Resolve, Reputation, and War: Cultures of Honor and Leaders’ Time-in-O�ce by Allan Dafoe A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Steven Weber, Chair Professor Ron Hassner Professor Jasjeet S. Sekhon Professor Matthew Rabin Spring 2012 Resolve, Reputation, and War: Cultures of Honor and Leaders’ Time-in-O�ce Copyright 2012 by Allan Dafoe 1 Abstract Resolve, Reputation, and War: Cultures of Honor and Leaders’ Time-in-O�ce by Allan Dafoe Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Steven Weber, Chair Leadersthroughouthistoryhavebeenconcerned—oftenobsessed—withhowotherleaders perceive them. Historians have argued that many wars have been fought for purposes of reputation, honor, status, and prestige. However, there is little systematic study of these phenomena, and specifically of the e↵ects of concern for reputation for resolve on interstate conflictbehavior. Afterpreciselydefiningresolve, andreputationforresolve, thisdissertation examines this question by developing a family of formal models of escalation and reputation- engagement. From these models I explicitly deduce four testable implications of variation in concern for reputation for resolve that take selection e↵ects into account and are robust to a variety of assumptions. To test these implications I search for research designs where concern for reputation is manipulated in a manner that is reasonably well-understood, and in which large unknown biases are unlikely. I find two such designs. The first, analyzed in collaboration with Devin Caughey, compares U.S. conflict behavior depending on whether the president is from the U.S. South. The U.S. South has a “culture of honor” that places greater importance on an individual’s reputation for resolve. Using permutation inference and NPC, a technique new to political science, to provide a joint statistical test of the predictions, we find that conflict behavior under Southern presidents is substantially and significantly di↵erent from non-Southern presidents in a manner predicted by my theory. Furthermore, this di↵erence remains significant under a large number of matched comparisons. This result is unlikely to bespuriousbecauseofitsrobustnesstoconditioningandbecauseoftheoreticalandempirical inconsistencies in the alternative accounts. The second research design compares the conflict behavior of leaders early in their time- in-o�ce with those same leaders later in their time-in-o�ce. Leaders at the start of their tenure, as compared with themselves later in their career, should care more about their reputations because they have less developed reputations and longer time horizons. Each prediction of my theory is examined and finds statistically significant support with relatively 2 large e↵ect sizes. Alternative potential explanations are systematically ruled out through critical tests. In summary, the results from a set of clear tests of the e↵ect of concern for reputation are consistent with the strongest claims made in the literature: concern for reputation seems to be an extremely important cause of war. i To my parents. ii Contents List of Figures v List of Tables vi 1 Reputation for Resolve in International Relations 1 1.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 Credibility, Deference, Status and other Reputational Aspirations of States . 3 1.2.1 Reputational Aspirations in International Politics . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2.2 Threat Credibility, Deterrence, and Reputation for Power . . . . . . . 5 1.3 Reputation for Resolve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4 The Fundamental Importance of Reputation for Resolve . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Figure 1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4.1 Coercion Game: b > a > c and x > y > z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4.2 Cooperation Game: c > a > b and y > z > x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.4.3 Importance of Commitment Devices, and hence Reputation . . . . . . 11 1.5 The Study of Concern for Reputation for Resolve (CRR) . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.5.1 Sechser 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.5.2 Research Design Issues in the Study of CRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.5.3 Selection E↵ects and Testable Implications of CRR . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.6 Research Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 Model of Escalation and Reputation-Engagement 17 2.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2 Summary and Analysis of the Formal Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.2.1 Summary of the Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.3 Equilibrium Strategies and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.4 Analysis of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.4.1 Limiting the Parameter Space Under Consideration . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.4.2 Only C Indi↵erence Point Interior? (Denoted Situation C) . . . . . . 23 2.4.3 Solving the Model under Situation C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.4.4 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 iii 2.4.5 Private CRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.4.6 Model F and R with Observable CRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.4.7 Signing dp1 for Specific Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 dR1 2.4.8 Summary of Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.5 Empirical Implications of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.5.1 Numerical Examination of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.5.2 Duration/Fatalities in Model F with Observable CRR: d� . . . . . . 38 dR1 dw1 2.5.3 Victory in Model R with Observable CRR: R . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 dR2 3 Honor and War 40 3.1 Honor, Interstate Conflict, and the American South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.1.1 Honor in International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.1.2 The Culture of Honor in the Southern United States . . . . . . . . . 44 3.1.3 Southern Honor and Foreign A↵airs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.2 Testable Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3.3.1 Data and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Nonparametric Approach . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.3.3 Statistical Tests and Causal Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Figure 3.3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.3.4 Details of the Statistical Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3.3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Table 3.3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.3.6 Ruling Out Alternative Causal Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Figure 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4 A Strong First Impression 59 4.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.1.1 Reputation Engagement and Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.1.2 Leader-Specific Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.1.3 Theory of Diminishing Reputational Incentives with Time-in-O�ce . 65 4.1.4 Empirical Findings Related to Time-in-O�ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.2.1 Subsetting by Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.2.2 Subsetting by Regime Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.3 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 iv 5 Conclusion 86 5.1 The Dark Matter of International Relations: Concern for Reputation . . . . 86 5.2 But Do Reputations Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5.2.1 Press’s Selection of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 5.2.2 The Di�culty of Showing the Absence of Reputational Inferences . . 89 5.2.3 Other Reasons to Take Reputation Seriously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.3 Empirical Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.4 Concern for Reputation in International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 A 109 A.1 Appendix for Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 A.2 Ability to Detect Reputational Inferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 v List of Figures 1.1 Generic Reputation Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1 Model of Escalation and Reputation Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.2 Cases and Indi↵erence Points for P ’s Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1 2.3 Unique Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.1 Conflict behavior under Southern and non-Southern presidents. . . 50 3.2 NPC p-values for (96) joint hypothesis tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.1 Histogram of Observations by Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 vi List of Tables 2.1 Numerical Examination of dp1 for Logistic Distribution . . . . . . . . 33 dR1 2.2 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.3 Numerical Examination of d� . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 dR1 dw1 2.4 Numerical Examination of R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 dR2 3.1 Matched sets of presidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.1 Behavior over Time-in-O�ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.2 Behavior over Time-in-O�ce (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 4.3 Time-in-O�ce Analysis with Leader Fixed-E↵ects. . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.4 Analysis on Subsets of Leaders by Age at Start of Term . . . . . . . 76 4.5 Analysis on Subsets of Leaders by Regime Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.6 Testable Implications of Di↵erent Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.7 Examining Marginal E↵ects over Time-in-O�ce . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4.8 Marginal E↵ects over Time-in-O�ce (for Polity < 7) . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.9 Analysis on Subsets of Leaders by Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 5.1 Probability of Fulfilling a Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 A.1 List of (regular entry) leaders who best fit the theory, sorted by combined rank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 A.2 List of (regular entry) leaders who best fit the theory, sorted by modified combined rank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 A.3 List of (regular entry) leaders who had the worst fit with the theory, sorted by combined rank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112