Ideology vs. Constitutionalism Power Without Limits: The Allure of Political Idealism and the Crumbling of American Constitutionalism Claes G. Ryn The Catholic University of America For the framers of the U.S. Constitution no task seemed more important than to limit and tame power. The chief reason why they established a government of divided powers and checks and balances was their view of human nature, which was pri- marily Christian and classical. It seemed to them self-evident that human beings are morally cleft. They are potentially decent, even admirable, but also have darker inclinations that pose a great threat to themselves and others. Human beings cannot be trusted with unrestricted power. The constitutional- ism of the framers assumed that the drive for power had to be contained first of all through the self-discipline of individuals, but corresponding external restraints, including constitutional checks, were necessary to protect the public. Since the adoption of the Constitution American govern- ment and society have changed radically. The Constitution still enjoys a kind of ceremonial respect. It is cited as if it possessed an august authority. In actuality, political practice is today so different from the intent of the framers that, in substance, the original Constitution has been virtually suspended. Over the Claes G. Ryn is Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America, Chairman of the National Humanities Institute, and Editor of Humanitas. Political Idealism and Power Without Limits Humanitas • 5 years sometimes tortuous and highly tendentious constitu- tional interpretation has combined with powerful political and intellectual trends to produce an enormous expansion and centralization of the federal government and a concomitant erosion of checks and balances. The claim that these devel- opments have realized the hopes of Alexander Hamilton is blatantly anachronistic. The American federal National Secu- rity and Welfare State with its presidential system bears little resemblance to the scheme of the framers. The reasons for the change are many and complex. They Moral and include the effects of wars, economic and scientific develop- cultural ments, and globalization. The change can also be traced to change helps moral, cultural, and social developments that have had pro- explain political found, transformative consequences. Briefly put, the way in change. which Americans today view themselves and the world is very different from what was the case at the time of the fram- ing of the Constitution. That change is far-reaching and goes a long way towards explaining the mentioned political change. One major consequence is a muting of the old American fear of power and the creation of vast new opportunities for politi- cians who desire more power. Although these developments have distinctively American characteristics, they reflect trends throughout the Western world. Those trends have, in fact, been even more pronounced in Europe. Although traditional religion and morality have long been in retreat, moralistic language seems more pervasive in American politics today than ever. Few public policy stands are advanced that are not said to be demanded by “justice” or “fairness.” To oppose them is to be “greedy,” “callous” or “intolerant”—to be morally inferior, even despicable. Moral indignation is, it seems, the favored posture of politicians and pressure groups. But the moralism of today is very different from the notion of morality prevalent at the time of the writing of the Con- stitution. The purpose of this article is to identify a powerful strain within this new moralism and to elucidate its role in en- gendering the transformation of American society and politics. While sharply lessening the old American fear of power, the change has facilitated and even stimulated a desire for power. According to the new conception of morality, it is virtuous to want government, almost always the federal government, to 6 • Volume XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2, 2013 Claes G. Ryn expand its reach. In foreign policy, it is common for American leaders to claim, sometimes with great ideological fervor, that Today’s moralism a America is exceptional and has a moral mission in the world. justification American leadership is needed to remake insufficiently “free” of power? and “democratic” countries. According to assertive national- ists, neoconservatives, and liberal interventionists in both parties, America should seek armed global hegemony—not, of course, to indulge a desire to dominate but to fulfill a morally noble destiny. The advocates of uncontested hegemony will deny that they desire, for its own sake, the enormous military power that would be necessary to achieving the stated goal; the need to wield enhanced American power is only incidental to the moral imperative of creating a better world. In domes- tic politics, many politicians similarly assume that their wish greatly to expand the scope and functions of government has solely moral motives. Here, too, the need to accumulate power at the political center is viewed as merely incidental to wanting a more just society. Yet one might wonder why the desire for moral public policy rarely, if ever, issues in calls for reducing the power of political leaders. So striking is this pattern that it raises the question whether the moralism in question and the wish to expand and centralize power might somehow be integrally connected. Whatever else this moralism might be, is it a subtle way of justifying a desire to rule others? The purpose of this article is to analyze the “idealism” that has helped transform America and, in particular, to demon- “Idealism” strate that its moral-imaginative dynamic is quite different may imply a right to from its reputation. It would appear that indistinguishable dominate. from its ostensible caring for the welfare of others is a desire to direct their lives. Indeed, the deepest source of idealism’s ap- peal may be that it is a sense of moral superiority that implies a right to dominate. To argue this thesis it will be necessary to revisit points that this author has made in other contexts and to recast, combine, and supplement them for the present purpose. The Old Morality and Its Social and Political Entailments The traditional Western view of man’s moral predicament carried with it a deep ambivalence about power. On the one hand, no political objectives could be achieved without the Political Idealism and Power Without Limits Humanitas • 7 exercise of power. On the other hand, the prominent lower proclivities of human beings made power potentially danger- ous, so that people in political authority had to be subjected to restraint. Both in personal and political life, it was important to foster moderation and a sense of limits. Even the political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), which breaks with the Western tradition with regard to both moral philosophy and the idea of restraints on power, offers a kind of confirmation of an older sense that governments must recognize limits. It never occurs to this advocate of supposedly absolute political rule to extend the sphere of sovereignty beyond matters touch- ing law and order. He is in this respect a kind of forerunner of classical liberalism. In his view of human beings Hobbes re- jects much of the older heritage, but in stressing man’s wholly egocentrical nature he might be said to advocate a simplified and extreme Augustinianism. Representatives of the dominant modern notion of politi- cal morality do not much worry about possible egotism and ruthlessness in people who seem to them to have the right ideals. They tend to place any dark inclinations outside of the supposedly idealistic and hence benevolent politician, place it among those, especially, who oppose the supposedly moral cause. One of the reasons why virtuous politicians are thought to need great power is to be able to overcome the opposition of recalcitrants. The framers of the U.S. Constitution were acutely aware Self-control that the responsible exercise of power had moral precondi- and consti- tions. They feared original sin in themselves as well as oth- tutionalism ers. They hoped that in personal life moral character would needed to restrain the desire for self-aggrandizement, just as in national check egotism. political life the checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution would contain and domesticate the all-too-human desire for power as an end in itself. Personal self-control and constitu- tionalism were but different aspects of the need to subdue the voracious ego. Freedom and rule of law required republican virtue. They had to be achieved by the members of society over time through protracted inner and outer moral struggle. Freedom and rule of law could not be bestowed as a gift on a people that had not undertaken any of this work. Constitu- tionalism could be safeguarded in America only through the 8 • Volume XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2, 2013 Claes G. Ryn continuation of the kind of culture that fostered it.1 The Framers assumed that for the Constitution to work its institutions had to be manned by individuals who embodied its spirit of restraint. That spirit stemmed from America’s un- written constitution, that is, from the religious, moral, cultural, and social life that had inclined Americans to constitutional- ism. To be capable of sustaining the constitutional order those working under its provisions had to be predisposed to virtues like moderation, respect for law, and readiness to compromise. They had to have what this author calls the constitutional personality. The main reason why the U.S. Constitution has become a mere shadow of its old self is that it cannot function as intended without the aforementioned personality traits. 2 It is important to understand that the moral character that the framers saw as the ultimate protection against arbitrary Moral power and as the source of the constitutional temperament character the ultimate also generated a society of a certain type. Most Americans will protection vaguely remember that at the heart of Christian morality is the against admonition to “love neighbor as thyself.” What is commonly arbitrary forgotten or is not very well understood are the far-reaching power. social implications of that moral vision. By “neighbor” is meant individuals within the person’s own sphere of life, people of flesh and blood with names and faces. We are to treat them as we would like to have them treat us. Note care- fully that traditional Christianity does not call upon us to love “mankind” or “humanity,” which, by modern, idealistic standards, looks more generous and ambitious. What sounds so nice in modern ears—loving “humanity”—is very different 1 The points made in this paragraph are more fully argued and substanti- ated in Claes G. Ryn, America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003) and Claes G. Ryn, Democracy and the Ethical Life, 2nd exp. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990; first published in 1978). Regarding the British origins of the American constitutional order, see Russell Kirk, The Conservative Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1990) and The Roots of American Order (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2003; first published in 1974). See also, Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995; first published in 1970). 2 On the relationship between the written Constitution and the unwritten one, including the constitutional personality, see Claes G. Ryn, “Political Phi- losophy and the Unwritten Constitution,” Modern Age, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Summer 1992), available also at http://www.nhinet.org/unwrit.htm. Political Idealism and Power Without Limits Humanitas • 9 from loving “neighbor” in that its object is not some particular Love of person in the here and now. “Humanity” is highly amorphous neighbor and distant. Humanity is not here, in our way, where it might very different inconvenience us. By the standards of traditional morality, from love of which are down to earth and rather crusty, loving mankind humanity. does not engage us where we live. It does not interfere with our ordinary lives and require acts of self-sacrifice. It takes place chiefly in the imagination. For that reason, it does not represent any moral challenge. All it requires is having sup- posedly noble sentiments, “feeling the pain” of a diffuse suffering collective somewhere far away. The proof to you and others that you are morally noble is that thinking about those who suffer puts a tear in your eye. Moral virtue is not, as for Christianity, charitable action toward particular people up close, but having warm feelings for nobody in particular. Those in trouble are not actually present, making uncomfort- able demands. From the point of view of traditional Western morality, the sentimental notion of virtue has little to do with real morality, which is to shoulder responsibility for persons, for “neighbors.” That older morality presupposes ability to overcome our native egotism and laziness. It requires strength of character. To be up to the task, the individual must have already learned to moderate his self-indulgence and callous- ness and to make the needs of others his own. It is because the problems of actual persons are concrete and nearby that loving neighbor can be very demanding. It may take up much of our time and energy. To compound the difficulty, neighbor may not even be likeable. Yet love him we should, not by emoting nobly and walking away, but by taking concrete, per- haps greatly inconvenient action. Without strength of will we may shrink from acting. Loving “mankind” does not require character. It takes place in the imagination and is to that extent morality made comfortable and easy. People who believe that loving neighbor will give meaning Traditional to life will be prone to give their best in settings that are near morality and intimate—families, neighborhoods, schools, churches, and centered in workplaces. There are many reasons why such groups and as- small groups. sociations will be for most people the main sphere of life, but it is crucial to understand that it is here more than elsewhere that traditional morality has its center and primary outlet. 10 • Volume XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2, 2013 Claes G. Ryn Note that in small, intimate associations the person must re- peatedly take others into account. There he cannot indulge his native self-indulgence and slothfulness without inviting im- mediate censure. In families and small groups where relations of mutual dependence are dense and numerous, the person is taught to behave with the well-being of others in mind. You cannot always have your own way. Each member must learn to perform little acts of self-denial. The person is habituated to do- ing his part, assisting others, and compromising. Character is bred and repeatedly tested. Where life is personal and up-close no one can get away with portraying himself as morally better than he is. Others will be quick to see through mere posturing. Never mind some conceited self-image of being a deeply car- ing friend of humanity; it is your actions toward real people that reveal who you really are, and they decide your reputa- tion. To the extent that moral character is fostered through life in groups, the will is honed for the responsibilities of the larger society. The more people learn to restrain their lower natures and take others into account, the greater the likelihood that ties of community will be fostered and strengthened. Traditional Western morality does not assume that people up close will be the only beneficiaries of moral responsibility. It assumes merely that genuine morality will originate in and be nurtured in intimate settings. Thus formed, moral character will have an effect wherever a person directs his attention. Some people will concern themselves with a world far beyond local associations and issues, but they will have learned from life in their groups and communities that what makes for a bet- ter society is not some nebulous warm sentiment, but a readi- ness to act responsibly in and to understand the world as it is, full not least of human weakness. To be able to understand moral “idealism” and its various entailments it is important to recognize first the social and po- Love of litical ramifications of the rather different traditional ethic just neighbor is for the described. The latter generates certain priorities. Love of neigh- here and bor is not for exceptional, grandiose circumstances but for the now. concrete life of the here and now. It shapes and enhances day- to-day relationships. Because it emphasizes that doing right by persons up close is essential to human well-being, it encour- ages people to give their best within their own groups, neigh- Political Idealism and Power Without Limits Humanitas • 11 borhoods, businesses, associations, and local communities. Love of From this understanding of man’s higher calling is derived neighbor a the old principle of subsidiarity, central not least to Roman decentralizing Catholic social thought, which says that problems should be force. addressed, as far as possible, by those immediately concerned. Only if people cannot manage on their own should they seek assistance elsewhere, and then, again, as near to themselves as possible. This sense of moral responsibility will let them at- tain their full stature as human beings. It is not difficult to see that the traditional understanding of morality encouraged and built energetic, strong communities. What people felt that they should handle personally, privately, and locally minimized the need for government. This morality was a powerful decentral- izing force. It was in the 1830s that Alexis de Tocqueville commented at length on the vitality and proliferation of private and local associations in America. Americans had a strong inclination to collaborate and to address their needs within their own groups. De Tocqueville was particularly struck by the active role of members of churches. He noted the great reluctance of Americans to part with any authority over their own lives. Ex- cept perhaps for the prominence of these observations in Demo- cacy in America, they should not be very surprising. Although there was no single reason for these social patterns, it should be easy to see the connection between a highly decentralized, group-oriented society and America’s moral roots. The same moral heritage that fostered cooperation, self- Traditional reliance, mutual assistance, self-restraint, modesty, respect morality for law, and a willingness to compromise helped shape the shaped constitutional personality. These traits formed the mentioned constitutional unwritten constitution, which gave life and direction to the personality. written one. Just as the traditional views and habits of Ameri- cans made them impose internal checks on themselves, so did they make them willing to accept and respect external legal constraints. Had these personality traits not been strong and widespread, nothing like the U.S. Constitution could have been conceived or made to work. That the American form of government today bears little resemblance to the constitutional design of 1787 reflects a change in America’s unwritten constitution, in the basic self- 12 • Volume XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2, 2013 Claes G. Ryn understanding and priorities of Americans. There can be no question here of attempting a comprehensive summary of what brought about the present state of affairs. The emphasis will have to be on how the change in the understanding of morality and society helped produce a new attitude towards power and government. It is necessary to take account of an aspect of so-called “modernity” that has had profound and far- reaching effects but that is still poorly understood. Idealism: Morality Reconceived Not all strains of modernity are incompatible with the older moral tradition, but special attention needs to be paid to the explicitly stated desire for liberation from earlier beliefs and ways of life that is most commonly called modernity. Two seemingly disparate but intimately connected currents have given that part of modernity its distinctive flavor and dynamic: one is a belief in rational enlightenment; the other is entertain- ing “idealistic” dreams of human existence transformed. Both currents assume the coming of a new, superior world, an era of liberty, harmony, and general well-being. Modern idealism follows no single path, but one may dis- cern a central, enduring pattern. The philosopher who gives Rousseau the clearest and most thorough-going expression to the dream paradigmatic for idealism. of a new world and who comes closest to being paradigmatic for this idealism is probably Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712- 1778). More than anybody else he inspired the kind of imagina- tion that has, in more or less extreme form, exerted enormous influence in the Western world, first of all in literature, art, phi- losophy, and religion, but soon also in politics. “Idealism” as a term for the moral-political force that Rousseau helped create should not be confused with the nineteenth century school of German philosophy that is often given the same name. Rousseau flatly rejects the ancient Western belief that human beings are morally torn between higher and lower potentialities and that they are their own worst enemies. Hu- man beings have nothing to fear from themselves. They are naturally good, but traditional societies pervert and imprison their true nature. The way to a better life is to liberate man’s natural goodness from inner and outer restraint. Rousseau dreams himself away from what he considers a dark and intol- Political Idealism and Power Without Limits Humanitas • 13 erable present. He starts the modern theme of estrangement from existing society—alienation, indeed, from all of life as it currently exists. He imagines a long lost idyllic past and a corresponding glorious future. Employing a new form of the imagination, he becomes the great pioneer in the West for en- visioning a society wholly different from anything known in history. The term “imagination” has been carefully defined by this author in other places. Here the context should provide suf- ficient definition.3 Human beings are dreamers. They often dream themselves Dreaming far away. Capable of imagining something quite different from of what the present, they are free in a way that animals are not. But cannot be. this power presents humanity with a big problem. They can use it to imagine and long for what simply cannot be, dream the impossible dream. The dream may become so captivating that they will try to enact it, which may bring disaster upon themselves and others. A central feature of what used to be known as civilization is not letting human beings escape too far into dreamworld. They need to tether their visions of a better life to what humanity has found to lie in the realm of the possible. Civilization pro- tects people against frivolous dreaming not least through its moral teachings and great works of art and literature, which seek to anchor the imagination in the world in which human beings have to act. More often than not experience in the world of action shows dreams to be mere wishful thinking. Civilization teaches that we cannot have the world just as we would like it. Children dream endlessly of what cannot be, but to mature as a human being means giving up childish things. Adults must face the facts of life, most importantly the limits imposed by man’s moral predicament. Yet in the last 250 years Western men and women became more and more reluctant to accept a world that limits their hopes. They did not want to remain imperfect creatures torn in the depths of their being between high and low, condemned 3 For a systematic analysis of the differences and intimate interconnections among will, imagination and reason, see Claes G. Ryn, Will, Imagination and Reason: Babbitt, Croce and the Problem of Reality, 2nd exp. ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997; 1986). 14 • Volume XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2, 2013 Claes G. Ryn