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Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 PDF

398 Pages·1987·21.41 MB·English
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SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY This page intentionally left blank Safe for Democracy The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 LLOYD C. GARDNER OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS New York Oxford 1987 Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dares Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and assoeiated companies in Beruit Berlin Ibadan Nicosia Copyright © 1984 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First published in 1984 by Oxford University Press, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1987 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Gardner, Lloyd C., 1934— Safe for democracy. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 2. Great Britain—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1913—1921. 4. United States—Foreign relations—1921 —1923. 5. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1910-1936. 6. Wilson, Woodrow, 1856—1924. 7. Lloyd George, David, 1863-1945. 8. World War, 1914-1918—Diplomatic history. I. Title. E183.8G7G2233 1984 327'.09*041 83-26790 ISBN 0-19-503429-5 ISBN 0-19-504155-0 (pbk.) Printed in the United States of America Printing (last digit): 98765432 i To my children, Rebecca, Erin, and Timothy. They know how much this book has meant; I hope they know how much more they mean. This page intentionally left blank Introduction When Woodrow Wilson arrived at the Capitol on the evening of April 2, 1917, it was not to ask Congress to intervene in a European war. His quest was for a new world. Only that outcome of the Great War could ensure the conversion of the "irrational" revolutionary impulses that surged up in the late imperial era from Mexico to China into steady forces support- ing world equilibrium. "When you have the foundations of established order," Wilson told Mexican newspaper editors in 1918, "and the world has come to its senses again, we shall, I hope, have the very best connec- tions that will assure us all a permanent cordiality and friendship."* Long before he had accepted American participation in the war as both inevitable and necessary, Wilson had called the Mexican Revolution a "wedge" in American politics. By that he meant that the industrial era had produced a genuine world politics. Wars could never be localized "private quarrels" any more; revolutions could no longer be considered mere "native uprisings." What was happening in Mexico would shape the future of the world in the same way the French Revolution had earlier altered European society and politics. Wilson believed this beforfc he made his decision to ask for war; but if there had been any question, events in Russia settled the issue. "It is no doubt true as Mr. House told me in so many words," British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour reported to London on April 27, 1917, "that but for Russian Revolution and fa- mous German telegram to Mexico, President would have found it very difficult to take decisive step. . . ."** *"An Address to a Party of Mexican Editors," June 7, 1918, in Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols. (New York, 1925-27), 5:223—28. **Balfour to Lloyd George, April 27, 1917, FO 371 3119/86512, Public Record Office, London. viii INTRODUCTION British prime minister David Lloyd George did not get involved in Mexican or Chinese questions as Wilson did. But from the time of the overthrow of the tsar in Russia in March 1917, he was as absorbed as the president was in devising a strategy to meet the revolutionary challenge. In British politics, revolution was more than a "wedge"; it was a likely cause of military defeat in the war and a real threat to postwar security. Some of the materials for this book were researched in 1965—66, when I held a Social Science Research Council Fellowship. A John Simon Gug- genheim Fellowship in 1973—74 and a Fulbright Professorship at the University of Birmingham in 1975—76 gave me the opportunity to com- plete the bulk of the work in the Public Record Office and in various private collections. I should like to thank all those connected with these organizations for making the book possible. I would also like to thank the archivists in the many libraries and research centers who have helped me with access to documents. Extracts from Crown-copyright material in the Public Record Office, London, appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. Inevitably, such lists leave out other persons who have contributed greatly to my research and writing. But I must give special thanks to Arthur S. Link for allowing me to consult the vast collection of Wilson materials he has assembled at Princeton University for the publication of the Wilson Papers. I am also indebted to him for many conversations on Wilson's role in attempting to construct a liberal alternative to revolution. Over the years, as well, I have learned so much from Arno Mayer, also of Princeton, both from his books and conversation, that it is a pleasure to acknowledge my debt here. In the course of doing the research for this, and a subsequent volume on the Roosevelt-Churchill era, I met Professor Christopher Thorne of the University of Sussex. He is a model scholar and a great companion on what he once called "the journey of enquiry." At Rutgers, Professor Michael Adas read the manuscript when it was nearly twice the size it finally turned out to be. No greater burden can be put on a friendship between historians than to read a rough draft. War- ren F. Kimball lets me try out all my ideas on him, and helps me to sort out the occasional insight from the truly insignificant. Samuel Baily never lets me forget that American diplomatic historians are all too narrow in their outlooks. He is as well a great good friend for all seasons. I can never finish a book without expressing my gratitude to the oldest of these friends, Walter LaFeber of Cornell University, Thomas McCor- mick of Wisconsin, and William Appleman Williams of Oregon State Uni- versity. Like Michael Adas, Walter LaFeber did double duty by reading the "whole thing." Thanks again. At Oxford, Sheldon Meyer may have Introduction ix thought he would never see the end of this project. I hope other authors are fortunate enough to work with an editor of Sheldon's skill and pa- tience. I should also like to thank his colleagues Leona Capeless and copy editor Tessa DeCarlo, who have provided expert help and advice in add- ing much more than the final touches to this project. Thanks, finally, to my literary agent and friend Gerald MacCauley, who successfully keeps abreast of developments both in the historical world and Little League coaching. East Brunswick, New Jersey L. G. July 4, 1983

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This ground-breaking book probes the way that two capitalist superpowers, Great Britain and the United States, responded to the momentous challenge of revolution that emerged during the early years of this century. Focusing on two key figures--Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George--the book explores
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