1 Paper prepared for the meeting of the Eric Voegelin Society at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association 2010, Sept. 2-5, 2010, Washington, D. C. Hans-Jörg Sigwart: Political Hermeneutics in the Writings of John Dewey and Hannah Arendt Provisional Version (Please do not quote without consultation) This paper1 focuses on John Dewey’s and Hannah Arendt’s political thinking, but it treats both thinkers as exemplary cases in order to bring out a general theoretical question which plays an important role also in the works of a number of other political thinkers particularly from the 20th century, among them Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin.2 My aim is to raise the question of the relation between politics and hermeneutics, between the problem of the Political on the one hand and the problem of understanding and interpretation on the other. I want to suggest that these two problems are intimately and substantially connected with each other and that this can be demonstrated by an exemplary interpretation of the two thinkers at hand. I want to argue that a core aspect of both Dewey’s and Arendt’s political theories is the idea that in order to theoretically understand politics or “the 1 The paper summarizes some of the results of a more comprehensive study which will be published in German early next year under the title “Politische Hermeneutik. Verstehen, Politik und Kritik bei John Dewey und Hannah Arendt”. 2 The crucial significance of the question of “hermeneutics and politics” in Strauss’s work is obvious. See Leo Strauss: Persecution and the Art of Writing, Chicago/London (University of Chicago Press) 1988. The questions raised in this paper, however, are more directly inspired by some earlier studies on Eric Voegelin’s political theory, although an elaborate consideration of the topic comparable to Strauss’s study, is missing in Voegelin’s writings. For the theoretical conception of political hermeneutics as it in my opinion is implied in Voegelin see Hans-Jörg Sigwart: Eine Hermeneutik des Politischen. Eric Voegelins Entwurf einer geisteswissenschaftlichen Staats- und Herrschaftslehre, in: Peter J. Opitz (Ed.): Erich Voegelins Herrschaftslehre: Annäherungen an einen schwierigen Text, Occasional Papers LVII, München (Eric Voegelin Archiv) 2007, S. 19-39. 2 Political”, it indeed has to be understood and described in hermeneutical terms. Although neither Dewey nor Arendt themselves explicitly use the term “political hermeneutics” and although there is no elaborate and explicit theory of hermeneutics (as a theory of “understanding” and of its various objectifications as “culture” or common ”experience”) to be found in their writings, such a theory of hermeneutics nonetheless is implied in their respective ideas of what politics is about. This distinctly hermeneutical understanding of the political problem in both thinkers has various interesting consequences for their understanding of major questions of political theory, among them the classical question of the relation between politics and theory or politics and philosophy. These are the two questions this paper focuses on. In the second chapter I will outline the distinctly hermeneutic understanding of politics that is implied in Dewey and Arendt. After that, in the third part, I will briefly indicate some of its implications for the relation between philosophy or theory and politics. In order to bring out these political-hermeneutic implications in Dewey’s and Arendt’s writings, it is necessary to somewhat step back from the more concrete topics of their writings and rather concentrate on the theoretical and methodical principles implied in them. And it is helpful to interpret them within a German- American comparative perspective, particularly to read them before the background of the classical hermeneutical tradition (which, of course, from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Hans-Georg Gadamer is a predominantly German philosophical tradition). This not only makes it easier to highlight the hermeneutical implications in Dewey’s and Arendt’s works which are not always very clearly articulated. It in turn also helps to highlight some major theoretical shortcomings of that classical German hermeneutic tradition itself. The comparative perspective particularly brings to the fore the fact that while in Dewey and Arendt the general hermeneutic problem of “understanding” is treated within a distinctly political theory and is therefore intimately connected with political problems, it is this very connection which is missing in the German tradition of hermeneutic philosophy. In the first part of my paper I will give a brief outline of this comparative perspective and take an exemplary look on Hans- Georg Gadamer’s conception of the hermeneutic problem in order to clarify the critical point just mentioned, by indicating how and to what extend politics, 3 although Gadamer himself occasionally seems to emphasize its importance for hermeneutics, nonetheless represents the pivotal blank space within his hermeneutic philosophy. I. German and American Hermeneutics To put Dewey’s and Arendt’s works in such a comparative perspective and also to treat them as hermeneutical thinkers can be justified with biographical reasons, to begin with. In both thinkers’ intellectual biographies, the German philosophical discourse of the 19th and early 20th century plays an important and a very ambivalent role. It serves as a source of inspiration and at the same time it is the object of a fundamental critique. In both respects, Dewey’s and Arendt’s critical reading of major parts of that German philosophical tradition had a significant influence on their own theories. In the case of Arendt, the influence of Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic philosophy on her own perspective, for instance, but also the important role of her determined critique of Heidegger’s existentialism is quite obvious.3 The influence of both is discernable not only in Arendt’s essay on “Understanding and Politics” which directly addresses the hermeneutic problem,4 but also in a number of key concepts of her general theory of politics and action, such as the concepts of “Welt” and “Mitwelt” or her idea of peculiar narratives that constitute public spaces and political communities.5 The whole general outset of her political theory, furthermore, is influenced and shaped by her conscious attempt to emancipate herself from the apolitical traditions of continental, and particularly of German philosophy by turning to the distinctly political experiences of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and to the modern American political tradition. 3 On Arendt‘s conceptual relation to Heidegger’s philosophy see Dana Villa: Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate of the Political, Princeton (Princeton University Press) 1996. 4 Hannah Arendt: Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding), in: Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding 1930-1954. Edited with an introduction by Jerome Kohn, New York (Schocken) 2005, pp. 307-327. 5 See Hannah Arendt: The Human Condition, 2nd Edition, Introduction by Margaret Canovan, Chicago/London (University of Chicago Press) 1998, pp. 50 ff., 175 ff. 4 What Dewey, on the other hand, shares not only with other prominent representatives of the philosophy of American pragmatism, but also with most of the classical representatives of German hermeneutic theory, is the substantial influence of his elaborate and critical examination of the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel,6 partly also his reference to various Neo-Kantian conceptions (particularly the concept of “value”). A critical reading of Kant and Hegel indeed constitutes a major part to the philosophical basis not only of German hermeneutics, but also of American Pragmatism. In certain respects, Dewey’s pragmatism can be seen as the genuinely American variant of that broad discourse of critical philosophical Neo- or Post-Hegelianism (combined with certain Neo-Kantian implications) which had a pervading influence on the intellectual scene in the late 19th and early 20th century and which also builds up the philosophical background of German hermeneutic philosophy. Seen before this background, it even seems appropriate to characterize American pragmatism and German hermeneutics as parallel philosophical traditions that share a number of fundamental questions and conceptions.7 These common questions and conceptions primarily concern the attempt to theoretically grasp the peculiarities of “societies” or “Lebenswelten” as “universes of meaning”8 that form the “natural” environment of man as a “cultural” and “historical” being, as a being, thus, that creates and shapes the conditions of his own existence in a variety of practices.9 To describe and to understand these cultural environments, built up of the various “objectifications” of practical processes and consisting of complex patterns of practical relations, meanings, symbols, ideas, and institutions, and to understand the various forms 6 See the short summary on Dewey’s reading of Hegel in Robert B. Westbrook: John Dewey and American Democracy, Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press) 1991, pp. 13 ff. 7 Such a common theoretical basis of pragmatism and hermeneutics is explicitly emphasized, for instance, in Richard Rorty’s reading of Gadamer, Heidegger and Dewey (see Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Thirtieth Anniversary Edition, Princeton/Oxford (Princeton University Press) 2009, pp. 357 ff.) or, in a more general and neutral way, by the German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel: Szientismus oder transzendentale Hermeneutik? Zur Frage nach dem Subjekt der Zeicheninterpretation in der Semiotik des Pragmatismus, in: Rüdiger Bubner et al (Eds.): Hermeneutik und Dialektik, Bd. I, Tübingen (Mohr) 1970, pp. 105-144, here: p. 133, footnote 62. 8 John Dewey: Experience and Nature (1925), in: The Later Works Vol. 1, p. 249. See also Gadamer’s use of the concept of the “hermeneutic universe” in his preface to the 2nd edition of Truth and Method: Vorwort zur 2. Auflage, in: Gesammelte Werke 2, pp. 437-448; hier: p. 441. 9 Arendt’s understanding of “the human condition” which is obviously echoed in this definition is indeed exemplary for this core question of both pragmatist and hermeneutic philosophy. 5 of cognition and knowledge that correspond to them, is one of the crucial tasks both of American pragmatist as well as continental hermeneutic or cultural philosophy. The comprising concepts which define this peculiar complex of phenomena and questions are the concepts of “culture” and “objective spirit” in continental philosophy, and the concepts of “experience” and of “common sense” in its genuinely American counterparts. Although they bear significantly different implications in certain respects, particularly regarding their political significance, these concepts can nonetheless be understood as theoretical equivalences which profoundly connect the hermeneutic and the pragmatist philosophical enterprises.10 The common ground of both perspectives is that they perceive “reality” in general, as far as it is the object of their philosophical reflection, primarily as “human” and that means: as “experienced” and “articulated” or as “cultural” reality. Their primary subject matter is the “world”, i. e. “reality” as far as it is penetrated by the symbols, meanings, experiences, histories of man. In both philosophical traditions, furthermore, these questions result in the quest for a specific form of reflection that corresponds to this peculiar sort of philosophy the primary objects of which are cultural phenomena, experiences, meanings, and symbols. Consequently, the question if and how the “understanding” of such a mediated reality in the form of articulations and objectifications of experiences, of meanings and symbols is possible and what it implies particularly for the concept of “truth”, constitutes the common epistemological focus of American pragmatism and German hermeneutics.11 In the German tradition this question is characterized as the fundamental “hermeneutic problem”. One of the major aspects of this problem, which, as we will see, bears interesting political implications, is the so called “hermeneutic circle” as the peculiar pattern inherent in the attempt to understand “experiences”. Considered in hermeneutic terms, any articulation, any symbol is 10 Dewey, for instance, emphasizes in a later self-comment on his major philosophical work Experience and Nature, that his pragmatist concept of “experience” can be more or less understood as an equivalent to the concept of “culture”. See Dewey: Experience and Nature, p. 361. 11 See, for instance, William James: Pragmatism, New York (Dower Publ.) 1995, pp. 63 ff. and 76 ff. and Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method, London/New York (Continuum) 2004, pp. xxi ff. 6 by definition a meaningful relation between experiences of “things” or phenomena that appear within the “world”. As such, any single meaning or experience is always embedded within a larger web of relations or pattern of meanings which altogether form the comprising “context” or “whole” of its constitutive relatedness. Consequently, “understanding” as the peculiar mode of cognition that corresponds to this peculiar pattern relatedness of cultural reality is the oscillating movement of the mind between the single parts and the comprising whole of such relations, the ongoing attempt to understand these two sides of the hermeneutic circle out of each other. A single experience, meaning or symbol can only be fully understood as an integral part of a comprising pattern of meaning, the “whole” of which in turn can only be understood by understanding its single parts. In hermeneutic terms, the “truth” of knowledge emerges from the oscillating movement of understanding between the parts and the whole of patterns of experience, and from the attempt to transform the oscillating into a spiraling movement in which the reciprocal understanding of the whole and the parts gradually and continuously improves, albeit without ever reaching a final conclusion that would transcend altogether the hermeneutic tension. What Gadamer particularly focuses on in his peculiar understanding of the hermeneutic problem and the movement of understanding is, first, his argument (which he adopts from Heidegger) that this circular structure, this tension between parts and whole, describes not merely a “methodical”, but rather an existential or, as he put it, an “ontological” problem.12 The circular or spiraling structure of the process of understanding corresponds to the structure of reality in general as it is experienced by human beings. It is, thus, a “philosophical” problem of first rank which has to be taken into account in any attempt to describe any aspect of reality, also, for instance: political reality. On the basis of this generalization of the hermeneutic problem Gadamer, secondly, focuses on the concept of the “whole” involved in this problem – and particularly on its implications with regard to the “subject” of understanding. Which sorts of “contexts” primarily determine processes of understanding, and how exactly and to what extend do these contexts determine the perspective of an individual 12 Gadamer: Truth and Method, pp. 267 ff. 7 pursuing the practice of understanding experiences? It is this question which Gadamer wants to bring out in its significance for the hermeneutic problem more clearly than his philosophical predecessors had done. For Gadamer, this question had been rather neglected and remained mostly unsolved in the hermeneutic tradition, primarily due to the impact of certain Kantian concepts and particularly due to the individualistic bias of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s and Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophical perspectives. While Schleiermacher and Dilthey, as Gadamer argues, focused their attempt of hermeneutic understanding almost exclusively on the “reconstruction” of the unique personal perspectives of individual actors (as authors, for instance), Gadamer himself aims at restituting the significance of “integration” for the hermeneutic problem, i.e. the fact that any individual experience and its interpretation also regarding its subject is embedded within and to a certain degree always influenced and shaped by a context of common experience.13 For Gadamer, the unsolved problem of hermeneutic philosophy therefore is the question of how the subjective fact of individual experiences can be theoretically connected with the objective reality of common experience. As a consequence, also the movement of understanding itself for Gadamer has to more clearly be characterized in terms of “integration” into comprising patterns of meaning. The “art of understanding” not only aims at the comprehension of the experience of some other individual person, as Dilthey had particularly emphasized, but also more directly at a comprehension of the context itself and thus at some sort of attunement to the “sensus communis” of common experience. In the first part of Truth and Method Gadamer consequently emphasizes the importance of “common sense” or the “sensus communis” (as developed, for instance, in Gianni Battista Vico’s philosophy of history) for the hermeneutic problem.14 And he emphasizes the problematic consequences of the fact that the importance of this concept, and particularly its 13 For the individualistic “reconstruction” of the hermeneutic problem as emphasized by Schleiermacher on the one hand and its “integration” into comprising contexts as emphasized by Hegel on the other as the two fundamental tasks of understanding see ibid., pp. 157 ff. 14 Ibid., pp. 17 ff. 8 political implications,15 got lost in German philosophy since Kant. The consequence of this intellectual development within the German philosophical tradition of hermeneutics is, as Gadamer points out, a problematic “privatization” of the ideas of experience (as “Erlebnis”) and of understanding in which the fundamental fact that not only any symbol and its meaning by its very definition refers to a “context”, but also that any individual experience or act of understanding is “integrated” in concrete patterns of common experience, of a “sensus communis”, has been lost out of sight.16 In these passages of the first part of Truth and Method Gadamer also stresses, or he at least alludes to the crucial role of politics as an individual practice and of the peculiarly political contexts of “societies” and “states” for understanding the hermeneutic problem of the “whole”. In fact, it is this major problem, so it seems in these passages, at which the problem of “the Political” comes into play.17 In the more conceptual passages of the second part of Truth and Method, however, Gadamer does not come back to these political implications.18 On the contrary, it seems as if in the pivotal second part of Truth and Method where Gadamer unfolds his original reconstruction of the hermeneutic problem, the question of politics is curiously avoided as a major problem. The reality of society as a political community is still emphasized, but it is treated as a necessary, yet rather opaque a priori of hermeneutics, as a premise which cannot be further theoretically clarified with regard to the hermeneutic processes of its constitution and its specific forms of meaning and symbolisms. Instead, in his further argument for a “recovery of the fundamental hermeneutic problem” Gadamer shifts the focus away from politics towards the ideas of “history” and “language” in general and towards a corresponding idea of “tradition” as the given “horizon” in which any social practice of understanding is 15 While the term sensus communis was, as Gadamer points out, at first present in the German philosophical discourse, it was “emptied of all political content” and therefore “lost its genuine critical significance.” (Ibid., p. 24.) 16 Ibid., pp. 29 ff. 17 See particularly ibid., pp. 19 ff. 18 Even in the passages where he interprets Aristotle’s concept of phronesis and where he stresses its significance for his own hermeneutic conception, a discussion of the significance of the Polis as the peculiarly political context of phronesis or even a substantial reference to the concept of “sensus communis” is missing. (Ibid., pp. 309 ff.) 9 embedded. Within this setting, the specifically political realities of “society and state” are almost indiscriminately merged into the concepts of history, language, and tradition, with the effect of a rather apolitical, deterministic and traditionalist conception of understanding. While the idea of “integration” is still emphasized, its distinctly political implications that were at least implicitly present in the first part of Truth and Method, such as community, publicity, active participation or citizenship, seem to be forgotten. Aimed against Dilthey’s individualistic bias, Gadamer now transforms the concept of understanding into a primarily socialized, historically embedded, yet almost historically determined intellectual process. Understanding now appears as the rather passive and primarily receptive cultural practice of an “Einrücken in ein Überlieferungsgeschehen” (the individual practice of assimilating into the ongoing process of tradition).19 In a famous passage in Truth and Method Gadamer criticizes Dilthey’s neglect of the “whole” of historical reality and summarizes his own perspective as follows: „(Dilthey) started from the awareness of ‘experiences’ (Erlebnisse), (but) he was unable to build a bridge to the historical realities, because the great historical realities of society and state always have a predeterminate influence on any ‘experience’. Self-reflection and autobiography – Dilthey’s starting points – are not primary and are therefore not an adequate basis for the hermeneutical problem, because through them history is made private once more. In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.”20 Although the significance of the “historical realities of society and state” are once more emphasized here, they are still not theoretically and directly abridged 19 The translation of this famous formula of Gadamer in the English edition of Truth and Method at hand is misleading in my opinion: “Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition” (Gadamer: Truth and Method, p. 291.) To translate “Einrücken” with “to participate” in my opinion rather obscures the more passive and receptive connotations of the German term. And the translation of “Überlieferungsgeschehen” with “event of tradition” shifts the emphasis of the term away from the implications of continuity and constancy to implications of situativeness and spontaneity it does not as strongly have in the German original. For the German version see Gadamer: Wahrheit und Methode, in: Gesammelte Werke Bd. 1, Tübingen (Mohr) 1990, p. 295: „Das Verstehen ist selber nicht so sehr als eine Handlung der Subjektivität zu denken, sondern als Einrücken in ein Überlieferungsgeschehen“. 20 Gadamer: Truth and Method, p. 278. 10 with individual experience but rather identified with or even merged into the all comprising and “closed circuits of historical life”. Consequently, what is lacking in Gadamer’s philosophy, is the awareness that “societies and states”, if politically understood, are peculiarly political phenomena and as such less “closed” than “open circuits” or better: open patterns of meaning permanently evolving and actively changing themselves within political practices of deliberation, judgment and decision. What Gadamer therefore rather neglects as major theoretical problems, are the most crucial questions of politics, such as the significance of political freedom and political participation, but also of genuinely political authority and legitimacy, the concept of citizenship, the deliberate (individual and collective) shaping and reshaping of ideas and institutions and the role of individual “judgments” within these processes (as analyzed in Arendt’s late work). What is finally and consequently neglected in Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy is the most fundamental question of political theory: the question of what politics is in the first place, how the concept of the Political can be determined if hermeneutically understood. From the perspective of political theory it is primarily this question which would have to be answered in order to “build a bridge” between individual and common experience, between the “subjective act” of individual understanding and the objective “historical realities of society and state”. In sum, it seems that Hannah Arendt’s following critical comment on Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic philosophy in a lecture she delivered to the American Political Science Association in 1954 on the topic of the “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought” holds true for Gadamer’s perspective as well: „(Heidegger´s) conceptual framework is better prepared to understand history than to lay the groundwork of a new political philosophy. This seems to be the reason why it is highly sensitive to general trends of the time, to all the modern problems that can be best understood in historical terms, such as the technicalization of the world, the emergence of one world on a planetary scale, the increasing pressure of society upon the individual, and the concomitant atomization of society. Meanwhile, the more permanent questions of political science which, in a sense, are more specifically