Mark B. Tauger September 2014 Retrospective for Yale Agrarian Studies This paper briefly presents the development of my ideas about Soviet agriculture and the famine of 1931-1933 and some of the issues that this research has raised. It omits my work on India and world agriculture, which I would be happy to discuss. The standard view sees Soviet collectivization as a policy of exploitation, a view based on certain Marxist theories and a very selective use of evidence. The standard view also holds that the famine of the early 1930s was the result of collectivization. A related interpretation views the famine as genocide aimed against allegedly rebellious nationalists. My research has shown that the famine resulted from drought, plant disease and pest infestations that caused two years of crop failures. I argue that this famine has to be understood in a broader context of earlier famines and Soviet agricultural sciences. I showed that the famines of the 1920s, not mentioned in previous studies, led Soviet leaders to resort to collectivization to restructure Soviet agriculture on the model of American mechanized farming, as an attempt to overcome its vulnerability to environmental disasters. Another important context is the history of Soviet agricultural sciences. The literature is split over the ability of Trofim Lysenko to distort Soviet biological research. Some studies focus on Lysenko’s victims such as N. I. Vavilov and overstate Lysenko’s impact; others show that many scientists evaded his domination. The case of Pavel Luk’ianenko shows that there were scientists in the USSR who witnessed the famine, understood its environmental causes, and worked to improve Soviet agriculture to prevent these disasters despite Lysenko. My research challenges the widely-held and publicized interpretation of the 1933 famine as a man-made famine that the Soviet regime allegedly imposed on Ukraine and other regions like Kazakhstan, to suppress political opposition or for other reasons. My work shows that these arguments usually misuse evidence, avoid contrary evidence, and misrepresent or ignore alternative interpretations. I am working now on a project on the history of Russian and Soviet famines that addresses their causes, the relief efforts to deal with them, and the interpretations of them. I will discuss scientific attempts to explain and devise methods to avert them, include Luk’ianenko’s work. 1. My work in this field began with my dissertation: Commune to Kolkhoz: Soviet Collectivization and the Transformation of Communal Peasant Farming, 1930-1941. PhD dissertation, UCLA, 1991. 1 In this I was strongly influenced by James Scott’s work on the “moral economy” and the arguments about peasant resistance. In working on this dissertation, however, I increasingly found the evidence for resistance to be isolated cases and not representative, and I also found other more concrete forms of evidence that suggested a different interpretation. The key insight was in my first article: 2. "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933." Slavic Review, v. 50 no. 1, Spring 1991, 70-89. Exchanges with Robert Conquest on this article, Slavic Review, v. 51 no. 1, Spring 1992, 192- 194; v. 53 no. 1, Spring 1994, 318-319. This article presented the data from the kolkhoz annual reports, which were final harvest data and showed that the 1932 harvest was much smaller than indicated in the official harvest statistics. It discussed evidence that the famine affected large areas of the country, cities as well as rural areas, and concludes that the famine was the result of serious crop failures. The main work to which I responded in this article was Robert Conquest’s Harvest of Sorrow, and my debates with him were published in Slavic Review as listed here. As a result of this work Robert Davies, a well-known British historian of the USSR whom I met while doing dissertation research in the UK, invited me to participate in two projects, which resulted in the following articles: 3. "Soviet Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-1933," coauthored with R. W. Davies and S. G. Wheatcroft, Slavic Review v. 54 no. 3, Fall 1995, 642-657. Republished in Christopher Read, The Stalin Years, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2003. 4. "Narkomzem SSSR and Economic Decision-Making in the 1930s." Chapter in E. A. Rees and R. W. Davies, eds., Soviet Economic Decision-Making in the 1930s, London: MacMillan, 1997, 150-175. The grain stocks article documented that the Soviet regime accumulated grain stocks during 1932 and then distributed them as famine relief in 1933. It was a response to an unpublished paper by a Russian scholar that claimed that the USSR had large stocks that it withheld, which turned out not to be true. The Narkomzem article discusses the policies of the Soviet agricultural commissariat during the 1930s, and some of the agricultural policies it implemented. At this point neither I nor any other historians knew about Luk’ianenko. During my research for these articles in Moscow, I came across much other evidence that challenged components of the traditional interpretation of the 1931-1933 famine and Soviet agricultural history. My work with this evidence resulted in the following publications. 5. "Grain Crisis or Famine? The Ukrainian State Commission for Aid to Crop Failure Victims and the Ukrainian Famine of 1928-1929," in D. J. Raleigh, ed., Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001). 2 This article documented the previously unknown famine of 1928-1929 in Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet relief effort for this famine, and some Soviet leaders’ responses to it. This article also discussed the similarly overlooked 1924 famine, which affected Ukraine and the rest of the USSR, and for which the regime also provided relief using imported food. 6. Statistical Falsification in the Soviet Union: A Comparative Case Study of Projections, Biases, and Trust, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies (Seattle: University of Washington, 2001), no. 34. 81pp. This paper explained the differences between the official harvest statistics of 1932 and the much smaller harvests reported in the kolkhoz annual reports. It showed that the official data were forecasts, and were therefore different in kind and much less reliable as an indication of the causes of the famine than the annual reports, which the collective and state farms were required to submit every year. 7. Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies (Pittsburgh: REES, University of Pittsburgh, 2001), no. 1506. 63pp. This paper, based on my first paper for the Yale Agrarian Studies series, documented the environmental factors that reduced the 1932 harvest, especially the 1932 rust infestation, and argued that these factors were more important than labor, lack of draft forces or other factors in causing the crop failure and the famine. Previous historical studies never mentioned most of the environmental factors I discussed, which were based on Soviet, European, and American scientific studies and data. 8. “Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-1939: Resistance and Adaptation,” Journal of Peasant Studies, v. 31 nos 3-4, April/July 2004, 427-546. Republished in Stephen Wegren, ed., Rural Adaptation in Russia, New York: Routledge, 2005. This article returned to the issue of peasant resistance that I had studied in my dissertation. It critical evaluated the idea of a “resistance interpretation,” showing some of the problems in the data for that interpretation. It placed that evidence in a broader perspective that took into account a more comprehensive range of actions of peasants in the USSR in the 1930s. The article showed that peasant resistance was a much less common pattern than adaptation to the new system, and cannot be seen as a major cause of the system’s problems. 9. “Stalin, Soviet Agriculture, and Collectivization,” in Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars, ed. Frank Trentmann and Fleming Just, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 109-142. This article drew out the implications of my 2001 study of the 1928-1929 Ukrainian famine for the standard view of collectivization as a means to exploit peasants and facilitate “procurement” of food from villages. The economist James Millar questioned this view in the 1970s by 3 showing that the regime invested more in collective agriculture than it extracted from it. My article argued that these larger expenditures were not accidental, as Millar thought, but intentional. I argued that the famines, famine relief and imports of the 1920s, and the weaknesses of Soviet agriculture (which neither the standard view nor Millar even mentioned), convinced Soviet leaders that Soviet farming was vulnerable to disasters because it was outdated and primitive. The leaders decided to restructure Soviet farming based on U.S. mechanized farming, which they saw as the most advanced farming system at the time. They began with a program of mechanized state farms in 1928 as a test project for collectivization. 10. “Modernization in Soviet Agriculture,” in Modernisation and Russian Society since 1900, ed. Markku Kangaspuro and Jeremy Smith, Helsinki: SKS, 2006. In this article I critiqued some widely-held negative views about Soviet agriculture by comparing certain aspects of Soviet agriculture to similar patterns in Western capitalist agriculture. This comparison also included a discussion of collectivization in light of Western farming. 11. “Famine in Russian History,” The Supplement to the Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, v. 10 (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 2011), 79-92. This encyclopedia article was a first attempt to work out my idea of viewing Soviet famines in light of the long history of famine, famine relief, and views of famine in Russian history. My ideas also developed in several so far unpublished papers on the 1924 famine, on American influences on Russian and Soviet agricultural scientists, and on Vavilov and Luk’ianenko. Because my research challenged established views associated with Cold War anticommunism, some referees attacked my papers in reviewing them for publication, and some editors demanded I change them to conform to the old views. Three times my articles were rejected, but other journals or series always accepted them. A few scholars dealt with my work in ways that constituted academic malfeasance. I published one article about a particularly egregious case: 11. “Arguing from Errors: On Certain Issues in Robert Davies’ and Stephen Wheatcroft’s Analysis of the 1932 Soviet Grain Harvest and the Great Soviet Famine of 1931-1933,” Europe- Asia Studies v. 58 no. 6, September 2006, 973-984. Another case involves the Yale historian Timothy Snyder, who revived the old views of collectivization as exploitation and the 1933 famine as genocide in his recent book Bloodlands. Snyder asserted (on p. 41-42) that during the famine of 1932-1933, Stalin did not reduce exports and did not provide famine relief. He cited as evidence the article (number 3 above) on Soviet grain stocks. In fact our article documented (pp. 652-653) that the Soviet government reduced exports and distributed millions of tons of grain as famine relief. I had documented these points in my other articles, dating back to 1991. Snyder stated at the honorary Callahan Lecture at West Virginia University in February 2012 that he had read “everything” I wrote. 4 Snyder also asserted (on p. 395) that Stalin allowed grain exports in order to make a “profit,” citing no evidence. My 1991 article, which Snyder asserted that he read, cited archival sources that the Soviet regime had fallen behind in paying its foreign debts and faced extremely punitive actions from foreign countries. According to German Chancellor Bruening, “their credit would be destroyed for good and all” if they did pay their foreign currency debts. Most of these points are also documented in easily available sources. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported on 10 December 1932, p. 10, that the Soviets had cancelled grain exports to all but one of its foreign purchasers. Snyder’s bibliography included other publications that documented famine relief in 1933. Robert Conquest’s Harvest of Sorrow, a key book for the Holodomor interpretation, admits that Soviet famine relief ended the famine in a few months. He did not cite any of these publications in his book. Snyder’s claims that the USSR maintained large exports and withheld reserves are central to his book’s argument, which views the 1933 famine as essentially the same as the Holocaust. If the regime reduced exports and distributed millions of tons of food from reserves as famine relief, then the image of the Soviet man-made famine is not correct. The Nazis in World War II obviously did not send millions of tons of food relief to alleviate conditions in the concentration camps. The famine affected most of the country, including 40 million people in towns dependent on a rationing system, which also distinguishes the Soviet case from the Holocaust. Soviet leaders made bad decisions that worsened the famine, but the regime also provided relief and helped peasants produce a larger harvest that ended the famine. Their actions continued relief programs that date back to the 1920s and the Tsarist regime. Here is what one Ukrainian reader wrote to me about my 2001 article on the 1928-1929 famine in Ukraine. “I was reading the first article you sent me on the way home and I'm glad you mention those famines in the late 20s because it seems that insofar as we can trust the evidence from that era, it creates a serious problem for those who would claim that the famine was "man-made" or "engineered". Obviously they made some mistakes in 31-32 in terms of policies, but it doesn't make sense that they would enact so many relief measures during several consecutive famines, only to start deliberately starving the same people shortly after.” Snyder explicitly told me that he read this article, but did not mention it or the 1928 Ukrainian famine in his book or his talk. Overall, my work has brought to light an environmental and agrarian history that the older literature on Soviet collectivization has omitted. I think it is essential for anyone writing about agrarian topics to address this research, rather than ignore it in order to make a political point. 5 1 “Pavel Pantelimonovich Luk’ianenko and the Origins of the Soviet Green Revolution” Mark B. Tauger, West Virginia University1 ©Mark B. Tauger, Dept. of History, West Virginia University Forthcoming in a collection of articles from the Second International Workshop on Lysenkoism, Vienna, Austria, June 2012. INTRODUCTION: The idea of a “Soviet Green Revolution” seems almost inconceivable: according to almost all scholarly and popular publications, the Stalinist policy of collectivization devastated Soviet agriculture, and the pseudoscientist Trofim Lysenko, supported by Stalin and Khrushchev, similarly destroyed Soviet genetics. Recent studies, however, have challenged this stereotype about collectivization.2 This article deals with Soviet genetics and plant breeding, and also contributes to a revised view of collectivization, by describing and contextualizing the hybrid wheat-breeding work of Soviet scientist Pavel Panteleimonovich Luk’ianenko at the Krasnodar agricultural research institute in the Kuban region. Luk’ianenko and his associates -created wheat varieties resistant to several of the environmental threats that had long caused crop failures and famines in Kuban and elsewhere in the USSR. These varieties included semidwarf high- yielding varieties [HYV] of wheat - such as Bezostaia-1 - which achieved international recognition for their high quality. Luk’ianenko’s work, which continued the work of the great Soviet biologist Nikolai Vavilov and was clearly on the forefront of world applied genetics, took place in the USSR during the peak 2 period of Lysenko’s power. This Soviet breeding program began before the plant breeding work of Norman Borlaug in northwest Mexico that was later called the “Green Revolution,” and continued contemporaneously with it. The Soviet program had the same objectives, employed the same basic breeding methods based on standard genetic principles, and used many of the same sources of plant germplasm, including hybrid dwarf and semi-dwarf wheats from Japan, Italy, Argentina and the USSR. The concurrence of Lysenko’s dominance and Luk’ianenko’s initiation of a Green Revolution in the USSR, absent from the historical literature except for a single brief reference in one publication, raises important questions about the conventional interpretation of Lysenkoism and Soviet agriculture.3 This article outlines the main components of the Green Revolution outside the USSR, and describes and analyzes the main Russian and Soviet research that laid the basis for similar developments in the USSR. It then discusses the limits of Lysenko’s attempts to stop Soviet genetics research: it was possible for an innovator to emerge despite Lysenko’s administrative position and his efforts to control Soviet research in genetics and agricultural sciences. Finally, it reviews Luk’ianenko’s work and discusses important issues that this history raises. A. The International Green revolution The usual story of the Green Revolution focuses on plant scientists from the United States.4 According to this story, Mexican officials asked the Rockefeller Foundation for aid in 1942, after infestations of rust, a major fungal plant disease of wheat, devastated wheat crops and greatly reduced harvests three years in a row. The Foundation financed a group of scientists who began 3 a research program in Mexico to breed wheat resistant to disease and drought. One of these scientists, Norman Borlaug, set up an experiment station in Ciudad Obregón in northwest Mexico, and in the 1950s introduced into its breeding program the partly Japanese dwarf wheat Norin 10. By the early 1960s, Borlaug’s group had bred semi-dwarf high-yielding varieties [HYV] that produced much higher yields when used with a “package” of fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation. These varieties inherited from Japanese wheat one or more “reduced height genes” (Rht), which caused the plants to grow short but very thick and sturdy straw much less likely to “lodge” or collapse.5 This crucial phenotype transformed these plants into high-yielding varieties because it allowed farmers to use more fertilizer, so the plants could develop a larger ear of grain containing more and heavier seed without the risk that lodging would destroy the crops. In 1963, the Ciudad Obregón center was renamed the International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat, known by its Spanish acronym CIMMYT. Borlaug encouraged international exchanges of varieties to develop new ones, and proselytized among world leaders to adopt the high-yielding varieties. After two years of droughts, crop failures, and incipient famine in 1965-1966 in India, Borlaug persuaded Indian politicians to import high yielding varieties of wheat and begin breeding programs. By 1970 India dramatically increased its wheat production. For this success as well as his previous work Borlaug was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. In 1971 CIMMYT and other recently formed research centers were unified under the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research [CGIAR], which now includes 16 agencies working on a wide range of agricultural problems. 4 This narrative of the Green Revolution is incomplete and slightly misleading because it omits or minimizes plant breeding work done before Borlaug and outside the United States in an international effort to produce higher-yielding crops. A brief review of this earlier history provides the necessary background to Luk’ianenko’s work and helps understand his unique contribution.6 Japanese farmers obtained the short wheat varieties in the 16th century from Korea, where they had been grown since late antiquity.7 In the 1920s, Japanese breeders crossed a short variety with varieties from the Mediterranean and Russia to produce 18-inch tall Norin- 10.8 Meanwhile, the first European to incorporate Japanese varieties and breed what were in essence the first HYVs was the Italian scientist Nazareno Strampelli (1866-1942).9 Strampelli set out to breed high-yielding wheat because of Italy’s dependence on imported wheat, as in 1904, when crop failures caused shortages in Italy while Argentina, its main source of imports, had an enormous harvest. Strampelli set out to make Italy self-sufficient in wheat years before Mussolini recruited him to lead his “Battle for Wheat” campaign of the 1920s.10 Strampelli and his co-workers at his research center in Rieti produced at least 65 new wheat varieties that substantially increased wheat production in Italy between 1900 and World War II. He specifically set out to breed wheat that had short stems to resist lodging, ripened early, and resisted rust, using the Japanese dwarf wheat Akakomughi. Two important results of these crossings were the varieties Ardito and Mentana, released in the 1920s, and used on millions of acres in Italy and elsewhere. In 1923, Strampelli went to Argentina with some of his new varieties and inspired agronomists there to breed new varieties based on the Italian ones. One breeder used Ardito and Mentana in crossings that produced rust resistant semi-dwarf varieties, named Klein 30, 31, and so forth, after the scientist who developed them. Borlaug used Mentana 5 as one of his main breeding varieties in Mexico in the 1940s, and applied the same basic approaches as Strampelli. The work of Strampelli and the other Italian breeders was (as an Italian scholar put it) the ‘first example’ of the Green Revolution.11 As the examples of Italy and Mexico show, the Green Revolution was inspired by chronic low food production, vulnerability to crop failures and dependence on imported food. The efforts to develop new varieties involved cross breeding of diverse domestic and foreign varieties to create new types of wheat with short, sturdy stems to resist lodging and with resistance to plant diseases, severe weather, and other characteristics. These characteristics were necessary to enable these new varieties to produce much higher yields. B. The Russian Background to the Green Revolution and the work of N. I. Vavilov The history of plant breeding in Russia and the USSR followed more or less the same pattern as the Green Revolution in the west: it sought the same goals, used many of the same varieties, and anticipated Borlaug’s work. Like Mexico and Italy, Russian breeding was also motivated by agricultural crises. The main difference was the interruption of Stalinism and Lysenko, discussed in the next section below. Russia has a long history of famines: famines occurred in more than 400 of its 1,000 years of Russia’s recorded history.12 Environmental disasters almost always caused these famines: drought or heavy rain, extreme cold or heat, lodging from heavy rains or excessive plant growth, weeds, pests, and blights (plant diseases). Russians, from peasants to scientists, tried to alleviate