Public Diplomacy and the Media in the Middle East Philip Seib August 2013 Figueroa Press Los Angeles PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST Philip Seib Published by FIGUEROA PRESS 840 Childs Way, 3rd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90089 Phone: (213) 743-4800 Fax: (213) 743-4804 www.figueroapress.com Figueroa Press is a division of the USC Bookstore Copyright © 2013 all rights reserved Notice of Rights All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmit- ted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission from the author, care of Figueroa Press. Notice of Liability The information in this book is distributed on an “As is” basis, without warranty. 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Figueroa Press and the USC Bookstore are trademarks of the University of Southern California ISBN 13: 978-0-18-216180-5 ISBN 10: 0-18-216180-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2013947679 For general inquiries or to request additional copies of this paper please contact: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School University of Southern California 3502 Watt Way, G4 Los Angeles, CA 90089-0281 Tel: (213) 821-2078; Fax: (213) 821-0774 [email protected] www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy CPD Perspectives is a periodic publication by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, and highlights scholarship intended to stimulate critical thinking about the study and practice of public diplomacy. Designed for both the practitioner and the scholar, this series will illustrate the breadth of public diplomacy—its role as an essential component of foreign policy and the intellectual challenges it presents to those seeking to understand this increasingly significant factor in international relations. CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy is available electronically in PDF form on the Center’s web site (www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org) and in hard copy by request. About the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School The USC Center on Public Diplomacy seeks to advance and enrich the study and practice of public diplomacy through its research and publication programs, professional training and public events. The USC Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD) was established in 2003 as a partnership between the Annenberg School for Communication and the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. It is a joint research, analysis and professional training organization dedicated to furthering the study and practice of global public diplomacy. Since its inception, the Center has become a productive and recognized leader in the public diplomacy research and scholarship community. CPD has benefited from unique international support within academic, corporate, governmental, and public policy circles. It has become the definitive go-to destination for practitioners and international leaders in public diplomacy, while pursuing an innovative research agenda. For more information about the Center, visit www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5 Public Diplomacy and the Media in the Middle East Public diplomacy, for purposes of thisrpaper, will be defined tersely: reaching out to global publics directly, rather than through their governments. This can be done in numerous ways, ranging from a micro approach, such as a Peace Corps project in an individual village, to the macro efforts that rely on various forms of mass media. This latter approach has long been at the heart of public diplomacy. Radio and television have been invaluable political tools for nations that have used them wisely. From the U.S. initiating radio broadcasts on the Voice of America during World War II, to China’s recent multi-billion dollar investment in its CCTV, governments have calculated the value of delivering information to people’s homes across the globe. In the Arab world, broadcasters such as the BBC and CNN have long offered outsiders’ perspectives on events affecting the Middle East, while more recently Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and other Arab television channels have allowed people in the region to watch the events that affect them through Arab eyes. This paper examines changes in how the Arab world receives and dispenses public diplomacy since the uprisings that began in 2011. The Middle East media universe has expanded and become more sophisticated in ways that affect Arabs and others. The Al Jazeera Generation To appreciate the impact of various forms of media in the Middle East it is necessary to recognize the history of ways that news is delivered in the region and the political influences on that delivery. An important ancestor of today’s regional Arab media was The Voice of the Arabs, a program first broadcast on Cairo radio in 1953. It soon had its own channel, broadcasting 18 hours a day, and its message was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arabism—a revolutionary mix of socialism and anti-colonialism that challenged conservative Arab governments.1 The Egyptian leader was among the first in the region to understand how broadcasting could affect regional politics. Marc Lynch observed that Voice of the Arabs “aimed 6 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST primarily at mobilizing pressure from below on rival regimes. Radio broadcasting transformed the potential for Arab political action by bringing Arabist political speech (if not rational discourse) directly to the increasingly mobilized masses.”2 The overt political messaging of Voice of the Arabs is only thinly disguised in the broadcasts of its most notable descendants, principally Al Jazeera television. The pan-Arab theme comes across in coverage decisions and talk shows, bringing a certain level of cohesion to the notion of “Arabness.” Faisal Al Kasim, host of Al Jazeera’s talk show The Opposite Direction, observed: “If anything, satellite talk shows have brought the Arab masses together and given them a pan-Arab identity. In other words, to a certain extent they have played a nationalist role by narrowing and sometimes bridging divides. In fact, one might argue that popular talk shows on Al Jazeera and other channels have succeeded where Gamal Abdel Nasser failed. Debate programs and live talks on satellite broadcasting are watched avidly by millions of Arabs and are contributing a great deal to the formation of pan-Arab public opinion over many issues. Arab viewers can now share each other’s problems, issues, and concerns.”3 Aside from purely political matters that contribute to the popularity of Arab media (although this popularity fluctuates depending on the issues of the day), the cultural significance of Arab news organizations covering the topics most affecting Arabs’ lives is important in understanding the contemporary Middle East media environment. The strength of Al Jazeera, from its inception in 1996, has been that its existence serves as an answer to the question, “Why must we rely on the likes of CNN and the BBC to get news about ourselves?” Qatar-based Al Jazeera capitalized on its indigenous character, as did a slew of additional channels such as Saudi-funded Al Arabiya. The best of the new Arab channels offer audience-grabbing topics and unprecedentedly high production values. Their “Arabness” is often reflected in coverage. In Al Jazeera’s reporting of the 2008 Olympics, “after an Algerian boxer won silver and an Egyptian Boxer PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7 won bronze, the bulletin headline was ‘New medals for Arabs in Beijing’ and not ‘New medals for Algeria and Egypt in Beijing.’ The item did go on to say the athletes’ countries…but it was the athletes’ Arab character that producers thought would attract maximum attention. Such flagging sends the message that the viewers, like the athletes, are ‘Arab’ and should take pride in the achievements of ‘their’ competitors, even if from a different state. This discourse was repeated throughout Al Jazeera’s Olympic coverage.”4 Perhaps the most significant characteristic of these broadcasters is that although their news product remains tethered to the policies of their home governments (even if this is sometimes disguised), satellite television is unfettered by physical borders. It reaches into countries where parochial state broadcasters—with their government- controlled content and drab on-air appearance—long were dominant because there were no viable options, but suddenly found themselves unable to compete effectively with the regional newcomers. The rise of pan-Arab broadcasting was accompanied by the rise of public expectations. News consumers found that the satellite dishes dotting almost every Arab city’s skyline could bring them vast amounts of information. Their worldviews were changing, and by the time the Arab uprisings of 2011 began, their appetites for media content of various kinds had expanded enormously. Those appetites were also becoming more sophisticated, with audiences differentiating between state-run and independent offerings, and the preference for the latter becoming more pronounced. Al Jazeera was not exempt from this, as it found that it was perceived by some as being merely a voice for Qatari foreign policy – policy that was seen by some as not adequately supportive of the uprisings in certain countries or too inflammatory in reporting events in other nations. Media and politics have always been inseparable, and a case can be made that as more media venues become available to the public, that relationship becomes more complex. More facets of characteristics such as “Arabness” become apparent, and those conducting public diplomacy must recognize that reaching publics is becoming ever more complicated. 8 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST Credibility and Public Diplomacy Should information disseminated as a part of public diplomacy be considered by its recipients to be believable and useful, or should it be dismissed as mere propaganda? That question persists, and how it is answered does much to determine public diplomacy’s value. The answer reflects various principles of public diplomacy: • A country’s public diplomacy is only as effective as the policies behind it. When President Barack Obama visited Cairo in 2009, he delivered a beautifully written speech that promised, among other things, assistance to the Palestinian people. Obama said, “So let there be no doubt: The situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. And America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.”5 That won applause in the Arab world, but it lasted only briefly because the United States was not perceived as following up with substantive policies to assist the Palestinians. • Perceived lack of “foreignness” is an asset, enhancing credibility. In 2011, when Muammar Qaddafi tried to blame Al Qaeda, Israel, and other outsiders for the rebellion within Libya, Libyans had access to Arab news sources that they trusted. As a result, wrote Shibley Telhami, Qaddafi’s “narrative was simply dismissed.”6 Just as Al Jazeera and other Arab news channels are more credible to many viewers than are channels from outside the region, so too are other forms of public diplomacy. (A historical example of this phenomenon can be seen in the British government’s “public diplomacy by proxy” efforts in 1940, when emphasis was placed on influencing American journalists’ content rather than relying solely on the BBC and other British media to sway Americans’ attitudes about assisting Britain in its war against Germany. American voices were judged to be more effective than British ones in puncturing America’s isolationist bubble.)7 As new regional, national, and local media proliferate, the ability of outsiders to compete effectively diminishes sharply. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 9 • Use of social media and other Internet-based communication, as well as pervasive mobile telephony, redefines “communities of interest” in terms of affinity and credibility. Given the breadth of Internet-based content, individuals can match their own specific interests with those of others as reflected by Facebook page content, Twitter feeds, YouTube imagery, and such. So many easily accessible venues for indigenous content now exist that it has become more difficult for foreign governments and other parties interested in conducting public diplomacy to compete for attention and to make the case for their own credibility. Taken together, all these factors create a universe of intellectual complexity in which information consumers have wider choice and greater autonomy. By comparison, a half-century ago, during the Cold War, when Eastern Europeans decided what information was credible, their choices were simpler: Radio Moscow and its brethren, or the Voice of America, BBC, and similar non-communist dispensers of information. When the United States government, for example, wanted to conduct public diplomacy directed to the publics of communist-bloc countries, competition was scarce. If indigenous sources were available, their reach was limited and their longevity precarious. Today, with indigenous sources plentiful, accessible, and credible in the Middle East, the public diplomacy environment is much different. Just getting the public’s attention is an intensely competitive process. As will be discussed below, this does not apply solely to outside voices, but also to those emanating from within the Arab world. In terms of democratic theory, all this is to the good – a great array of freely expressed voices that stimulate open political discourse. Within this array is a broad range of political perspectives and predispositions that affect the impact of public diplomacy. Shahira Fahmy, Wayne Wanta, and Erik C. Nisbet found that within the Arab world, U.S. public diplomacy is most successful not at winning converts from among those who are strongly anti-American,