R P A T F ISING OWERS ND HE UTURE I O NTERNATIONAL RDER The redistribution and diffusion of power in the international system has refl ected the rise of new centres of power demanding their legitimate say. Speculation on the preferred strategy of established powers towards the demands of rising contenders has become an important concern. While some scholars believe that it will be accommodation, others think that it will be containment. This paper analyses why established states prefer to accommodate some rising powers while opposing others and fi nds that, to comprehend the prospects of accommodation, one must understand the intentions of the challengers. Since intentions and perceptions are shaped by domestic variables, attention has been given to four such factors, namely regime type, economic system, human rights regime and social system. This paper concludes that the prospects for accommodating nations with revisionist intentions and wider differences in terms of domestic variables vis-à-vis established powers are poorer than for status quoists and those with large-scale similarities. VIKASH CHANDRA The post-war liberal international order was established by the victors of the Second World War, with the United States of America (US) playing a pivotal role in the process. The defi ning features of the shift from the earlier international order was “the end of European imperialism and the evolution of a more multilateral and institutionalised economic order”. (Charles A Kupchan, “Reordering Order: Global Change and the Need for a New Normative Consensus” in Trine Flockhart (Ed), Liberal Order in a Post- 10 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER Western World, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC, 2014, p3) According to noted international relations theorist G John Ikenberry, (Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, pxi) the present international order is nothing but a “hierarchical political order with liberal characteristics”. In the hierarchy, the US is at the zenith from where it organises and manages the order. The defi ning features of the post-World War Two international order include in theory “liberal democracy, industrial To maintain and expand liberal capitalism, secular nationalism and values such as the rule of law, open trade”. (Kupchan, ibid) Ikenberry (“Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the democracy and protection and Dilemmas of Liberal World Order”, Perspectives on preservation of human rights, the Politics, vol7, no1, 2009, p71) also sees, “open US envisaged a rule-based order markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic characterised by multilateralism. community, progressive change, In the post-Cold War era, when collective problem solving and the rule the distribution of power became of law” as the defi ning principles of unipolar, the US sought to the liberal international order. Thus, expand the order to hitherto non- to maintain and expand liberal values accommodated states, especially such as the rule of law, democracy and the former constituents of the protection and preservation of human rights, the US envisaged a rule-based Soviet Union and of the Global order characterised by multilateralism. South. In the post-Cold War era, when the distribution of power became unipolar, the US sought to expand the order to hitherto non-accommodated states, especially the former constituents of the Soviet Union and of the Global South. In recent years, the redistribution of power in the international system has led to the emergence of new centres of power across the globe. With their rise, “the hegemonic aspect of the liberal order—that is, America’s role and the old hegemonic bargains that surround it—is under pressure”. (Ikenberry, 2011, ibid) The liberal order is in fl ux as not all rising powers give equal respect to the principles and values underpinning it. However, the rise of new power centres is inevitable and irreversible. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the power transition will be peaceful or confl ictual? It would be peaceful if established powers accommodate rising powers and give them roles and responsibilities in 11 VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS VIKASH CHANDRA accordance with their respective status. In this regard, TV Paul (“The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics” in TV Paul (Ed), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p2) argues that amidst the redistribution of power, while “structural conditions can lead to confl ict ... (the) proper synchronisation of strategies for peaceful change by established and rising powers can mitigate the possibilities of violent confl ict”. In accounting for the treatment of rising regional hegemons by leading states Evan B Montgomery (In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016, p11) contends, “If a leading state is worried that a local actor might dominate a peripheral region ... then it will prefer parity to ensure that its own access to the area is not jeopardised. In this case, it should accommodate the rising regional powers that are attempting to weaken local hegemons”. On the other hand, “if a leading state is more concerned about an outside power conquering a peripheral region, then it will prefer primacy instead because the strongest local actors are the best barriers to intervention”. (Montgomery, ibid) This paper is divided into four sections. The fi rst defi nes accommodation while the second delineates some of its successful and failed cases. The third section explicates how the differences and/ or similarities in domestic variables shape the mutual intentions of established and rising powers. The last part throws light on the possible scenario of the emerging international order. WHAT IS ACCOMMODATION? The redistribution of power and resources is a continuous process in the international system and as a result new states rise while the capabilities of existing powerful states decline either in absolute or relative terms. This leads to a problem of status recognition between established and rising powers, as the former demonstrate a conservative and reluctant attitude to the recognition of new states and the sharing of power while rising states want their status recognised at the earliest to claim new roles and responsibilities as per their status. For an amicable resolution, “the waning hegemon must cede infl uence to the rising challenger to the point where the latter’s prestige matches its actual power”. (Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981 cited in Randall L Schweller, Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders, Valdai Discussion Club Paper 16, Moscow, 2015, p3, online at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru) Such status recognition is 12 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER regarded as accommodation. Thus, a two-dimensional process takes place between established and rising powers, which has been defi ned and understood varyingly by scholars. According to Paul, (ibid, p5) accommodation stands for status adjustment and leadership role sharing between established and rising powers through membership and due roles in international institutions and acceptance of spheres of infl uence. He adds that the accommodation of rising powers simply implies that emerging powers are given the status and perks associated with the rank of great power in the international system, including in many instances a recognition of spheres of infl uence or the decision not to challenge them militarily. This does not however assume deep friendship or lack of competition. Thus, in essence, accommodation is nothing but a readjustment of status, manifest in two ways—membership in international organisations and regimes and the relative position of The accommodation of rising states in that conglomeration. (Jeffrey powers simply implies that W Taliaferro, “Did the United States and the Allies Fail to Accommodate Japan in the 1920s and 1930s” in emerging powers are given the Paul, ibid, p175) That is, in the process of status and perks associated with accommodation, established powers the rank of great power in the grant membership to rising powers international system, including in leading organisations and regimes, in many instances a recognition ample share in global governance and recognition and respect for spheres of spheres of infl uence or the of infl uence. The accommodation decision not to challenge them lasts when power sharing is to the militarily. This does not however extent that the rising powers are assume deep friendship or lack content with it and voluntarily give of competition. up their revisionist intentions, at least for some considerable duration. Nevertheless, Paul believes that nonviolent accommodation is a rare phenomenon because the preferred strategy of established powers vis-à-vis rising powers is containment and preventive wars. Once the rising powers reach threshold capability, they often try to achieve higher status by altering the existing international order even at the cost of war. Accommodation is “peaceful” only when competition between the established and rising powers does not “lead to confl ict and war” and “rising powers are willing to play by mutually acceptable norms and rules”. (Paul, ibid, p5) 13 VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS VIKASH CHANDRA ACCOMMODATION OR CONTAINMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST Successful accommodation is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions found at the domestic, transnational and systemic levels. Martin Claar and Norrin M Ripsman (“Accommodation and Containment: Great Britain and Germany Prior to the Two World Wars” in Paul, ibid, p152) suggest that accommodation is possible if three conditions are satisfi ed. First, if rising powers do not challenge the core interests of declining powers, at least in the short term. Second, even if established powers feel threatened, it is no more so than rising powers do. Lastly, if the dynamics of domestic group politics in the established power system prefer cooperation. Charles Kupchan too considers three conditions—institutionalised restraint, compatibility of social orders and cultural commonality—or the political, ideological and cultural similarity between the rising and established powers, as key to accommodation. (Ali Zeren and John A Hall, “Seizing the Day or Passing the Baton: Power, Illusion and the British Empire” in Paul, ibid, p117) He argues that the British accommodation of the US in the early twentieth century was a result of similarities between the two states. Both nations were liberal democracies with limited governments, checks and balances and the rule of law. The extension of the franchise in Britain coincided with a resolution of the north-south confl ict in the US, which “created compatible social orders” in the two states. (Zeren and Hall, ibid, p129) There already existed a cultural commonality between the two. However, because of its limited explanatory power, Kupchan’s similarity argument has come under fi erce criticism. Zeren and Hall (ibid) argue that the US’s accommodation “owes little to British skills” and the former could seize power from Britain as and when “it was able to do so”. Other scholars state that rather than similarities, domestic and systemic variables play a pivotal role in determining whether power transition is peaceful or confl ictual. In the case of the US and China, domestic changes such as Richard Nixon’s coming to power, the death of Mao Tse Tung, Beijing abandoning its revisionist foreign policy goals and Deng Xiaoping’s four modernisations played a pivotal role in the US’s partial accommodation of China in the early 1970s. According to Lorenz M Lüthi, (“The US Accommodation of Communist China” in Paul, ibid, p132) context matters for accommodation. That is, structural factors like increasing nuclear parity between the US and the Soviet Union, the widening rift between China and the Soviet Union, the Afghan crisis, the beginning of the new 14 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER Cold War and the Iranian revolution compelled the US in the late 1970s to accommodate China fully. If the satisfaction of certain conditions paves the way for accommodation, the lack of it inevitably pushes leading states to opt for containment. Claar and Ripsman (ibid) point out that the failure to accommodate rising powers depends on environmental and volitional variables. They conclude that partisan domestic politics, competing national interests and a restrictive environment compelled Britain to contain Germany in the early twentieth century. On the basis of case studies of the Japanese–Russian rivalry If leading states believe that (1894–1904), the South Asian crisis regional hegemons may challenge (1971) and Iraq’s quest for primacy (1979–91), Montgomery (ibid, p23) their position, containment will asserts that “a leading state should be the preferred strategy. Here align with the weaker side in a regional the prospects of accommodating competition to ensure that the area rising powers increase if they does not fall under the sway of a single are in a position to challenge actor”. Thus if leading states believe regional hegemons that may that regional hegemons may challenge challenge the leading states. The their position, containment will be the US’s backing of Pakistan against preferred strategy. Here the prospects of accommodating rising powers increase India in the South Asian crisis if they are in a position to challenge of 1971 and sending its Seventh regional hegemons that may challenge Fleet was a case of balancing the the leading states. The US’s backing de facto regional hegemon. of Pakistan against India in the South Asian crisis of 1971 and sending its Seventh Fleet was a case of balancing the de facto regional hegemon. (Montgomery, ibid, pp102–25) Britain’s response to Japan’s rise in Southeast Asia and its war with Russia was based on the same logic that shaped the US response to the South Asian crisis—Britain wanted to contain Russia’s rise in Asia and therefore covertly supported Japan. The American response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the quest to gain primacy in the Gulf region was based on the assumption that after acquiring a hegemonic position in the regional system, Iraq would claim a sphere of infl uence that would be incompatible with the US’s sphere of infl uence. 15 VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS VIKASH CHANDRA DECODING THE INTENTIONS OF RISING POWERS The mere convergence or divergence of interests does not explain why established powers accommodate or contain rising powers. Rather, one has to look at the intentions of the rising powers, that is, whether they are “poised to reinforce, establish, undermine, or overturn the type of local order that leading states prefer”. (Montgomery, ibid, p17) Despite intentions being an important variable in shaping state behaviour, the problem that persists is that states cannot always be certain about the intentions of other states. (John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton, 2001, p31) On the basis of the behaviour and foreign policy goals of rising powers, two types of intentions may be discerned—revisionist and status quoist. Revisionist states are not satisfi ed with their status and seek to “undermine the established order for the purpose of increasing their power and prestige in the system”. (Randall L Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p24) Whereas satisfi ed states “accept the existing ordering principles of the international system” (Steve Chan, “Can’t get no Satisfaction: The Recognition of Revisionist States”, International Relations of the Asia–Pacifi c, vol4, no2, 2004, p216) and voluntarily show willingness to “preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order”. (Schweller, 1998, ibid) States that have political regimes, economic systems, social systems and human rights regimes in line with the existing international order are less likely to be revisionists while those with distinct visions are more like to be so, as they believe they are discriminated against. Despite their respectable positions in the international system, the international order does not refl ect their norms and values. Thus, the intentions of rising powers are important—for status quoists or states wanting to make only slight changes to the existing international order the prospects of accommodation are better than for revisionists. China’s preferences and behaviour show mixed motives. Its engagement in multilateral organisations indicates a status quoist stance. However, its political regime, economic system, closed society and human rights regime create suspicion. Although the West formally respects the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, on grave human rights violation issues it appears to move away from the Westphalian notions of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic jurisdiction towards a pro-interventionist stance. China however 16 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER vociferously “tends to defend the principle of non-interference”. (Yang Razali Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect, New York: Springer, 2014, p44) Contrary to American liberal values that put the individual and human rights at the centre, China believes that “sovereign rights will always be more valued than individual rights” because Chinese society, unlike Western liberal society, is organised around a group or society and not the individual. (Ashley J Tellis and Sean Mirski, “Introduction”, Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2013, p8) According to Chinese strategic culture “the optimal hierarchy of political priority should be tianxia (the world) > country/nation > family and not the current, undesirable order of individual > community > country/nation”. (Fei-Ling Wang, “From Tianxia to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World Order” in G John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng (Eds), America, China and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies and Global Visions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p57) The Chinese and American conceptions of human rights also vary. Henri Feron (“The Chinese Model of Human Rights”, China Legal Science, vol3, no5, 2015) highlights that America bestows universal abstract Beijing’s adherence today to human rights while China has multilateral institutions and the cultural relativist Asian values. The international order is suspect American model prioritises civil and because many believe that once political rights while the Chinese model prioritises social and economic it becomes powerful enough to values. While the universal conception alter the existing order, it will is based on individual rights, in the not hesitate to take measures to Chinese conception, society is above place itself at the centre of the the individual or the individual is international system. subordinate to society. Although China and the US share capitalism, Chinese style capitalism is distinct from its American counterpart. In this regard, Yasheng Huang (“Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the Washington Consensus”, Academy of Management Perspectives, vol24, no2, 2010, p33) argues that since the early 1990s, the “China model (has been) ... more statist in orientation ... (with an) emphasis on fi nancial and political control”. These principles and practices are often referred to as the “Beijing Consensus”, whose defi ning features include gradualism, managed globalisation, export-led growth and state capitalism. It “offers an alternative to the policy toolkit offered to developing countries”. (Mustafa Yağci, “A Beijing Consensus in the Making: The Rise of Chinese Initiatives in the International Political Economy and Implications for Developing Countries”, Perceptions, vol11, no2, 17 VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS VIKASH CHANDRA 2016, p30) Certain elements of China’s strategic culture also raise suspicion. For instance, the concept of tianxia (all under heaven) places China at the centre of the international system, where other “countries acknowledge its cultural and political superiority”. (Elizabeth C Economy, “History with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s Imagined Past Shapes its Present”, Foreign Affairs, July–August 2017) Fei-Ling Wang (ibid) avers that the worldview/concept of tianxia has made “a strong rearticulation in China”. It is not only “entirely different from ... (but also) opposing to the dominant Western worldview of nation-states that implies national sovereignty, competition and balance of power”. China for the most part has shown revisionist intentions. It believes that “the tianxia worldview is the precondition for a new, better, more harmonious and rational world order”. (Wang, ibid) With regard to Chinese revisionist intentions, Joshua Cooper Ramo (The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power, Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2004, p3) notes, “China is assembling the resources to eclipse the US in many essential areas of international affairs and constructing an environment that will make US hegemonic action more diffi cult”. Beijing’s adherence today to multilateral institutions and the international order is suspect because many believe that once it becomes powerful enough to alter the existing order, it will not hesitate to take measures to place itself at the centre of the international system. The institutionalisation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa) led New Development Bank support this argument. Moreover, China has as we have shown an authoritarian political regime, an economic system with features distinct from liberal conceptions, a human rights regime that keeps society instead of people at the centre and a social system that also keeps society at the core and the individual at the periphery. Unlike China’s mixed motives, non-democratic regime, divergent ideology and contrary organising principles of society that create mutual suspicion, there are greater similarities between India and the US that create positive mutual perceptions. India is the largest democracy in the world with an increasingly open market economy. Along the lines of Western liberal democracy, civil society in India is being strengthened even at the cost of state power. (Tellis and Mirski, ibid) To bring in transparency and empower the people, the government introduced the Right to Information Act in 2005. Further, New Delhi supports multilateralism and multilateral institutions, especially 18 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER the United Nations and its principles and purposes and is a staunch supporter of a rule-based system. Instead of being a revisionist state seeking to challenge and disrupt the present international order, India is a “status quo power ... (that) aspires to a seat at the table”. (Aseema Sinha, “Partial Accommodation without Confl ict: India as a Rising Link Power” in Paul, ibid, p226) In the post-liberalisation era, a consensus has emerged that state intervention in the economy should be minimal and the role of the public sector reduced. Consequently, the disinvestment process has been gradually intensifi ed. India also advocates a human rights regime consistent with universal human rights. This however does not mean that India does not have any disagreement with the existing international order. Despite an adherence to a rule-based system, it opposes hegemonic adventurism in While India does not have multilateral fora. India has reservations an alternative vision of the against the way some norms and international order, it does principles have been selectively implemented. It stands for the principle disagree with the US on the of non-intervention and strongly existing international order. adheres to the national sovereignty and Therefore, it is likely that New territorial integrity norms enshrined Delhi will adhere to the present in the United Nations Charter and international order but with international law according to which slight modifi cations. intervention should be as a last resort. New Delhi believes that exceptional breaches of state sovereignty and non- intervention norms should require the consent of host states, in self-defence and/ or with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, while India does not have an alternative vision of the international order, it does disagree with the US on the existing international order. Therefore, it is likely that New Delhi will adhere to the present international order but with slight modifi cations. Russia to a certain extent represents revisionism and its relationship with the US has been mired in mistrust and mutual suspicion. It does not support American-style unilateral adventurism in a rule-based system but instead believes in “collective leadership of the major states”. (Nicola Contessi, “Prospects for the Accommodation of a Resurgent Russia” in Paul, ibid, p275) Russia is unwilling to accept the US’s unilateral leadership model and regards incidents like the US led bombing in Serbia, 19 VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS