THE S.A. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 139T T O BE REMOVED PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA By B. COCKRAM THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS These four lectures were given by Professor Ben Cockram during October and November, 1963, to the South African Institute of Interna- tional Affairs, which is an unofficial non-political organisation established to encourage the study of international affairs and problems. The Institute as such does not express opinions and the views expressed in this publi- cation are those of Professor Cockram and not of the Institute. CONTENTS Page THE RHODESIAS AND NYASALAND 1 BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND 19 SOUTH WEST AFRICA 32 THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 47 PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA By PROFESSOR BEN COCKRAM C.M.G., O.B.E., M.A., Ph.D. Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JAN SMUTS HOUSE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND JOHANNESBURG 1963 THE RHODESIAS AND NYASALAND THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND is dead and all that remains is for the heirs to divide the corpse's poor garments. The experiment in multi-racialism which began so hopefully less than ten years ago, appeared to have gone a long way to achieve its social purpose in 1962, when hotels, cinemas and swimming pools in Southern Rhodesia were, as in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, opened to all. So confident was Sir Edgar Whitehead that he chose that moment to appeal to the electors to endorse his policy, only to be defeated by Mr. Winston Field, and by his defeat fatally to weaken Sir Roy Welensky's Federal Govern- ment. Mr. Field differed from Sir Edgar mainly over timing: he was prepared to accept the idea of a "black" government in Southern Rhodesia some day, though certainly not for a generation, but he differed from Sir Roy Welensky in that he believed that white supremacy could meanwhile be better defended in Southern Rhodesia if the Government of the Colony was freed from the federal necessity of having con- stantly to accommodate itself to the wishes of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He was therefore prepared to acquiesce in, even if he did not welcome, the desire of the African population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to make an end of the Federation, and this enabled the British Government to argue plausibly that since none of the three constituent territories wanted Federation to continue, the de- mand of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to be allowed to secede must be accepted. The break-up of the Federation, of course, involves the end of the Federal Government. It has lasted for only a decade, a very short period so far as countries go, but a considerable period for a government to remain in office, and ironically Sir Roy could point to the fact that less than a year ago he won a general election by a record number of votes, and that his party has remained in complete control of the Federal Parlia- ment in which his supporters hold 54 out of 59 seats. Sir Roy could moreover boast an impressive record of achievement, particularly in the economic sphere: the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia had developed rapidly, tonnage handled by the railways had increased ninefold, and the Kariba Dam had been built to supply power from the waters of the Zambesi. In 1961 there was a record favourable balance of trade of £59,000,000. Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auctions had seen record sales, and Nyasaland had been given, at the expense of the Rhodesias, the social services of a modern state. The pace of development had indeed been such that both white and black incomes had reached levels which could only be maintained if the mining companies and other outside in- vestors could be persuaded to continue to invest £50,000,000 a year in the Federation, but there had been every likelihood of their doing so. Sir Roy's bitterness can, therefore, be understood, but is there justification for its being directed, not against Mr. Field, but against Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Butler; and for his charge that the British Government had acted in bad faith? The explanation would seem to be that Sir Roy, who loves a fair fight, was never in doubt about Mr. Field's views, but that he believed that the British Government had acted in bad faith in agreeing that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be given independence, which involved the break-up of the Federation, without obtaining the prior consent of the Federal Government. He has received support from the former Secre- taries of State for Commonwealth Relations (Lord Salisbury) and the Colonies (Lord Chandos) for his statement that it had been taken for granted, when the Federation was set up,-that its basis could not subsequently be changed without the con- sent of the Governments concerned, including the Federal Government, which would, naturally, have to be a party to any discussions. He has been contradicted by the Lord Chancellor on his further contention that the British Parliament could, after Federation, only legislate at the request of the Federal Parliament: the Lord Chancellor pointed out that since two of the three territories forming the Federation were still non- self-governing colonies, Parliament had abrogated neither its responsibilities nor its powers so far as they were concerned. This statement did not refer to the legislative position as regards Southern Rhodesia, which was, before Federation, a self-governing colony. That the constitution of Southern Rhodesia was, during the period of Federation, amended by British legislation might be held to point to Parliament having retained its powers, but the amending legislation was intro- duced by agreement between the Southern Rhodesian and British Governments, and was designed to do away with the authority which the British Government had retained, under the 1924 Constitution, to instruct the Governor to refuse his assent to legislation which might adversely affect the interests of the African inhabitants of the colony. Further if the British Government had as recently as 1961 recognised the autonomy of Southern Rhodesia it is difficult to argue that it retained the right to dispose of the Federation of which Southern Rhodesia was a constituent part, without the concurrence of the Southern Rhodesian Government. And, if the concurrence of the Southern Rhodesian Government was necessary, surely it followed logically that the Federal Government would also have to agree. The tendency in countries with federal constitutions has indeed always been to deny the right of constituent units to secede. The American Civil War was fought to prevent the Southern States seceding. The Australian Commonwealth Government successfully resisted, thirty years ago, the desire of Western Australia to secede. And it is most unlikely that Canada will agree to the recent demands of various organisa- ions in Quebec for independence for French Canada. It is not unreasonable therefore to conclude that in the optimistic atmosphere of 1953 Sir Roy was given to understand that the Federal Government would naturally have to be a party to any revision of the Federal Constitution, and it would have left a better taste had the British Government frankly admitted this and faced the consequences. To have done so would have had other advantages. In the absence of a written undertaking, it would have been arguable that such an understanding should be construed in the context of the sort of situation which, in the minds of those concerned with the drafting of the Federal Constitu- tion, was in fact likely to occur. In view of the strong opposi- tion in both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to the forma- tion of the Federation the possible continuance of such opposi- tion could not have been disregarded in 1953 and was not therefore a new factor in 1962. What was a new factor was the overwhelming demand for independence which had become evident among Africans all over the continent in the interven- ing years. And within a few months another new factor had been introduced into the situation which could certainly not have been forecast in 1953, namely the change of view in Southern Rhodesia. It is reasonably safe to assume that the possibility of two-thirds of the Federation demanding the right to secede and the remaining third indicating that it was pre- pared to fall in with their wishes, was not a situation which had been in the minds of the two responsible Secretaries of State when the Federation was formed. Sir Roy recognised implicitly the validity of this argument when he acquiesced at the Victoria Falls Conference, in July of this year, in its break- up. Had the correctness of Sir Roy's understanding been admitted the British Government would also have been in a stronger position to resist the demand of a number of African countries at the United Nations, that they should, on the break- up of the Federation, refuse independence to Southern Rhodesia and take steps to ensure that the franchise there was so revised as to make the election of an African Government likely. The countries supporting this demand have been able to point to the fact that the Federal Constitution included external affairs in the list of matters with respect to which the Federal Legislature had powers to make laws and defined them as such external relations as might, from time to time, be entrusted to the Federation by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. They have further pointed out that while, under the 1961 Constitution, Southern Rhodesia was free to make any amendments to any sections of its constitu- tion without reference to the United Kingdom, an exception was made of certain specified amendments which included the right of the United Kingdom to safeguard international obliga- tions. They have gone on to argue that in these circumstances it is the duty of the United Kingdom to ensure that recognised human rights are guaranteed to the population of Southern Rhodesia. And why, the argument continues, if the United Kingdom can decide to break up the Federation without the consent of the Federal Government, cannot they insist on amendments to the constitution of Southern Rhodesia? It is necessary to remember at this point that Southern Rhodesia has, since 1923, and increasingly as the years have gone by, been a constitutional anomaly: a colony with almost complete powers of self-government, yet without the control of its own external affairs. Had it possessed the latter it would have been a full Dominion, and an independent member coun- try of the Commonwealth, as Newfoundland was for a few years, even though it would not have been a member of the League of Nations or in all probability subsequently of the United Nations. Without such control the constitutional posi- tion of the colony approximated to that of an Australian state. The White Paper preceding the 1961 Referendum in Southern Rhodesia recognised the existence of a convention for "Parlia- ment at Westminster not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia," and this is in fact the answer which the United Kingdom has had to give at the United Nations and subsequently to support with a veto. This constitutional argument can be supported by the political argument that there is in fact no international obliga- tion upon the United Kingdom to ensure that manhood suf- frage, which is the specific demand of the Afro-Asian coun- tries, should be granted in Southern Rhodesia or anywhere else. Functioning democracies are in a minority among the member countries of the United Nations today, and, while the United Kingdom practises manhood suffrage itself and has admittedly brought many of its other colonies to indepen- dence with the prior grant of manhood suffrage, such suffrage was a prerequisite neither of its own independence, nor of the independence of Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa, nor does it exist today in, for example, Pakistan. The Labour Party in the United Kingdom which clearly shares the views of the Afro-Asian and other members of the United Nations as to the eventual desirability of the grant of manhood suffrage in Southern Rhodesia, appears, to an exter- nal observer, to have tried to walk a tightrope by accepting, sub silentio, the reality of the constitutional obstacle, but get- ting around it by arguing that Parliament should at least take no step to grant Southern Rhodesia independence, at the time independence is given to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, unless the Constitution is amended at the same time (that is, by Southern Rhodesia) to provide for the grant of adult suf- frage. This returns the ball to the Southern Rhodesian court. In a further attempt, if I may mix a metaphor, to pass the poisoned chalice to others it has been pointed out in the British press that, in present conditions, Southern Rhodesia could not expect a majority of the member-countries of the Common- wealth to accept it as a member, and, therefore, that it would be no use Britain giving a pledge of independence such as the Southern Rhodesian Government has asked for. Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, has pointed out that this is to confuse the grant of independence by Britain, which is a matter for Britain alone, with the subsequent approval of membership of the Commonwealth, by all the existing member countries. It points to the dilemma which will face Southern Rhodesia, which wants to retain membership of the Common- wealth, with all that goes with it, after independence, but it does nothing to resolve the dilemma whether Parliament can and ought to ignore the fundamental constitutional conven- tions of the Commonwealth by refusing to pass the necessary legislation for the grant of independence if desired to do so by the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia. In October, 1963, however, Mr. Wilson lent his support to this same line by declaring that Britain should not take the responsibility of deciding the question of independence, but submit it to the arbitration of the Commonwealth. The latter has never been an arbitral body, and since it also does not vote, a decision could only be reached by unanimity. If a Labour Government had previously come into office in Britain, and if Mr. Menzies' Government had similarly been replaced by a Labour Government in Australia, it is however possible that unanimity could be found for some recommenda- tion unfavourable to the grant of independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the present constitution remains un- amended. Such a recommendation would be politically con- venient to the Labour Party: but there could be no constitu- tional justification for it. ' If, in the event, Britain took no action at all, what could Southern Rhodesia do or not do by itself? This depends on what happens to the powers of the Federal Parliament and Government when Federation comes to an end. The British Government took the view, when the Federa- tion of the West Indies was dissolved in 1962, that powers formerly in the hands of the territorial Governments did not automatically revert to the territories in question, but fell into the hands of the British Government and although certain of these powers were subsequently reinvested in the different territorial Governments, the process of reinvestment varied from territory to territory in time, if not in content. Sir Patrick Dean has, however, recently informed the Security Council of the United Nations that, when the Federation is dissolved, Southern Rhodesia will simply take over the powers which it had voluntarily surrendered on the formation of the Federation, so that it can be assumed that Southern Rhodesia will, even if it is not granted independence, at least recover full self-governing status. If this happens it would then be possible for the Southern Rhodesia Parliament to pass legislation declaring Southern Rhodesia to be independent, although such legislation might well not be agreed to by the Governor. It would be unilateral action and might have serious economic consequences, but it is unlikely that Britain would take forcible steps to occupy the country and replace the Government responsible for the legis- lation. Sir Roy Welensky has very recently quoted Mr. Macmil- lan to this effect in connection with an earlier Federal crisis. To attempt to do so would be contrary to all recent constitutional practice and it would be a hazardous undertaking; Sir Patrick Dean has already informed the United Nations that after the dissolution of the Federation the Southern Rhodesian armed forces would revert to the colony, which would have full responsibility for their use internally, and Mr. Field told his recent party congress that it was the intention of his Govern- ment to keep the military and air forces up to full strength. It is on the other hand difficult to see how Mr. Field could reconcile unilateral action with his statement that Southern Rhodesia wished to obtain independence within the Common- wealth and to continue to owe allegiance to the Queen: the former would certainly not be given in such circumstances and the constitutional problem of what happens when the Queen is given divergent advice by two Commonwealth Governments would be raised in an acute form. It is difficult not to conclude that she would probably be guided by the