Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 26, Number 2 Spring 2013 TRADEMARKS AS SEARCH ENGINE KEYWORDS: MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING? David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 482   II. BACKGROUND ON THE ISSUES ..................................................... 485   A. Overview .................................................................................. 485   B. Search Engine Output Architecture and Labeling ................... 488   C. Keyword Auctions .................................................................... 490   D. Search Engine Policies Regarding Trademark Usage ............ 492   1. United States ......................................................................... 493   2. European Union ..................................................................... 494   3. Other Regions ........................................................................ 495   III. SEARCH CONTROVERSIES OVER TRADEMARKED KEYWORDS ................................................................................... 496   A. Case Law .................................................................................. 496   1. Overview ............................................................................... 496   2. Judicial Assumptions ............................................................. 499   A. Consumer Goals and Expectations ................................... 499   B. Intent .................................................................................. 501   C. Consumer Knowledge of and Attentiveness to Search Page Architecture and Labels ...................... 502   D. Appearance of Plaintiff’s Mark in Defendant’s Ad Text ........................................................................... 503   E. Likelihood of Diversion ..................................................... 503   F. Likelihood of Confusion .................................................... 504   B. Academic Scholarship .............................................................. 504   C. Private Litigation — Consumer Surveys .................................. 506   * Franklyn is Professor of Law; Executive Director, McCarthy Institute for Intellectual Property and Technology Law; and Director, Center for the Empirical Study of Trademark Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law. Hyman is H. Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law, University of Illinois College of Law; Academic Affiliate, McCar- thy Institute and Center for the Empirical Study of Trademark Law. Financial support for this project was received from the McCarthy Institute, University of San Francisco, and the University of Illinois. We appreciate the helpful comments we re- ceived from Professors Eric Goldman, Robert Lawless, Thomas McCarthy, Peter Molk, Mark Rosso, and Rebecca Tushnet, and comments when the paper was presented at the University of Alabama and the University of Illinois. Finally, Craig Hawkins, then a McCarthy Institute Senior Research Fellow and student at the University of San Francisco School of Law, provided invaluable assistance. 482 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 26 IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ................................................................. 510   A. Coding Study ............................................................................ 510   B. Surveys ..................................................................................... 511   1. Overview ............................................................................... 511   2. Background on Surveys ........................................................ 512   A. 1st Survey .......................................................................... 512   B. 2nd Survey ......................................................................... 512   C. 3rd Survey ......................................................................... 512   3. Survey Findings ..................................................................... 513   A. Consumer Knowledge of Search Page Architecture ......... 513   B. Adequacy of Disclosure of Paid Links .............................. 515   C. Consumer Preferences and Expectations .......................... 517   D. Consumer Attentiveness to Search Page Architecture and Labels ........................................... 518   E. Paid Link Click-Through ................................................... 520   F. Diversion and Confusion ................................................... 523   G. Fairness Norms ................................................................. 526   H. Regression Analysis .......................................................... 527   V. DISCUSSION ................................................................................. 527   A. Limitations of Our Findings ..................................................... 527   B. Framing of the Trademarks as Keywords Debate ................... 528   C. Search Page Architecture and Labels ...................................... 529   D. Trademark Inclusion in Ad Text .............................................. 530   E. Intent ........................................................................................ 531   F. Diversion .................................................................................. 532   G. Likelihood of Confusion ........................................................... 533   H. Survey Complexities ................................................................. 536   I. Whither Trademark Law: Confusion, Free-Riding, or Both? ...................................................................................... 538   J. The Perils of Casual Empiricism .............................................. 540   K. What is Really at Stake? .......................................................... 540   VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 541   APPENDIX ONE: TABLES ................................................................... 543   I. INTRODUCTION Google, Bing, and Yahoo are the primary gateways to the Internet 1 for most people in the United States. Google is worth more than $260 1. Brad Stone, Sure, It’s Big. But Is That Bad?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at BU1; see also Benjamin G. Edelman, Google’s Dominance — And What To Do About It, ACSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/google%E2%80%99s-dominance-%E2%80 %93-and-what-to-do-about-it. No. 2] Trademarks as Keywords 483 2 billion, and Yahoo is worth more than $25 billion. These lofty mar- ket capitalizations are almost entirely attributable to the income gen- 3 erated by the advertising that accompanies search results. Most searches result in one or more paid ads appearing alongside the unpaid (organic or algorithmic) results. The specific ads that ap- pear are selected because they relate to the search terms (“keywords”) entered by the user. For example, a search for “bicycle” will return ads from stores and websites selling bikes as well as bike manufactur- ers. A search for “wedding” will return ads from stores and websites selling wedding supplies, wedding dresses, and wedding cakes. A search for “mesothelioma” will return ads from plaintiffs’ attorneys. Each of these entities pays the search engine if its ad is clicked on, 4 irrespective of whether a sale is ultimately made. When search engines began offering ads using trademarks as keywords, disgruntled trademark owners filed more than one hundred 5 lawsuits in the United States and Europe. Despite the volume of liti- gation, there has been little independent empirical work on consumer goals and expectations when using trademarks as search terms, on whether consumers are actually confused by search results, and on which entities are buying trademarks as keywords. Instead, judges have relied heavily on their own intuitions, based on little more than armchair empiricism, to resolve such matters. We report on the results of a two-part study, including three online consumer surveys and a coding study of the results when 2500 trademarks were run through three search engines. Consumer goals and expectations turn out to be quite heterogeneous: a majority of consumers use brand names to search primarily for the branded goods, 2. Google Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/ symbol/goog (last visited May 9, 2013); Yahoo! Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/yhoo (last visited May 9, 2013). It is difficult to put a value on Bing, since it is part of Microsoft, but one set of analysts estimated it was worth about $11 billion. Robert Cyran & Martin Hutchinson, At Microsoft, Bing Too Costly to Keep, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011, at B2. 3. Advertising revenue made up 97% of Google’s first quarter revenues in 2011. Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 27 (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://investor.google.com/pdf/20120331_google_10Q.pdf. For Yahoo, the figure is 80%. Yahoo Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 37 (May 9, 2012), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/2326254543x0xS1193125-11-134295/ 1011006/filing.pdf; see also Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profitability, WIRED (May 22, 2009), http://www.wired.com/culture/ culturereviews/magazine/17-06/nep_googlenomics (quoting then-Google CEO Eric Schmidt that after the implementation of a new version of AdWords, “[a]ll of a sudden we realized we were in the auction business”). 4. See Cost-Per-Click Bidding, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/ answer.py?hl=en&answer=2464960&topic=1713914&path=1713956-1713909&ctx=leftnav (last visited May 9, 2013). 5. A list of the filed cases we have been able to identify as of June 2012 is available from the authors on request. 484 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 26 6 but most consumers are open to purchasing competing products. We find little evidence of traditional actionable consumer confusion re- garding the source of goods, but only a small minority of consumers correctly and consistently distinguished paid ads from unpaid search 7 results, or noticed the labels that search engines use to differentiate 8 paid ads from unpaid search results. We also find that the aggregate risk of consumer confusion is low, because most of the ads triggered by the use of trademarks as keywords are for authorized sellers or the trademark owners them- 9 selves. Perhaps our most intriguing finding is the sizeable mismatch between consumer sentiments and the protections provided by U.S. trademark law. After we excluded those who were unsure or had no opinion, survey respondents were evenly split on whether it was fair and appropriate for competitors to purchase one another’s trademarks for use as keywords, even without any confusion as to source, spon- 10 sorship, or affiliation. These findings may explain why European trademark law recognizes a cause of action for taking unfair ad- 11 vantage of a trademark. Although the law need not precisely match common moral intuitions, our findings suggest that it may be desira- ble to create a similar cause of action under U.S. trademark law. Although we do find some evidence of confusion, the types of confusion we document do not map neatly onto the categories recog- nized by U.S. trademark law. Our findings suggest that the develop- ment of the doctrine in this area has not been well served by the reliance of judges on casual empiricism in resolving these disputes. 6. See infra Table 6. 7. See infra Table 4, Panel B. 8. See infra Table 7. 9. See infra Table 2. 10. For two of the three ads, approximately 53% of those who had an opinion thought it was not fair and appropriate. For the third ad, 42% of those who had an opinion thought it was not fair and appropriate. For each ad, 25% of those responding did not have an opinion. See infra Table 13. 11. A European Union directive protects trademark owners from taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character of a registered mark. See generally Council Directive 89/104, art. 5, 1988 O.J. (L 40) (EU). This prohibition allows a trademark owner to stop others from using marks that are identical or similar to the registered mark when doing so “takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.” Id. at 6–7. An advertiser takes unfair advantage when they select a keyword that is similar or identical to an established trademark, “in order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to create and maintain the mark’s image.” L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, Case C-487/07, para 50, 2009 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 532 (June 18, 2009). However, if an advertiser that selects a reputable trademark as a keyword is only doing so to present an alternative to the trademark owner’s goods or services, that use is fair competi- tion as long as the advertiser does not blur, tarnish, or adversely affect the primary trade- mark. Interflora Inc., Interflora British Unit v. Marks & Spencer plc, Flowers Direct Online Ltd., Case C-323/09, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2120 (Sept. 22, 2011). No. 2] Trademarks as Keywords 485 Much remains to be done to ensure that trademark doctrine is empiri- cally well-grounded, and “fits” the online context. Part II provides some context for this dispute, including back- ground on search engines and keyword searches. Part III outlines the extensive litigation, both foreign and domestic, over the use of trade- marks as keywords, and identifies six assumptions that judges have made in resolving these cases. Part IV presents our empirical results. Part V discusses our findings, and Part VI concludes. II. BACKGROUND ON THE ISSUES A. Overview In 2004, Google started selling keywords that were also trade- 12 marks. Conflict quickly arose. The problem is straightforward. If I run a search for American Airlines, and Delta Airlines appears in a paid ad on the search output page because Delta Airlines purchased “American Airlines” as a keyword, does American Airlines have any recourse? If so, against whom? Google? Delta Airlines? Both? Nei- ther? What if Travelocity, which sells flights on both American Air- lines and Delta Airlines, appears in a paid ad? Should the outcome turn on whether the paid ad uses the words “American Airlines” in the ad text? Trademark law is primarily intended to prevent confusion about the origins of trademarked goods and services, but is it plausible that a consumer who searches for American Airlines and then buys a ticket on Delta Airlines was ever confused about which carrier he will be flying on? Even if the consumer is not confused about the airline he ultimately selects, should diversion of attention, however temporary, create a cause of action? Should the mode or level of trade make any difference in the analysis? For example, searchers can obtain a reservation for a room at a Hyatt hotel either directly from Hyatt’s website or from a travel website (e.g., Orbitz, Travelocity, getaroom.com, etc.). Hyatt makes more money if searchers deal directly with them, instead of going 13 through a travel website. Does Hyatt have a valid complaint if travel 12. See infra Part II.C. Earlier disputes had involved the use of trademarks as domain names and metatags. Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375, 1376–81 (2010). 13. See Peter M. Ripin, Keyword Confusion, HOSPITALITY.NET (May 1, 2007), http://www.hospitalitynet.org/news/4031253.html (noting that hotels “have to pay a com- mission of approximately 18–30% to the online travel agency,” and “[s]ince a hotel’s own branded Website produces the highest average daily rate, it is clearly in the hotel’s best interest to drive Internet business to its own site rather than to an online travel agent”). See also Jane L. Levere, American Airlines in Fee Battle with Web Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at B1 (noting that “to sell an average, round-trip domestic ticket, American must pay $10 to $12, for global distribution and agency incentive fees, on online agency book- 486 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 26 websites purchase the Hyatt trademark as a keyword? Should the out- come turn on where consumers ultimately make reservations after searching for “Hyatt”? Does the fact that Hyatt makes less money if reservations are made through travel websites have any legal signifi- cance? Of course, Hyatt can capture some of these reservations if it bids on its own trademark, but should Hyatt have to pay for the use of a 14 trademark it already owns? Hyatt could prohibit travel websites with which it does business from purchasing its trademark as a keyword, but that would leave the field open to its competitors to buy higher 15 placement for their ads. What if someone searches for Rolex, and three ads come up: one for Seiko, one for a seller of counterfeit Rolexes, and one for a store ings, while it costs the carrier only $2 to $3 — for administrative and marketing expenses — to sell the same ticket on its own Web site”). Early on, companies used pop-up ads to try to divert traffic from competitors. Peter M. Ripin, Hotel Internet Marketers Beware: Pop-up and Keyword Advertising Threaten Your On-line Brand, WIREDHOTELIER.COM (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.wiredhotelier.com/ news//4021026.html. One commenter at the time noted a prominent example: [A] recently published report stated that a number of our most promi- nent companies were now using popup ads to target their competi- tors’ websites including Best Western whose ads appeared on 208 other sites including those of Comfort Inn and Day’s Inn; Thrifty Rent A Car whose ads were aimed at Dollar-Rent-A-Car and Enter- prise Rent-A-Car and Verizon DSL whose ads were triggered by vis- its to the sites of broadband provider competitors. Id. 14. See Scott Cleland, Google 21st Century Robber Baron, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2011/09/19/google-21st-century-robber-baron (“Google shortchanges trademark owners by forcing them to buy their own trademark prop- erty as keyword advertising in order to protect their businesses from Google selling their trademarks to competitors. In the physical world this scheme is known as a ‘protection racket.’”). Trademark owners have made similar complaints about the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ addition of new top-level domains. Dennis S. Prahl & Eric Null, The New Generic Top-Level Domain Program: A New Era of Risk for Trademark Owners and the Internet, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1757, 1759 (2011). 15. Cf. Johanna Jainchill, Carnival Brands’ Keyword Rule Gives Rivals a Boost, TRAVEL WKLY. (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.travelweekly.com/Cruise-Travel/Carnival-brands’- keyword-rule-gives-rivals-a-boost (describing a similar situation after cruise lines restricted travel agencies from using their trademarks). An observer noted the greater prominence of rival sites once the travel agencies ceased advertising: Carnival Corp. brands’ decision to prohibit travel agencies from bid- ding on their trademarks as keywords in online search engines led to what would seem to be an unintended consequence: a higher place- ment for the sponsored links of competing cruise lines . . . . “It doesn’t make sense that Carnival would prefer to have their competi- tion’s website right up at the top of the search results, instead of peo- ple who actually sell Carnival cruises . . . .” Id. (quoting an anonymous cruise seller and former Carnival keyword bidder). Marriott and Intercontinental Hotels have also prohibited online travel agencies from bidding on their trademarks. Five Cruise Lines Ban Agencies from Bidding on Keywords, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD (Jan. 6, 2010), http://atwonline.com/it-distribution/news/five- cruise-lines-ban-agencies-bidding-keywords-0309-0. No. 2] Trademarks as Keywords 487 selling genuine Rolex and Seiko watches. Does Rolex have a case against any or all of them? If Rolex has a case, what needs to be es- tablished? Does the bare fact that a competitor or counterfeiter pur- chased another company’s trademark as a keyword establish the necessary elements of trademark infringement? Are there any defens- es available to those who purchased a trademark to use as a keyword, and to the search engine that sold it? Does it matter if the resulting ad is simply comparative? For example, “our watches have the same de- sign features as a Rolex, but cost less.” Does it matter that the store sells both Rolex and Seiko watches? Does it matter if the individual who conducted the search was using Rolex as a generic proxy term for “expensive watches”? These questions are not law school hypotheticals. In well over one hundred cases in U.S. and foreign courts, disgruntled trademark owners have sued Google and other search engines, as well as the en- 16 tities that have purchased trademarks as keywords. Courts have var- ied in their approaches to these cases, in many instances showing 17 considerable skepticism about the merits, while in other instances expanding the law to include conduct outside the traditional ambit of 18 trademark doctrine. Judges in both camps have routinely engaged in armchair empiricism, making casual assumptions about such matters as why consumers use trademarks as search terms, consumer knowledge about the difference between paid and unpaid links, and the likelihood of confusion when competitors purchase one another’s 19 trademarks for use as search engine keywords. The sale of search engine keywords, whether trademarked or not, also raises interesting consumer protection issues. As noted previous- ly, a search engine typically returns both paid and unpaid results. Consumer protection law requires a “clear and conspicuous” disclo- 16. See supra note 5. 17. See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. LP v. Settlement Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780, 1786 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 818–19 (D. Ariz. 2008). 18. See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg. Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1035–36 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that the infringing act in the Internet context is diversion of consumers even where consumers know they are not going to plaintiff’s site because the defendant improp- erly benefits from the owner’s goodwill); Partners for Health and Home, LP v. Yang, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1467 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that actual confusion is not needed to find initial interest confusion since initial interest confusion is based on defendant’s misappro- priation of plaintiff’s goodwill); Partners for Health and Home, L.P. v. Yang, No. CV 09- 07849-RZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130921, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (holding that use of a competitor’s trademark as a keyword constitutes infringement absent circumstances negating confusion); Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Initial interest confusion results when a consumer seeks a particular trademark holder’s product and instead is lured to the product of a competitor by the competitor’s use of the same or a similar mark.”). 19. For discussion of six specific types of judicial armchair empiricism, see infra Part III.A.2. 488 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 26 20 sure of paid content. Are search engines complying with these re- quirements? How have search engines changed their descriptions of paid content over time? Do changes made by search engines result in greater awareness of the difference between paid and unpaid content? Do these changes affect click-through behavior? The Federal Trade Commission has expressed concern about the labeling and page archi- tecture of search engine results, but has not brought any cases to 21 date. We focus on Google in this Article because it is the dominant search engine. However, where appropriate, we describe differences in the way in which Google, Bing, and Yahoo present and label search results. B. Search Engine Output Architecture and Labeling We are confident that every reader of this Article has a general understanding of how Google organizes its search output. However, for those happy few who have no knowledge of Google’s search page architecture, but for some reason have chosen to read this Article, Figure 1 is a screenshot of the results when “Mercedes” was used as a 22 search term in 2011. 20. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING (2000), available at http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus41-dot- com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising. 21. See Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.shtm. In 2013, Google agreed to change some of its business practices in response to FTC concerns, but the labeling of its search results was not part of the settlement. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Mar- kets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm. 22. This screenshot was captured on December 16, 2011 and used as part of the third sur- vey, as described below. We have modified the image so that it is easier to see the different regions of the search output. After research for this Article was completed, Google revised the architecture of its search output page and created a new “Google Shopping” section. Sameer Samat, Building a Better Shopping Experience, GOOGLE COM. BLOG (May 31, 2012), http:// googlecommerce.blogspot.com/2012/05/building-better-shopping-experience.html. The new section, which appears under either Section 1 or Section 2 in Figure 1, is labeled “Spon- sored.” Id. Thus, Google is simultaneously using the terms “Ads” and “Sponsored” to refer to paid content. The impact of these changes on consumer perceptions is the subject of an ongoing empirical study. No. 2] Trademarks as Keywords 489 Figure 1: Google Search of “Mercedes” As Figure 1 reflects, Google’s search output from 2011 has sever- al discrete sections. At the top of the page is a small search box, with links to various types of search output (e.g., web, images, videos, maps, news, shopping, mail, and “more”). To the left, a column large- ly replicates the links in the top zone, along with links to change the region that Google uses as the search location, and a tool with which to specify the time period searched. Below and to the right are three sections containing search information. The shaded top section, Sec- 490 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 26 tion A, contains various search results and associated links, which are 23 labeled “Ads.” The right-hand column, Section B, contains more search results and associated links, and is labeled “Ads” as well, though the background is not shaded. Finally, underneath Section A and to the left of Section B is Section C, with more search results and associated links. The links in Section A and Section B are all paid ads. Each link that appears in these areas of the search results page is there because the relevant site won the right to appear by bidding in an auction of 24 keywords run by Google. Conversely, the links in Section C are unpaid “organic” or “algorithmic” content, which appear as a result of 25 Google’s search program. Bing labels its paid links using the same terminology (“Ads”) and 26 the same search page architecture. Yahoo labels paid links with the term “Sponsored Results” but uses the same search page architecture 27 as Bing. Prior to November 2010, Google labeled paid links as “Sponsored 28 Links.” Prior to April 2011, Bing labeled paid links as “Sponsored 29 Sites.” Other search engines have used a wide array of labels to identify paid links at one time or another, including “Featured List- ings,” “Premier Listings,” “Recommended Sites,” “Search Partners,” 30 and “Spotlight.” C. Keyword Auctions Google began AdWords, a program of selling ads based on spe- 31 cific keywords, in 2000. AdWords took its current payment-per- 23. As Professor Benjamin Edelman has pointed out, the label “Ads” is so small that it almost fits inside the “O” in the Google masthead. A Closer Look at Google’s Advertisement Labels, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/ google-nov2010.html. 24. We describe the keyword auction in greater detail infra Part II.C. 25. Google is increasingly trying to customize its results, so the reference to “algorith- mic” search is an oversimplification. For an alternative formulation of Google’s search methodology, see Our Search: Google Technology, GOOGLE (Apr. 1, 2002), http://www.google.com/onceuponatime/technology/pigeonrank.html. 26. Benjamin Edelman & Duncan J. Gilchrist, Advertising Disclosures: Measuring La- beling Alternatives in Internet Search Engines 6, 14 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-048, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1706121. 27. Id. 28. Barry Schwartz, Google Does Away with “Sponsored Links” Label, Now Ads Are Labeled “Ads,” SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 5, 2010, 3:06 PM), http:// searchengineland.com/google-does-away-with-sponsored-links-label-now-ads-are-labeled- ads-54956 [hereinafter Schwartz, Google Does Away with “Sponsored Links”]. 29. Edelman & Gilchrist, supra note 26, at 6. 30. See Hippsley, supra note 21. 31. Press Release, Google, Google Launches Self-Service Advertising Program (Oct. 23, 2000), http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/pressrelease39.html.