Public Choice (2007) 130 Author Index Agren, H., 137 Lazarev, V., 437 Azfar, O., 471 Leeson, P.T., 41, 245 Barrett, S., 179 Mork, E., 137 Belova, E., 437 Miinster, J., 329 Binder, J.J., 251 Majumdar, S.K., 209 Bjgrnskov, C., 267 Mixon, F.G., 503 Bjgrnskov, C., | Nelson, Jr., W.R., 471 Black, H.T., 503 Padovano, F., 401 Brennan, G., 457 Paldam, M., 311 Brenner, S., 225 Patty, J.W., 293 Brooks, M., 457 Pecorino, P., 337 Calabrese, S., 23 Primo, D.M., 129 Carter, J.R., 163 Quesada, A., 395 Christoffersen, H., 311 Richter, W.F., 239 Crocker, C.C., 503 Schelker, M., 79 Dahlberg, M., 137 Schwarz, P., 363 Depken II, C.A., 55 Schwieren, C., 115 Dreher, A., 267 Sen, K., 209 Eichenberger, R., 79 Spaeth, H.J., 225 Felgenhauer, M., 347 Staffiero, G., 115 Fischer, J.A.V., 267 Sutter, D., 499 Fredriksson, P.G., 381 Temimi, A., 337 Gardner, R., 495 Thompson, E.A., 99 Guillen, P., 115 Wiirtz, A.H., 311 Kifmann, M., 243 Weber, R.A., 293 Lépez, E.J., 249 Whitmeyer, J.M., 225 Lagona, F., 401 Wollscheid, J.R., : = Springer Public Choice (2007) 130 Public Choice Contents of Volume 130, 2007 Volume 130, Nos. 1-2 Articles Christian Bjornskov, Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison 1-21 Stephen Calabrese, An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts 23—40 Peter T. Leeson, Efficient anarchy 41-53 Craig A. Depken, II, Another look at anti-scalping laws: Theory and evidence ; 55-77 Reiner Eichenberger, Mark Schelker, Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government 79-98 Earl A. Thompson, The tulipmania: Fact or artifact? 99-114 Pablo Guillen, Christiane Schwieren, Gianandrea Staffiero, Why feed the Leviathan? 115-128 David M. Primo, A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The open rule equilibrium and coalition formation 129-135 Hanna Agren, Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mérk, Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation 137-162 John R. Carter, An empirical note on economic freedom and income inequality 163-177 Scott Barrett, The smallpox eradication game 179-207 Sumit K. Majumdar, Kunal Sen, The debt wish: Rent seeking by business groups and the structure of corporate borrowing in India 209-223 Saul Brenner, Joseph M. Whitmeyer, Harold J. Spaeth, The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court 225-237 Wolfram F. Richter, Mathias Kifmann on “health insurance in a democracy: Why is it public and why are premiums income related?” 239-242 Mathias Kifmann, Health insurance in a democracy: A reply to Richter 243 Book Reviews Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg, eds., Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (Peter T. Leeson) 245-247 J. Patrick Gunning, Understanding Democracy: An Introduction to Public Choice (Edward J. L6pez) 249-250 D Springer Volume 130, Nos. 3—4 Articles John J. Binder, Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election 251-266 Christian Bjornskov, Axel Dreher, Justina A.V. Fischer, The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world 267-292 John W. Patty, Roberto A. Weber, Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence 293-310 Henrik Christoffersen, Martin Paldam, Allan H. Wirtz, Public versus private production and economies of scale 311-328 Johannes Minster, Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment 329-335 Paul Pecorino, Akram Temimi, Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation 337-346 Mike Felgenhauer, A sheriff, two bullets and three problems 347-362 Peter Schwarz, Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio? 363-380 Per G. Fredriksson, Jim R. Wollscheid, Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy 381-393 Antonio Quesada, 1 dictator = 2 voters 395-400 Francesco Lagona, Fabio Padovano, A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union 401-436 Eugenia Belova, Valery Lazarev, Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance 437-456 Geoffrey Brennan, Michael Brooks, Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply 457-470 Omar Azfar, William Robert Nelson Jr, Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption 471-493 Book Reviews Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. (Roy Gardner) 495-497 Gordon Tullock, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking (Daniel Sutter) 499-501 Erratum Franklin G. Mixon, Chena C. Crocker, H. Tyrone Black, Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising Author Index Volume Contents