www .press .umich .edu MICHIGAN This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Positive Political Theory I This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms MICHIGAN STUDIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS Michigan Studies in Political Analysis promotes the development and dissemination of innovative scholarship in the field of methodology in political science and the social sciences in general. Methodology is defined to include statistical methods, mathematical modeling, measurement, research design, and other topics related to the conduct and development of analytical work. The series includes works that develop a new model or method applicable to social sciences, as well as those that, through innovative combination and presentation of current analytical tools, substantially extend the use of these tools by other researchers. General Editors: John E. Jackson (University of Michigan) and Christopher H. Achen (Princeton University) Keith Krehbiel Information and Legislative Organization Donald R. Kinder and Thomas R. Palfrey, Editors Experimental Foundations of Political Science William T. Bianco Trust: Representatives and Constituents Melvin 1. Hinich and Michael C. Munger Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice John Brehm and Scott Gates Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public R. Michael Alvarez Information and Elections David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference Gregory Wawro Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Positive Political Theory I Collective Preference David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks Ann Arbor THE liNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms First paperback edition 2000 Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1999 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America @ Printed on acid-free paper 2010 2009 2008 2007 7 (, 5 4 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval svstem, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP cataloJ? recordfor this book is al'ailablefrom the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ansten-Smith, David. Positive political theory I : collective preference 'David Austen-Smith,Jetlrey S, Banks, p, cm.-(Michigan studies in political analysis) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-472-10480-2 (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Political science-Methodology. 2, Political science-Decision making. 3. Rational choice theory. 4, Social choice. I. Banks, Jeffrey S. II. Title. III. Series. JA71.A76 1999. 320·.0l'l-dc21 98-42902 CIP ISBN 0-472-08721-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-472-10480-2 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-472-08721-1 (pbk, : alk. paper) ISBN13 978-0-472-02246-5 (electronic) This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Dedicated to the merrwry of William H. Riker 1921-1993 Teacher; Colleague, Friend This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Contents Acknowledgments ix Preface xi 1 Choice and Preference 1 1.1 Preference-driven choice .. 1 1.2 Rationalizable choice . .. 6 1.3 Application: The unitary actor assumption 12 1.4 Transitive rationalizability . .. 12 1.5 Application: Choice of coalitional partners. 18 1.6 Discussion . .. 19 1.7 Exercises 21 1.8 Further reading . 23 2 Power and Collective Rationality 25 2.1 Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem 26 2.2 Application: Choosing a representative. 38 2.3 Quasi-transitive and acyclic rules 39 2.4 Decisive sets and filters 46 2.5 Collective choice rules 49 2.6 Discussion . .. 52 2.7 Exercises 54 2.8 Further reading . 55 3 Restricting Outcomes 57 3.1 Decisive coalitions and simple rules. 58 3.2 Acyclic simple rules .. . .. 63 3.3 Application: A comparison of simple rules 70 3.4 Voting rules . 71 3.5 Counting rules 77 This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:12 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms viii CONTENTS 3.6 Discussion ... 88 3.7 Exercises 90 3.8 Further reading 91 4 Restricting Preferences 93 4.1 Single-peaked preferences 94 4.2 Core characterization. . . 99 4.3 One-dimensional outcome space . 102 4.4 Application: Public goods provision 104 4.5 Order-restricted preferences ..... 106 4.6 Application: Collective choice of tax-rates 113 4.7 Discussion... 115 4.8 Exercises 117 4.9 Further reading 118 5 The Spatial Model 119 5.1 Choosing from a continuum 122 5.2 Core existence ...... . 126 5.3 Application: Distributive politics 132 5.4 Characterizing core points 133 5.5 Discussion... 151 5.6 Exercises ... 152 5.7 Further reading 153 6 Instability and Chaos 155 6.1 Generic nonexistence of core points . 156 6.2 Application: Distributive politics revisited 167 6.3 Cycles ... 168 6.4 Discussion... 184 6.5 Exercises ... 185 6.6 Further reading 185 7 Summary and Conclusions 187 7.1 Social choice 190 7.2 Game theory . 192 Bibliography 195 Index 202 This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:12 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Acknowledgments The genesis of this book lies in graduate classes we taught at the University of Rochester, roughly through the decade 1986-1996. Many people have contributed to it in one way or another. We are very grateful to all of the students who have suffered through our classes at Rochester, offering constructive criticism, insight, and commentary on both the material itself and on our presentation thereof. Among these students we are particularly indebted to Daniel Diermeier, Tim Feddersen, Tarik Kara, Eichi Miyagawa, Alastair Smith and Tayfun Sonmez. Special thanks are due to John Duggan (who, among other things, proposed using the diagrams in Section 3.5), David Epstein (who suggested Example 3.4) and Tim Groseclose, all of whom were kind enough to use earlier drafts of the manuscript in classes they taught and to offer valuable feedback for improving the text based on their experiences. In addition, conversations over the years with Randy Calvert, John Ferejohn, Richard McKelvey, Bill Riker, Norman Schofield, and doubtless many others have influenced our appreciation of preference aggregation theory and its role in understanding politics. We thank them all. We are also grateful to Bob Turring who drew the figures, deciphering our handwritten scrawls and accomodating our changes with considerable patience. Some of the material used in the Preface and Chapter 7 is taken from our paper [4J and appears with permission from the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 1, copyright 1998, by Annual Reviews. The final draft of the manuscript was completed while the second author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation under grant SBR-9601236. Both authors are similarly grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SBR-9510877. Finally, we should like to thank our wives, Maggie Weiss and Shannon Banks, and children, Clare and Luke Austen-Smith, and Bryan and Danny This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 17:11:12 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms