Rationality Reconsidered Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research Edited by Günter Abel and James Conant Volume 9 Rationality Reconsidered Ortega y Gasset and Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Belief, and Practice Edited by Astrid Wagner and José María Ariso Series Editors Prof. Dr. Günter Abel Technische Universität Berlin Institut für Philosophie Straße des 17. Juni 135 10623 Berlin Germany e-mail: [email protected] Prof. Dr. James Conant The University of Chicago Dept. of Philosophy 1115 E. 58th Street Chicago IL 60637 USA e-mail: [email protected] ISBN 978-3-11-044199-4 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-045441-3 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-045404-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printing on acid free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com. Table of Contents List of Abbreviations VII José María Ariso and Astrid Wagner On Constraining Rationality and Revisiting the Logic of Beliefs: An Introduction 1 Part 1: The Problem of Rationality Günter Abel Rethinking Rationality: The Use of Signs and the Rationality of Interpretations 15 Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer Rationality, Reason, and Wisdom On the Significance of Meta-Philosophical Reflection in the Case of Ortega and Wittgenstein 31 Javier Vilanova Arias Rationality, Philosophy, and Common Sense 49 Part 2: Rationality, Pluralism, and Relativism Ángeles J. Perona Pluralism and Soft Rationality in the Philosophy of Ortega and Wittgenstein 75 Stefan Majetschak Moore and the King Wittgenstein on the Groundlessness of World-Pictures 89 Astrid Wagner Dynamics of Basic Beliefs in the Philosophical Approaches of Ortega and Wittgenstein 103 VI TableofContents Part 3: Belief and Knowledge Thomas Gil Are There Background Beliefs? 119 Jaime de Salas Belief and Perspective after Ortega and Wittgenstein 125 Karsten Schoellner The Life and Logic of Our Beliefs 141 Stefan Tolksdorf Knowledge and the “Favor of Nature” 171 Part 4: Limits of Rationality José Medina On Refusing to Believe: Insensitivity and Self-Ignorance 187 José María Ariso Counterwill and Logical Priority Over Ideas: Two Constituents of Our Basic Convictions 201 Kevin Mulligan Anatomies of Foolishness 1927–1937 215 Ana María Rabe Scientific Rationality, Experience of Limit, and the Problem of Life and Death in ‘Tractatus’ Wittgenstein in Dialogue with Newton and Tolstoy 237 Notes on contributors 267 Author Index 271 Subject Index 275 List of Abbreviations Thefollowingabbreviationshavebeenusedinthisvolume.Detailsontheeditionstheauthors haveusedaregivenintheindividualbibliographiesattheendofeachchapter. WorksbyJoséOrtegayGasset ETG EntornoaGalileo(ManandCrisis) HG Elhombreylagente(ManandPeople) HS Historiacomosistema(HistoryasaSystem) IC Ideasycreencias(IdeasandBeliefs) LA LasAtlántidas MQ MeditacionesdelQuijote WorksbyLudwigWittgenstein CV CultureandValue LWPP LastWritingsonthePhilosophyofPsychology OC OnCertainty/ÜberGewissheit PI PhilosophicalInvestigations/PhilosophischeUntersuchungen RFM RemarksontheFoundationsofMathematics TLP TractatusLogico-Philosophicus Z Zettel José María Ariso and Astrid Wagner On Constraining Rationality and Revisiting the Logic of Beliefs: An Introduction In this volume we will treat the topic of rationality, understanding the term in a broad sense. We will try to develop a constructive perspective on the topic in whichelementsofphilosophyoflanguage,phenomenology,pragmatism,andphi- losophyoflifearelinkedwitheachother.Subjectsthatwillbetreatedinthepapers are: the relation of knowledge and belief, of implicit and explicit knowledge, the role of world-pictures and forms of life, questions regarding certainty, error, doubt,andmadness,abouttheroleoflifepractice,abouttheoreticalandpractical rationality, aswellasaboutmattersofpluralismandrelativism. The two reference authors of the volume, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1888–1951) andJoséOrtegayGasset(1883–1955),belongtothesamegeneration,butcome fromvery different philosophical traditions.Wittgenstein’s early work has been influenced by logical positivism; later he developed a new form of philosophy oflanguage,inwhichthepracticeispivotalforthegenerationandunderstand- ing of meaning. By contrast, Ortega’s philosophy is informed by very different approaches: the Marburg neo-Kantianism, the perspectivism of Nietzsche, the life philosophy of Dilthey, and Husserl’s phenomenology. While conserving some methods, main concepts, and reflections of these approaches,Ortega de- veloped an independent, phenomenologically inspired philosophy of life that has become known under the term“ratiovitalism”. Although both authors never entered into any intellectual dialogue with each other, there are a number of conceptual and argumentative affinities and points of intersection in their philosophical works, particularly with regard to thequestionofrationalityinabroadsense.Theseparallelsprovidethepossibil- ityof bringingboth approaches into a synergetic relation. Both authors investi- gate the structures and limits of rationality, and both criticize the restriction of rationalityconcepts to the intellectual, mental sphere. InordertoanalyzetheroleofrationalitywithinOrtega’swork,itisparticu- larly useful to consider his attitude towards rationalism and the kind of reason he ended up devising. Such attitude towards rationalism is already revealed in the 1920s,when he positions himself in relation to the antinomy between life andculture.Inexplainingthisposition,Ortegaopposesrationalismtorelativism tosuchanextentthatnoneofthesetermscanbeunderstoodwithouttakingthe other into account, for each of them gives up what the other withholds.Taking 2 JoséMaríaArisoandAstridWagner theproblemoftruthasareferencepoint,henoticesthatrelativismforgoestruth to bring life to the forefront,whilst rationalism relinquishes life to keep truth. Ortegarejectsbothoptions.Relativism,hesustains,cannottakeitselfseriously iftruthdoesnotexist,astheamputationoffaithintruthwouldentailthatlifebe- comesabsurd.Withregardtorationalism,heisaversetoitsdenialofthehistorical dimension, as rationalism considers knowledge possible only if reality can pene- tratethe individualwithoutdeforminghim,that is, if heremains unchanged and, thus, alien to history and life itself. Rationalism would thus reduce history to the accountofthecountlesserrorsthatwillhascausedpeopletocommitbyavoiding reasontomanifestitself,andfurthermore,bypreventingtheindividualfromdiscov- eringallthetruthshecanreach.Purereason,hestates,cloistersitselfbyfocusing onthegeometricperfectionofitsproducts,butitisblindtolifeandvitalproblems. Bearingthisinmind,Ortegatakessidesneitherwithrelativismnorwithrationalism, forheregardsalifewithouttheorganoftruthasabsurdasatruthwhichonlyexists ifithaspreviouslybeenstrippedofvitalfluency.However,theopposition–orrath- er,thecomplementarity–betweenrelativismandrationalismisnotrestrictedtothe problemoftruth,asthisoppositionexistsalsointherealmsofethics,law,art,re- ligion,and,inshort,inallaspectsofculture.Whenusingtheterm‘culture’,Ortega emphasizesvitalconnotationsattheexpenseoftechnicalones,whichleadshimto present thought as a function as vital as digestion or blood circulation. Hence, thought continues to be subject to an objective law,but now it is also considered avitalnecessity. Infact,Ortegaproclaimsthatrationalism’scentralerrorliesinclingingtoa fictitious reason which is not contemplated as avital function: in other words, rationalism’s main error lies in regarding culture as radically detached from life, as if culture were onlyguided by its objective laws,but not by the laws of life.ThealternativelaiddownbyOrtegaconsistsinseekingbalancebetweencul- tureandlifebecause,inhisview,anyimbalancebetweenthemdoesinexorably leadtodegeneration.WhileinthetimeofSocratesphilosopherstriedtoputpure reason in the place of spontaneous life, thus generating not a substitution but only a mere concealment, because what we really are – spontaneity – cannot be replaced by what we are not really – pure reason –,Ortega seeks to subject reason to vitality, for reason, in his view, is only an island that floats on the sea of vitality by which it is nourished. In facing up to Socrates’ enormous task, Ortega holds that the mission consists in ensuring that culture is put at the service of life. But what seems to be a defeat of culture does clearly not imply its dissolution: far from that, traditional culture must become biological culture,whilst pure reason must cede its sovereignty to a new form of reason called vital reason. In a nutshell, Ortega is not opposed to reason in itself but