This report is available online at www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications For media and public inquiries about this report, contact [email protected] For more information about the Defense Intelligence Agency, visit DIA's website at www.dia.mil Cover image, Russian tanks, model T90A. Source: Shutterstock. DIA-11-1704-161 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK PREFACE For more than 50 years, DIA officers have met the full range of security challenges facing our great nation. Our intelligence professionals operate across the globe, and our work supports customers from the forward-deployed warfighter to the national policymaker. DIA is united in a common vision—to be the indispensable source of defense intelligence expertise—and for the past five decades we have done just that. As part of this vision, DIA has a long history of producing comprehensive and authoritative defense intelligence overviews. In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a complete and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time. Today, we are faced with a complexity of intelligence challenges from multiple threats that we cannot afford to misunderstand. In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA is proud to produce an unclassified defense intelligence overview of the military capabilities associated with the challenges we face—beginning with Russia. This product is intended to foster a dialogue between U.S. leaders, the national security community, partner nations, and the public about the challenges we face in the 21st century. IV RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations Vladimir Putin’s address to the Russian Federal Assembly following the referendum on annexation of Crimea, 18 March, 2014: “The USA prefers to follow the rule of the strongest and not by the international law. They are convinced that they have been chosen and they are exceptional, that they are allowed to shape the destiny of the world, that it is only them that can be right. They act as they please. Here and there they use force against sovereign states, set up coalitions in accordance with the principle: who is not with us is against us.” The international order established after the Second World War and developed throughout the Cold War largely ensured widespread peace and stability even as it saw new conflicts—large and small—take place in different regions of the world. This post-war era, underwritten primarily by the strength of the United States, also gave rise to the greatest period of prosperity in history, witnessing countries rebuild from war and emerge from colonialism to become vibrant and valuable members of the international community. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as a world leader militarily, economically and diplomatically. Today, however, the United States faces an increasingly complex array of challenges to our national security. The resurgence of Russia on the world stage—seizing the Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern Ukraine, intervening on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information environment to suit its interests—poses a major challenge to the United States. Moscow will continue to aggressively pursue its foreign policy and security objectives by employing the full spectrum of the state’s capabilities. Its powerful military, coupled with the actual or perceived threat of intervention, Y allows its whole-of-government efforts to resonate widely. C Russia continues to modernize its extensive nuclear forces and is developing long range precision-guided N conventional weapons systems. It is manipulating the global information environment, employing tools E G of indirect action against countries on its periphery and using its military for power projection and A expeditionary force deployments far outside its borders. Its ultimate deterrent is a robust nuclear force capable of conducting a massed nuclear strike on targets in the United States within minutes. E C Within the next decade, an even more confident and capable Russia could emerge. The United States needs N to anticipate, rather than react, to Russian actions and pursue a greater awareness of Russian goals and E capabilities to prevent potential conflicts. Our policymakers and commanders must have a complete G understanding of Russia’s military capabilities, especially as U.S. and Russian forces may increasingly I L encounter each other around the globe. DIA will continue to provide our leaders decision-space, ensuring L they have the time and information necessary to protect our nation. The wrong decisions—or the right E ones made too late—could have dire consequences. T This report examines a resurgent Russia’s military power to foster a deeper understanding of its core N I capabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century. E S N E F E D Vincent R. Stewart Lieutenant General, USMC Director V Defense Intelligence Agency INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations CONTENTS Introduction/Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 1991–Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Russian National Military Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Russia’s Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 National Security Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Stability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 External Defense Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Y C Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 N E Military and Security Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 G A Main Operations Directorate 25 E National Military Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 C N Russian Nuclear Command and Control 26 E G Command and Control of Joint Forces 27 I L Core Russian Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 L E T Nuclear Forces and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 N I Biological and Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 E Anti-Access/Area Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 S N Information Operations 32 E F Strategic Air Operations 32 E D Integrated Air Defense System 33 Modern Precision Strike Capabilities 33 VII Precision Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Space/Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Propaganda Helps Shape The Information Environment 38 Cyber-Enabled Psychological Operations 39 Information Defense 40 Media Laws—A Hedge Against Instability 41 Indirect Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Underground Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Denial and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Outlook: A Modernizing Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Appendix B: Russian Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Appendix C: Russian Aerospace Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Appendix D: Russian Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Appendix E: Russian Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Appendix F: Russian Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Appendix G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs . . . . . . . . . . 75 Appendix H: Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 VIII RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations mage Source: Shutterstock Y I Kremlin Guards in 2017. Military power has always been regarded as of critical importance by Russian and C Soviet leaders, but after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was left with a dramatically weakened military. N E G Introduction/Historical Overview A E C N 1991-Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military E G I L F ollowing the collapse of the USSR in nuclear arsenal were of particular importance. L 1991, the Russian Federation inher- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, E T ited several formidable tasks and chal- the four states with nuclear weapons in their N lenges from its Soviet predecessor. For the new- territory, eventually reached an agreement I ly-formed Russian Ministry of Defense, the most to dismantle all tactical and strategic nuclear E immediate challenge was to relocate military weapons in the non-Russian republics or return S N equipment and personnel from the newly inde- them to Russia.2 The issue of conventional mili- E pendent states of the former USSR and coun- tary forces was much more problematic. Forces F E tries of the disbanded Warsaw Pact into a new returning from Eastern Europe had to be rein- D Russian state.1 The assets of the Soviet Union’s tegrated into the new Russian military, while 9 those in the newly independent states were viewed as the basis for building national mili- taries for new sovereign countries.3 Returning military forces from Eastern Europe were often shipped piecemeal back to unprepared bases in the Russian Feder- ation.4 Other units located in the territory of the former Soviet Union were absorbed by the newly independent states. In certain cases, units such as the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine or the 14th Army in Moldova actively resisted the attempts by the Soviet successor states to absorb these forces. Some of these stranded units became embroiled in ethnic conflicts in Troops gathered around a fire for warmth during the Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.5 Most sig- Chechen conflict; the difficulties Moscow’s weakened nificantly for the new Russian military, inte- military faced during its operations against the sep- rior military districts, which under the Soviet aratist republic underscored its deterioration during the 1990s. Union contained low-readiness mobilization forces such as the Moscow and North Cauca- Image Source: Shutterstock sus Military Districts, now became “front-line” districts bordering foreign states.6 The Rus- funding and fuel to train and exercise, and pay sian Federation emerged from the collapse of was often months in arrears. The readiness of the Soviet Union with a much smaller military the force was minimal, and the popular image and an entirely new set of security challenges.7 of the Russian military of the 1990s remains ships rusting at pier side, pilots unable to fly, Russia’s new military faced dramatic budget- and Russian officers moonlighting with second ary, readiness, and personnel shortfalls, as jobs to make ends meet.11 well as uncertainty of its role as Moscow strug- gled to determine its place in the post-Cold War Moscow also had difficulty manning its mil- world.8,9 Russia cut military spending drasti- itary. Press reports on military life that began cally during the decade of post-Soviet economic to appear during the glasnost (openness) era of turbulence. Fielding of new weapons systems the late 1980s highlighted the harshness of the slowed to a trickle and eventually halted; the conscript’s lot, and in particular the brutal and huge former Soviet arms industry struggled, sometimes deadly dedovschina hazing of new focusing on gaining hard currency by selling its draftees. Draft evasion became endemic, with most modern weapons to foreign buyers.10 At many young Russian men using any and all legal the same time, Russian military units lacked or illegal measures to avoid military service.12,13 10