Political Order in Changing Societies Samuel P. Huntington Foreword by Francis Fukuyama New Haven and London, Yale University Press Copyright © 1968 by Yale University. Copyright © renewed 1996 by Samuel P. Huntington. Foreword © 2006 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Control Number: 2005932004 ISBN-ig: 978-0-300-11620-5 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-io: 0-300-11620-9 (cloth : alk. paper) A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10 9876543 For Nancy, Timothy, and Nicholas This page intentionally left blank Contents List of Tables x Foreword by Francis Fukuyama xi Preface xix 1. POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY i The Political Gap i Political Institutions: Community and Political Order 8 Social Forces and Political Institutions 8 Criteria of Political Instinationalization 12 Political Institutions and Public Interests 24 Political Participation: Modernization and Political Decay 32 Modernization and Political Consciousness 32 Modernization and Violence 39 Modernization and Corruption 59 The City-Country Gap: Urban Breakthrough and Green Uprising 72 Political Stability: Civic and Praetorian Polities 78 2. POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: AMERICA vs. EUROPE 93 Three Patterns of Modernization 93 Rationalization of Authority 98 Differentiation of Structure 109 Tudor Institutions and Mass Participation 122 Tudor Polity and Modernizing Societies 134 3. POLITICAL CHANGE IN TRADITIONAL POLITIES 140 Power, Institutions, and Political Modernization 140 Traditional Political Systems 148 Policy Innovation: Reform vs. Liberty 153 Group Assimilation: Pluralism vs. Equality 166 The King's Dilemma: Success vs. Survival 177 Transformation 177 Coexistence 180 Maintenance 185 Vlll CONTENTS 4. PRAETORIANISM AND POLITICAL DECAY 192 The Sources of Praetorianism 192 Oligarchical to Radical Praetorianism: Breakthrough Coups and the Soldier as Reformer 198 Radical Praetorianism: Social Forces and Political Techniques 208 Radical to Mass Praetorianism: Veto Coups and the 219 Soldier as Guardian Praetorianism to Civic Order: The Soldier as Institution- Builder 237 5. REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL ORDER 264 Modernization by Revolution 264 Institutional and Social Circumstances of Revolution 274 The City and Revolution 278 Lumpenproletariat 278 Industrial Labor 283 Middle-Class Intelligentsia 288 Peasants and Revolution 291 The Revolutionary Alliance and Nationalism 300 Political Development by Revolution 308 Community and Party 308 Mexico 315 Bolivia 325 Leninism and Political Development 334 6. REFORM AND POLITICAL CHANGE 344 Strategy and Tactics of Reform: Fabianism, Blitzkrieg, and Violence 344 Reform: Substitute or Catalyst? 362 The Urban Intelligentsia: Reform as a Catalyst 369 The Peasantry: Reform as a Substitute 374 The Politics of Land Reform 380 7. PARTIES AND POLITICAL STABILITY 397 Modernization and Parties 397 Political Community in Modern Society 397 The Fragility of the No-Party State 403 Strong Parties and Political Stability 408 Processes of Party Development 412 Adaptability of Party Systems 420 CONTENTS IX The Green Uprising: Party Systems and Rural Mobiliza- tion 433 Parties and the Rural-Urban Gap 433 Rural Mobilization through Nationalist Struggle 438 Rural Mobilization through Party Competition: The Conservatism of Democracy 443 Two-Party Competition and Ruralizing Elections 448 The Organizational Imperative 460 Index 463 Tables 1.1 Military Conflicts, 1958-1965 4 1.2 Per Capita GNP and Violent Conflicts, 1958-1965 40 1.3 Literacy and Stability 43 1.4 Rapid Economic Growth and Political Instability 52 1.5 Political Modernization: Changes in Urban-Rural Power and Stability 76 1.6 Types of Political Systems 80 1.7 Institutional Development at Time of Independence 85 3.1 Political Systems and Power Configurations 144 3.2 Traditional Political Systems 150 3.3 Types of Contemporary Monarchies 151 5.1 Extent of Labor Organization 285 6.1 Attitudes Toward Political Change 364 6.2 Vulnerability to Agrarian Unrest 382 7.1 Coups and Coup Attempts in Modernizing Countries Since Independence 408 7.2 Party Strength and Party Number 421 7.3 Party Stability and Party Number 422 7.4 Successful Coups in Modernizing Countries: 1945 or Date of Independence through 1966 423 7.5 Institutionalized Party Systems (Major Party Age Index of 30 or more in 1966) 424 x Foreword by Francis Fukuyama It is an immense honor for me to write the Foreword to the new paperback edition of Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies. This book, which first appeared in 1968, was one of the classics of late twentieth-century social science, a work that had enormous influence on the way people thought about de- velopment, both in academia and in the policy world. The breadth of knowledge about developing countries, as well as the analytical insight that Political Order brought to bear, was astonishing, and cemented Samuel Huntington's reputation as one of the foremost political scientists of his generation. In order to understand the book's intellectual significance, it is necessary to place it in the context of the ideas that were domi- nant in the 19508 and early 19605. This was the heyday of "mod- ernization theory," probably the most ambitious American at- tempt to create an integrated, empirical theory of human social change. Modernization theory had its origins in the works of late nineteenth-century European social theorists like Henry Maine, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Ferdinand Tonnies, and Max Weber. These authors established a series of concepts (e.g., status/con- tract; mechanical/organic solidarity; Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft; charismatic/bureaucratic-rational authority) to describe the changes in social norms and relationships that took place as human societies made the transition from agricultural to indus- trial production. While basing their works primarily on the experi- ences of early modernizers like Britain or the United States, they sought to draw from them general laws of social development. European social theory was killed by the two world wars; the ideas it generated migrated to the United States and were taken up by a generation of American academics after the Second World War at places like Harvard's Department of Comparative Politics, the MIT Center for International Studies, and the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. The Harvard de- partment, led by Weber's protege Talcott Parsons, hoped to create xi Xll FOREWORD BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA an integrated, interdisciplinary social science that would combine economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology. The period from the late 19405 to the early igGos also corre- sponded to the dissolution of European colonial empires and the emergence of what became known as the third or developing world, newly independent countries with great aspirations to modernize and catch up with their former colonial masters. Scholars like Edward Shils, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, and Walt Whitman Rostow saw these mo- mentous developments as a laboratory for social theory, as well as a great opportunity to help developing countries raise living stan- dards and democratize their political systems. Modernization theorists placed a strong normative value on being modern, and in their view, the good things of modernity tended to go together. Economic development, changing social relationships like urbanization and the breakdown of primary kinship groups, higher and more inclusive levels of education, normative shifts towards values like "achievement" and rationality, secularization, and the development of democratic political in- stitutions were all seen as an interdependent whole. Economic development would fuel better education, which would lead to value change, which would promote modern politics, and so on in a virtuous circle. Political Order in Changing Societies appeared against this back- drop and directly challenged these assumptions. First, Huntington argued that political decay was at least as likely as political develop- ment, and that the actual experience of newly independent coun- tries was one of increasing social and political disorder. Second, he suggested that the good things of modernity often operated at cross-purposes. In particular, if social mobilization outpaced the development of political institutions, there would be frustration as new social actors found themselves unable to participate in the political system. The result was a condition he labeled praetoria- nism, and was the leading cause of insurgencies, military coups, and weak or disorganized governments. Economic development and political development were not part of the same, seamless process of modernization; the latter had its own separate logic as institutions like political parties and legal systems were created or evolved into more complex forms. Huntington drew a practical implication from these observa-