Religio Perennis "Sankara's Doctrine of Maya Abstract Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of maya which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by 'superimposition'. Maya, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self-explanatory. Sankara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy. * Maya is most strange. Her nature is inexplicable. (Sankara)i Brahman is real; the world is an illusory appearance; the so-called soul is Brahman itself, and no other. (Sankara)ii I The doctrine of maya occupies a pivotal position in Sankara's metaphysics. Before focusing on this doctrine it will perhaps be helpful to make clear Sankara's purposes in elaborating the Advaita Vedanta. Some of the misconceptions which have afflicted English commentaries on Sankara will thus be banished before they can cause any further mischief. Firstly, Sankara should not be understood or approached as a 'philosopher' in the modern Western sense. Ananda Coomaraswamy has rightly insisted that, The Vedanta is not a philosophy in the current sense of the word, but only as it is used in the phrase Philosophia Perennis... Modern philosophies are closed systems, employing the method of dialectics, and taking for granted that opposites are mutually exclusive. In modern philosophy things are either so or not so; in eternal philosophy this depends upon our point of view. Metaphysics is not a system but a consistent doctrine; it is not merely concerned with conditioned and quantitative experience but with universal possibility. It therefore considers possibilities that may be neither possibilities of manifestation nor in any sense formal, as well as ensembles of possibilities that can be realised in a given world.iii This claim is pregnant with significance. It alerts us to the kind of confusion which bedevils any attempt to accommodate Advaita within the assumptions and the vocabulary of a purely rational and dialectical philosophic outlook. This remains true whether one is engaged in explanation or apparent 'refutation'. The same misconceptions will ambush any study resting on the assumption that metaphysics is but a branch of philosophy. What essentially distinguishes the metaphysical from the philosophical proposition is that the former is symbolical and descriptive, in the sense that it makes use of symbols to describe or translate knowledge possessing a greater degree of certainty than any knowledge of a sensible order, whereas Religio Perennis philosophy... is never anything more than what it expresses. When philosophy uses reason to resolve a doubt, this proves precisely that its starting point is a doubt that it is striving to overcome, whereas... the starting point of a metaphysical formulation is always something essentially intellectually evident or certain, which is communicated, to those able to receive it, by symbolical or dialectical means designed to awaken in them the latent knowledge that they bear unconsciously and, it may even be said, eternally within them.iv Metaphysics, then, both grows out of and points to the plenary and unitive experience of Reality. It attempts to fashion out of the ambiguities and limitations of language, and with the aid of symbolism, dialectics, analogy and whatever lies at hand, principles and propositions which testify to that Reality. Metaphysics is, in brief, "the doctrine of the uncreated".v Sankara was not the 'author' of a new 'philosophy' but a metaphysician and spiritual teacher. His purpose was to demonstrate the unity and consistency of the Upanishadic teachings on Brahman, and to explain certain apparent contradictions "by a correlation of different formulations with the point of view implied in them".vi Like his gurus Gaudapada and Govinda, Sankara was engaged in an exposition of Vedanta and the development of a framework, both doctrinal and practical, for the quest of liberation. However, Sankara's teachings should in no sense be considered irrational or anti- rational—he was, indeed, a masterful logician and a most formidable opponent in debate. The point is simply that his metaphysic, while it always mobilises reason where appropriate, cannot be strait-jacketed in any purely rationalistic framework. Reason was not the idol it has become for some but rather a tool, an instrument, not the ultimate avenue to, or test of, Reality. In another context a contemporary commentator has said: "Reason may be compared to a convex lens which directs the light of the Spirit in a particular direction and on a limited field."vii Sankara himself warned that: the pure truth of Atman, which is buried under maya, can be reached by meditation, contemplation and other spiritual disciplines such as a knower of Brahman may prescribe—but never by subtle argument.viii Mircea Eliade has suggested that: Four basic and interdependent concepts, four 'kinetic ideas' bring us directly to the core of Indian spirituality. They are karma, maya, nirvana, and yoga. A coherent history of Indian thought could be written starting from any one of these basic concepts; the other three would inevitably have to be discussed.ix This claim not only emphasises the cardinal importance of the doctrine of maya but also forewarns us of the hazards of considering it in isolation. It is with these cautionary observations in mind that we can now turn explicitly to the doctrine of maya and its place in Sankara's Advaita Vedanta. II T.R.V. Murti has remarked that any absolutism, be it that of Madhyamika Buddhism, Vedanta or Bradleian philosophy, must posit a distinction between the ultimately Real and the empirically or relatively real. It thus establishes a doctrine of two truths and, consequently, a theory of illusion to explain the relationship.x Mahadevan has clearly articulated the problem which Advaita Vedanta had to resolve: Truth, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman. Mutable, non-intelligent, finite and perishing is the world. Brahman is pure, attributeless, impartite and immutable. The world is a manifold of changing phenomena, fleeting events and finite things... The problem for the Advaitin is to solve how from the pure Brahman the impure world of men and things came into existence. It is on this rock that most of the monistic systems break.xi Religio Perennis Sankara's resolution of this problem hinges on the doctrine of maya. The Sankhya-Yoga darsana had postulated the existence of two distinct and ultimate entities, purusa (loosely, 'spirit') and prakrti (loosely, 'nature' or 'matter', not excluding subtle matter). The nature of reality had been explained in terms of a cooperative relationship between these two entities, prakrti being for man "a veritable fairy godmother".xii For Sankara and the Advaitins such a formulation was untenable: no such relationship could exist between two such disparate entities. Not only did they believe that the Sankhya view could not be supported logically but it also compromised the sole reality of Brahman which Sankara identified as the central teaching of the Upanishads. The alternatives to the Sankhya view were either a full-blown materialism which could immediately be thrown out of court under the auspices of Upanishadic sruti, or the belief that material existents are in some sense less than real—illusions utterly dependent on the reality of Brahman for their existence but their apparent independence and multiple existences grounded in some pervasive error. Such was the Advaitin view and it was along such lines that the puzzling relationship of the phenomenal world to Brahman was to be explained, the doctrine of maya being the key to the whole argument. We shall return to the paradox of the two truths and to the theory of illusion in some detail when we come to discuss the world-Brahman relationship in specifically Advaitin terms. But first let us consider the suggestive etymology of the term maya which has been translated, or at least signalled, by a kaleidoscopic array of terms. These can be sampled in two clusters: (a) 'illusion', 'concealment', 'the web of seeming', 'appearance', 'glamour', 'relativity', 'classification', 'contingency', 'objectivisation', 'distinctivisation', 'exteriorisation'; (b) 'cosmic power', 'divine art', 'universal unfolding', 'cosmic magic', 'the power of Isvara' and 'the principle of self-expression'. Clearly there is, behind these terms, a principle of considerable subtlety. However, in these translations, we can see two strands of meaning—more or less negative in the first group, positive in the latter. The Sanskrit terms avarana ('concealment') and viksepa (projection) are closely associated with the notion of maya and designate two aspects, or guises, of it. These twin faces of maya are reflected in Hindu temple iconography and are traceable in the etymology of the word. The word maya is linked to the root 'matr': 'to measure, form, build, or plan'. Several Greco-Latin words are also connected with this root: metre, matrix, matter and material.xiii On a more immediate, literal level the word refers simply to 'that which' (ya) 'is not' (ma).xiv In its more positive meanings we find maya is etymologically related to the Assyrian maya (magic) and to maya-Devi (mother of Sakyamuni Buddha), Maia (mother of Hermes) and Maria (mother of Jesus).xv Here we can detect the obvious association with the feminine and Shaktic pole of manifestation. All of these etymological considerations provide clues to the various meanings which will emerge more clearly in subsequent discussion. As Mahadevan has said, following Sankara, "To logic maya is a puzzle. Wonder is its garment; inscrutable is its nature".xvi This does not mean that nothing whatsoever can be said about maya in logical terms but rather that the ratiocinative process must necessarily arrive, sooner or later, at certain impasses which cannot, by their nature, be overcome logically. Sankara did elaborate a detailed and acute dialectical examination of maya. Of itself this could not lead one to penetrate the nature of maya, but through it the mind could be cleared of certain misconceptions. The following exposition is a condensed account which attempts to rehearse Sankara's argument in outline and in its most salient points. Maya is a power or potency of Brahman, coeval with Brahman, completely dependent on and inseparable from Brahman, neither independent nor real in itself. It is not different from Brahman on pain of contradicting Scriptural declarations of non-difference, but it is Religio Perennis also not non-different from Brahman as there cannot be identity between the Real and the unreal. Nor can maya be both different and non-different as such contradictors cannot reside in one and the same thing. The relationship between maya and Brahman is thus tadatmya, neither identity nor difference nor both.xvii A similar dialectic exposes maya's status considered in terms of the Real. Maya is not real because it has no existence apart from Brahman, because it disappears at the dawn of knowledge, because it does not constitute a limit on Brahman. However, it is not altogether unreal because it does project the world of appearances. It is not both real and unreal because of contradiction. Maya is not possessed of parts. If it were partite it would have a beginning and consequently the Lord and the jivas which are reflections thereof would have a beginning. Furthermore, maya with a beginning would necessitate another maya as its cause and there would thus be a contingence of infinite regress. However, maya cannot be partless because of the contingency of its not being the primal cause. It is the cause only of partite phenomena, and cannot be both partite and impartite because of contradiction. Maya, has a phenomenal and relative character and is an appearance only (vivarta). It is of the nature of superimposition (adhyasa) and is removable by right knowledge. Its locus is Brahman but Brahman is in no way affected by maya. Maya is beginningless (anadi), for time arises only within it; it is unthinkable (acintya), for all thought is subject to it; it is indescribable (anirvacaniya), for all language results from it.xviii Because its nature is outside the determination of normal human categories it is indeterminable (anirvaniya) and indefinable. Maya, indeed, is most strange! III Before moving into an exploration of Sankara's views on the relationship of the world to Brahman and the role of maya in 'mediating' this relationship, a small digression: it is sometimes suggested, often obliquely rather than directly, that the classical Indian view of reality is somewhat idiosyncratic. We have seen in the Vedanta the refusal to equate the 'real' with the existent. Such a position sits uncomfortably with modern Western notions derived from our recent intellectual history. However, in the long view it is the modern notion of reality (as the existent) which looks eccentric even within the Western tradition. A view more in accord with the Vedanta is everywhere to be found in traditional wisdoms. Here we shall restrict ourselves to two illustrative examples. St Augustine: I beheld these others beneath Thee, and saw that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not. An existence they have because they are from Thee; and yet no existence, because they are not what Thou art. For only that really is that remains unchangeably ...xix Here we not only see a view quite in agreement with the Indian insistence on eternality and immutability but a line of thinking which, like Sankara's, accommodates certain paradoxical possibilities—things which "neither altogether are, nor altogether are not". From Hermes Trismegistus: That which is dissoluble is destructible; only that which is indissoluble is everlasting... Nothing that is corporeal is real; only that which is incorporeal is devoid of illusion.xx Here we again anticipate some of the themes residing in Sankara's doctrine of maya. IV As we have seen already the nub of the problem confronting Advaita was the relationship of the empirical world of multiple phenomena to Brahman.xxi It was to this question that much of Sankara's work was addressed and it is here that the doctrine of maya comes into Religio Perennis full play. The Upanishadic view had suggested that the world, in all its multiplicity, emanates from, subsists in and ultimately merges in Brahman. In the Mundaka Upanishad, by way of example, we find this: As a spider spreads and withdraws (its thread)... so out of the Immutable does the phenomenal universe arise. And this: As a thousand sparks from a blazing fire Leap forth each like the other, So friend, from the Imperishable, modes of being Variously spring forth and return again thereto. This 'projection' of Brahman is not to be understood as something other than Brahman. As the same Upanishad tells us, Immortal in very truth is Brahman East, west, north and south below, above Brahman projects Itself Brahman is the whole universe.xxii This is by no means the pantheistic notion wherein the cosmos and the Absolute are identified, but is to be understood in the spirit of the old Rabbinic dictum: "God is the dwelling place of the universe; but the universe is not the dwelling place of God."xxiii The Svetasvatara Upanishad describes the Lord (Isvara) as the mayin, the wonder-working powerful Being out of whom the world arises.xxiv The word maya is used in this sense in the Rg Veda. Sankara's purpose was to make explicit and to explain more fully the Upanishadic view that the universe is really only in the nature of an appearance, devoid of any ultimate ontological reality. Following the Upanishads Badarayana had insisted on the sole reality of Brahman, "The alone, supreme, eternal" which "through the glamour of Ignorance, like a magician, appears manifold...".xxv Sankara's metaphysic elucidates the nature of this manifold. The key principle is maya and the crucial process adhyasa (superimposition). We have already established that: ...the term maya combines the meanings of productive power' and 'universal illusion; it is the inexhaustible play of manifestations, deployments, combinations and reverberations, a play with which Atma clothes itself even as the ocean clothes itself with a mantle of foam ever renewed and never the same.xxvi 'Maya' can be used to signify both the principle which effects the illusory world, the power which superimposes the manifold and sensuous on the supersensuous Brahman, and the effects of this power, i.e. the world. In the ensuing discussion the sense in which it is being used will be clear from the context. The relationship of the world to Brahman, according to Sankara, is paradoxical. The world is illusory, an appearance only. Now, several obvious questions present themselves: if there is only one Reality (Brahman) how can its non-duality be sustained in the face of the multiple world? What is the nature of the illusory world of maya? In what sense can we speak of the world and Brahman as being both different and non-different? Is not Brahman (the cause) affected by maya (the effect)? What is Sankara's stance in regard to Isvara and his relationship to maya? We shall address these questions in turn. The first question has already been partially answered. The phenomenal world, simply, is not real—it is not eternal and immutable, and it is sublated by the experience of Religio Perennis Brahman. We recall the words of the Bhagavad Gita: "...of the non-real there is no coming to be: of the real there is no ceasing to be."xxvii The world is not real. It has no ontological or ultimate status. Nevertheless, while the world is not real (sat), nor, says Sankara, is it altogether unreal (asat). It is apparently real (vyavaharika). It is perceived and it exhibits spatial, temporal and causal order. "There could be no non-existence" (of external entities) says Sankara, because "external realities are perceived".xxviii It is the existence and the apparent reality of the world which is in need of explanation. It has often been remarked that maya can be viewed from several standpoints: from that of mundane experience, the phenomenal world of maya is real; from that of the inquiring mind maya and all her effects are a riddle, a puzzle, a Sphinx; from the viewpoint of the Absolute and from that of the realised being, maya simply is not. The problematic relationship between maya and Brahman is only apparent from the empirical, worldly and maya-created point of view. It is only because of ignorance (avidya) that we are unable to see the non-duality of Brahman. Non-duality exists a priori: the separation of the world from Brahman is an illusory 'fissure' which from its own standpoint, within the limits imposed by the very nature of maya, is enigmatic. Right Knowledge reveals the non- duality of Brahman quite uncompromised or qualified by the phenomenal realm.xxix Clearly this still leaves many questions unanswered: If this world is illusory, how is the illusion to be explained? What is the nature of the illusion? Sankara distinguishes three kinds of illusion: a phenomenal or 'objective' illusion such as our waking perception of the empirical world (vyavaharika)); a private, subjective illusion such as a dream; and a third kind of illusion, altogether unreal, non-existent and absurd, of which the hare's horn is the most popular example.xxx The illusion of the world is of the first kind: the world is not simply a hallucination or a chimera, nor is it an absurd non-entity. Maya, and thus the world, is not real but it is existent. It is certainly not non-existent. Why does this illusory world have an apparently objective homogeneity? Because the world is not an illusion of each particular individual, in which case each individual would 'dream' a different world, but of the human collectivity. The empirical and objective 'solidity' of the world proves not its reality but the collective nature of the illusion.xxxi Mircea Eliade has written of the association of maya with temporality. His commentary is worth quoting at some length not only because this opens up another perspective on the questions at hand but also because it consolidates some of the points already made: ...the veil of maya is an image-formula expressing the ontological unreality both of the world and of all human experience: we emphasise ontological, for neither the world nor human experience participates in absolute Being. The physical world and our human experience also are constituted by the universal becoming, by the temporal: they are therefore illusory, created and destroyed as they are by Time. But this does not mean they have no existence or are creations of my imagination. The world is not a mirage... The physical world and my vital and psychic experience exist, but they exist only in Time... Consequently, judged by the scale of absolute Being, the world and every experience dependent upon temporality are illusory... Many centuries before Heidegger, Indian thought had identified, in temporality, the 'fated' dimension of all existence... In other words, the discovery of historicity, as the specific mode of being of man in the world, corresponds to what the Indians have long called our situation in maya... In reality our true 'Self'... has nothing to do with the multiple situations of our history.xxxii Whence comes this illusion and how is it maintained? The brief answer is that it derives from maya as avidya (ignorance, or nescience) and is generated and sustained by adhyasa (superimposition). These terms require clarification. Some commentators have distinguished avidya from maya, associating avidya not only with the negative aspect of maya and thus with the jiva but not with Isvara. Sankara himself used the two terms more or less interchangeably. The question has generated Religio Perennis something of a philosophical squabble but Mahadevan has persuasively argued that the distinction cannot be maintained with any philosophic integrity. He exposes the faulty constructions of some of the post-Sankaran commentators who have been bent on separating avidya from maya. Nevertheless Mahadevan does concede that the distinction does have some empirical utility: When prakrti generates projection or when it conforms to the desire of the agent as is the case with Isvara it is called maya in empirical usage. When it obscures or when it is independent of the agent's will it is known as nescience (avidya). Apart from this adjunct-conditioned distinction, there is no difference between maya and nescience.xxxiii It is in this sense that some speak of maya as being cosmic in significance, avidya subjective. Until the dawn of knowledge all are subject to ensnarement in the web of appearances. This is the source of the illusion. The 'mechanism', as it were, through which the illusion is generated and sustained is adhyasa, the super-imposing of limitations and multiplicities upon Brahman. Because of avidya and through adhyasa we mistakenly take phenomenal distinctions to be real. This, according to Gaudapada, is like seeing footprints of birds in the sky.xxxiv Padmapada, one of Sankara's disciples, explained that "superimposition means that manifestation of the nature of something in another which is not of that nature". So it is when one says, "I am deaf" where a property of the organ of hearing is imposed on the self.xxxv An example Sankara himself used was "the sky is blue".xxxvi In like manner we couple the unreal with the Real and vice versa.xxxvii As a recent commentator has observed, The main or primary application of adhyasa is made with respect to the self. It is the superimposition on the Self (Atman, Brahman) of what does not properly belong to the Self (finitude, change) and the superimposition on the non-self of what does properly belong to the Self (infinitude, eternality) that constitute avidya.xxxviii Thus maya makes possible the 'impossible'—the appearance of the infinite and unconditioned as if finite and contingent. We can now see how and why maya makes the world-nature inscrutable to the discursive mind. Maya is an "ontic-noetic state wherein limitations (upadhis) are imposed on Reality".xxxix All attachments, aversions, dreams, fears and thoughts, all memories, cognitions and mental modifications of whatever kind are grounded in maya. "The mind which is a product of maya cannot in full measure understand the nature of its parent."xl It is only intuition (in the full and characteristically Indian sense—jnana) that can apprehend the Brahman-nature. In this context it is worth remembering that in a metaphysic such as Sankara's "logical proof is only a quite provisional crystallisation of intuition ... ".xli In this order maya is not, in fact, inexplicable but only not self-explanatory.xlii The second question we posed in reference to the world-Brahman relationship: how we are to understand the 'difference' and 'non-difference'? We have already seen how in strictly logical terms this relationship can only be enunciated negatively, i.e. maya and Brahman are neither different, nor non-different, nor both. Nevertheless we can speak provisionally, metaphorically as it were, of "difference" and "non-difference". The difference of maya and Brahman is clear enough. It is the non-difference which is more puzzling. In metaphysical terms the following principial demonstration articulates the relationship precisely: The 'non-difference' of Real and unreal does not in any way imply either the unreality of the Self or the reality of the world. To start with the Real [Atman/Brahman] is not "non-different' in function of the unreal [the world of maya]; it is the unreal which is 'non-different' in function of the Real, not, that is, inasmuch as it is unreality, but inasmuch as it is a 'lesser Reality', the latter being none the less 'extrinsically unreal' in relation to 'Absolute Reality'.xliii Religio Perennis Whilst ultimately unreal, "cosmic existence partakes of the character of the real and the unreal."xliv The relationship of the relative to the Absolute is elaborated in one fashion or another in all traditional metaphysics and is to be found in the esoteric and sapiential dimension of most religious traditions, albeit couched in the vocabulary appropriate to the tradition in question. It can, for instance, be formulated no less precisely in the terminology of the theistic Occidental traditions, i.e. in terms not of Brahman and maya but in terms of God and man. This is provided that we remember that, In the three Semitic monotheistic religions, the name 'God' necessarily embraces all that is proper to the principle [the Absolute] with no restriction whatsoever, although their exoteric formulations evidently envisage the ontological aspect alone.xlv In other words, 'God' refers, in this context, to the trans-ontological and Beyond-Being 'dimension' of Reality and not to personalised theological notions of God which correspond not to nirguna-Brahman but to saguna-Brahman which encompasses Isvara. One such formulation explicates the relationship this way: That we are conformed to God—made in His image—this is certain; otherwise we should not exist. That we are contrary to God, this is also certain; otherwise we should not be different from God. Without analogy to God we should be nothing. Without opposition to God we should be God. The separation between man and God is at the same time absolute and relative... The separation is absolute because God alone is real and no continuity is possible between nothingness and Reality; but the separation is relative—or rather 'not absolute'—because nothing is outside God. In a sense it might be said that the separation is absolute as from man to God and relative as from God to man.xlvi This kind of enunciation is closest in spirit to the Sufic tradition but similar statements of the Absolute-Relative can be found in other Occidental wisdoms, not excluding the Christian and Judaic. Our next question: is not Brahman in some sense affected, contaminated, as it were, by maya? Are not the effects implicit in the cause? By no means, says Sankara. We shall not here rehearse the theories of apparent manifestation (vivartavada) or transformation (parinama-vada) but simply recall the famous analogy with which Sankara resolved this problem. As the magician is not affected by this illusion (maya) which he himself has created, because it is without reality (avatsu), so also Paramatman is not affected by the illusion of Samsara... Consequently it is false to hold that the cause is polluted by the qualities, materiality etc of the effect, if they return into that essence.xlvii The illusion is caused by the power of the magician and the ignorance of the audience: for the magician there is no illusion whatsoever. So with Brahman, maya is illusion until the dawn of knowledge; thence maya is not. Brahman, says Sankara, cannot be affected by maya just as the desert sands cannot be muddied by the waters of a mirage.xlviii Maya is sometimes referred to as 'the power of Isvara' which brings us to the question of the place of Isvara in the Advaitin scheme and his connections with maya. Isvara's nature is of saguna-Brahman which might roughly be signified as 'qualified Brahman',xlix the qualifications having only an ad hoc validity and existing only from a strictly maya- based point of view. In a sense Isvara can be represented as the cosmic parallel to the jiva with the qualification that Isvara remains untouched by avidya. Further, Isvara is the reflection of Brahman in maya, and the jiva is the same reflection of Brahman in avidya, which is only 'part' of maya.l Brahman thus appears as Isvara when considered from the relatively ignorant viewpoint of the jiva. As Vivekananda so aptly put it, "Personal God [Isvara] is the reading of the Impersonal by the human mind."li Brahman is in all senses prior to Isvara. Metaphysically speaking "maya non-manifested...is Being: Isvara".lii Here we find a principle analogous to Religio Perennis Meister Eckhart's distinction between God (the ontological, Being dimension of the Absolute; Isvara) and the God-head (the Absolute, Beyond-Being, unqualified; Brahman).liii Considered in religious rather than metaphysical terms Isvara becomes the creator of the universe, the great magician who conjures up the spectacle of the realm, out of whom the world arises. Being untouched by avidya and divine in nature, Isvara also becomes an exemplar and a focus of bhaktic worship. Whilst ruthlessly non-dualistic in his metaphysics Sankara himself addressed prayers to the deities. He was sympathetically disposed towards bhaktic forms of worship, denying only that ultimate realisation could be reached by such practices. Certainly he did not see bhakti only as a concession to the weakness of the popular mind—as some neo-Vedantins would have it. Isvara not only provides a focus for bhakti but also helps to bring the world into a more immediately intelligible relationship with Brahman. V Up to this point we have, for the most part, been considering only the negative aspects of maya—illusion, concealment, avidya. Mention of Isvara provides a bridge to the other side of maya, the aspect of projection and of 'divine art', and to the related notion of lila. Maya is indeed 'cosmic illusion' but ...she is also divine play. She is the great theophany, the unveiling of God 'In Himself and by Himself' as the Sufis would say. Maya may be likened to a magic fabric woven from a warp that veils and a weft that unveils; she is the quasi-incomprehensible intermediary between the finite and the Infinite—at least from our point of view as creatures—and as such she has all the multi-coloured ambiguity appropriate to her part-cosmic, part-divine nature.liv As this passage suggests, the Sufic doctrine of the veil is, in some respects, analogous to the doctrine of maya as articulated in Advaita Vedanta. Maya has also been called the principle of 'self-expression' (i.e., Isvara). In this context: Creation is expression. It is not a making of something out of nothing. It is not making so much as becoming. It is the self-projection of the Supreme. Everything exists in the secret abode of the Supreme. The primary reality contains within itself the source of its own motion and change.lv This perspective on maya also embraces the idea of lila to which we will return presently. But first a digression is in order to meet possible objections to the notion that maya simultaneously has both a negative and a positive character. How is it, it may be asked, that maya both conceals and projects? This is the kind of question likely to vex an either/or line of ratiocinative thought. The objection is best met by analogy. We turn here to Frithjof Schuon, a contemporary commentator who has illuminated many traditional doctrines in terms intelligible across the linguistic and symbolic barriers of the various traditional wisdoms: It is very easy to label as 'vague' or 'contradictory' something one cannot understand. Rationalist thinkers generally refuse to admit a truth that represents contradictory aspects and that is situated seemingly beyond grasping, midway between two negative enunciations. Now there are some realities which could be formulated in no other way than this. The ray which proceeds from a light is itself light, since it illumines, but it is not the light from which it proceeded; therefore it is neither that light nor yet other than that light, though growing ever weaker in proportion to its distance from its source. A faint light is light for the darkness it illumines, but darkness for the light whence it emanates. Similarly maya is both light and darkness at the same time: she is light inasmuch as being the 'divine art', she reveals the secrets of Atma; she is darkness inasmuch as she conceals Atma. As darkness she is ignorance, avidya.lvi Religio Perennis The idea of lila can also be explored in another, larger context. A perennial line of questioning which inevitably arises in any consideration of the religious doctrines of creation and manifestation runs along these lines: why does manifestation occur in the first place? Why, in crude terms. does the world exist? Here we shall not concern ourselves with questions of beginning and end, of temporality and eschatology, which, in Vedanta, are always subordinate to the inquiry into 'the relation of ground and consequent'. Rather, the question here is this: is there any 'explanation' for the appearance, as it were, of maya? Here we will touch lightly on three responses to this question: the conventional Vedantin attitude; the notion of lila; and a metaphysical 'explanation' not itself drawn from Sankara's metaphysic but in no way incompatible with it. Radhakrishnan has articulated the typical Vedantin response to these kinds of questions when he writes: If we ask why the Supreme has this... character, why it is what it is [and thus the 'why' of maya] we can only accept it as a given reality. It is the ultimate irrationality in the sense that no logical derivation of the given is possible. It is apprehended by us in spiritual consciousness and accounts for the nature of experience in all its aspects. It is the only philosophical explanation that is possible or necessary.lvii In other words certain questions about maya cannot be resolved outside the plenary experience. Elsewhere Radhakrishnan reminds us that, If we raise the question as to how [or why] the finite rises from out of the bosom of the infinite, Sankara says that it is an incomprehensible mystery...lviii As Murti has observed, the doctrine of maya is not, in itself, an explanation of this mystery.lix As we have seen already, any attempt to explain the 'creation' or 'origin' of the world is bound to fail not only because the mind is trapped in maya but also because the very notion of creation is an error. As Gaudapada stressed, "...this is the supreme truth: nothing whatever is born" (or 'created').lx It is only when we have torn the veil of maya, as it were, that we can see that this kind of question is ultimately meaningless.lxi All this notwithstanding, the notion of lila, is in some sense a kind of metaphorical explanation. In the Brahma-Sutra Bhasya Sankara says: The activity of the Lord...may be supposed to be more sport [lila] proceeding from his own nature, without reference to any purpose.lxii This recalls Krsna's words in the Bhagavad Gita. There is naught in the three worlds that I have need to do, nor anything I have not gotten that I might get, yet I participate in action.lxiii This idea of the playfulness of the Creator Lord is found in the Rg Veda, the Upanishads and the Gita though the word lila as such is not always used.lxiv The notion conveys that Isvara's creation answers to no compelling necessity or constraint but arises out of an inherent exuberance or joy. It is spontaneous, purposeless, without responsibility or moral consequence—in short, like play. Ramakrishna was fond of recounting the following story which contains something of this idea of the playfulness of Isvara. (The anecdote is perfumed with the scents of Hindu spirituality.) Once there came a saddhu here [Ramakrishna would relate] who had a beautiful glow on his face. He just sat and smiled. Twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening, he'd come out of his room and look around. He'd look at the trees, the bushes, the sky and Ganges and he'd raise his arms and dance, beside himself with joy. Or he'd roll on the ground, laughing and exclaiming