MARCH 2017 RECALIBRATING U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD RUSSIA A New Time for Choosing PROJECT DIRECTORS PRINCIPAL AUTHORS Kathleen H. Hicks Lisa Sawyer Samp Jeffrey Mankoff Lisa Sawyer Samp Kathleen H. Hicks Anthony Bell Olga Oliker Heather Conley Jeffrey Rathke Blank MARCH 2017 RECALIBRATING U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD RUSSIA A New Time for Choosing PROJECT DIRECTORS PRINCIPAL AUTHORS Kathleen H. Hicks Lisa Sawyer Samp Jeffrey Mankoff Lisa Sawyer Samp Kathleen H. Hicks Anthony Bell Olga Oliker Heather Conley Jeffrey Rathke Lanham • Boulder • New York • London About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 fulltime staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preemi- nent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and eco- nomic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Cen- ter’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. G N SI ISBN: 978-1-4422-8005-2 (pb); 978-1-4422-8006-9 (eBook) O O H C R O F E M TI W E N A A: SI S U R D R A W O T Y G E T A R Center for Strategic & International Studies T S S. 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW U. G Washington, DC 20036 N TI 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org A R B LI A C Rowman & Littlefield E R 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 II 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Contents IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V The Choice V The Challenge VII The Strategy 5 INTRODUCTION 7 Scope and Objectives 13 CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIA CHALLENGE 14 U.S. Policy during the Cold War 16 Russia’s Post–Cold War Accommodation 17 Putin’s Russia Defines a New Foreign and Security Policy 25 CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDIES ON RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE 26 The Kosovo War, 1999 IIIIII 30 NATO Enlargement, 1990–2004 34 Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 2004 39 Russian’s Intervention in Georgia, 2008 44 The Ukraine Crisis, 2013–2015 54 Russia’s Intervention in Syria, 2015 59 Russia's Use of Force: Case Study Conclusions 63 CHAPTER 3: RUSSIAN INSTRUMENTS OF POWER 65 Political and Economic Tools 65 The Information Space: Cyber Operations, Information Operations, and Electronic Warfare 71 Nuclear Capabilities 71 Russia’s Conventional Military Forces 84 Recent Military Operations: Ukraine and Syria 86 Conclusions 89 CHAPTER 4: U.S. AND ALLIED INSTRUMENTS OF POWER 90 Political and Diplomatic Instruments 94 Economic Tools 102 Military Instruments 135 Conclusion 137 CHAPTER 5: RESPONDING TO THE RUSSIA CHALLENGE 139 U.S. and European Actions in Perspective 143 Confronting the Challenge We Face 145 Defining Strategic Objectives 150 The Ways and Means of a Strategy in Practice 162 ABOUT THE PROJECT DIRECTOR AND AUTHORS 166 NOTES G Acknowledgments N SI O This project would not have been possible without the combined efforts of the Interna- O H tional Security Program, the Russia and Eurasia Program, and the Europe Program at CSIS. C R The project directors and the authors would like to thank the many experts and staff at O F CSIS who contributed to the research and writing of this report, especially Andrew Met- E M rick, who lent his vast knowledge of military capabilities to this project, as well as Grant TI W Murphy, Amelia Armitage, Matthew Melino, Max Shafron, Oliver Backes, Nick Conlon, E N Su-zanne Freeman, Mikhail Strokan, Leland Sidle, and Katherine Baughman. A A: We would also like to extend our thanks to the experts at CSIS who offered insightful re- SI S views and comments throughout the drafting of this report, including Christine Wormuth, U R D Thomas Karako, Rebecca Hersman, Alan Dayton, Edward Chow, and Wes Rumbaugh. R A W We are grateful to the CSIS Dracopoulos iDeas Lab for the outstanding layout and graphics O T in this report, especially the inspiring efforts by Caroline Amenabar and Nirja Desai, along Y G with the management support of Max Markusen. E T A R The study team also appreciates the numerous experts who gathered and met with us in T S S. Brussels, Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington, D.C., to share their time and insights at various U. points throughout the study process. In particular, the CSIS team thanks the EU Institute G N for Security Studies for facilitating a productive working group meeting in Brussels. TI A R Finally, the study team thanks the Smith Richardson Foundation (SRF), which sponsored B ALI this work. The content and recommendations presented—including any errors—remain C E solely those of the authors. R IV Executive Summary These are turbulent times for American foreign policy. Nowhere are the challenges facing the United States more evident than in U.S. policy toward Russia. Drawing on scholars across several disciplines and perspectives, CSIS conducted a year-long study that sought to achieve two goals. First, to provide policymakers with a clearer under- standing of Russia’s strategic motivations and objectives, along with the tools it could use to advance its goals. Second, to lay out a comprehensive strategy to secure U.S. and transatlantic interests in the face of the complex Russia challenge set. The Choice • A fundamental choice faces the Trump administration: either it can work to defend and bolster the global system America helped create, or it can aid in the system’s de- struction, through intent or neglect, and start anew. This choice extends beyond U.S. strategy toward Russia, but is foundational to the direction any such strategy will take. In turn, how the United States approaches Russia will reverberate throughout its world affairs, setting expectations for allies, partners, and potential foes alike. • President Putin has made his preference clear. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian security policy has been suffused to greater and lesser degrees with a sense that the West did not accord it sufficient respect as a great power. Russia’s propensity to use force to right this perceived historical wrong has risen over the years, commensurate with its growing military prowess and economic and internal stability. Moscow today is viewing its options through the lens of a security dilem- ma that defines U.S. strength as its own weakness, and vice versa. It sees control of its periphery as central to its own security, and Putin may be seeking to reap domestic political benefits through foreign escapades abroad. Russia is testing its tools of coercion, which are increasingly unconstrained by the rule of law, and find- ing them sufficiently effective to meet its objectives. It does not want a war, but it is VV finding it can get a lot done without one. • Accommodating Russia’s preference would mean more than developing a new un- derstanding with Russia about Europe’s security. It would mean rethinking the val- ues and organizing principles, including the role of the United States in the world, that have served as the foundation of global security since the end of World War II. It would mean a world in which political decisions are made by great powers for smaller powers; where borders can be redrawn by force; where liberal democratic values fall victim to autocratic whims; and where existing international obligations are no longer valid. The Challenge • Defending the international system against Russian attempts to undermine it will require addressing two interrelated problems. First is the degree of disrepair within the West’s core institutions, which has been exposed and exploited by the second (more obvious) problem—Russia’s renewed aggression and opportunism. The first cannot be expected to spontaneously fix itself and requires concerted action across the United States and Europe to revitalize our institutions and inoculate our societies against illiberal trends. The second will not abate while Moscow is reaping such ben- efits from the situation as it stands. Indeed, Russia’s incentives today appear to push it toward more activism, rather than less. • The weaknesses that have been revealed in the current international system extend beyond and are rooted deeper than the Russia challenge, but Russia is exploiting the West’s vulnerabilities and increasing them. These weaknesses include the tone and polarization of U.S. and European politics, our susceptibility to disinformation, the disengagement and disenchantment of our publics (who have largely forgotten why NATO and the European Union were created), growing income inequality, the lack of transparency and corruption in our governments, Europe's divestment in defense, and the lack of clear and shared priorities. • Russia’s revisionist turn is not the only significant challenge the U.S.-led interna- tional order faces today. In both the United States and Europe, the Russia chal- lenge competes for attention and resources with a range of other threats: large- scale migration as well as terrorism spawned by disorder in the Middle East; economic dislocation; the rise of populism; and the continued if uneven rise of China and other non-Western powers. In contrast to the Cold War, the Russia challenge is rarely sufficient to promote unity of purpose among Western allies, especially with the emergence of populist, pro-Russian movements in several Western states. • Russia’s rebellion against Western-prescribed rules, norms, and values makes use of a range of military and nonmilitary levers. Its nonmilitary coercive tools, such as cyber infiltration and political influence operations, are being used to strong effects. It is likely still calibrating what can and cannot be done at acceptable risk, but insofar as these tools can be impactful at less human and financial cost than military tools, the United States and Europe dismiss these capabilities at their peril. • In the conventional military realm, Russia continues to modernize and build. It has combined its niche capabilities with a low bar for the use of force to ably do more with less. Russia’s armed forces remain well below the capabilities of the United States and NATO, but they are sufficient to Russia’s preferred means of using them: smaller-scale G operations with comparatively limited goals in defined regional spheres. The United N SI States and its allies, by contrast, have been overly hesitant and reactive in using the O O wide and global array of tools at their disposal. H C R • Almost every facet of the collective Western response to the Russia challenge— O F from its overly cautious tactics to its insufficiently realistic assumptions—remains E M far removed from what is required to adequately manage it. To believe that Russia is TI W committed to risk reduction, transparency, and predictability is a dangerous start- E N ing point that will lead the West astray. Russia is playing a different game—one in A A: which Western leadership and existing institutions are to be challenged and in which SI threats, ambiguity, and violence have emerged as effective, and thus preferred tools. S U Moreover, dissonance among allies is only serving to further embolden Russia and R RD broaden its goals. The United States and its allies must chart a clearer course in their A W Russia strategy, and take a bolder approach in its implementation. O T Y • A bolder approach to Russia does not equate to warmongering or taking reckless ac- G E tion without concern for the consequences. It also does not mean challenging Russia T A R at every opportunity. However, given what is revealed in this report regarding Russian T S S. motives, past use of force, instruments of power, and so-called redlines, it is logical to U. conclude there exists a wide gulf between the steps that have been taken to date and G N the steps that could be taken in the future to increase the West’s leverage vis-à-vis TI A Russia without sparking a conflict, or even coming close. This will entail lessening R B LI the West's sensitivity to Russia’s reflexive protestations and false indignation, while A C also taking into account Russia’s interests and perspective. E R VI The Strategy • U.S. strategy should aim to defend the current global order, protect the transatlantic relationship, and manage the Russia challenge in a way that avoids direct hostilities, discourages the sowing of global instability, and builds ties with the Russian people. This should be done until Moscow stops playing the spoiler and begins to work con- structively to develop and strengthen security in Europe and the world—a long-term proposition to be sure. In support of these objectives, the United States should pur- sue actions across three key pillars: strengthen, contest, and cooperate. • Strengthen the health of our democracies, institutions, and defenses. First, the West must shore up its vulnerabilities not simply to Russian coercion, but to all that makes Russian coercion possible. The Unites States and its allies will not be credi- ble critics of Russian aggression if they do not provide a strong alternative example. Among other things, this requires practicing what we preach, standing up for human rights and democracy in Russia and elsewhere, reinvesting in NATO and expanding NATO-EU cooperation, reevaluating global interests and establishing clear priorities, and building resilience among allies and partners. • Contest Russian attempts to undermine U.S. interests. Second, the United States needs more-robust offensive and defensive measures to contest Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions. Russia’s challenging of the international order will not be con- strained only by punitive measures imposed after the fact, but must also be shaped by the proactive imposition of a predictable set of policies and actions that makes clear the United States’ boundaries and expectations. This means shaping a new rela- tionship paradigm, together with our transatlantic partners, that puts more onus on Russia to comply with international norms rather than simply imposing consequenc- es for breaching them. The sooner that the West adjusts its expectations and begins standing firm in defense of its interests, the better able it will be to shape events vice fall victim to them. A stronger approach may include creating a predictable sched- ule of progressing sanctions, conducting proportional offensive cyber activities, in- VII creasing and optimizing the U.S. and overall NATO conventional military presence in Europe (including greater allied burden sharing), doing more to combat Russian propaganda, and supporting non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, in their right to maintain sovereignty. • Cooperate where advantageous and feasible. Finally, engagement with Russia on areas of mutual interest is not only wise but necessary. The United States must approach engagement selectively, cautiously, and with firm limits. It must remain steadfast in upholding its core values, remain clear-eyed about Russia's motives, and understand the potential tradeoffs that deal-making with Russia might entail. Engagement that degenerates into endless accommodation does not serve U.S. or allied interests. For now, the United States and its allies may wish to focus on areas where cooperation is both advantageous and feasible. This may include: improving crisis communications and transparency measures, maintaining nuclear nonpro- liferation and moving forward on bilateral nuclear and conventional arms control, and working together in the Arctic. • Attention should be paid to any potential opportunities for interaction across these pillars—particularly between the contest and cooperate pillars—that could create leverage for the United States as it seeks political concessions in its negotiations with Russia. The more strongly the United States contests Russian attempts to reshape the security landscape, the greater the opportunities later to cooperate on acceptable terms. In other words, escalate to negotiate. • U.S. leadership in forging a common approach with allies will also be essential. The role of the United States as a leader in NATO provides a unique platform to resolve disputes and drive the agenda. While it is crucial that European voices be at the cen- ter of European policy, the United States must be prepared to push back against calls for greater isolationism and accommodation and rally allies to remain resolute in de- fending the rules-based international order. ◊ The Importance of Europe. While focused on Russia, this report also emphasiz- es the importance of Europe. This is not meant to suggest that Russia’s ambitions are geographically limited. Europe, however, is where U.S. political, economic, and security interests come into greatest tension with Russian interests and where the stakes are arguably the highest beyond America’s own shores. This is because the U.S. interest in Europe extends well beyond preserving the ideal of a just and stable global order. ◊ Next to the strength of our constitutional democracy, our alliance structure is America’s greatest foreign policy advantage. Europe is home to a number of the United States’ most capable and willing coalition partners, who have fought and died alongside the United States in every major combat operation since the turn of the twentieth century. Joint action under NATO adds legitimacy and capability to U.S. interventions and U.S. military bases in Europe enable rapid global force projection. Intelligence relationships with European allies multiply the United States’ ability to maintain awareness of common threats. Despite needing to grow, the collective defense budget of European allies amounts to $300 billion annually, more than quadruple Russia’s defense budget. The European Union is the United States’ largest and most important economic partner, with trade totaling over $1 G trillion in goods and services in 2014 alone, supporting an estimated 2.6 million N U.S. jobs. Additionally, the United States’ close relationship with Europe provides SI O powerful diplomatic influence that can shape allied decisionmaking in a way that O H is beneficial to U.S. political and policy imperatives, as well as to American busi- C R ness interests. Appeals for nations to “buy American” will have less resonance with O F allies that feel abandoned or threatened. E M TI • This approach in some ways builds on the strategy of the Obama administration. W E However, it is neither reluctant in implementation nor averse to accepting some esca- N A lation risk (criticisms that have been levied against the Obama administration’s strat- A: egy). It is decisive and forceful in nature and defined by the defense of U.S. interests. SI S U Now is the time for choosing a clear path that manifests a high U.S. priority on Europe- R RD an and transatlantic security. Should it rush to make deals with Russia to secure lesser A W objectives, the United States may well find itself sacrificing a more fundamental goal: O T advancing a global order that benefits our people, our economy, and our constitutional Y G values. Standing resolutely by our allies and our treaty commitments is central to up- E AT holding that order. This approach will speak to Putin’s Russia in the language it best un- R ST derstands: power and resolve. At the same time, it seeks to avoid miscalculation and es- U.S. calation by finding avenues for cooperation where possible and by adapting deterrence G approaches to signal effectively across the full spectrum of Russian security threats. N TI A R B LI A C E R VIII