ResPublica(2015)21:309–329 DOI10.1007/s11158-015-9266-1 Political Anarchism and Raz’s Theory of Authority Bruno Leipold Publishedonline:11April2015 !SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015 Abstract This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of au- thority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason.Iarguethattherearecaseswhereanarchismisanexistingalternativetothe stateandbetterfulfilsthiscondition.Consequently,inthesecases,anarchistgroups andsocieties andnotthe state have legitimateauthority.When anarchismis notan existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Raz’s theory, have some le- gitimate authority, but that authority will be limited because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state. To support the political anarchist claim I discuss the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative to the state that better fulfils Raz’s serviceconceptionandalsoprovidesuggestiveevidencethatanarchismisingeneral a better possible alternative. I also discuss the relationship between political anar- chism and authority and I argue that despite some tension they are not irreconcil- able. I conclude that the interesting anarchist challenge for political theorists is political not philosophical. Keywords Anarchism Authority JosephRaz Legitimacy Spanishcollectives ! ! ! ! B.Leipold(&) DepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford,ManorRoad, OxfordOX13UQ,UK e-mail:[email protected] 123 310 B.Leipold Introduction Theprimary focusofdebates aboutauthorityisphilosophicalanarchism,theclaim that the state does not have legitimate authority. Indeed overcoming the ‘challenge of philosophical anarchism’ has motivated much of the modern discussion of authority(Raz1990,p.4).Thefocusonphilosophicalanarchismhashoweveroften eclipsedandsometimesevenhinderedtheunderstandingofpoliticalanarchism,the claimthatanarchismisabetteralternativetothestate.Consequentlythe‘challenge ofpoliticalanarchism’usuallyplaysonlyaminimalroleindiscussionsofauthority. Ithinkthisneglectismistaken.Theclaimofpoliticalanarchismisnotonlyinitself important but relevant to questions of authority. I believe that this is particularly true of one of the most influential theories of authority, Joseph Raz’s service conception. I will show that using Raz’s theory to reject philosophical anarchism can beaffected by politicalanarchism.1 I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative and better fulfils the conditionsoftheserviceconceptionthanthestate.2Consequently,inthesecases,if the political anarchist claim is true, Raz’s theory does not reject philosophical anarchism but instead assigns authority to anarchist groups and societies. When anarchism is not an existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Raz’s theory, have some legitimate authority, but because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state that authority will be limited to not preventing the promotion or establishment of anarchism. Consequently, in these cases, if the political anarchist claim is true, Raz’s theory gives only a limited response to philosophical anarchism. Thus both in cases where anarchism is an existing alternative and when it is only a possible alternative, the state’s authority and the extent ofthatauthority iscontingentonwhethertheclaimofpoliticalanarchism is true. I support this through an extended discussion of the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative that better fulfils Raz’s service conception than the state. This provides suggestive, but not definitive, evidence for the claim that anarchism is in general a better possible alternative to the state. ForthepurposesofthisarticleIlargelyacceptRaz’stheoryofauthorityandmy argumentishencemostlyinternaltoit.3Idonottakeastandonwhetherhistheory is the best way to understand authority or if political anarchists should in general have a theory of authority. My argument is thus primarily addressed towards those 1 Gordon (2005, pp. 147–149) has argued that while Raz’s argument might be a suitable response to philosophicalanarchismitdoesnotaffectpoliticalanarchism. 2 Krehoff (2008, p. 294) also suggests that non-state actors (such as international courts and non governmentalorganizations)couldhaveauthorityiftheyfulfilledtheserviceconceptionbetterthanthe state. 3 Ithereforedonotengagewithcriticismsofthetheoryitself.Thesehoweverincludethatitdoesnottake into account the importance of democratic procedures to legitimate authority (Hershovitz 2003), skepticismabouttheroleofexclusionaryreasons(Darwall2010),andthatauthoritativedirectivesarenot necessary for solving coordination problems (Green 1985). For an overview of Raz’s critics see Ehrenberg(2011). 123 PoliticalAnarchismandRaz’sTheoryofAuthority 311 thataresympathetictoRaz’stheory,thoughIthinktheconclusionsareofinterestto discussions of authority more generally. My argument is structured in five sections. First, I outline the main aspects of Raz’s theory and then deal with how we should interpret the service conception whenitcomestoalternativeinstitutionswithaclaimtoauthority.Second,Idiscuss thedifferencesbetweenphilosophicalandpoliticalanarchismandthensetoutwhat I mean by anarchism. Third, I present my core argument, where I show how using Raz’s theory to reject philosophical anarchism is affected by political anarchism. Fourth,tosupportthis,IturntothehistoricalevidencefromtheSpanishcollectives. Finally I discuss the relationship between political anarchism and authority and argue that they are not irreconcilable. Raz’s Service Conception of Authority At the heart ofRaz’s service conceptionof authority is the idea that authorities are legitimate if they help people do the right thing more than if people just acted on theirown.Thisisarticulatedinmoreformaltermsbyhisnormaljustificationthesis, which states that: the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritativedirectives) if heacceptsthedirectivesoftheallegedauthorityasauthoritativelybindingand triestofollowthem,ratherthanbytryingtofollowthereasonswhichapplyto him directly (Raz 1986, p. 53). An institution consequently has legitimate authority over someone else if the authority enables her to conform better with reason than if she tried to act on her own.4 Authorities are able to do this, Raz (1986, pp. 49–51) argues, because their power to issue authoritative directives that everyone must follow enables them to solve coordination problems and overcome prisoner’s dilemma situations. In these situationsitwouldbebetterifeveryonestucktoonecourseofaction,butiftheyjust act individually they cannot guarantee this outcome. The institution derives its authorityfromthefactthatitprovidesthe‘missinglink’inthesecases,byensuring that people will do the right thing (Raz 1986, p. 49). A straightforward example of this is how an authority can make an authoritative decision about whether people shoulddriveontheleft-orright-handsideoftheroad,whichensuresthateveryone follows this convention (Raz 1986, pp. 30–31). Though my argument will focus mainly on the normal justification thesis, the service conception also includes two further theses. First, the dependence thesis, 4 Raz’stheoryalsoappliestopersonsbutIwillhenceforthonlyrefertotheauthorityofinstitutions.I also understand institutions broadly so that it includes forms of social and political organisation. By legitimateauthorityIfollowRaz(1986,p.23)thatitshouldberegardedas‘centrallyinvolvingarightto rule,wherethatisunderstoodascorrelatedwithanobligationtoobeyonthepartofthosesubjecttothe authority.’ I will occasionally say that an institution has ‘authority’ as a shorthand for ‘legitimate authority’. 123 312 B.Leipold whichstatesthatauthoritiesshouldbasetheirauthoritativedirectivesonreasonsthat already apply independently to people (Raz 1986, p. 47). For example, a law requiringparentstoproperlycarefortheirchildrenisbasedonparents’independent duty of care towards their child (Raz 1986, pp. 43–44). Authorities are hence illegitimate if they rule onthe basisofreasons that donot apply tothe people they governoriftheyareworseornobetterthanifpeopleactedbythemselves.Itisfor thisreasonthatRaz(1986,pp.55–56)callsitthe‘service’conceptionofauthority, becauseitencapsulatestheideathatauthoritiesshouldservethepeopletheygovern. Second, the pre-emptive thesis, which states that the authoritative directive of an authorityexcludesourotherreasonsforaction,ratherthanjustbeingaddedtoother reasons(Raz1986,p.46).Ifwehaveforexamplereferredadisputetoanarbitrator her decision willnotjustbeoneamongmanyreasons toact,it isthe reason toact, and excludes all our other reasons (Raz 1986, pp. 41–42). Finally, Raz sets a limit ontheauthorityofaninstitution,arguingthatitshouldnotextendtothoseareasof life where there is an ‘intrinsic desirability of people conducting their own life by their own lights’ (Raz 1986, p. 57). Raz (1989, pp. 1180–1181; 2006, p. 1014) has subsequentlyreferredtothisasaseparate‘conditionofautonomy’or‘independence condition’, which must be satisfied along with the normal justification thesis in order for an authority to be legitimate.5 This covers the accepted understanding of Raz’s theory. I turn now to an interpretive point within the theory. The original formulation of the normal justificationthesisarguesthatauthorityisestablishedbycomparinganinstitutionto individuals acting by themselves. But this does not address situations where there are several institutions with a claim to authority. In a pregnant comment Raz says that: One recurring kind ofreason against accepting the authority of one person or institutionisthatthereisanotherpersonorinstitutionwithabetterclaimtobe recognized as an authority (Raz 1986, p. 57). This suggests that an institution does not have authority if there is an alternative institution that better fulfils the normal justification thesis.6 Consequently it seems possible that an institution could be better than individuals acting on their own but doesnothaveauthoritybecauseanalternativeinstitutionisevenbetterthanthefirst. 5 Simmons(1999)hasarguedthatweshoulddistinguishbetweenthejustificationandthelegitimacyof thestate.Astateislegitimateifithasauthority,whereasastateisjustifiedifitis‘rationallypreferableto allfeasiblenon-statealternatives’(1999,pp.742&746).Astatecantherefore,accordingtoSimmons,be justifiedwithoutbeinglegitimate(inthatitisallthingsconsideredpreferablebutthereisnoobligationto obeyit).InRaz’stheoryaninstitutioncannotbelegitimateifitisnotjustified,because(asIwillshow)if aninstitutionisnotbetterthanitsalternativesthenitdoesnothaveauthority.Raz(1989,pp.1180–1181) howeveralsosaysthataninstitutioncanbejustified,becauseitpassesthenormaljustificationthesis,but is not a legitimate authority, because it fails the independence condition. In Raz’s theory then, justificationisanecessarybutnotsufficientconditionforlegitimateauthority.Intermsofmyargument wecanseethatpoliticalanarchismisprimarilyaclaimaboutthejustificationofthestate,sinceitclaims thatanarchismisabetteralternativetothestate.Butthepointofmyargumentistoshowthat,ifwe acceptRaz’stheoryofauthority,politicalanarchismcanalsoaffectthelegitimacyofthestate. 6 SeealsoRaz’s(1989,p.1180)laterremarkthataninstitutionhasauthoritywhenit‘makescompliance with its directives closer to reason than either compliance with a less efficient institution or acting independently’. 123 PoliticalAnarchismandRaz’sTheoryofAuthority 313 This constraint, Raz (1986, p. 57) says, will only apply when ‘two authorities are incompatible,asaretheclaimsoftwogovernmentstobelegitimategovernmentsof one country’. Raz has subsequently addressed in greater depth the possibility of conflicting alternative institutions claiming authority: Atothertimesauthoritiesmaybehostiletoeachother,directingtheirsubjects not to obey, and more generally not to cooperate with the working of other authorities. In such cases the question whether a given authority’s power extendstoexcludetheauthorityofanotheristobejudgedinthewaywejudge thelegitimacyofitspoweronanymatter,namely,whetherwewouldconform bettertoreasonbytryingtofollowitsdirectivesthanifwedonot(Raz2006, p. 1021). Thus in cases where there are conflicting, even ‘hostile’, alternative institutions, legitimate authority is assigned to whichever institution enables people to conform better to reason than the alternatives. Legitimate authority is thus allocated to the institution that is ‘best’ among the alternatives, even if the other institutions might be ‘better’ than the individuals acting by themselves. Let us look a little closer at what these alternative institutions with a claim to authoritymightbe.Razwritesthatinordertobeconsideredalegitimateauthorityan institutionmustbeadefacto authority,inthatthey‘areinfact followed oratleast conformedwithbyconsiderablesegmentsofthepopulation’(Raz2006,p.1036,see alsoRaz1986,p.56).Thusitseemsthatonlyalternativeinstitutionsthatarealready de facto authorities, i.e. followed by a large amount of the population, can be candidatesforlegitimateauthority(whichIwillcallexistingalternatives).Thereisa question however, Nicole Roughan argues, as to how we should interpret this condition: a ‘strict reading would limit legitimate authority to those bodies that already have effective authority; a looser reading would require that legitimate authoritycouldattachtobodiesthatcouldhaveeffectiveauthority’(Roughan2013, p.108).Inotherwords,shouldtheserviceconceptiononlylookatexistingdefacto alternative institutions, or should it also consider possible alternatives, institutions thatarenotcurrentlyfollowedbylargepartsofthepopulationbutcouldbe. RoughanpointstoRaz’s(1986,pp.75–76)statementthattheserviceconception can extend to an institution that ‘is soon likely to acquire effective power’ as evidence that Raz does slightly open the door to possible alternatives having legitimateauthority,i.e.whentheyareveryclosetobeingexistingalternatives.But Razseemstoruleoutpossiblealternativesthatarefurtherfromrealisation.Razfor examplegoesontosaythatinasituationwheresomeoneclaimsauthoritybutdoes not yet have effective power: ‘He may deserve to have such authority. It may be better ifheacquiresit.He mayeven have aright toit.Buthedoes notyethave it’ (Raz 1986, p. 76). This suggests that even when a possible alternative would be better than an existing institution, it does not have authority until it becomes (or is very close to being) an existing alternative. Roughan (2013, p. 108) believes that Raz’spositionthusstrikesabalancebetween‘notprecludingnewcompetitorsfrom beingcandidatesforlegitimateauthority’and‘helpingtodealwiththeproblemthat it will sometimes be difficult to work out whether a particular power is or has the capacity to be effective.’ 123 314 B.Leipold In contrast, I believe that a theory of authority should take greater account of possible alternatives than this. This is because I think the possibility of a better alternativeshouldplayanimportantroleindelegitimizingexistinginstitutions.Yet itwouldtakeustoofarfromRaz’scommitmenttoalegitimateauthoritybeingade factoauthoritytoarguethatapossiblealternativecouldcompletelydelegitimizean existing institution. But it is, I think, broadly faithful to the central features of the service conceptiontolimit anexisting institution’s authorityinonecrucial respect. Consider the case of when an existing authority is hostile to a better possible alternative,totheextentthatitactivelyusesitsauthoritytoprohibitorobstructthe promotion or establishment of the possible alternative. By granting the existing institution legitimate authority we are seemingly committed to obeying directives that stop the emergence of a better alternative. Obeying these directives would in this case fail to live up to the central motivation behind the service conception: bringing people closer to reason. I therefore think that the authority of an existing institutionshouldnotextendtoareasconcerningthepromotionorestablishmentof a better possible alternative.7 Interpreting the service conception in this way ensures that we do not grant existing institutions so much authority that it precludes the possibility of better alternatives emerging. Considering only existing alternatives would I think exhibit an unwarranted bias towards the status quo and potentially foreclose challenges to it.Thoughitshouldbenotedthat,undertheserviceconception,existinginstitutions will stillhave legitimateauthority inthoseareas notaffected by thisconsideration. Philosophical and Political Anarchism Let us now turn to philosophical and political anarchism. Philosophical anarchism deniesthatthestatehasauthority.ItismostcommonlyassociatedwithRobertPaul Wolff’s short but influential In Defense of Anarchism (1970).8 Wolff argued that people’s primary moral obligation is to be autonomous, to obey only their own morallaws.Thestatehoweverclaimsauthorityoverpeoplesothattheymustobey its directives. There is therefore a clash between the state’s authority and the autonomy of the individual. Consequently, Wolff claims, a legitimate state (where people are obligated to obey its directives) is impossible. Wolff’s argument has howeverbeensubjectedtoanumberofcriticisms.OneproblemhighlightedbyRaz (1990,p.12),isthatitsstrongaccount ofautonomy strikes manyas‘exaggerated’. AsRazpointsout,itisconsistentwithautonomytosometimesdefertoothersifthat will help you achieve what you wanted to do anyway. In the case of the state’s authority, a common line of thinking is that because the state allows people to realize what they could not achieve by themselves, then all things considered the 7 Idonotofcourseexpecttheexistingauthoritytorespectorrecognizethatitsauthorityislimitedinthis way.Itisinsteadaimedatthosesubjecttotheauthoritywhoshouldseethemselvesasnotobligatedto followtheauthority’sdirectivesinthesematters. 8 A more sophisticated account of philosophical anarchism is given by Simmons (1979), where his approachistoshowthatsomeofthemaintheoriesofauthority(consent,tacitconsent,fairplay,dutiesof justice,andgratitude)allfailtoestablishtheauthorityofthestate. 123 PoliticalAnarchismandRaz’sTheoryofAuthority 315 state is legitimate, even if it might potentially conflict with a strong view of autonomy.OneofthestrengthsofRaz’stheoryisthatitprovidesaconvincingreply to Wolff’s philosophical anarchism by capturing this common belief in a philosophical framework. Political anarchism on the other hand is the claim that anarchism is a better alternative to the state.9 It is therefore a view about existing structures and the desirabilityofchanging them, andisonethe central contentionsofanarchistsocial and political movements. Philosophical anarchism is however primarily a philo- sophicalpositionwithinaphilosophicaldebate.Thiskindofdistinctioniscommon in the literature (Gordon 2005, p. 148; Miller 1984, pp. 15–29; Pateman 1979, pp.135–142;Simmons1987,p.269;1996,p.23).Ithelpsdistinguishbetweenideas thatshareanameandasuperficialresemblancebutareimportantlydistinct.Indeed, instark contrasttopoliticalanarchism, philosophical anarchism is compatible with still believing in the need for a state. Wolff (1970, p. 18) for example accepts that the philosophical anarchist may not think that there is ‘any real prospect of eliminatingthestateasahumaninstitution’andSimmons(1987,p.269)saysthatit is ‘compatible with the view that government may be necessary and that certain typesofgovernmentsoughttobesupported’.Itisthislackofpoliticalconsequences that led David Miller to label philosophical anarchism a ‘rather bloodless’ position (Miller 1984, p. 15). Political anarchism then is the claim that anarchism is a better alternative to the state,andinthelanguageofRaz’sserviceconceptionwecansaythatitclaimsthat anarchism is better at enabling people to conform with reason than the state. This raises the question of what I mean by the ‘state’ and ‘anarchism’. For the state I adopt the standard definition as a (i) centralised and hierarchical organisation with (ii)amonopolyoncoercionoveragiventerritory.Incontrast,byanarchismImean a form of social and political organisation that (i) is decentralised and non- hierarchical, (ii) does not have institutionalised and extensive means of coercion, and (iii) has democratic control over the means of production. This conception of anarchism is consequently anti-statist and anti-capitalist.10 I contrast the state with this thicker conception of anarchism, rather than with just anti-statism, because it reflectsthehistoricalunderstandingofanarchismandisimportanttounderstanding howanarchismmightbebetterthanthestate.Anarchismisanti-statistinsofarasit opposes both capitalist and communist states, largely because the centralised and hierarchical nature of all states allows a ruling class to use the coercive machinery ofthestatetomaintainitsposition.Butaconceptionofanarchismthatdoesnotalso take a view on the social and economic organisation of society can have only a limited conception of how it will be a better alternative to the state. 9 Idonotfocusonanadditionalimportantideaassociatedwithpoliticalanarchismthatbelievinginthis alternativeobligatesonetoactivelyopposethestatebecauseitislessrelevanttotheensuingdiscussion. 10 Itthereforedoesnotcoverright-wing‘anarcho-capitalist’varietiesofanarchism.Thesevarietiesof anarchismarealsoanti-statistbutwantthemeansofproductiontoremaininprivatehands.ThoughI cannot defend the view here, I believe that anarcho-capitalism reproduces the exploitative and dominatoryeconomicandsocialstructuresofcapitalismwithoutthemodestwelfareprovisionsandlegal protectionsofthestate,andisconsequentlyworsethanthestate.Itthereforedoesnotfulfilthepolitical anarchistclaimofanarchismbeingabetteralternativetothestate. 123 316 B.Leipold Historically the anarchist movement emerged as a distinct social and political movementfromwithinthebroadersocialistmovement,andparticularlyfromwithin theFirstInternational,inthe1860s.Theanarchistmovementexplicitlysawitselfas aformofsocialism,inthatitaimedtooverthrowcapitalismthroughclassstruggle, but it opposed the statist tendencies of other varieties of socialism. It therefore rejected the idea that capitalism could be overthrown by seizing state power and insteadadvocatedorganisingclassstruggleoutsideofandinoppositiontothestate. Some of the key figures associated with this early political and theoretical development of anarchism include Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and Emma Goldman. The movement gained particular prominence and influence in Spain in the 1930s, but was influential in workers and peasant struggles across the world throughout the late 19th and early 20th century.11 By the end of the Second World Warithadhoweverbeenmostlywipedoutbycommunistandfascistdictatorships. But its ideas re-emerged with the 1960s students’ and workers’ protests, and its contemporary influence can be found in the Zapatistas in Mexico, various anti- racist, feminist and queer liberation movements, the alter-globalisation movement (Gordon 2008, pp. 29–31; Graeber 2002), and the numerous social protest movements that have arisen in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Gibson 2013; Graeber 2013). Thereare,Ibelieve,severalhistoricalandcontemporaryexamplesoflarge-scale societies that meet the description of anarchism as a form of social and political organisation that is (i) decentralised and non-hierarchical, (ii) does not have institutionalised and extensive means of coercion, and (iii) has democratic control over the means of production. These features were, as I will discuss below, at one point widely realised by the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war. A further example, are the areas under anarchist control during the Ukrainian revolution and civil war from 1917 to 1921. In these areas, anarchists, known as ‘Makhnovists’, began organising free soviets and communes based on peasant and worker self-administration, across a territory with a population of several million people,whilstsimultaneouslyfightingboththeWhiteandRedarmies(Malet1982, pp.107–125;Marshall1992,pp.473–475;Shubin2010).Inaddition,theZapatistas have been largely autonomous from the Mexican state since their 1994 rebellion. They consist of more than a thousand self-governing communities in a region of about300,000people.Theyprovideeducational,health, andjudicialservices,with political decisions made through a set of community, municipal, and regional assemblies, and they organise the local economy through agricultural and small- scaleindustrialcollectivesandcooperatives(H´ıjarGonza´lez2008;Starretal.2011, pp. 104–108; Stahler-Sholk 2007, pp. 54–60).12 These examples of anarchist organisation across a large-scale society meet the definition of an existing or de 11 ThisunderstandingandhistoryofanarchismisindebtedtotheapproachtakenbySchmidtandvander Walt(2009).Foranoverviewofanarchism’slesswell-knowninfluenceoutsideofWesternEuropeduring thisperiodseetheeditedvolumebyHirschandvanderWalt(2010). 12 ThoughtheZapatistacommunities thusdisplaymanyanarchistfeaturesitisimportanttonotethat theirideasandpracticesareinfluencedbyanumberoftraditionsincluding,Indigenousphilosophiesand autonomousMarxism. 123 PoliticalAnarchismandRaz’sTheoryofAuthority 317 facto alternative in that they were/are followed by a considerable proportion of territory’s population. Furthermore, the features of anarchism highlighted above can also apply to groupswithinstates.Cooperatives,collectives,tradeunions,andsocialmovements canallbedescribedasanarchist(andasmoreorlessanarchist)basedontheextent to which they realise the features highlighted above. This understanding of anarchism, as a form of social and political organisation rather than just a utopian ideal, is often associated with Colin Ward who argued that anarchism: is always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow…far from being a speculative vision of a future society, it is a description of a mode of human organisation,rootedintheexperienceofeverydaylife,whichoperatessideby side with, and in spite of, the dominant authoritarian trends of our society (Ward 1973, p. 11). Anarchistgroupsthatareorganisedalongthefeaturesoutlinedabovecantherefore exist within the state. Though they do not meet the definition used here of an existing alternative to the state, in that they are followed by a large part of the population, they could have authority in those areas in which they operate if they perform better than the state. The Challenge of Political Anarchism Havingsetoutthesedefinitionsweareinapositiontoturntothepoliticalanarchist challenge to the authority of the state. The most straightforward way to use Raz’s theoryofauthoritytojustifytheauthorityofthestateistoarguethatthestateisan institutionthatfulfilstheconditionsoftheserviceconceptionandthereforethestate hasauthority.Razhoweverbelievesthattheserviceconceptioncannotbeappliedto the state quite so straightforwardly. He argues that the state’s ability to help individuals conform better with reason varies from individual to individual. Where thestateisnobetterthantheindividualitdoesnothaveauthority(Raz1986,p.78). Furthermore,Raz’sindependenceconditionlimitsthestate’sauthoritytoonlythose areas where it is not more important for individuals to decide for themselves. This means that the service conception of authority actually only gives a ‘piece-meal’ justification of state authority; it will have authority in some areas, over some people,andtheextentofthatauthoritywillvaryfromindividualtoindividual(Raz 1986, p. 80).13 However, Raz (1986, pp. 100 & 103) also claims that in spite of theselimitations,statesstillhavea‘gooddealofcommonauthority…overall[their] subjects regarding a certain range of issues’ and that a relatively just state would have ‘authority over just about everyone in certain matters.’ Thus when I say that political anarchism affects how Raz’s theory justifies the state’s authority, I mean 13 BecauseRaz(1979)hasdeniedthatthereisageneraldutytoobeythelawheissometimesthoughtof asaphilosophicalanarchist.HoweverbecauseRazmaintainsthatthestatehas‘piece-meal’authorityhe rejectsthephilosophicalanarchistclaimthatthestatehasnoauthority. 123 318 B.Leipold this more limited ‘piece-meal’ understanding of state authority, which Raz at the same time believes is still fairly extensive. With this caveat in mind, let us first look at the justification of the state’s legitimateauthorityincaseswhereanarchismisanexistingalternative.Thenormal justification thesis states that an institution has authority if it is better an enabling people to conform with reason than if it they acted on their own. The state, it is claimed, is an institution that enables people to conform better with reason that if they acted on their own. The state would therefore seemingly have legitimate authority.However,thequalificationRazsetsonthisisthattheinstitutiondoesnot havelegitimateauthorityifthereisabetterexistingalternativeinstitution.Political anarchism claims just that, that in these cases anarchism is a better existing alternative to the state. The state therefore does not have legitimate authority becausethereisaninstitutionthatisevenbetteratenablingpeopletoconformwith reason.Thus,inthesecases,Raz’stheorydoesnotrejectphilosophicalanarchism,it instead assigns legitimate authority to anarchist groups and societies. In order to establish the state’s authority in these cases the theory would have to be supplemented by an additional argument that shows that the political anarchist claim is wrong; that the state is in fact better at enabling people to conform with reasonthantheanarchistgroupsandsocieties.Rejectingphilosophicalanarchismin these cases is therefore reliant on also rejecting political anarchism. Nowletusturntocaseswhenanarchismisnotanexistingalternative,butonlya possibleone.AfurtherqualificationweaddedtoRaz’sserviceconceptionisthatan existinginstitution’sauthoritydoesnotextendtothepromotionorestablishmentof abetterpossiblealternative.Ifthepoliticalanarchistclaimistrue,andanarchismis in fact a better possible alternative, then the state’s legitimate authority will be limitedtonotpreventingthepromotionorestablishmentofanarchism.Theextentto which Raz’s theory responds to philosophical anarchism in general will thus be weakened if political anarchism is true. This consideration in effect makes the state’sauthorityevenmorepiece-meal,sinceinadditiontotheareasnotedbyRaz, thestatenowalsodoesnothaveauthorityinthoseareasrelatedtothepromotionor establishment of anarchism as a better alternative.14 Thusbothincaseswhereanarchismisanexistingalternativeandwhenitisonly a possible alternative, the state’s authority and the extent of that authority is dependent on whether or not political anarchism is true. Raz (1986, p. 70) in fact rejectspoliticalanarchism,arguingthatthe‘existence[ofstates]ispreferabletoany alternative method of social organization’.15 He acknowledges however that the application of his theory of authority is ‘contingent’ on these matters, but (as he rightly points out) this contingency does not affect the service conception of authorityitself (Raz 1986,p.57).Myargumentthus only questionsthe application oftheserviceconceptiontothestate,andnotthetheoryassuch.Politicalanarchism ineffectdrivesanempiricalwedgebetweenauthorityandtheauthorityofthestate. 14 The state’s authority might be even further limited by anarchist groups within the state, which, providedtheyperformbetterthanthestate,willhaveauthorityintherelevantareasratherthanthestate. 15 SimilarlySimmons(2008,p.64)claimsthat‘someexistingstatesclearlydoenoughgood(andrefrain sufficiently from unwarranted coercion) that they should not be opposed or undermined. Political anarchism…isforthatreasonfalse.’ 123