OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi POLITICAL RATIONALE AND INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN LIBYA OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya Editedby DAG HENRIKSEN and ANN KARIN LARSSEN 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. 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OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi Acknowledgements Writing this book has rested heavily upon the financial support, academic ingenuity and steadfast support of the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy (RNoAFA). For that we will always be grateful. Warm gratitude goes to our colleagues at the RNoAFA, as well as each of the contributors to this book. Withouteachofyou,thisacademicvoyagewouldneverhavetakenplace. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi Contents Introduction ix TimelineoftheLibyanCrisis/War(2011) xxv ListofAbbreviations xxxi ListofContributors xxxv PART I. THE UN VETO POWERS’ PERSPECTIVES 1. USInterventionintheLibyanCivilWar:AreThereLessons tobeLearned? 3 TomJ.Farer 2. TheWarinLibya:ThePoliticalRationaleforFrance 25 FrançoisHeisbourg 3. TheUKPoliticalRationaleforInterventionanditsConsequences 45 ChristinaJ.M.Goulter 4. Russia:ThePrincipleofNon-InterventionandtheLibyaCase 67 AnnKarinLarssen 5. ThePoliticalRationaleofChina’sDeliberatelyLimitedRole intheLibyanCivilWar 86 ShengDing PART II. THE ARAB PERSPECTIVES 6. Libya&theArabLeague 105 RanjAlaaldin 7. TheRationaleandImplicationsofQatar’sInterventioninLibya 118 KristianCoatesUlrichsen 8. ThePoliticalRationaleandImplicationsoftheUnitedArab Emirates’MilitaryInvolvementinLibya 134 Jean-MarcRickli PART III. THE SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 9. ThePoliticalRationaleandImplicationsofNorway’sMilitary InvolvementinLibya 155 DagHenriksen OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi viii Contents 10. TheSwedishDecisiontoParticipateinOperation UnifiedProtector 174 RobertEgnell 11. TheDanishLibyaCampaign:OutinFrontinPursuit ofPride,Praise,andPosition 192 PeterViggoJakobsen PART IV. NATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) 12. TheRoleandImpactonNATO 211 RyanC.Hendrickson 13. Libya,R2P,andtheUnitedNations 228 ThomasG.Weiss 14. TheInterventioninLibyainaLegalPerspective:R2P andInternationalLaw 245 SigmundSimonsen PART V. THE AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES 15. TheRoleandImpactontheAfricanUnion 269 LinnéaGelot 16. TheImpactoftheWaronLibya 286 GeorgeJoffé Index 305 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2016,SPi Introduction Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen TheambitionofthisbookistousetheLibyaninterventionasacasestudyto explore the dynamics of international interventions in so-called ‘wars of choice’.1 Richard N. Haass argues that ‘wars of necessity’ are essentially unavoidable. They involve the most important national interests, a lack of promisingalternativestotheuseofforce,andacertainandconsiderableprice to be paid if the status quo is allowed to stand. Examples include the Second World WarandtheKoreanWar.By contrast,wars ofchoicetendto involve interests that are less vital and the existence of viable alternative policies, be theydiplomacy,inaction,orsomethingelse.ThewarsinVietnam,Bosnia,and Kosovo were all ‘wars of choice’. By definition, a war of choice is optional. WhatgovernedthedecisiontointerveneinLibya? ThemilitaryinterventioninLibyain2011isaparticularlyinterestingcase formanyreasons,notleastbecausethelegitimizationformilitaryintervention was leaning heavily on the principle of ‘the responsibility to protect’ (R2P). Thus,publicly,itwasawarofchoicewithamotivenotrootedinself-interest. Still, the military coalition consisted of a number of nations with different histories,cultures,interests,andstrategicoutlooks. It seems fair to argue that the vast majority of empirical evidence, after millennia of international politics and decisions on war, has gravitated over- whelmingly more towards national interest as the real rationale for military interventions. Despite public rhetoric of humanitarian intervention and this being the first war based on the new doctrine of R2P, were the dynamics governing the international intervention in Libya any different than national self-interest?Thus,thisbooktriestoanswertwobroadquestions: 1. Whatwasthepoliticalrationaleforthevariousactorstoproceedasthey didinthelead-uptoandconductofthemilitaryinterventioninLibya? 2. Giventhewaythisoperationwashandled,whataretheconsequencesof theUnitedNations(UN)-authorizedmilitaryinterventioninLibya? Inordertotryandanswerthesesomewhatlargeandoverarchingquestions, avarietyofoptionsandactorswasavailable.Wequicklyrealizedthatnotonly 1 WeareusingthedefinitionofRichardN.Haass,fromWarofNecessity,WarofChoice: AMemoirofTwoIraqWars(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2010);and‘TheNecessaryandthe Chosen’,ForeignAffairs(July/Aug.2009),<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65072/richard- n-haass/the-necessary-and-the-chosen>.