"Preserving the Ethos ": Heidegger and Sophocles' Antigone NORMAN K. SWAZO, University ofA laska Fairbanks The Question Heidegger claims a word such as "ethics" begins to flourish when originary thinking [ursprungliche Denken] has come to an end.! He implies one ought neither to desire nor to elicit the end of originary thinking to the extent such thinking remains accessible or incumbent upon us, even as we inquire into ethics. In originary thinking one does not ask about ethics to articulate the content of this or that normative theory. One must think what is essential to ethics by first thinking what is essential to human being (Dasein) in his "ek-sistence" toward Being, thereby to apprehend in a more "attuned" way the relation between fundamental ontology (Fundamentalontologie) and ethics. Heidegger himself has provided the requisite thinking in his Dasein analytic, as developed in Being and Time, then in subsequent works, so that one may follow Heidegger in his expectation that one think what is essential to ethics. But "ethics" is itself a term in need of clarification according to its "essence" [Wesen], even before one merely assumes or posits a concept of ethics as normative theory, i.e., what is denominated ethike. Thus Heidegger could say (LH, 255): Where the essence of man is thought so essentially, i.e., solely from the question concerning the truth of Being, but still without elevating man to the center of beings, a longing necessarily awa kens for a peremptory directive and for rules that say how man, experienced from eksistence toward Being, ought to live in a fit ting manner. The desire for an ethics presses ever more ardently for fulfillment as the obvious no less than the hidden perplexity of man soars to immeasurable heights. The greatest care must be fostered upon the ethical bond at a time when technological man, delivered over to mass society, can be kept reliably on call only by gathering and ordering all his plans and activities in a way that corresponds to technology. Who can disregard our predicament? Should we not safeguard and secure the existing bonds even if they hold human beings to gether ever so tenuously and merely for the present? Certainly. r 442 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 443 The essence of the human is thought essentially only when (a) thinking This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. Ethos is guided by the question concerning the truth of Being, and (b) the means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in human is not elevated to the center of beings, thus (c) the whole of which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows what being is not construed according to anthropocentric interests. Absent pertains to man's essence, and what in thus arriving resides in fundamental ontology, the essence of the human is not thought at all, in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of man contains and which case humanity succumbs to the forgetfulness of Being (Seins preserves the advent of what belongs to man in his essence. Ac vergessenheit). Neither is the essence of the human thought properly cording to Heraclitus' phrase this is daimon, the god. The frag when the human is made the center of beings, i.e., when the epis ment says: Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of temological frame entails immersion in the subject-object dichotomy con god. sistent with the metaphysics of presence. Heidegger does not leave the matter there. He would have us not Heidegger's instruction is clear: a proper understanding of ethics is to be merely sustain a provisional morality that binds tenuously and merely for found in the tragedies of Sophocles, but also in the fragmentary thought the present, i.e., during "the planetary domination of Technology" or of Heraclitus. Ethics is not thought essentially, Heidegger counsels, if "Enframing" [das Ge-Stel/j. For Heidegger, another kind of questioning conceived merely in terms of "rules" that lay forth how the human is to must be undertaken, provisional moralities to be interrogated consistent live in a fitting manner. More than rules are at issue, for they are ever with the question concerning the meaning of Being (Seinsfrage): "we secondary to that human achievement Heidegger calls dwelling [Bauen]. must ask what ... ethics [is]" (conceived as a discipline) even as we By pointing beyond "the modern way" of thinking to "a Greek" way of would interrogate the content of all normative theory given an "essential" thinking, Heidegger would have us think the essence of dwelling rather determination by Plato and Aristotle. than (as in the case of "virtue ethics" of concern to Socrates, Plato, and Why so? Prior to the explicit beginning of philosophy as such in the Aristotle) the achievement and manifestation of "character" (i.e., human writing of Plato, "thinkers" before him knew not of an ethics in the sense "excellence"-arete-that manifests eudaimonia). of a discipline that is a branch of "science" (episteme). Yet their thinking Heidegger (LH, 258) proposes: "If the name 'ethics,' in keeping with was not "immoral." Pre-Platonist thinkers understood something essential the basic meaning of the word ethos, should now say that 'ethics' to ethics without their thinking being bound, or determined in advance, ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of by theoria.2 In the absence of a theoretical determination they were Being as the primordial element of man, as one who eksists, is in itself nonetheless able to apprehend (and presumably also to appropriate) the original ethics. However, this thinking is not ethics in the first what is "moral" in the sense of manifesting a fit way of life, a fit way "to instance, because it is ontology." The antecedent of this conditional pro be." Without constructing a "system" they also did not construe the position reveals the way Heidegger would have us construe the meaning essence of ethics as a universal standard applied to particulars, both real of "ethics": Undertaken as a mode of interrogation, ethics first and and possible. "Everything that we see in particulars is always determined foremost ponders the abode [der Aufenthaltj of the human being (one by what we have in advance," yet such "determination" is subject to err consequence of which can be, of course, the elucidation and articulation in making sense of uniquely human acts never merely something of normative theory providing rules for living). This thinking cannot but "present-at-hand" (Vorhanden) or intelligible in that way at al1.3 think the truth of Being, this "truth" [aletheia] apprehended as the Heidegger (LH, 256) introduces his paramount claim and authoritative primordial element of the human being. The human is then understood referral to a source of that pre-Platonist essential thinking: as one who ek-sists in (stands out into) the truth of Being (in contrast to the metaphysical or practical-philosophical modes as zoon logon echon or The tragedies of Sophocles-provided such a comparison is at all as zoon politikon). "Ethics" and "originary ethics" are thereby inextricably permiSSible-preserve the ethos in their sagas more primordially interrogated together. 4 than Aristotle's lectures on 'ethics.' A saying of Heraclitus which In writing tragedy Sophocles does not thereby produce a fundamental consists of only three words says something so simply that from it ontology, yet his sagas preserve what is essential to "ethics" and "origi the essence of the ethos immediately comes to light. nary ethics" as Heidegger would have us interrogate them.s Challenged The saying of Heraclitus (Frag. 119) goes: ethos anthropoi dai to examine Sophocles' tragedies, we are to find therein what is preserved mon. This is usually translated, 'A man's character is his daimon.' and yet instructive if we today are to move beyond provisional moralities, r 444 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 445 enabling our meaningful confrontation with the planetary domination of her act of honor to the citizens, not forcing the law or crossing the royal technology. Because of Heidegger's keen interest in Sophocles' Antigone vote and power. The text opens, in short, with opposing claims from the I turn to it. Whatever we find in Sophocles' sagas must be consonant of two daughters. I take this contra position to be central for Sophocles, in the same theme pronounced by Heraclitus: they "think and say the contrast to "the opposition of Creon and Antigone" most critics interpret same." to disclose the significance of the drama.9 Surely the dialogue between Antigone and Creon, as well as their respective actions, manifest con Sophocles' Antigone, Heidegger's Commentary sequences following from a ruler who "misconstrues the role of the rebel and his own as sovereign"-yet this interpretation prejudices and, so I It is appropriate to begin with Sophocles' Antigone if only because it is submit, misleads us in our apprehension of what is essential to Anti the first of "the Theban plays" ("produced in 441 B.C.," Oedipus Rex gone's act. Hers is not first and foremost that of a "rebel" against a produced "some fourteen or fifteen years later") that inaugurates Soph sovereign, a view that characterizes Antigone in a negative light. Con ocles' principal theme.6 Yet the Antigone is particularly apt in another strued positively and essentially, Antigone's act is that of one who would sense. For Heidegger, beginnings disclose an "essential configuration," be pious and honorable before the gods. More to the point, in being holding sway or governing what ensues thematically.? The Antigone dis pious Antigone draws to our attention what is essential to her act, that closes what is essential for Sophocles and for us, involving us imme is, the open region of her abode that allows what pertains to the human diately in what Heraclitus intends us to understand in his saying, ethos essence to appear, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to her. anthropoi daimon-in the sense given it by Heidegger. There is "an Specifically, Antigone dwells in the nearness of the gods. Through her essential connection" between Heraclitus and Sophocles in their appro act Antigone insists on the primacy of dwelling in nearness to the gods, priation and respective elucidation of the ethos. itself the fitting guide to dwelling in nearness to mortals, "mortals" At the outset of the saga, Antigone's query to 1smene speaks of the literally and expressly brought to the fore by the dead brother Polyneices sufferings "sprung from their father" Oedipus. The god Zeus "achieves yet untombed and thus dishonored. suffering" even for the survivors. Their suffering extends to their en Antigone's intention and her act fly in the face of Creon's assertion gagement of the plight of Polyneices. Both daughters are faced with the that one "cannot learn of any man [pantos andros] the soul [psuche], prospect of sharing in "the labor and act" that may mend a misdeed the mind [phr6nema], and the intent [gnomen] until he shows his -Polyneices' corpse left "unwept" and "untombed," contrary to what practise of the government [archais] and law [nomoisin]." Sophocles befits proper burial and, thereby, due honor of the dead.B If Antigone deliberately contraposes Antigone's act to Creon's utterance: Antigone perceives the matter correctly, both sisters are called to a deed despite it discloses her soul, her mind, and her intent when she claims what is her being forbidden by the command of Creon. Antigone declares what is own, namely, an act of piety despite what either ruler (basileus/ essential to this deed: "It's not for him to keep me from my own" (Line turannos) or ruled (polites) construe to be proper "practice" (prassein) in 48). Antigone's declaration is contra posed to that of 1smene, who re the interest of government and law. 1smene and Creon conceive of minds of their proper place in the polis (Lines 59-60): "We'll perish friendship (philia) within the frame of such practice-1smene as one who terribly if we force law and try to cross the royal vote and power." is ruled not wanting to dishonor the citizens with whom she has Referring to acts that exceed their power [perissa prassein] 1smene adds friendship and so refusing her sister's deed; Creon, in a similar vein, (Lines 66-7): "for in these things I am forced, and shall obey the men in asserting that "he who counts another greater friend than his own power." The contrast is patent: Antigone, not to be kept from her own, fatherland" [kai meizon hostis anti tes autou patras philon nomizel] is to dares "the crime of piety" [hosia panourgesas] (Line 74), daring to be placed nowhere, i.e., to lack place in the polis and thus effectively to "honor what the gods [theon] have honored"; sustaining her perspective, be exiled as "stranger" and thus as "enemy." 1smene holds, "I shall do no dishonor. But to act against the citizens I At issue is what conduct befits a citizen (polites). Creon holds that, cannot" (Line 79). "The man who is well-minded [eunous] to the state [polel] ... in death Antigone and 1smene manifest the deliberative dilemma, that is, what and life shall have his honor [timesetal]." For Creon as for 1smene, the honor requires of them (indeed of any citizen). Antigone performs what well-minded citizen does not force the law (nomos), especially the law is for her the honorable deed, an act of piety, thereby honoring what the issuing from the power of the basileus/turannos on behalf of the gods have honored; 1smene seeks to perform the honorable deed that is fatherland (patras). Yet one need not concede to Creon this claim. One 446 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 447 must instead ask what it is to be "well-minded" to the polis when faced thousands of eyes should examine man, searching for attributes with the claim of the gods even as one is faced with the claim of ruler and states. Such being is disclosed only in poetic insight. and ruled. That the gods may and do lay claim to an individual's act is a matter of some consequence, given the chorus's query ("Isn't this action Let us pause here. We noted Creon's claim to know of the soul, the possibly a god's?") when the guard reports the burial "all accomplished." mind, and the intent of a human disclosed in a person's practice of the Antigone's act elicits the question whether the polis is sustained in its government and law. Such practices lay forth the requisite evidence of essence primarily or only when one privileges the law (nomos) in def "friendship to the fatherland," thus a person's manifest pious deeds and erence to its provenance in the royal command. The chorus discloses the due honor in life and in death. Yet Sophocles' ascription of the human as possibility that Antigone's act is related to an act of the god. Her deinotaton points to "the extreme limits and abrupt abysses of his "dwelling in the nearness of the god" through her act of piety itself elicits being," Creon's or lsmene's practices (prassein) not disclosing what is the drawing near of the god to her. Her act may then indeed be pious essential. What is essential can be declared only if one apprehends that according to the judgment of the god, therefore veritably not a crime the human being is to deinotaton, the strangest. Thus Heidegger (1M, against either god or citizen-thus not an act against the polis conceived 149-150) would have us clarify the meaning of the Greek word deinon: as patras-even though both ruler (Creon) and ruled (Ismene) deem Antigone's act to be a crime. That is why Antigone declares that she ... deinon means the powerful in the sense of one who uses does "what the gods have honored." power, who not only disposes of power [Gewaltj but is violent Creon will not hear of such a possibility: "Unbearable, your saying [gewalt-tatig] insofar as the use of power is the basic trait not that the gods take kindly forethought for this corpse" (Line 282). Creon only of his action but also of his being-there .... Man is deinon, first claims to "revere great Zeus," yet it remains to be established whether because he remains exposed within this overpowering power, he himself draws near to the gods so that the gods may draw near to because by his essence he belongs to being. But at the same time him. The gods draw near in response to a deed of piety. Whether Creon man is deinon because he is the violent one in the sense himself dwells in nearness to the gods turns on whether he is attuned to deSignated above. (He gathers the power and brings it to mani their claim (e.g., that of Zeus). The question also is whether Creon is festness.) Man is the violent one, not aside from and along with himself "well-minded" (eunous), Sophocles drawing the question obli other attributes but solely in the sense that in his fundamental quely in the guard's query as to what his unwelcome speech offends in violence [Gewalt-tatigkeitj he uses power [Gewaltj against the Creon: "Does it annoy your hearing or your mind [psuche]?" For good overpowering [Uberwaltigende]. Because he is twice deinon in a reason the chorus signals what is fundamentally the enigma of the sense that is originally one, he is to deinotaton, the most power human, irrespective of his or her place in the polis as ruler or ruled: ful: violent in the midst of the overpowering. "Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man" [polla ta deina kouden anthropou deinoteron telel]. These words resonate what is es Heidegger pOints to what is essential to all who have share in the polis. sential to the Greek discernment of the human way to be, which is why Creon disposes his power as basileus/turannos, lsmene her delimited Heidegger reflected on these words expressly. power as ruled polites, and Antigone as one who takes her stand outside In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1M, 146 ff), Heidegger turns to the ruler-ruled dichotomy by appropriating what is her own (to auto). Sophocles' Antigone to learn of "the poetic project of being-human Each is exposed within "the overpowering power" and acts in a way among the Greeks." Heidegger interprets, focusing on Sophocles' ascrip more fundamental than the conventional exercise of power that opposes tion: Nothing surpasses the human being in strangeness. Taking this in "violence" and "peace" within the polis. Each is "strange" such that we, the superlative (deinotaton) rather than the comparative (deinoteron), like Heidegger, should ask: "But why do we translate deinon as 'strange' Heidegger observes (1M, 149): [unheimlich]?" Heidegger (1M, 150) continues: Man, in one word, is deinotaton, the strangest. This one word en Not in order to hide or attenuate the meaning of powerful, over compasses the extreme limits and abrupt abysses of his being. powering, violent; quite on the contrary. Because this deinon is This aspect of the ultimate and abysmal can never be discerned meant as the supreme limit and link of man's being, the essence through the mere description that establishes data, even though of the being thus defined should from the first be seen in its 448 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 449 crucial aspect. But, in that case, is the designation of the powerful strangeness only if we experience the power of appearance and the as the strange and uncanny [unheimlich] not a posterior notion struggle with it as an essential part of being-there." derived from the impression that the powerful makes on us, All who have place in the polis experience "the power of appearance," whereas the essential here is to understand the deinon as what it which the Greeks understood as phainomenon, surely, but also as intrinsically is? That is so, but we are not taking the strange in the eidolon, semblance. Essential to the human's power is the power to sense of an impression on our states of feeling. unconceal, to disclose, to bring what is thus given "to stand," discrimi nating among being (to on), appearance (phainomenon), and semblance Heidegger points beyond what the chorus describes after declaring the (eidolon). It is this discrimination among being, appearance, and human (anthropos) the most strange: Crossing seas ("excursion" [Auf semblance that for Heidegger is at the heart of the human being-there in bruch]), ploughing up the earth ("incursion" [Einbruch]), snaring birds the polis. Commenting on Line 370 of the Antigone, Heidegger (1M, 152) and wild beasts, making shelter, contriving refuge from illness, etc., the focuses on the Greek words "hypsipolis apolis' and instructs: human "can always help himself. He faces no future helpless." All of this is conventional, familiar enough to us as the human's "cleverness" in It speaks ... of poliS; not of the paths to all the realms of the "inventive craft." But this is not what is essential to the human power as essent but of the foundation and scene of man's being-there, the the "strangest." Heidegger (1M, 15D-1) clarifies further: point at which all these paths meet, the polis. Polis is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full We are taking the strange, the uncanny [das Unheimliche], as that meaning. Polis means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which casts us out of the 'homely,' i.e., the customary, familiar, which historical being-there is. The polis is the historical place, the secure. The unhomely [Unheimische] prevents us from making there in which, out of which, and for which history happens. To ourselves at home and therein it is overpowering. But man is the this place and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the strangest of all, not only because he passes his life amid the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, strange understood in this sense, but because he departs from his the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and customary, familiar limits, because he is the violent one, who, the fleet. tending toward the strange in the sense of the overpowering, surpasses the limit of the familiar [das Heimlische]. All such elements are "part and parcel" of what is proper to "the political" (ta politika) in the Greek "City-state," including Thebes. All are political by This sense of the human as "strange" immediately resonates with the having "jointure," i.e., a fitting-together or con-stitution, connoted by the act taken by Antigone. She dares to place herself outside the customary, word politeuma. The politeuma assigns to each its place within this familiar, and secure insofar as she (as Ismene anticipates) "forces the jOinture. But Heidegger (1M, 152-3) points otherwise: law." Polyneices being yet untombed brings to the fore for Antigone her being "un homely" in Thebes. So long as she sustains the command of All this does not first belong to the polis, does not become political the basileus/turannos and does not depart from her customary, familiar by entering into a relation with-a statesman and a general and the limits, she is "unhomely." Appropriating her own, she unavoidably sur business of the state. No, it is political, i.e., at the site of history, passes the limit of the familiar such as ruler and ruled construe it. provided there be (for example) poets alone, but then really poets, Antigone "appears" to Ismene to be one who "craves what can't be priests alone, but then really priests, rulers alone, but then really done" (Line 90), her act "wrong from the start," Antigone chasing "what rulers. Be, but this means: as violent men to use power, to be cannot be." Hence we have Creon's consonant attribution of shame, come pre-eminent in historical being-there as creators, as men of unholiness of deed, enmity to the fatherland, as he indicts-while not yet action. Pre-eminent in the historical place, they become at the really knowing (or dissembling that he does not know?)-the doer of the same time apolis, without city and place, lonely, strange, and deed we know to be that of Antigone. But appearance is ever subject to alien, without issue amid the essent as a whole, at the same time our vigilance if discernment is to find its way to the truth. Thus Heid without statute and limit, without structure and order, because egger writes (1M, 150): "We shall fully appreciate this phenomenon of they themselves as creators must first create all this. , 450 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 451 What is essential to the polis as the site (topos) of history and of human that which gives place to the false (pseudos) in the poli~thereby to being-there (Dasein) is that men-and women (qua anthropinos, thus bring forth being (to on). One achieves an overcoming (die Uberwin gunaika included even as andras is)-become preeminent through acts dung) of what otherwise would be the human's exclusion from being. that are "without statute and limit." These acts are creative, manifesting Those like Ismene, who foreswear crossing the royal vote and power and initiative independent of (a) the "structure and order" that is the withdraw from forcing the law, bar themselves "from reflection about the politeuma and (b) the directive that issues from "ruler and generaL" Pre appearance" in which they move. eminent acts create what is essential to the polis, challenging the What is to be gained from reflection on appearance? Nothing less structure and order of the politeuma and the command of the basileus/ than transcendence [Hinaussein] of the familiar, the customary; that turannos. That is precisely what Antigone does; acting pre-eminently she "knowledge" is gained that is a "perSistent looking out beyond what is "crosses" the royal vote and power, "forces" the law, transgressing both given at any given time." This "looking out" is precisely that "violence" statute and limit set by poltteuma and basileus/turannos. On this read [Gewalt-tatigkeitj that "wrests being from concealment into the mani ing, Antigone is "well-minded" in virtue of her transgressive act. fest." Thus, comments Heidegger, "The violent one, the creative man, In what sense is Antigone's act transgressive? In continuing its who sets forth into the un-said, who breaks into the un-thought, compels reflections on the strangeness of man, the chorus remarks (Lines 369- the unhappened to happen and makes the unseen appear-this violent 70): "When he honors the laws of the land and the gods' sworn right one stands in all times in venture (tolma, line 371)." Antigone trans high indeed is his city; but stateless the man who dares to dwell with gresses to "force" what is to happen according to her venture, her dishonor" [nomous pareiron chthonos theon t' henorkon dikan hupsipolis. "daring" act. Her act is a "scene of disclosure." Thus Heidegger (1M, 163) Apolis hoto to me kalon zunesti tolmas charin]. Antigone's act illumines adds: "The strangest (man) is what it is because, fundamentally, it culti the primacy of dwelling in nearness to the gods, and links expressly with vates and guards the familiar, only in order to break out of it and to let Heidegger's interpretation of" hupsipolis apolis." The human who "dwells what overpowers it break in." Antigone breaks out of the familiar and lets with dishonor" is essentially stateless-better said, truly "homeless," dis what overpowers the customary "break in." What breaks in? The chorus placed such that s/he does not truly "dwell" (Le., is apolis). Through her had antiCipated in its response to Creon: "Isn't this action possibly a pre-eminent act, Antigone may (from the perspective of appearance held god's?" That is, the god draws nigh to Antigone in her drawing near to by Ismene and Creon) be "stateless" in the sense of being transgressive the god, their reciprocal act of mutual appropriation bringing forth a of the royal vote and power, thereby acting against the citizens. Yet, her deed. It is this deed that would have all in the polis of necessity dis pre-eminent act, through which she is hupsipoli~"high indeed"-is her criminate how that deed either succumbs to the rule of appearance and essential way of being-there. She seeks to dwell with honor before the semblance or manifests the deed for what it truly is. gods, though others think her impious and dishonoring of the polis. Anti Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Sophocles know "the unconcealment [die gone, in contrast to Ismene and Creon, apprehends that in committing to Unverborgenheit, aletheia] of being is not simply given. Unconcealment her transgressive act she, like any human, "is always thrown back on the occurs only when it is achieved by work [in the Greek sense of ergon]," paths that he himself [she herself] has laid out." Everything that is the including "the work of the polis as the historical place" in which word, "ethical" (in the sense of fitting norms for living) or the "political" (as the thought, and deed are "grounded and preserved" (1M, 191). We who established jointure of ruler and ruled) represents any number of "paths" witness Antigone apprehend that her deed-though it "shatter against all in the polis have laid out, wittingly or unwittingly, be they ruler or being" in her death according to the command of Creon-is precisely this ruled. Thrown (recall Heidegger's discussion of Gworfenheit [BT, 174]) kind of work. It is a work of unconcealment, "a combat against con citizens generally-along with those of Thebes who must engage the cealment, disguise, false appearance," thus "a struggle against pseudos, unsettled question of Polyneices' lack of burial and rites-can seemingly distortion and perversion" (IM, 192), even when that distortion is en act only in the context in which the human "becomes mired in his paths, gendered by and given in the royal command. In her creative act, then, caught in the beaten track, and thus caught he compasses the circle of Antigone preserves the etho~her act of unconcealment builds the world his world, entangles himself in appearance, and so excludes himself from anew, her act of "world-building" thereby "history in the authentic sense" being" (1M, 157). Only one (like Antigone) pre-eminent in action over (1M, 62). As one who is "creator" in virtue of a world-building deed, comes entanglement in appearance (phainomenon). More important, Antigone sustains the ineradicable conflict (polemos) that makes the only thus does one overcome entanglement in semblance (eidolon)-as 452 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 453 polis the site of history, the site of disclosure in the primordial conflict of that you, a mortal man, would over-run being, appearance, and semblance (IM, 63): the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws. Not now, nor yesterday's, they always live, When the creators vanish from the nation, when they are barely and no one knows their origin in time. tolerated as an irrelevant curiosity, an ornament, as eccentrics So not through fear of any man's proud spirit having nothing to do with real life; when authentic conflict ceases, would I be likely to neglect these laws, converted into mere polemics, into the machinations and intrigues draw on myself the gods' sure punishment. of man within the realm of the given, then the decline has set in. For even if an epoch still strives to maintain the inherited level and Antigone preserves the ethos thereby: attuned to the claim of the gods, dignity of its being-there, the level falls. It can be maintained only attuned to the "unwritten" (agrapta) and "unfailing" (kasphale) laws, she if it is at all times creatively transcended. apprehends the written law-Creon's proclamation (ho keruxas)-may not "over-rule" though Creon be ruler (turannos). She herself will abide Antigone acts, then, to transcend her time, preserving the ethos against in the nearness of the gods according to what the unwritten yet unfailing the prospect of decline, a consequence of ruler and ruled being dis law claims from her. As witnesses to her act our task is to discern possessed of "authentic conflict" because of their thrownness onto the whether she is caught in "open shame" as it appears, thus Antigone's paths of the customary. Thus, when Antigone is brought before Creon telling words to Creon: "And if you think my acts are foolishness the and the chorus declares (Line 383), "It cannot be you that they bring for foolishness may be in a fool's eye" (otherwise translated as, "And if you breaking the royal law, caught in open shame," Antigone has trans think my actions foolish, that amounts to a charge of folly by a fool"). gressed the command of the turannos and forced "the law," thereby to One must ask: What is it that Antigone wrests from concealment through contest the "royal law." What remains to be decided, the chorus anti her pre-eminent act? One must answer: Antigone struggles with ap cipating with us, even for us, is whether in reality (in contrast to in pearance (phainomenon), even with semblance (eidolon), given the appearance) Antigone is caught not in "open shame" but instead in open charge of folly against her, to disclose not only her act as one of piety honor according to the claim of the god. (thus, one of honor) before the claim of the gods; but also to disclose This matter of shame or honor is what is essentially to be "proved" by again as If anew both (a) the presence of the gods and (b) the rule of Creon, though the surface question is whether Antigone has buried the their unwritten yet unfailing law as an authentic polemos with the royal dead and performed the due ritual of threefold libation. Even the guard law of the turannos-all of this yet properly to occur in and for the polis manifests his superintendence by the familiar, his own movement upon as the site (topos) of the human being-there (Dasein) as each human the beaten paths, when he says, "bringing friends to trouble is hard being qua citizen (polites) either takes up (appropriates as his or her grief. Still, I care less for all these second thoughts than for the fact that own) or prescinds from that essential task of discriminating his and her I myself am safe." The guard, in short, surrenders, even refuses, the "way" or "path" among being, appearance, and semblance. possibility of authentic conflict between him and Antigone and between Creon, privileging the royal law, not yielding to the claim of the him and the royal command he serves. His safety (soterias) matters most unwritten yet unfailing laws of the gods, characterizes Antigone's deed to him.lO This concern for personal safety is manifestly deficient in tolma, hubris ("insolence"). Antigone's reply clarifies for all who would hear that that "venture" or "daring" such as Antigone discloses, admitting she Creon remains out of attunement to the claim of the gods: "Nothing that dared (etolmas) to transgress (huperbainen) the laws (nomous). Anti you say fits with my thought. ... Nor will you ever like to hear my words." gone's justification for her deed cannot be more clear as it pits the royal Attuned to the claim of Hades even as she has been attuned to the claim law of the basileus/turannos against the law of the gods that claimed of Zeus and Dike, Antigone insists (Line 519), "Death yearns for equal Antigone for her creative deed (Lines 450-9): law for all the dead" [homos ho g' Haides tous nomous toutous pothel]. Ismene at the outset stood contraposed to the intent of Antigone, For me it was not Zeus who made that order. unwilling to cross the royal vote and power or act against the citizens. Nor did that Justice who lives with the gods below Once implicated by Creon, Ismene (in stark contrast to Creon) manifests mark out such laws to hold among mankind. her turn of mind, understood essentially as a turn from "appearance" to Nor did I think your orders were so strong "being" as she properly discerns Antigone's deed: "Sister, I pray, don't 1 I 454 "Preserving the Ethos" i "Preserving the Ethos" 455 fence me out from honor, from death with you, and honor done the word (command), his thought (opinion), and his deed (in this case, con dead." Ismene perceives that she stands to be "fenced out" from honor tra Antigone). (atimases). Antigone is not satisfied: the gods (Zeus, Dike, Hades) will The murmuring among the citizens hupo skotou makes Creon's ac not permit Ismene a share in honor; for, as Antigone declares, Ismene customed seat suspect (note the double-entendre here insofar as he wished no part in the deed and did not make the deed her own (poiou holds "the seat" of power even as his "seat" is his accustomed path). seautes). Hence, Antigone indicts her: "I cannot love a friend whose love Creon may not be "correct" (orthos) in word, thought, and deed, though is words" (Line 542). Here again we find voiced the contraposition of he believes himself to "be" so. With his telling warning, Haemon elicits Antigone and Ismene, each as citizen, each as ruled, in relation to the our reflection: is Creon himself "well-minded" (eunous), even as Creon basileus/turannos and the politeia. Whereas Antigone transgresses to expects others within the polis to "be" (and not merely "appear" to be) become hupsipolis, making the venture (tolma) her own and thus her act well-minded? Haemon counsels: no man should ever be ashamed to "un an "authentic" (eigentlich) conflict (polemos) on behalf of that nomos bend his mind" (Line 711), permit a change (metastasin), meaning to go which is unwritten yet unfailing, Ismene remains thrown upon the beyond where he stands, in his way to be to transcend (Hin-aus-sein) familiar and customary path. Antigone wins an authentic self [eigentlich the customary, the familiar, his manner and habit, his apparent but per Selbstj; she does so having from the outset apprehended her act in view haps not real ethos. Creon may learn (mathein) the lesson (didaxo of her uttermost possibility-of-being, i.e., her death. Ismene-as do all in mestha) manifest first in Antigone's deed and then in Haemon's good the city-acquiesces in Creon's faulty reason as he asserts, "The man the counsel and just word, but only if he takes leave of his "seat," his state has put in place must have obedient hearing to his least command "customary" and "familiar" path.12 when it is right, and even when it's not' [italics mine]; said otherwise, "in Haemon's counsel is just insofar as he too perceives what is essential justice and its opposite" (diakaia kai tanantia). Antigone rightly discerns to the polis in its jointure: "No city is property of a single man" [polis gar the matter to be otherwise, for no human can dwell with dishonor in a ouk esth hetis andros est henos] (Line737). The polis belongs to no man human deed contra posed to the unfailing law of the gods. though the human belongs to the polis as the site (topos) of his being In short, Antigone's pre-eminent act discloses that she is a citizen there (Dasein). Creon is correct: "custom gives possession to the ruler" alone even as she is really (in contra position to "apparently") a citizen in (ou tou kratountos he polis nomizetal). But custom does not disclose the virtue of her Singular act; for her act preserves the polis in its essence by essential. A ruler is really a ruler only when he ventures beyond the preserving the primacy of the unwritten law of the gods that ever has its customary, thereby to be a ruler alone, in so ruling preserving the ethos place (topos) in that jointure within which the deeds of men qua citizens of the polis via a venture that "stands out" (metastasin), transcends, the are brought to light. Yet as Haemon tells, there is the "unsaid," the customary. Creon, in short, misperceives his deed, though Haemon in unspoken undercurrent-what occurs "under cover" (hupo skotou) forms him: "You tread down the gods' due. Respect is gone" [ou gar among many Thebans who grieve for Antigone. They bear witness in sebeis/ timas ge tas theon paton]. Misperceiving, Creon "speaks" (/egein) their silence, as well as in their murmuring, to this citizen "unjustly but does not "hear" (kluein). He refuses "attunement" to the claim of the doomed" for a "glorious action done" (ergon eukleestaton phthinel). gods, though their unfailing law superintends even the ruler, whether he Counseling Creon, Haemon warns him of being of "one mind" only. act "in justice and its opposite." The Greek words are revealing: me nun hen ethos mounon hen sauto Antigone, by contrast, having drawn nigh to the gods, shows herself phorei. Creon, Haemon discerns, is of "one mind" (hen ethos) in "man to be theogennes. As "offspring" of the gods, she remains attuned to ner" and "habit," thus his "outward bearing," i.e., his outward appear their presence in the polis and shows her respect (eusebeia) in her deed, ance (phainomenon). "Ethos' refers in other, more essential, words to even to the point (as the chorus observes) of "the furthest verge of "an accustomed seat," an "abode," one takes Up.ll The question here is daring" (eschaton), there to find "the high foundation of justice" (hupse whether Creon's outward bearing-the way he shows himself to the Ion es dikas bathron). We, like those among the Thebans who may citizens who dare not cross his royal vote and power-is merely or succeed in discriminating among being, appearance, and semblance, can always in this manner of self-presentation. At issue is whether Creon's concur with Antigone when she declares, "And yet the wise will know my outward bearing gives evidence of one who dwells in the polis even as choice was right," the "evidence" plain of her "pious duty done" though he "abides" in the secondary, more mundane, sense of having his "seat" she stand "convicted of impiety." No justice of the gods (daimonon of power. At issue is whether Creon truly preserves the ethos through his diken) has she transgressed in deed.13 Creon, in contrast, sees justice 1 456 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 457 (ten diken idein) too late, his own deed one of "error" (hamartia) before do with ethics," that Heidegger "did not attempt to describe how ethics the claim of the gods rather than one of "wickedness" (moxtheria).14 We could be thought in an ontologically proper way."lS Lawrence Hatab re like the chorus, see: "Concealment is all over," and the lesson is clear; marks, "Heidegger subordinated the question of ethics to the question of "The gods must have their due." Being. Like other ontical matters, ethics could not be addressed ade quately until the ontological question of Dasein's general mode of Being Heidegger's Omission? was given priority.,,19 Herman Philipse complains Heidegger issues a "heteronomous doctrine" that is "destructive with regard to moral Our excursus within the text of Sophocles' Antigone has illuminated how theory," that "exterminates ethics by investing a transcendent non-entity his saga preserves the ethos such as Heidegger construes it, but also (Being) with a moral monopoly, but without specifying moral rules so and more to the point-how concretely a citizen such as Antigone pre authorized," Heidegger's "ontological analysis of human existence" lack serves the ethos through her pre-eminent act in the scene of disclosure ing "a substantial moral dimension.,,20 Christopher Long opines, "ontology that is her "being-with" (Mltsein) others in the pO/is. Of course, we must has never been merely theoretical; it is always born out of and deter keep forefront Mary Blundell's observation: "A special virtue of dramatic mined by the historico-ethico-political conditions under which it is form is the opportunity it provides for the persuasive presentation of developed."2l Yet one may assert confidently that the whole of Hei various pOints of view without obliging the author to commit himself to degger's thought is "ethical" because his Denken pOints to what is any of them or provide any systematic answers" (HF, 10). Thus, one may essential to preserving the ethos in our day (understood as "the reasonably suspend judgment that merely concurs with the chorus when destitution of modernity," modernity's "loss of the gods," "homelessness" it declares "concealment" is all over. Heidegger will readily tell us con insofar as we lack a proper discernment/discrimination among being, cealment (die Verborgenheit) never ceases. Instead, all who abide in the appearance, and semblance so as to preserve a "dwelling thinking,,).22 po/is struggle daily to wrest being from concealment into unconcealment Daniel Dahlstrom may be correct: if there is to be a "turn" (Kehre) (die Unverborgenheit); such is the unceasing claim of being, appearance, such as Heidegger understands is requisite in the face of the planetary and semblance upon human being-there. The "illumination" I have pro domination of technology, "the turn must take place primarily in human vided has its "positive" hermeneutic prejudice, of course, given the con beings; after all, the gods are always already there and only the hard ceptual frame of Heidegger's Dasein analytic, including here both the ness of the metaphysical heart prevents the community from appro early "fundamental ontology" articulated in Being and Time and his later priating them.,,23 Yet Dahlstrom may correctly counsel, "If the grounding efforts at "originary" (anfang/iche, ursprOng/ich) and "essential" (wesent that Heidegger allegedly gives to ethics cannot provide principles for this /ich) thinking (Denken).15 Yet one may well have to consider a genea discrimination [between the ethical and the unethical], e.g., for deter logical, even architectonic, movement at play here. Heidegger's Dasein mining that certain courses of action are generally right and some even analytic, his attention to the Fourfold (das Geviert) of dwelling, etc., may enforcibly so, then talk about an 'ethics of dwelling' seems to be a bit of well have its prior "ground" (Grund) in what he has discovered in So hyperbole." Schalow comments that, "weaving its way silently through phocles'sagas, not to mention the fragments of Heraclitus, Parmenides, [Heidegger's] entire corpus is the enigma of how Being, through its cor and others who precede Plato in "thinking." Heidegger's thought, then, respondence with us, can yield the directives necessary for our concrete itself works to preserve the ethos in his authentic po/emos with (a) the interaction with others." He asks, "how do the allegedly more 'generic,' Platonist-Aristotelian and modern metaphysics of presence, and thus (b) ontological concerns of such an 'attunement' translate into singular "first philosophy's" superintendence of "practical" philosophy such as responses toward the 'other' (person)?,,24 ethics (ethike) as a movement within the domain of theoretike. The foregoing questions may elicit responses having systematic arti Scholars, of course, tend to find in Heidegger's thought a serious culation according to the demands of normative theory. But because 16 "omission": his corpus articulates no normative ethics. Frank Schalow Heidegger refers us to the poets such as Sophocles, one must not claims there is an "assumption governing Heidegger's formulation of an prematurely force the issue of theoretical disquisition and demonstration 'original ethics' in the 'Letter on Humanism,' namely, that thought (as (as when one concludes, quod erat demonstrandum), especially when ontology) provides the initial access to the ethos prior to any subsequent reminded to differentiate the philosophical focus of Socrates and Plato attempt to prescribe normative guidelines for action."l? Topi Heikkero from that of the poet: "Moral conflict was not a notion congenial to Plato claims, "Heidegger was careful to note that his philosophy had nothing to or most Greek philosophers, but it is the life blood of tragedy .... The 458 "Preserving the Ethos" "Preserving the Ethos" 459 essence of the tragedy in such cases is often precisely that moral conflict of being, appearance, even that of semblance and the false. In this is insoluble or soluble only at enormous cost" (HF, 11). In other words, freedom as the choice of one possibility, one can, and often does, choose one must beware a "naive view of the didactic function of poetry"-"the "the common sense" of "the 'they,''' which is nothing other than "the poets' own aims were not didactic," providing no "factual or categorical satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and [Le., as well as] the wisdom" (HF, 12, 13). failure to satisfy them" (BT, 334). Sophoclean tragodia, in contrast to Of course, ethical theory-ethike as scientific knowledge, episteme Aristotelian ethike, leads Heidegger not to the explication of moral norms does not rest comfortably with unresolved moral conflict. Blundell (HF, to be satisfied (preferred, justified), but to consider first of all whether 20) reminds us, "It was partly the manifest inadequacy of tragic char philosophers have "arrived at the right ontological horizon" for the acters as uplifting moral exemplars which led Plato to banish them from interpretation of ethics. his ideal state." Plato "censures the tragic poets for pandering to the In sorting through the existential condition of "conscience" [Gewis masses by portraying 'the fretful and varied ethos instead of 'the wise sen], Heidegger takes notice of the criticism that he "takes no account of and calm ethos, always consistent with itself' (Rep. 604e-605a)." Some the basic forms of the phenomenon-'evil' conscience and 'good,' that one may hypothesize, as Blundell does, "that Sophoclean stage figures which 'reproves' and that which 'warnslll (BT, 336). Why not? Heidegger may be treated as bearers of a broadly consistent Aristotelian ethos, or is concerned with how a human responds to the summons to ownmost moral and intellectual character." Yet, I submit, Heidegger directs us to (eigentlich) possibilities of being. To understand "conscience" in the the tragedies of Sophocles rather than to Aristotle's treatise on ethics ordinary way is to understand the "experience of conscience ... atCerthe because Sophocles illuminates the authentic polemos ineradicably essen deed has been done or left undone. The voice follows the transgression tial to the polis, a polemos always more than the sum of the "rational" and pOints back to that event which has befallen and by which Dasein (nous) and "emotional" (pathos) possibilities of engagement manifest as has loaded itself with guilt." This happens, e.g., with Creon when he, too a citizen's "character." In short, what Plato finds deficient in Sophocles's late, admits his error. Heidegger emphasizes the import of the summon tragedies is precisely what is essential to the poet's illumination-a fretful ing to a deed, as opposed to remembering a deed. One has the freedom and varied ethos that is the "scene" of disclosure, what is unavoidably to choose one possibility of being, or, as the case may be, one possibility the "abode" of human "authentic conflict.,,25 of being as appearance or semblance: "If conscience makes known a Perhaps because Sophocles represents this ethos as fretful and varied 'Being-guilty' [Schuldigsein], then it cannot do this by summoning us to we can be instructed by Aristotle's theoretical criterion: "actions per something, but it does so by remembering the guilt which has been formed in ignorance of a relevant particular are not open to moral eval incurred and referring to it" (BT, 336-7). Heidegger adds, "neither the uation in the same way as those that result from fully informed decisions call, nor the deed which has happened, nor the guilt with which one is (EN 1109b30-11b3)." Sophocles' sagas make us aware that the site of laden, is an occurrence with the character of something present-at-hand human being-there ever discloses "confusion" of good (esthlos) and bad which runs its course." (kakos) that mayor may not be dissipated in an individual's act of What obtains when moral judgment is rendered-by the philosopher, discrimination among being, appearance, and semblance. Essential here by the ethicist, each with her theoretike, by the lay person with his doxa is the human Seinsverstandnis (understanding of being) within which (said to be deficient relative to the episteme of those who theorize), by moral discernment occurs; for, as Heidegger wrote in Being and Time the dramatist such as Sophocles with his theater of tragodia? When one (Macquarrie/Robinson, §58, 332), there is an "existential condition for has a moral principle, applies a moral rule, evaluates according to a the possibility of the 'morally' good and for that of the 'morally' evil-that moral rule, or evaluates according to what appears, does one speak of is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take acts as "something present-at-hand" which have "run their course" and factically" [die Existenziale Bedingung der Moglichkeit fur das ''moralisch'' in their presentation subject to our comprehension? This seems to be so Gute und Bose, das heisst fur die Moralitat uberhaupt und deren faktisch in heteronomous judgment, Le., when "the other" is judged, in contrast mogliche Ausformungen]. to when autonomous self-assessing judgment is rendered (though Morality may take many forms, yet "Freedom ... is only in the choice duplicity and error occur here as well). Yet whether the evaluation is of one possibility-that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the one's own or another's, every act "calls beyond the deed which has others and one's not being able to choose them" (BT, 331). This freedom happened, and back to the Being-gUilty into which one has been thrown, is ever "uncanny"; the human disclosure or unconcealment may be that which is 'earlier' than any indebtedness" (BT, 337). Heidegger hesitates