PHYSICAL THEORY PHYSICAL THEORY Method and Interpretation Edited by Lawrence Sklar 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 © Oxford University Press 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Physical theory : method and interpretation / edited by Lawrence Sklar. pages cm Includes index. ISBN 978–0–19–514564–9 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Science— -Methodology. 2. Science—Philosophy. I. Sklar, Lawrence, editor of compilation. Q175.P514 2014 501—dc23 2013010048 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper CONTENTS List of Contributors vii Introduction 1 PART ONE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 1. Scientific Explanation 9 James Woodward 2. Probabilistic Explanation 40 Michael Strevens 3. Laws of Nature 63 Marc Lange Contents 4. Reading Nature: Realist, Instrumentalist, and Quietist Interpretations of Scientific Theories 94 P. Kyle Stanford 5. Structure and Logic 127 Simon Saunders and Kerry McKenzie 6. Evolution and Revolution in Science 163 Jarrett Leplin PART TWO FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 7. What Can We Learn about the Ontology of Space and Time from the Theory of Relativity? 185 John D. Norton 8. QM 229 ∞ Laura Ruetsche 9. Statistical Mechanics in Physical Theory 269 Lawrence Sklar Index 285 vi LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Marc Lange University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Jarrett Leplin University of North Carolina at Greensboro Kerry McKenzie University of Calgary John D. Norton University of Pittsburgh Laura Ruetsche University of Michigan Simon Saunders Oxford University Lawrence Sklar University of Michigan P. Kyle Stanford University of California, Irvine Michael Strevens New York University James Woodward University of Pittsburgh Introduction The contributions to this volume provide a survey of two aspects of contemporary philosophy of science. The pieces in the first part of the volume give the reader a rich sampling of current work in the general methodology of science. The pieces in the second part of the volume offer a sample of the current work exploring the foundations of our most general and basic science, contemporary physics. 1. sCIentIFIC MetHoD Three general problem areas have dominated discussion about the methods of the sciences. How do scientists answer “why?” questions— that is, what kinds of explanations do the sciences offer of the phenom- ena in their domains? What is the nature of the broad structures we call “theories”—how do theories unify science and provide a context for particular explanations? Finally, what is our rationale for believing or disbelieving in the explanations and theories proffered by our current, best available science? These problem areas are explored by the contrib- utors to part 1 of the volume. In “Scientific Explanation,” James Woodward explores what the structure of an explanatory answer to a “why?” question might be in science. He outlines the important idea that to explain is to place what occurs under a generalization, exceptionless or statistical, about what kinds of things occur. Then he notes a number of objections to that simple notion of explanation. Woodward then explores some propos- als to supplement this subsumption model of explanation, including the proposal to demand that explanations in science be unifying and the proposal that a basic notion of causation is essential to our concept of explanation. 1