: “A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (MacIntyre 1984, 222). Such a tradition of rational enquiry provides its adherents with a set of background beliefs about the world, as well as with a set of prob- lemsorquestionsthatmembersofthetraditionattempttoresolveand thestandardsofrationaljustificationthataretobeusedinsolvingthose problems.Thus,onMacIntyre’sview,thenatureofrationaljustification isinternaltotraditions.Thisdoesnotmean,ofcourse,thatvarioustra- ditionswillnotshareanybackgroundbeliefs,problems,orstandardsof rationaljustification.Onthecontrary,whatissharedbetweentraditions willvary,andanytwotraditionsmayshareagreatdealorverylittleat all.Forinstance,MacIntyreacknowledgesinWJWRthat,“Allthetradi- tionswithwhichwehavebeenconcerned[referringtotheAristotelian, Augustinian, Scottish Enlightenment, and Liberal traditions examined inthatbook]agreeinaccordingacertainauthoritytologicbothintheir theory and in their practice” (MacIntyre 1988, 351). What MacIntyre stresses, however, is that what is shared between rival traditions, in- cluding laws of logic, is not substantial enough to serve as a means of providingarationalresolutionforthesignificantdisagreementsbetween traditions. MacIntyrecastshisviewofreasonastradition-dependentasanalter- nativetotheEnlightenmentviewofrationality.Accordingtothelatter, reason stands independent of and in contrast to tradition, rather than as something that operates only from within a given tradition. On the Enlightenmentviewreasonisexternaltotradition,anditprovidesallra- tionalpersonswithuniversalstandardsofreasonwhich,inprinciple,en- ablethemtosettledisagreementsbetweenvarioustraditionsinaratio- nalfashion.MacIntyredoesnotarguethatsuchatradition-independent view of reason is inherently contradictory, but he contends that it is a notion that should be abandoned on historical grounds: the repeated failure(intheperiodencompassingandfollowingtheEnlightenment)of anyone to find standards of rational justification that secure universal assentfromallrationalpeopleprovidesoverwhelmingevidencethatthe projectofdoingsoisessentiallyflawed. 1.2 Troublelurking:Relativismandperspectivism MacIntyre recognizes, however, that his rejection of tradition- independent norms of rational justification and his insistence that all rationality is tradition-dependent raises the possibility of other prob- lems, including relativism and perspectivism. If rational standards are tradition-dependent (as well as background beliefs and problems to be solved),thenitmightseemthatitisimpossibleforanytraditiontoratio- nallyevaluateorcriticizearivaltradition.Thisissobecausetherational 318 JournalofReligiousEthics standardsusedbyonetraditionmightnotbeacceptedasrationalbyan- other tradition. Thus, we could say that certain claims of a tradition different from our own were irrational, but only in the sense that they were irrational according to the standards of our tradition. They might very well be perfectly rational according to the standards of their tra- dition. Since there is no tradition-independent standard of reason to appeal to, we would be left saying that our disagreement with a rival tradition was not resolvable by rational means: what emerges is either asortofrelativismornon-rationalfideism.MacIntyreputstheproblem thisway: It may therefore seem to be the case that we are confronted with the ri- val and competing claims of a number of traditions to our allegiance in respect of our understanding of practical rationality and justice, among whichwecanhavenogoodreasontodecideinfavorofanyoneratherthan of the others. Each has its own standards of reasoning; each provides its ownbackgroundbeliefs.Toofferonekindofreason,toappealtoonesetof backgroundbeliefs,willalreadybetohaveassumedthestandpointofone particulartradition.Butifwemakenosuchassumption,thenwecanhave no good reason to give more weight to the contentions advanced by one particulartraditionthantothoseadvancedbyitsrivals.Argumentalong these lines has been adduced in support of a conclusion that if the only availablestandardsofrationalityarethosemadeavailablebyandwithin traditions,thennoissuebetweencontendingtraditionsisrationallydecid- able.Toassertortoconcludethisratherthanthatcanberationalrelative to the standards of some particular tradition, but not rational as such. Therecanbenorationalityassuch(MacIntyre1988,351–352). Thus,theproblemisthatwhereasMacIntyre’sgoalwastoprovideaview of rationality as tradition-dependent, his view appears to collapse into whatisnotrationalityatall,butrelativismorfideism.MacIntyrecalls thisview—theviewthat“Everysetofstandards,everytraditionincorpo- ratingasetofstandardshasasmuchandaslittleclaimtoourallegiance asanyother”—the“relativistchallenge”(MacIntyre1988,352). MacIntyre also cites a related challenge to his view of tradition- dependentrationality,achallengehereferstoasthe“perspectivistchal- lenge.” Whereas the relativist argues that rational choice between tra- ditionsisimpossibleaccordingtoMacIntyre’saccount,theperspectivist argues that because no single tradition can show itself to be rationally superior to its rivals, no tradition can claim unique legitimacy or ex- alted status over a rival tradition. Thus, no tradition can claim that its theories are “true” in contrast to the incompatible theories of its rivals. “Thesolution,sotheperspectivistargues,istowithdrawtheascription of truth and falsity, at least in the sense in which ‘true’ and ‘false’ have beenunderstoodsofarwithinthepracticeofsuchtraditions,bothfrom individualthesesandfromthebodiesofsystematicbeliefofwhichsuch Self-ContradictionandSelf-Reference 319 theses are constitutive parts” (MacIntyre 1988, 352). According to this view,then,theimplicationofMacIntyre’snotionofrationalityisthatno traditionshouldbeseenasofferingusanaccountofwhatis“true”;each tradition is only offering its own perspective in contrast to the perspec- tivesoftheothers. 1.3 Whytradition-dependentrationalitydoesnotleadtorelativism orperspectivism Tocounterthecontentionthattradition-dependentrationalityleadsto either relativism or perspectivism, MacIntyre offers an account of how traditions of rational enquiry develop and how they can enter into ra- tional competition with each other, even though this competition is not basedonanEnlightenment-styleappealtotradition-independentstan- dards of rationality. According to MacIntyre, traditions of enquiry pass throughseveralwell-definedstages.Beginningfromastageinwhichre- ceived authorities are accepted unquestionably, a tradition next moves intoastageinwhichinadequaciesintheacceptedbeliefsareidentified butnotresolved,andfromthereintoathirdstageinwhich“responseto thoseinadequacieshasresultedinasetofreformulations,reevaluations, andnewformulationsandevaluations,designedtoremedyinadequacies andovercomelimitations”(MacIntyre1988,355).Oncethisthirdstage hasbeenreached,participantsinthetraditionareinthepositiontorec- ognize a discrepancy between the world as they now understand it and theirpreviouslyheldbeliefsabouttheworld.Thislackofcorrespondence iswhatparticipantsrefertowhentheycallthosepreviouslyheldbeliefs “false”(MacIntyre1988,356).Asatraditionadvances,itsmembersfor- mulatebeliefsandtheoriesandtestthemthroughaprocessofdialectical questioning. The goal of this process is to arrive at true beliefs—beliefs thatdonotsufferthesameinadequaciesthatarenowapparentinprevi- ousbeliefsnowseentobefalse.“Toclaimtruthforone’spresentmindset andthejudgmentswhichareitsexpressionistoclaimthatthiskindof inadequacy, this kind of discrepancy, will never appear in any possible future situation, no matter how searching the enquiry, no matter how muchevidenceisprovided,nomatterwhatdevelopmentsinrationalen- quirymayoccur”(MacIntyre1988,358).Theabilitytosurvivedialectical questioning is the criterion according to which the claims of a tradition maybejudgedtobetrue. Asatraditionofenquirymovesforwardhistorically,itisalwayschar- acterized by a certain set of unsolved problems, and rational progress within a tradition is judged by the ability of the adherents of the tradi- tion to deal with their set of problems, solving problems that were left unsolvedbytheirpredecessorsandexplainingwhythoseproblemshad sofarbeenleftunsolved,aswellasexpandingthescopeandexplanatory 320 JournalofReligiousEthics powerofthetradition.Aparticulartheorywillbejustifiedwithinatradi- tionaccordingtoitsabilitytocontributetothissortofprogress.Thatis, itwillbejustifiedonthebasisofitsabilitytobothexplainandovercome the inadequacies of its predecessors in the tradition up to the present time. An important corollary of this is that justification within a tra- dition will always be tied to the history of that tradition, because it is in relation to its predecessors in the tradition (and not in relation to generic,timelessrationalstandards)thatatheoryisjustified.Thus,the justification of a theory is always inseparable from the writing of the history of the tradition up to that point. This is what MacIntyre refers towhenhesays:“Tojustifyistonarratehowtheargumenthasgoneso far”(MacIntyre1988,8). Such rational progress within a tradition, however, is not inevitable, andthisisakeyfactinMacIntyre’sargumentthattradition-dependent rationality does not entail relativism or perspectivism. At any given time,atraditionmayconfrontwhatMacIntyrereferstoasan“epistemo- logical crisis” (MacIntyre 1988, 361–362).1 This is a situation in which a tradition’s “hitherto trusted methods of enquiry have become sterile” (MacIntyre 1988, 362). The tradition is no longer able to solve the problems that it has set for itself; new inadequacies and incoherencies are recognized within the tradition for which its practitioners have insufficient conceptual resources to resolve while maintaining the core beliefs and rational standards of the tradition. Such a crisis might be resolved and a tradition saved if new conceptual resources can be used tosolvetheirresolvableproblemsinsuchawaythatalsoexplainswhy they had been unsolvable before, as well as maintains a fundamental continuity between the new conceptual resources and the beliefs and standardsofthetraditionsofar. However, it is also possible that such a crisis may not be solved by its adherents. In this situation, the adherents of the tradition in crisis might turn to a rival tradition for help. In order to do this, the adher- ents of the tradition in crisis must first learn the second tradition as a “second first language”—they must come to understand it conceptually on its own terms, rather than simply from the perspective of their orig- inal tradition. Having come to “speak” the language of two traditions, adherentsofatraditionincrisismightdiscoverthattherivaltradition providestheconceptualresourceslackingintheirowntraditiontosolve, bytheirownstandardsofrationality,theproblemsoftheirowntradition whichhadledtoanepistemologicalcrisis,andalsotoexplainwhythose problemswereunsolvablefromtheperspectiveoftheoriginaltradition. Recognizing the superiority of the rival tradition in this way, members of the tradition in crisis may choose to abandon their tradition in favor of one of its rivals. This process of abandoning one tradition in favor of 1SeealsoMacIntyre1977. Self-ContradictionandSelf-Reference 321 another constitutes the way in which there may be rationality across (and not only within) traditions, even though there can be no appeal to Enlightenmentstandardsoftradition-independentrationality.Rational competitionbetweentraditionstakesplaceonthebasisoftheabilityof one tradition to solve both its own problems and the problems of rival traditionsbytherivals’ownstandards. How does this account of rationality between traditions via episte- mological crisis and problem-solving show that MacIntyre’s tradition- dependent rationality does not lead to relativism? The claim that tradition-dependentrationalityleadstorelativismdependsontheclaim that, given tradition-dependent rationality, we can have no way of de- ciding rationally between competing traditions, and each tradition will alwaysjudgeitsownclaimstoberationallyacceptablebyitsownstan- dards of reason. MacIntyre’s account of crisis and competition shows, however, how a tradition may fail by its own standards of rationality andhowatraditionmayrationallycompetewithanotheronthebasisof itsabilitytosolveitsrival’sproblemsbetterthantherivaltraditioncan solve them itself. Thus, we have a criterion according to which we may make a rational choice of one tradition over another: “It is in respect of theiradequacyorinadequacyinresponsestoepistemologicalcrisesthat traditionsarevindicatedorfailtobevindicated”(MacIntyre1988,366). Similarly,thisaccountofrationalcompetitionbetweentraditionsisa rejoinder to perspectivism. Like the relativist, the perspectivist claims that we cannot decide rationally between traditions. The perspectivist then takes this claim, which is about the relativism of the justifica- tionsforourbeliefs,andgoesontoarguethatinviewofthisrelativism we should abstain from referring to our beliefs as “true” or “false.” Thus,theperspectivistargumentregardingtruthclaimsdependsonthe premisethat“noclaimtotruthmadeinthenameofanyonecompeting traditioncoulddefeattheclaimstotruthmadeinthenameofitsrivals” (MacIntyre 1988, 367). But MacIntyre’s account shows how, from the perspective of tradition-dependent rationality, the claims of one tradi- tion can defeat, in a rational way, the truth claims of a rival tradition, andthusperspectivismisundermined. 2. Is MacIntyre’s Account of Reason and Tradition Self-Contradictory? A number of thinkers have questioned the coherence of MacIntyre’s theory of tradition-based rationality and the rationality of competing traditions.PerhapsthemostseverecriticismofMacIntyre’sunderstand- ingofrationalityhasbeenmadebyJenniferA.Herdt,whoarguesthat MacIntyre’saccountisself-contradictory.HerdtarguesthatMacIntyre, inhisaccountofrationalcompetitionbetweentraditions,hasofferedjust thesortoftradition-independentmeansofrationaljustificationthathe 322 JournalofReligiousEthics earlier claimed could not be attained: “It seems, then, that by offering whatheclaimed—onempiricalgrounds—couldnotbeprovided,thatis, a tradition-independent mode of rational justification, MacIntyre has contradicted himself; he has proved himself a liberal at just that point where he is most specific in his indictments of liberalism” (Herdt 1998, 537). HerdtseemstoacceptthelineofreasoningthatMacIntyrepresentsin WJWRwhichsuggeststhatintheabsenceofsomewaytojudgerationally betweenconflictingtraditions,weareinapositionofrelativismwithre- specttorivaltraditions.Thequestion,then,iswhetherornotMacIntyre’s claims about the tradition-dependent nature of reason mean that we havenowaytojudgerationallybetweenconflictingtraditions.Ofcourse, MacIntyre’saccountoftraditionsinepistemologicalcrisisandtheability ofsometobetterdealwiththosecriseswasmeanttobeadescriptionof justsuchawaythatatraditioncanberationallyvindicatedagainstrival traditions,andofhowmembersofonetraditionmaymakearationaldeci- siontoabandontheiroriginaltraditioninfavorofarivaltraditionjudged tobesuperior.Theproblemwiththisaccount,accordingtoHerdt,isthat in offering it MacIntyre has provided a tradition-independent standard ofrationaljustification,whichispreciselywhatheearlierclaimedcould not be done. Thus, MacIntyre is caught in a dilemma: “It would seem either that his theory of rational conflict-resolution is correct, thus dis- proving his empirical claim about tradition-dependence, or this theory fails,inwhichcasehehasnotsucceededinshowingawaytoescapethe roadfromhistoricismtorelativism”(Herdt1998,527). HerdtpointsoutthatMacIntyre’saccountofrationalconflictbetween competingtraditionscanbeformulatedasauniversalstandardorprin- cipleofrationality,whichsheformulatesthus:“WhenatraditionBcan provideacogentandilluminatingexplanationofanepistemologicalcri- sis faced by rival tradition A according to tradition A’s own standards, and B does not face a similar crisis, then rationality requires members ofAtoacknowledgethesuperiorrationalityofB.Iwillcallthisprinciple Rt” (Herdt 1998, 535). It is this principle, Herdt argues, that makes a switchbetweentraditionsrational,andwithoutitsuchaswitchwouldbe irrational. She acknowledges that this principle is tradition-dependent in several ways: it employs concepts that were developed within spe- cifictraditions,2 itsapplicationrequiresevaluatingparticularissuesin their context, and the person who evaluates particular issues in con- junction with Rt must begin with his or her own context (Herdt 1998, 537). However, she insists that Rt is tradition-independent insofar as: 2Herdt’schiefexamplehereisthatRtmakesuseofempatheticimagination,whichshe arguesis,ironically,avirtuethatgrewoutoftheliberaltraditionthatMacIntyreintends tocriticize. Self-ContradictionandSelf-Reference 323 “(1)thetheoryisnotrestrictedtovalidusewithinthetraditioninwhichit arose;(2)ittranscendsandabstractsfromconcreteissueswithinagiven tradition;and(3)itcanbearticulatedapartfromanyparticularissues” (Herdt1998,537). NotingthatMacIntyre’saccountisthustradition-independentinsome waysandtradition-dependentinothers,Herdtasks:“Isthisasimplecon- tradictionwithinMacIntyre’sthought,orisitpossibletomovebeyondthe impasse?”(Herdt1998,538).ThesolutionshesuggestsisthatMacIntyre provide an argument to show that Rt is a theory of rationality presup- posedbyallrationaltraditionsassuch.Suchatranscendentalargument woulddefeatrelativismbyshowingthatRtisavailabletoalltraditions becauseitisanessentialpartofthedevelopmentalprocessoftraditions as such, a process that is the result not merely of the contingent facts ofhumannature,butoflogicalnecessity.Atthesametime,however,an account of Rt that showed it to be a tradition-transcendental standard of justification would satisfy the demand that our standards of ratio- nality be understood as tradition-dependent, because Rt is something thatemergesfullyfromwithinthehistoricaldevelopmentoftraditions. Thus, MacIntyre could “continue to insist that all our conceptual re- sourcescomefromwithinthehistoricalandculturalmatrixinwhichwe are embedded” while still maintaining that “rational debate and choice amongrivaltraditionsispossible,becauseofthegeneralstandardspre- supposedbytraditionsofenquiry”(Herdt1998,541). 3. Two Sorts of Criticism, Two Kinds of Contradiction What are we to make of Herdt’s assessment of the contradiction be- tween MacIntyre’s account of tradition-dependent rationality and his formulation of a tradition-independent way of rationally evaluating ri- valtraditions?WecanbeginbypinpointingtheexactplacewhereHerdt locates the contradiction in MacIntyre’s thought. As we have seen, she seems to suggest in several places that the problem is simply that MacIntyre’s account of competition between traditions (which she for- mulates into the rational principle Rt) is tradition-independent, which contradicts his claim that standards of rationality are tradition- dependent.ButthenHerdtherselfgoesontonotethatMacIntyre’sRtis tradition-independent in some ways and tradition-dependent in others. ThismoveallowsustoseehowMacIntyre’saccountmaybeunderstood asfullyconsistentwithoutanappealtotranscendentalstandardsofra- tionality necessarily present within all traditions of enquiry. We may simplysaythatMacIntyre’saccountofRtistradition-dependentinallof theessentialsensesinwhichoneistounderstandthestandardsofratio- nalitytobetradition-dependent.Mostimportantly,Rthasarisenoutofa particular Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in which MacIntyre locates 324 JournalofReligiousEthics himself,andtounderstandRtwemustunderstanditintermsofitshis- toricalcontextwithinthatparticulartradition.Moreover,Rtwillberatio- nallyjustifiedwithinitstraditionbyreferencetothehistoryofthattradi- tion,andthesupportthatsomeoneoutsideofthattraditionwillhavefor believingRtwilldependonthestatusofthebroadertraditionofwhichRt isapart.ThoughitmightbepossibletoformulateRtinsuchawaythat “transcendsandabstractsfromconcreteissueswithinagiventradition,” it nevertheless remains the case that Rt, even as formulated by Herdt, isrelatedtospecificquestionsaboutthenatureofrationaljustification acrosstraditions,questionsthathaveariseninparticularhistoricalcon- texts and must be understood in relation to the historical traditions in whichtheyarepresent. GiventhefactthatHerdtherselfrecognizesthesedifferentwaysofun- derstanding tradition-dependence and tradition-independence but still sees a contradiction in MacIntyre’s thought, we may well ask further about where exactly Herdt finds self-contradiction in MacIntyre’s ac- count of rationality. What about her claim that part of the problematic tradition-independence of Rt is that Rt is “not restricted to valid use withinthetraditioninwhichitarose”?Thetrans-traditionalapplication of Rt—in contrast to claims about theory-dependence—appears to be a key part of what Herdt finds contradictory in MacIntyre’s account. We might restate the problem that Herdt seems to be raising in this way: “You, Mr. MacIntyre, say that reason only works within traditions, but then you offer a theory of reason that works not only in your tradition butacrosstraditionsaswell.”Now,itispossibletounderstandthiscrit- icism in two ways: either as (1) a criticism regarding the coherence of thetheoryofrationality(includinghisaccountofrationalitybothwithin and between traditions) that is presented in MacIntyre’s claims, or as (2) a criticism regarding the coherence of MacIntyre’s ability to make these claims. The first sort of criticism argues that in laying out his theory of rationality MacIntyre makes certain claims and employs cer- tainconceptsthatareinconsistentwithoneanother.Thesecondsortof criticism argues that in the act of making his claims about rationality, MacIntyre contradicts (implicitly or explicitly) the content of his own claims.3 It seems to me that Herdt’s argument can be best construed as an argument of the second sort. But before considering how Herdt’s position might be characterized in this way, let us consider two other argumentsofthefirstsortagainstMacIntyre’sposition. 3This second sort of criticism is a charge of self-referential incoherence, such as is exhibitedifIsaytoyou,“IhaveneverutteredawordofEnglish.”Thefirstsortofcriticism isthechargeofplain-oldincoherence,suchasisexhibitedifIsaytoyou,“Thatfigurehas foursidesandithasonlythreesides.”