Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)                         Psychology under Fire: Adversarial Operational Psychology and Psychological Ethics   Jean Maria Arrigo Project on Ethics and Art in Testimony, Irvine, CA Roy J. Eidelson Eidelson Consulting, Bala Cynwyd, PA Ray Bennett Washington, DC       Authors  Note  1.  This  essay  has  been  published  in  Peace  and  Conflict:  Journal  of  Peace   Psychology  (Copyright,  American  Psychological  Association;  DOI:  10.1037/a0030323).   This  article  may  not  exactly  replicate  the  final  version  published  in  the  APA  journal.  It  is   not  the  copy  of  record.     Authors  Note  2.  For  consultations  on  this  essay  we  are  grateful  to  Julianne  McKinney,   Case  Officer  A,  Commander  A,  David  Debatto,  David  MacMichael,  Grant  Marler,   Lawrence  Rockwood,  and  Special  Investigator  A  (military  intelligence);  David  Cooper   and  Walter  Schaller  (ethics);  Clark  McCauley,  Trudy  Bond,  Steven  Reisner,  and  Stephen   Soldz  (psychology);  Chuck  Ruby  (military  psychology);  Carolyn  Fluehr-­‐‑Lobban   (anthropology);  Chaplain  A  (U.S.  Army  chaplaincy);  Robert  Shabkie  (law);  John  Crigler   (finance);  journal  editor  Susan  Opotow,  and  anonymous  reviewers.  Correspondence   concerning  this  article  should  be  addressed  to  Jean  Maria  Arrigo,  110  Oxford  Street,   Irvine,  CA  92612.  Contact:  peat@peat-­‐‑intel.org     1 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   Abstract     The  9/11  attacks  on  the  United  States  have  motivated  psychologists  to  advance   counterterrorism  and  related  operations  through  psychological  principles  and  skills.   These  operational  psychologists  seek  to  legitimize  adversarial  interventions  against   targets  by  prioritizing  societal  welfare  over  traditional,  individual-­‐‑focused  principles  of   psychological  ethics.  In  this  essay  we  distinguish  adversarial  operational  psychology,  which   facilitates  deceptive  and  coercive  operations,  from  collaborative  operational  psychology,   which  optimizes  personnel  performance  in  high-­‐‑risk  operations.  Our  analysis  finds  that   adversarial  operational  psychology  is  largely  unsupported  by  the  APA  Ethics  Code;   that  its  potential  benefits  are  exceeded  by  the  likelihood  of  irreversible  harms;  and  that   its  military  necessity  is  undemonstrated.  We  offer  a  three-­‐‑factor  framework  for   distinguishing  between  adversarial  and  collaborative  operational  psychology,  and  we   recommend  institutional  separation  of  these  roles  so  that  professional  psychologists  do   not  serve  in  adversarial  capacities.     Keywords:  operational  psychology,  psychological  ethics,  APA  Ethics  Code,   counterterrorism,  psychological  torture     About  the  Authors     Since  1995  social  psychologist  JEAN  MARIA  ARRIGO  has  given  voice  to  military   intelligence  professionals  of  conscience  through  oral  histories  and  joint  activities  with   scholars.  She  established  the  Intelligence  Ethics  Collection  at  Hoover  Institution  Archives,   Stanford  University,  and  the  Ethics  of  Intelligence  and  Weapons  Development  Collection  at   Bancroft  Library,  University  of  California,  Berkeley.  (peat@peat-­‐‑intel.org)       ROY  J.  EIDELSON  is  a  clinical  psychologist  and  the  president  of  Eidelson  Consulting,   where  he  conducts  research,  writes,  and  consults  on  the  role  of  psychological  issues  in   political,  organizational,  and  group  conflict  settings.  He  is  a  past  president  of   Psychologists  for  Social  Responsibility,  associate  director  of  the  Solomon  Asch  Center   for  Study  of  Ethnopolitical  Conflict  at  Bryn  Mawr  College,  and  a  member  of  the   Coalition  for  an  Ethical  Psychology.  ([email protected])       RAY  BENNETT  is  a  retired  military  intelligence  officer  with  more  than  20  years  of   experience  in  the  field  of  military  and  law  enforcement  interrogation,  including  service   in  Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  and  conflict  deployments  to  Bosnia  and  Iraq.     2 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   Psychology  under  Fire:     Adversarial  Operational  Psychology  and  Psychological  Ethics     For  almost  a  century,  American  psychologists  have  assisted  national  security   operations,  often  outside  of  public  awareness  or  concern.  The  progressive  social   psychologist  Kurt  Lewin,  for  example,  applied  group  dynamics  to  survival  training  for   spies  destined  for  Occupied  Europe  in  World  War  II.  Lewin’s  role  in  this  training,   unknown  to  two  generations  of  behavioral  scientists  (Cooke,  2007),  is  an  example  of   operational  psychology  –  the  use  of  psychological  principles  and  skills  to  improve  the   effectiveness  of  military  and  intelligence  operations.     The  psychological  roots  of  operational  psychology  in  the  U.S.  lie  in  the  mobilization  of   American  psychologists  in  World  War  I  by  Robert  Yerkes,  then  president  of  the   American  Psychological  Association  (APA)  (Kennedy  &  Williams,  2011a).  When   prominent  non-­‐‑interventionists  contested  U.S.  entry  into  the  war,  Yerkes  maneuvered  a   politically  divided  APA  Council  to  “throw  the  machinery  of  the  Association  behind   mobilization  for  national  service”  (Camfield,  1992;  p.  100).  Along  with  like-­‐‑minded   colleagues,  he  then  persuaded  reluctant  military  authorities  to  embrace  psychology   because  “(a)  the  human  factor  was  as  important  in  warfare  as  the  material  and  (b)   psychologists,  as  the  scientific  experts  on  human  behavior,  had  vital  contributions  to   make  to  the  war  effort”  (Camfield,  1992;  p.  102).     The  operational  roots  of  operational  psychology  lie  in  the  World  War  II  Office  of   Strategic  Services  (OSS),  precursor  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  (Kennedy  &   Williams,  2011a).  A  1944  review  of  the  involvement  of  social  psychologists  in  the  war   effort  named  fourteen  OSS  psychologists  drawn  from  the  faculties  of  notable   universities  (Marquis,  1944).  As  one  example  of  their  activities,  these  psychologists   developed  efficient  methods  of  selection  of  agents  for  high-­‐‑risk  missions  (Office  of   Strategic  Services  Assessment  Staff,  1948).  The  tests  predicted  fairly  well  which  recruits   would  complete  the  costly  course  of  training.  But,  illustrating  the  high  stakes  of   selection,  “the  ability  of  the  tests  to  predict  stress  tolerance  under  combat,  or  torture  by   the  Gestapo,  could  only  be  guessed”  (Banks,  1995,  p.  78).   Williams,  Picano,  Roland,  and  Banks  (2006)  provide  a  useful  contemporary   definition  of  operational  psychology:     Operational  psychology  is  defined  as  the  actions  by  military  psychologists   that  support  the  employment  and/or  sustainment  of  military  forces…to   attain  strategic  goals  in  a  theater  of  war  or  theater  of  operations  by   leveraging  and  applying  their  psychological  expertise  in  helping  to   identify  enemy  capabilities,  personalities,  and  intentions;  facilitating  and   supporting  intelligence  operations;  designing  and  implementing   assessment  and  selection  programs  in  support  of  special  populations  and   3 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   high-­‐‑risk  missions;  and  providing  an  operationally  focused  level  of  mental   health  support.  (pp.  194-­‐‑195)     Although  operational  research  is  not  specifically  mentioned,  it  is  an  inseparable   component  of  the  actions  listed.   After  the  9/11  attacks  on  the  United  States,  operational  psychology  gained  new   prominence  as  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  terrorist  threat  –  cross-­‐‑cultural,   asymmetric,  religiously  and  ethnically  motivated,  inspired  by  charismatic  personalities,   networked  rather  than  institutional,  and  manifested  through  small-­‐‑group  dynamics  –   attracted  psychological  expertise  to  master  an  unfamiliar  enemy.  However,  operational   psychology  also  became  the  center  of  intense  controversy  and  debate  following  media   reports  that  psychologists  were  actively  involved  in  the  military’s  and  the  CIA’s  abusive   interrogations  of  national  security  detainees  at  various  sites  including  Guantanamo  Bay   Naval  Base  in  Cuba  and  Bagram  Airbase  in  Afghanistan  (e.g.,  Lewis,  2004).       Adversarial  versus  Collaborative  Operational  Psychology     These  activities  highlight  the  reinvigoration,  as  part  of  the  past  decade’s  “global  war   on  terror,”  of  the  ethically  fraught  category  of  operational  psychology  that  is  the  focus   of  this  essay.  Within  this  category  we  differentiate  between  adversarial  operational   psychology  and  collaborative  operational  psychology.  As  we  will  argue,  in  most  cases   specific  operational  activities  can  readily  be  categorized  as  predominantly  adversarial   or  collaborative,  based  on  the  relationship  between  the  operational  psychologists  and   the  targets  of  their  interventions.   Collaborative  operational  psychology.  Collaborative  operational  psychology  (COP)   encompasses  the  traditional  operational  psychological  tasks  of  personnel  assessment,   selection,  training,  evaluation,  and  overt  operations  research  to  maximize  personnel   performance  and  survivability  for  high-­‐‑risk  military  and  intelligence  operations.  It   accords  with  operational  medicine,  whose  official  goal  is  “to  maximize  performance   and  survivability  of  the  warfighter”  (Naval  Operational  Medicine  Institute,  2011).  In   COP  the  targets  of  psychological  intervention  ideally  share  the  psychologist’s  overall   mission  and  are  party  to  employment  or  social  contracts  that  limit  harm  and  permit   legal  representation.     Consider,  for  example,  a  clinical  psychologist  instructed  to  evaluate  the  mental   stability  of  an  employee  at  a  nuclear  weapons  facility  (Picano  et  al,  2011).  This  activity   fits  the  profile  of  COP.  Although  the  evaluation  could  possibly  have  adverse   consequences  for  the  employee,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  the  employee  to  share  the   overriding  commitment  to  the  safe  operation  of  the  nuclear  facility.  In  addition,  by   accepting  this  position  the  employee  has,  more  or  less,  agreed  to  such  evaluations  and,   in  principle,  judicial  recourse  is  available  if  the  employee  disputes  a  negative   assessment.  Or  consider  a  clinical  psychologist  assigned  to  a  Special  Forces  sniper  team   4 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   for  mental  health  care  (U.S.  Army  Medical  Department,  2010).  In  this  role  the   psychologist  provides  care  for  the  sniper,  which  is  again  considered  collaborative,   although  the  sniper  is  in  an  adversarial  relationship  to  his  target.   Adversarial  operational  psychology.  In  contrast  with  collaborative  operational   psychology,  adversarial  operational  psychology  (AOP)  engages  psychologists  in  direct   support  of  deception,  coercion,  and  assault  in  military  and  intelligence  operations  and   in  covert  operations  research.  It  encompasses  the  tasks  of  identification  and   manipulation  of  adversaries  in  counterintelligence  and  counterterrorism  operations  and   of  covert  behavioral  and  weapons  research  on  human  subjects.  The  targets  of   psychological  intervention  in  AOP  oppose  the  psychologist’s  mission  and/or  are  subject   to  non-­‐‑stipulated  harms.  Examples  of  AOP  would  be  the  clinical  evaluation  of  a   national  security  detainee  in  order  to  uncover  psychological  vulnerabilities  that  will   subsequently  be  exploited  in  an  interrogation  of  the  prisoner  for  intelligence  gathering   purposes  (Frakt,  2009),  or  the  in-­‐‑house  psychological  evaluation  to  discredit  a   whistleblower  or  moral  dissident  in  a  national  security  setting  (Brewer  &  Arrigo,  2008).     Clarifying  the  Nature  of  Operational  Psychology       We  emphasize  that  the  COP-­‐‑AOP  categorization  is  not  simply  a  good-­‐‑bad   distinction  for  two  reasons.  First,  psychological  ethics  can  be  irreconcilable  with   military  ethics.  For  example,  obedience  to  superiors  is  a  virtue  in  military  ethics  but  a   source  of  caution  in  psychological  ethics;  physical  courage  is  central  to  military  ethics   but  largely  irrelevant  to  psychological  ethics.  Second,  the  COP-­‐‑AOP  categorization  does   not  precisely  demarcate  ethical  professional  psychology  from  unethical  professional   psychology.  Rather,  this  distinction  is  a  very  close  approximation  that  is   comprehensible  to  agents  and  amenable  to  institutional  implementation.  It  thereby   meets  the  demands  of  “psychological  realism”  in  ethics  (Flanagan,  1991,  p.  32)  in  a   national  security  setting.     Thus,  three  clarifications  are  important  at  this  point.  First,  operational  psychology  is   a  specialization  area  within  a  much  broader  realm  of  psychological  knowledge  and   practice  relevant  to  military  and  national  security  settings.  Most  psychologists  whose   work  supports  the  U.S.  military  and  other  defense-­‐‑related  agencies  are  not  in   operational  roles.  For  example,  the  many  clinical  psychologists  routinely  providing   valuable  psychological  services  to  soldiers  and  veterans  in  VA  hospitals  and  other   medical  facilities  are  not  engaged  in  activities  characterized  as  operational  psychology.   Nor  are  those  psychologists  who  teach  traditional  psychology  courses  at  any  of  the   military  academies.  In  contrast,  psychologists  serving  in  counterintelligence  or   counterterrorism  roles  are  working  in  the  operational  psychology  arena.   Second,  we  write  here  about  collaborative  and  adversarial  operational  psychology,   not  about  collaborative  and  adversarial  operational  psychologists.  For  us,  the  key   5 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   considerations  and  concerns  revolve  around  the  operational  roles  assigned  to,  or   initiated  by,  psychologists  –  not  the  individual  psychologists  who  perform  them.  By  this   we  mean  that  it  is  not  our  intention  to  globally  categorize  people  as  “ethical  professional   psychologists”  or  “unethical  professional  psychologists.”  Instead,  our  goal  is  to  provide   a  framework  for  separating  specific  operational  roles  into  ethical  and  unethical   categories.  In  this  regard,  both  COP  and  AOP  involve  risks  to  psychological  ethics,  and   COP  activities  sometimes  transform  rapidly  into  AOP  activities  –  and  vice  versa  –   depending  upon  the  assignment  and  exigencies.  But  the  ethical  dilemmas  of  COP  are   pliable;  they  yield  to  planning,  training,  monitoring,  and  negotiation.  AOP,  on  the  other   hand,  has  an  obdurate  core  of  exploitation  essential  to  the  operation  and  incompatible   with  independent  oversight.     Third,  we  are  strictly  focused  on  issues  of  psychological  ethics  surrounding  the  use  of   psychologists  for  operational  roles  in  military  and  other  national  security  settings.  We   recognize  that  a  non-­‐‑psychologist  may  ethically  assume  certain  roles  that  it  would  be   unethical  for  a  psychologist  to  assume.  However,  with  U.S.  society  under  terrorist   threat,  leading  advocates  of  AOP  (e.g.,  Ewing  &  Gelles,  2003)  argue  that  the  traditional   psychological  ethics  of  professional  psychology  must  be  adapted  to  national  security   exigencies  in  order  to  protect  society  and  promote  the  greater  good.  In  a  recently   published  edited  book,  Ethical  Practice  in  Operational  Psychology  (Kennedy  &  Williams,   2011b),  seven  papers  champion  adversarial  operational  psychology.  The  editors  and   many  chapter  authors  are  themselves  operational  psychologists.  Three  served  on  the   controversial  ten-­‐‑member  APA  Presidential  Task  Force  on  Psychological  Ethics  and   National  Security  (PENS),  which  declared  that  psychologists  serve  to  keep   interrogations  of  national  security  detainees  safe,  legal,  ethical,  and  effective  (American   Psychological  Association,  2005).   In  sum,  while  recognizing  the  valuable  contributions  of  military  and  intelligence   psychologists  in  collaborative  operational  psychology,  our  purpose  in  this  essay  is  to   probe  and  challenge  the  ethical  underpinnings  and  practical  consequences  of   adversarial  operational  psychology.  We  will  argue  that:  AOP  poses  irresolvable  ethical   conflicts  for  the  psychologists  involved;  APA’s  ethics  code  fails  to  support  the   interpretations  of  AOP  advocates;  unintended  harmful  effects  of  AOP  are  significant;   and  proponents  of  AOP  presume  its  military  necessity  (e.g.,  American  Psychological   Association,  2005;  Ewing  &  Gelles,  2003;  Johnson,  2008;  Kennedy  &  Williams,  2011b)   without  providing  evidence.  We  conclude  by  offering  an  ethical  framework  for  further   discussion  and  by  emphasizing  the  urgent  and  critical  need  for  institutional  separation   of  collaborative  operational  roles  from  adversarial  operational  roles  so  that  no   psychologists  serve  in  both  capacities  during  any  employment  contract  period.     In  our  analysis  we  include  the  perspectives  of  several  veteran  military  and   intelligence  professionals  who  have  worked  with  military  psychologists.  Their   interviews  and  correspondence  with  the  first  author  (Arrigo)  have  been  archived  as   6 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   cited.  These  individuals  offer  alternative  viewpoints  to  the  uncritical  AOP  stance   presented  by  Kennedy  and  Williams  (2011b)  and  related  publications  (e.g.,  Department   of  the  Army,  2010;  Ewing  &  Gelles,  2003;  Shumate  &  Borum,  2006).     Adversarial  Operational  Psychology:  Questions  and  Concerns     Which  Ethical  Codes  Apply?       From  the  start,  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  all  active-­‐‑duty  military  psychologists   are  fully  deployable  soldiers  –  soldiers  first,  psychologists  second  (Debatto,  2011;   Johnson,  2008).  According  to  the  Department  of  the  Army  (2010,  January  7),  U.S.  law   and  military  regulations  override  the  APA  Ethics  Code:     The  [APA]  Ethics  Code  does  not  supersede  applicable  U.S.  and   international  law,  regulations,  or  DoD  [Department  of  Defense]  policy....   The  Ethics  Code  pertains  only  to  a  psychologist’s  activities  that  are  “part   of  their  scientific,  educational  or  professional  roles”  pertaining  to  the   profession  of  psychology.  The  Code  does  not,  therefore,  have  purview   over  the  psychologist’s  role  as  a  Soldier,  civilian,  or  contractor  employee   that  is  unrelated  to  the  practice  of  psychology.  For  instance,  the  dictum  for   beneficence  does  not  pertain  to  actions  against  the  enemy  in  combat.  (p.   19)     At  the  same  time,  the  U.S.  military  requires  its  medical  corps  personnel,  including   psychologists,  to  maintain  professional  practice  licenses  with  their  state  licensing   boards.  This  requirement  establishes  a  strong  connection  between  military  psychology   and  the  APA  Ethics  Code  because  this  Code  is  the  foundation  for  most  state  licensing   board  regulations.  The  U.S.  Army  regulations  for  Behavioral  Science  Consultation   Teams  (BSCTs)  involved  in  detention  and  interrogation  operations,  headed  by  state-­‐‑ licensed  clinical  psychologists,  foreground  the  APA  Ethics  Code  yet  ultimately  override   it.  For  operational  psychologists  there  is  no  official  line  where,  in  principle  at  least,   national  security  missions  yield  to  psychological  ethics.  The  mission  comes  first.  This  is   why  psychologists  engaged  in  AOP  are  essentially  military  and  intelligence   professionals  with  a  specialization  in  psychology,  obliged  to  adhere  to  psychological   ethics  only  when  compatible  with  the  mission  (e.g.,  Olson  &  Davis,  2008),  as  illustrated   in  the  Mohammed  Jawad  case  described  below.     Operational  psychologists  who  work  outside  the  Department  of  Defense  (DoD)  may   not  even  be  accountable  to  military  regulations  and  military  ethics.  The  Detainee   Treatment  Act  of  2005  restricted  DoD  interrogation  techniques  to  the  Human  Intelligence   Collector  Operations,  Field  Manual  2-­‐‑22.3  (U.S.  Army  Headquarters  2006),  which  respects   the  Geneva  Conventions  –  apart  from  the  dispensation  for  isolation  of  interrogatees  in   Appendix  M.  But  only  the  discretion  and  authority  of  President  George  W.  Bush  placed   7 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   limits  on  CIA  interrogations  (Suleman,  2006).  Thus  veteran  military  psychologists  under   CIA  contract  were  able  to  initiate  waterboarding  of  detainees,  which  military   regulations  forbade  but  the  President  approved  (Shane,  2009).       Are  Psychologists  More  Ethical  then  Doctors  and  Anthropologists?     We  can  look  to  the  operational  experience  of  sister  professions  for  useful   comparisons  with  operational  psychology.  The  international  history  of  operational   medicine  and  psychiatry  is  infamous,  with  the  “Nazi  doctors”  (Lifton,  1986),  tactical   diagnoses  of  dissidents  by  Soviet  psychiatrists  to  justify  forced  drugging  (Warren,   1975),  and  persistent,  worldwide  involvement  in  torture  (Vesti  &  Somnier,  1994).  In  the   United  States,  adversarial  operational  medicine  and  psychiatry  flourished  secretly  in   the  Army’s  “man-­‐‑break”  biochemical  weapons  experiments  in  World  War  II  (Pechura  &   Rall,  1993),  post-­‐‑war  nuclear  weapons  development  programs  (Advisory  Committee  on   Human  Radiation  Experiments,  2005),  and  the  Cold  War  CIA  behavioral  modification   project  MKULTRA  (U.S.  Senate,  1977).     Early  revelations  of  U.S.  torture  interrogations  in  the  Iraq  War  pointed  to  the   involvement  of  operational  physicians  (Bloche  &  Marks,  2005;  Miles,  2006)  and  aroused   concern  about  the  psychiatrists  initially  assigned  to  BSCTs  (Department  of  Defense,   2002,  November  11).  In  May  2006  the  American  Psychiatric  Association  forbade   psychiatrists  from  “being  present  in  the  interrogation  room,  asking  or  suggesting   questions,  or  advising  authorities  on  the  use  of  specific  techniques  of  interrogation  with   particular  detainees”  (American  Psychiatric  Association,  2006).  Assistant  Secretary  of   Defense  for  Health  Affairs  William  Winkenwerder  (2006)  responded  that  psychiatrists   could  be  assigned  to  interrogations  if  no  qualified  psychologists  were  available,  and  the   DoD  continued  to  train  BSCT  psychiatrists  (Marks  &  Bloche,  2008).  As  is  true  for   psychologists,  the  missions  and  regulations  of  national  security  agencies  can  override   the  professional  ethics  codes  of  medical  personnel.     Historically,  U.S.  anthropologists  subjugated    Native  Americans  for  the  Bureau  of   Indian  Affairs  and  doubled  as  spies  in  World  War  I  (Fleuhr-­‐‑Lobban,  2003);  developed   outrageous  ruses  for  the  OSS  in  World  War  II  (Marks,  1979);  facilitated  the  internment   of  Japanese-­‐‑Americans  (Starn,  1986);  planned  counterinsurgency  research  in  South   America  under  the  U.S.  Army’s  Project  Camelot  in  1964  (Horowitz,  1974);  and  advised   the  CIA’s  Phoenix  Program  on  the  capture  and  killing  of  alleged  counterinsurgents  in   the  Vietnam  War  (Gusterson,  2008).     Post-­‐‑9/1l,  Gusterson  (2008)  noted  that  “The  Pentagon  seems  to  have  decided  that   anthropology  is  to  the  war  on  terror  what  physics  was  to  the  Cold  War.”  Secretary  of   Defense  Robert  Gates  embedded  armed  anthropologists  with  “Human  Terrain  Teams”   in  combat  brigades  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  The  goal  was  to  improve  cultural   sensitivity,  collect  intelligence  from  villagers,  and  serve  as  liaisons  to  local  authorities.   8 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   The  2009  American  Anthropological  Association  (AAA)  Ad  Hoc  Commission  on   Anthropology’s  Engagement  with  the  Security  and  Intelligence  Communities   emphasized  the  ideal  of  constructive  rather  than  adversarial  engagement  between   anthropology  and  the  military.  The  Commission  nevertheless  attempted  to  separate   professional  from  adversarial  operational  duties  by  declaring  the  Human  Terrain   System  inconsistent  with  the  AAA  Code  of  Ethics:     When  ethnographic  investigation  is  determined  by  military  missions,  not   subject  to  external  review,  where  data  collection  occurs  in  the  context  of   war,  integrated  into  the  goals  of  counterinsurgency,  and  in  a  potentially   coercive  environment  ...  it  can  no  longer  be  considered  a  legitimate   professional  exercise  of  anthropology.  (American  Anthropological   Association  Commission  on  the  Engagement  of  Anthropology  with  the   U.S.  Security  and  Intelligence  Communities,  2009,  p.  3)     Advocates  for  AOP  must  explain  how  professional  psychologists  can  adhere  to   psychological  ethics  in  adversarial  operations  even  though  doctors  and  anthropologists   have  been  uable  to  adhere  to  the  ethics  of  their  professions  in  diverse  adversarial   operations  over  decades.     Who  Is  the  Client  of  Adversarial  Operational  Psychology?       Like  the  ethical  principles  of  medicine,  psychiatry,  anthropology,  and  law,  the   principles  of  psychological  ethics  evolved  to  protect  the  weaker  from  the  stronger.  They   are  designed  to  protect  the  patient-­‐‑client  or  research  subject,  as  the  relatively   unknowledgeable,  vulnerable,  and  exposed  party,  from  the  psychologist,  as  the   relatively  knowledgeable,  authoritative,  and  unexposed  party.  Indeed  the  APA  Ethics   Code  largely  mandates  the  psychologist’s  responsibility  to  individual  patient-­‐‑clients   (American  Psychological  Association,  2010).  Proponents  of  AOP  though  interpret  the   government  as  an  appropriate  client  and  recipient  of  the  operational  psychologist’s   protection.   For  example,  Dunivin,  Banks,  Staal,  and  Stephenson  (2011)  defend  the  role  of  BSCT   psychologists  in  detainee  interrogations,  arguing  that  a  balance  “must  be  established   between  ethical  responsibilities  to  an  individual  and  ethical  responsibilities  to  the  larger   society”  (p.  87).  Acknowledging  that  Principle  A  of  the  APA  Ethics  Code  –  Beneficence   and  Nonmaleficence  –  calls  upon  the  psychologist  to  “do  no  harm”  to  the  individual   being  questioned,  they  claim  that  Principle  B  –  Fidelity  and  Responsibility  –  provides  a   key  counterbalance  by  protecting  the  interests  of  other  individuals  and  the  general   public.     A  full  reading  of  Principle  B,  however,  belies  this  narrow  interpretation.  Principle  B   refers  not  only  to  psychologists’  being  “aware  of  their  professional  and  scientific   responsibilities  to  society,”  but  also  emphasizes  that  psychologists  “establish   9 Psychology  under  Fire  (Arrigo,  Eidelson,  &  Bennett,  2012)   relationships  of  trust  with  those  with  whom  they  work,”  “uphold  professional   standards  of  conduct,”  “accept  appropriate  responsibility  for  their  behavior,”  “seek  to   manage  conflicts  of  interest  that  could  lead  to  exploitation  or  harm,”  and  are   “concerned  about  the  ethical  compliance  of  their  colleagues’  scientific  and  professional   conduct.”  Standard  3.08  of  the  APA  Ethics  Code  on  Exploitative  Relationships  is   especially  germane  here  as  well  (APA,  2010).  It  states  specifically  that  “Psychologists  do   not  exploit  persons  over  whom  they  have  supervisory,  evaluative,  or  other  authority   such  as  clients/patients,  students,  supervisees,  research  participants,  and  employees.”     Although  disarming,  the  government-­‐‑as-­‐‑client  analogy  is  spurious.  The  reversal  of   power  relations  whereby  the  psychologist  serves  to  protect  the  collective,  stronger  party   at  the  expense  of  the  individual,  weaker  party  is  a  profound  alteration  –  not  merely  an   extension  –  of  traditional  ethical  practice  in  psychology.     The  government-­‐‑as-­‐‑client  analogy  also  fails  as  a  practical  matter  when  conflict   emerges  between  government  authorities.  Consider  an  example  from  military  court   records.  In  2003,  BCST  psychologist  “X”  advised  on  the  interrogation  of  the  teenager   Mohammed  Jawad  at  Guantanamo  Bay  Detention  Center.  Jawad’s  defense  attorney,   Maj.  David  Frakt,  subsequently  subpoenaed  Dr.  X  for  the  2008  trial  of  Jawad  by  the   Guantanamo  Military  Commission.  Frakt  (2009,  p.  22)  later  wrote:     I  also  was  provided  records  showing  that  Mr.  Jawad  was  placed  in   isolation  for  two  thirty-­‐‑day  periods....  The  [second]  period  of  isolation  was   ordered  by  intelligence  officials  upon  the  recommendation  of  the   Behavioral  Science  Consultation  Team  psychologist  [X]  to  socially,   physically  and  linguistically  isolate  this  teenage  boy  in  order  to  create   complete  dependence  on  his  interrogator....  and  to  break  Mr.  Jawad  and  to   devastate  him  emotionally.     At  the  time,  Frakt  and  the  psychologist  for  the  defense  reported  that  Dr.  X  refused  to   testify,  invoking  the  right  to  remain  silent  to  avoid  self-­‐‑incrimination  by  Section  831,   Article  31,  of  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice  (Soldz,  2008;  S.  Soldz,  personal   communication,  May  11,  2011).  The  government-­‐‑as-­‐‑client  analogy  offers  no  ethical   remedy  in  this  case  of  conflicting  obligations  to  different  government  clients  such  as  the   local  commander  and  the  military  court.    Veteran  U.S.  Army  case  officer  Julianne  McKinney  raised  an  additional  point:   “Dr.  X  worked  ‘against’  U.S.  service  members  as  much  as  he  or  she  worked  against   Jawad”  through  “the  lowering  of  standards  and  ethical  compromises  inflicted  on   inexperienced  interrogators  who  complied  with  Dr.  X’s  advice”  (2011,  July  9).This  case   may  represent  rarer  abuses  of  AOP,  but  proponents  need  to  address  the  lack  of  a   systematic  means  of  addressing  excessive  zeal.  Williams  and  Kennedy  (2011)  seem  to   incorporate  this  fervor  into  the  AOP  program  with  alarmist  exaggerations  such  as  this:   10