Policy Influencing, Lobbying and Advocacy Mozambique country study Study Commissioned by: Policy and Operations Evaluation Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Maputo, April 2015 Acknowledgment The consultant wishes to express appreciation to the women and men working for civil society organisations who shared their professional experiences, views and insights about policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in Mozambique as well as their organisational documentation, which formed the foundation for the elaboration of the draft document here submitted for discussion. The consultant would also like to particularly thank the support provided by staff of the Netherlands Embassy in Maputo as well as the guidance from the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 2 ACRONIMS APRM AfricanPeerReviewMechanism CAC ExtendedConsultationCouncil CASC PrivateSectorAnnualConference CESC CentreforLearningandCapacityBuildingforCivilSociety CFJJ CentreforLegalandJudicialTraining CIP CentreforPublicIntegrity CS CivilSociety CSO CivilSocietyOrganisation CTA MozambicanBusinessConfederation DAC DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee ECOSIDA EntrepreneursAgainstHIV,MalariaandTuberculosis EITI ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative FAMOD ForumofMozambicanAssociationsofPeoplewithDisabilities FORCOM ForumofCommunityRadios IHP+ InternationalHealthPartnership INGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisation INGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisation IOB PolicyandOperationsEvaluationDepartment JANS JointAssessmentofNationalStrategies JOINT LeagueofNon-GovernmentalNGOsinMozambique LDH HumanRightsLeague LGBT Lesbians,Gays,BisexualsandTransgender NAFEZA CentreofWomen’sAssociationsofZambézia NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation OBI OpenBudgetIndex OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment OSISA OpenSocietyInitiativeforSouthernAfrica PARP PovertyReductionActionPlan PERPU StrategicProgrammeforUrbanPovertyReduction PES EconomicandSocialPlan PESOD DistrictEconomicandSocialPlan PESS HealthSectorStrategicPlan PILA PolicyInfluencing,LobbyingandAdvocacy PSC-PS MozambicanCivilSocietyPlatformforSocialProtection ROSC CivilSocietyForumforChildRights SNV NetherlandsDevelopmentOrganisation UNAIDS UnitedNationsJointProgrammeonHIVandAIDS USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment WLSA WomenandLawinSouthernAfrica 3 Table of Contents 1.Introduction..................................................................................................................................5 1.1Scopeofthecountrystudy......................................................................................................5 1.2Methodology...........................................................................................................................6 1.2.1Criteriaforselectionof10focusCSOs..............................................................................6 1.3Limitations..............................................................................................................................7 2.TheenvironmentinwhichCSOsoperate......................................................................................8 2.1Politicalcontext.......................................................................................................................8 2.2Economiccontext....................................................................................................................9 2.3Basicrightsandliberties.......................................................................................................10 2.4Aiddependency....................................................................................................................12 3.Policy-makingprocesses:actorsandspaces...............................................................................14 3.1Actors....................................................................................................................................14 3.2Spaces&Spacetoinfluence..................................................................................................22 4.CSOsengaginginpolicyinfluencing,lobbyingandadvocacy......................................................28 4.1.OrganisationalProfiles.........................................................................................................28 4.2.Topics&Issues.....................................................................................................................29 4.3.Legitimacyissues..................................................................................................................30 4.4.PolicyinfluencingStrategiesandPractices...........................................................................33 4.4.1.TheRoleofCivilSocietyPlatformsandThematicNetworks .........................................37 4.5.Evidence-basedpolicyinfluencing?......................................................................................40 4.6.Theoriesofchange...............................................................................................................43 4.7.Effectiveness........................................................................................................................46 4.7.1.Factorsaffectingeffectivenessofinfluencingactivities ................................................51 4.8.CapacityDevelopmentProcesses.........................................................................................52 4.8.1DonorssupporttoCSOs.................................................................................................54 4.8.2TheroleofDutchorganisations.....................................................................................55 5.Conclusions.................................................................................................................................59 6.Recommendations......................................................................................................................65 Bibliography............................................................................................................................67 Annexes..................................................................................................................................69 4 1. Introduction ThePolicyandOperations EvaluationDepartment (IOB),ofthe MinistryofForeignAffairsof the Netherlands is undertaking an Evaluation of Policy Influencing, Lobbying and Advocacy coveringthe2008-2014period.Inthiscontext,ithascommissionedcountrycasesstudiesof Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique. The consultant (Katia Taela) has been hired to conduct the Mozambique case study. The first deliverable under the contract was the submission of an Inception Report to IOB’s evaluation team and the internal IOB peer review team. The Inceptionnoteproposedtheapproachandmethodologyforthecountrystudyinlightofthe Terms of Reference (Annex 1). IOB’s comments to the Inception Report have been consideredinthisreport. 1.1Scopeofthecountrystudy According to the Terms of Reference the main purpose of the evaluation is to contribute to insights and lessons about support provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy and its effectiveness. The evaluation includes the study of success factors and limitations of Northern (Dutch) organisations’ support to policy influencing work of Southern CSOs. The main questions guidingtheevaluationarethefollowing:  Howdoestheministrysupportpolicyinfluencing,lobbyingandadvocacy?  What evidence is there for the effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying strategies/ programmes in influencing policy in the public and private sector that is supportive of poverty reduction, justice and sustainable inclusive development? Whatfactorsexplainlevelsofeffectiveness?  How does Southern CSOs’ capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy at national or global level develop and how does the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations influence that capacity development? How can Northern (Dutch) organisations best support Southern CSOs’ capacity to practise policyinfluencing,lobbyingandadvocacyinthefuture? The present case study contributes to address the second and third main evaluation questionsaboveoutlined.Theoverallobjectiveofthecasestudyis: “To generate insights and conclusions concerning the environment, practice and support of Northern (Dutch) organisations to capacity development in the area of policy influencing, lobbyingandadvocacyinMozambique”. Specifically, the case study offers insight into how Southern CSOs operate (focus on the policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities they have undertaken); what they have achieved (focus on how they have contributed to changes in policy and what role have knowledge production, freedom of expression and civic engagement played in the policy change process) how they develop (focus on organisational development) and; what has been the role and impact of external (Dutch) support to their organisational development andpolicyinfluencing,lobbyingandadvocacyinterventions1. 1 The ToR present these issues in the form of five evaluation questions to be looked into,with a total of 30 specificquestionstoanswer. 5 1.2Methodology The study was conducted between October 2014 and February 2015 over a period of 40 days, during which the consultant conducted a literature review, prepared an Inception Report, attended a one-day expert meeting in the Hague2, conducted field work in Maputo City, Nampula and Zambézia, conducted a review of organisational documents of selected CSOs,produceda draft reportwhichwasdiscussedduringaworkshop onthe 17thFebruary, attheNetherlandsEmbassyinMaputo,andonthe19thFebruaryparticipatedinaworkshop in Nairobi with CSO in Kenya; on the occasion the preliminary findings of the Mozambique countrystudywerealsopresented. The report is based on a qualitative studythat employed a variety of sources of information and data collection methods comprising literature and document review, semi-structured interviews3 with key informants and leadership and/or technical staff of 10 CSOs, a focus group discussion with 08 members of staff of ORAM Nampula, informal conversations with knowledgeable individuals, and participant observation at the plenary of the Provincial Civil Society Platform in Nampula4. Annex 2 outlines the study methods and data sources and Annex 3 provides a list of people interviewed. The discussions held during the workshops in Maputo and Nairobi as well as a work session with the IOB evaluation team on the 20th February provided valuable inputs to the present report. Also important were the written comments received from Mozambican CSOs that were unable to attend the workshop in Maputo. The country study’s conclusions and recommendations draw extensively from the discussionsheldduringtheworkshops. 1.2.1Criteriaforselection of10 focus CSOs The selection of focus CSOs has built on the work that was conducted as part of the IOB evaluation of Direct Financing to Local NGOs5 to capitalise on the groundwork that had already been done and the relations that were built in the process. The selection of the actual cases was based on analysis of internal appraisal documents and the report of the Direct Funding evaluation, focusing on the extent to which the organisation is (or aims to be) active in the field of policy influencing,lobbying and advocacy. The following criteria for selectionofthe10CSOshasbeenadopted:  10CSOssupportedbyDutchorganisationsorfunding;  AtleastoneCSOfromeachregionofthecountry(South,CentreandNorth);  AtleastfiveCSOsthatwereconsultedaspartoftheevaluationofdirectfinancing;  AtleasttwoCSOsthatwerenotconsultedaspartoftheevaluationofdirectfunding;  AtleasttwoCSOsthatworkatlocallevel; 2 Expert-meeting took place on the 7th October 2014, in The Hague – Netherlands. The aims of the meeting were: a) to solicit advice that serves as methodological guidance for the conduct of the evaluation; b) to discussoptionstostrengthenthelearningobjectiveoftheevaluation. 3TheinterviewswereguidedbythequestionsprovidedintheTORs,butmodified(shortened)tofocusonthe mostrelevantissuesforeachgroup. 4Theplenarytookplaceonthe10thDecember2014,from9H00amto16H00. 5Thereportisavailableat:http://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/directe-financiering 6 Furthermore,forlearningpurposestheselectionofCSOscoveredabroad rangeofthematic areas (for e.g. gender equality, land rights, sexual minorities’ rights, local governance). Basedonthesecriteriathefollowing10CSOswereidentified: 1. AssociaçãoparaoDesenvolvimentoSustentável-Akilizetho 2. CentrodeIntegridadePública–CIP 3. AssociaçãoCoalizãodaJuventudeMoçambicana-Coalizão 4. InstitutodeInvestigaçãoparaoDesenvolvimento JoséNegrão–CruzeiroSul 5. ForumMulher–FM 6. N’weti-ComunicaçãoparaaSaúde 7. RededeAssociaçõesFemininasdaZambézia-NAFEZA 8. AssociaçãoMoçambicanadaAjudaMútua-ORAM 9. AssociaçãoMoçambicanaparaDefesadasMinoriasSexuais-LAMBDA 10.WomenandLawinSouthernAfrica-WLSA Annex 3 provides more details about the thematic areas of work, activities and location of theCSOs. 1.3Limitations The main limitation of the study was the period during which it was undertaken. In October 2014, General Elections were held in Mozambique, and between November and December CSOs were occupied with the elaboration of annual narrative and financial reports and the use of funds that had been disbursed late and needed to be spent in 2014. Women and feminist organisations were involved in the 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence (from 25 November to 10 December). In December, many professionals from development agencies CSOs approached by the consultant were on holidays. During this period, it was also extremely difficult to interview government officials or members of parliament. These constraintscombinedhaveaffectedtheviewscapturedinthisreport,whichfocuslargelyon people from selected CSOs,although individuals from CSOs not covered by the case studies havealsobeeninterviewed. The lack of documentation of CSOs’ policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy interventions has also influenced the content of this report demanding an effort to balance the information provided during the interviews with that gathered through review of available documentation. The gaps contained in the preliminary report were discussed during the workshop on the 17th February 20156 and the inputs from participating CSOs contributed to addresstheminthepresentdocument. Finally, whilst covering 10 CSOs provided a good overview of the work of a wide range of organisations, it did not allow depth about the work of individual organisations. However, we hope that the issues raised will stimulate debate and contribute to the on-going debate oncivilsociety’sinvolvementinpolicydialogueinMozambique. 6 The objective of the workshop was to discuss the preliminary findings of the study and collect inputsforitsimprovement.Thediscussionfocusedonthecontext,practices,capacitiesandexternal supportforpolicyinfluencing,lobbyingandadvocacyinMozambique. 7 2. Theenvironmentin whichCSOs operate This section describes the socio-political environment in which policy influencing, lobbying andadvocacytakesplace.Itfocuseson:a)thepoliticalandeconomiccontext;b)basicrights and freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression, press and association) and; c) the effects of Mozambique’saiddependencyonpolicymakingprocesses. 2.1Politicalcontext Formally,Mozambiqueisademocratic republicwithamulti-partysystem.Inreality,thereis dominance of a single political party – Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO)7, ascendance of the party over state institutions and of the executive over the judiciary and the legislative, weak democratic institutions, politicisation of electoral and state bodies, weakoppositionparties8,andlackofsocialaccountability. In October 2014, Mozambique held its fifth presidential elections amidst a political climate characterised by increased distrust and deterioration of dialogue9 between FRELIMO (in power for the past 40 years) and the main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO). On 15th January 2015, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi was sworn in as Mozambique’s new President amid controversy surrounding the election results and doubts about Nyusi’s autonomy,in relation to the cessing president (Armando Emílio Guebuza). RENAMO has refused to accept the results of the 2014 elections, alleging irregularities and fraud. In protest, it boycotted the inaugural seating of the National Assembly10; none of RENAMO’s 89 members of parliament took part in the swearinginceremony. It is uncertain how the election of the new president, the appointment of a new government and the new parliament will affect state-society relations and whether the president is willing to constructively engage with citizens. Many fear that the space for civil society may reduce, deepening an emerging tendency during President Guebuza’s two mandates.CSOsclaimthatthereductionofspace forcivilsocietyisrelatedtotheinterestof political elites to derive personal gains from the economic deals with companies operating in the extractive industries sector, an area which has been increasingly scrutinized by CSOs11. What is certain is that civil society engagements with the state have changed significantly in the last ten years. From an almost exclusive focus on complementing government’s efforts to deliver services, civil society organisations are increasingly involved inmonitoringprovisionofpublicservicesandinpolicyinfluencing. 7 Whilst FRELIMO continues to enjoy considerable influence as a political and economic force, the recent events associated the selection of FRELIMO’s presidential candidate for the 2014 elections revealed internal fissures within the party, challenging assumptions of cohesion and homogenous loyalty to the president. Fairbairn (2011) and Buur et al. (2011) had already identified factions within FRELIMO pointing out their differentiatedpolicyorientations. 8AlthoughthepreandpostelectionsperiodalsoshowntheincreasedmobilisationcapacityofRENAMOand abilitytoattractlargecrowdstoitsgatherings. 9Whichledtolocalisedmilitaryactionbetween2012and2014. 10WhereFRELIMOretainedthemajority-144ofthe250seats. 11Interviewnotes. 8 2.2Economiccontext Gender,income and wealth inequalities; poor coverage of the formaleducation system and resultinghighilliteracyrates;and lack ofaccessto public institutionsandservicesconstitute important barriers for the exercise of the civil, political, social and economic rights recognisedbytheMozambican constitution(OSISA2009:6). Thecountry’seconomicgrowth (7% GDP growth rates in the last 10 years) has not been translated in safer livelihoods and improved quality of life for the majority of the population. Despite a reduction in absolute povertyrates,shownbythenationalpovertyassessmentsfrom69.4%in 1996/7to 54.7%in 2002/03, the majority of the Mozambican population continues to live below the poverty line. Poverty rates have not reduced between 2003 and 2007/08 (MPD 2010). There are significantregionalandgenderdifferences:povertyratesarehigherinthecentralregionsof thecountry(59.7%)andinruralareas (56.9%),andithasafemaleface,withfemale-headed householdsfiguringamongstthepoorest(CMI2008). Whilst many of the barriers above outlined are the effect of a history of colonial exploitation, civil war and natural disasters, they are also a reflection of inadequate policy choices. For instance, even though subsistence agriculture is the main source of livelihoods for the majority of the Mozambican population, there has been little investment in improvingagriculturalproductivityofsmallholder farmers.Moguesetal(2012)analysedthe relation between low use of productivity enhancing services and technologies and public agricultural spending between 2001 and 2011. They point out that “although public agricultural expenditure (PAE) has increased rapidly over time at about 12.2 percent per year in constant prices (…),the bulk of the expenditure,about 75 percent,is on salaries and other transfers including institutional support. Spending on agricultural research and development (AgR&D), support to farmers, and provision of other agricultural services together accounted for only about 25 percent of total agricultural expenditures”. The focus of macro-economic policies in the agriculturalsector on rapid expansion of agricultural land areahasmarginalisedsmallholdersubsistenceagriculture. Castel-Branco (2010) argues that the inefficiency of economic growth to reduce poverty rates is related to the extractive character of the economic development modeladopted by Mozambique, based on large scale foreign investments focused on the extraction of natural resources (land, forestry, minerals and energy). Mozambique’s “mining boom” and the recent discovery (in 2010 and 2012) of large deposits of exploitable gas in the Rovuma Basin, off the coast of Cabo Delgado province is expected to exponentially increase foreign direct investments over the next years. The impacts of these investments on Mozambicans’ livelihoodsareyettobeseenandmanyfearthatthesediscoveriesmayonlybenefitpolitical elites, increase social inequalities and exacerbate social and political cleavages as centralisation of party-state control over the economy and political-business alliances are strengthened (Wittmeyers 2012, Chichava 2013, ILPC 2013). The changing environment requires a new posture on the part of CSOs. While a growing number of organisations has been actively engaged in advocating for economic policies more responsive to the needs of theMozambicanpopulation,themajorityisill-equippedtoperformthisrole. 9 A political economy analysis of the petroleum sector in Mozambique points out that “rent- seeking in the central feature of FRELIMO – for personal enrichment and as a means to consolidate further political influence (which in turn enables further rent-seeking opportunities) Guebuza and his close network function as industry gatekeepers vis-à-vis foreign companies – in particular in the gas industry - earning rents through political and administrative decision-making (licensing, project approvals, land titles, fiscal regimes) and secondly, by lining up their own companies to take advantage of contracts (logistics, catering,constructionetc.)(ILPC2013:13).” The political-economic dynamics associated with the rising cost of living and attempts to increase fuel/transport costs in 2008, of bread and other basic products in 2010, and again of transport in 2012 have stirred popular protests in Mozambique. A study conducted by IESE & IDS (2014) notes that unemployment, poverty and inequalities in combination with “the blocking or non-existence of mechanisms for dialogue between citizens and the government authorities” contributed to the adoption of violent forms of protest to express discontent. The popular protests brought forth important issues about the relations between professionalised and donor oriented civil society and citizens and between the state and citizens. The report underlines the inability of CSOs to engage with the food questionandhowtheyhavedistancedthemselvesfromthepopularprotests. 2.3Basicrightsandliberties The political, economic and social changes Mozambique has been experiencing have considerable implications for civil, political and economic rights. The rights granted by the Mozambican Constitution (1990 and 2004) which offer the foundation for the exercise of citizenship, including multi-party democracy, gender equality, and freedom of association, expressionandpresshavebeenthreatenedbyattemptstoreducethespaceforcivilsociety andrestrictpeople’scivillibertiesandpoliticalrights. The gap between a relatively progressive legal and policy framework, the practice of public institutions and people’s living conditions is deepening. Cultural arguments are often deployedtolegitimisetheinfringementofcivillibertiesandassociationalrights-particularly women and sexual minorities’ rights, based on claims that these are Western cultural exports with no resonance in local culture - whilst political rhetoric is used for intimidation andvilificationofincreasinglyassertiveandvocalcivilsocietyactors,inattemptstosilencing voicesthatchallengethestatusquo,clearlyviolatingtherighttofreedomofexpression. The list of people murdered for exposing or challenging the interests of political elites is growing. It includes journalist Carlos Cardoso12, economist and banker Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua13, director of investigation, audits and Intelligence of the Mozambican Customs 12CarlosCardosowasshotdeadincentralMaputoon22November2000,whileinvestigatingaUS$14million fraudconnectedwiththeprivatizationofMozambique'slargestbank,BancoComercialdeMoçambique. 13AntonioSiba-SibaMacuacuawastheheadofbankingsupervisionattheBankofMozambiqueandbecame emergencychairoftheprivatisedAustralBankwhenitcollapsedinApril2001afterfraudcarriedoutbyhighly placed people. Siba-Siba attempted torecover bad debts,including some from senior people in government and in Frelimo. He also cancelled contracts signed by the previous board, including one in with Nyimpine 10