About This Book Few people today, says Susanne Langer, are born to an environment which gives them spiritual support. Even as we are conquering nature, there is "little we see in nature that is ours." We have lost our life-symbols, and our actions no longer have ritual value; this is the most disastrous hindrance to the free functioning of the human mind. For, as Mrs. Langer observes, ". . . the human brain is constantly carrying on a process of symbolic transfor- mation" of experience, not as a poor substitute for action, but as a basic human need. This concept of symbolic transformation strikes a "new key in philosophy." It is a new generative idea, variously reflected even in such diverse fields as psychoanalysis and symbolic logic. With- in it lies the germ of a complete reorientation to life, to art, to action. By posing a whole new world of questions in this key, Mrs. Langer presents a new world-view in which the limits of language do not appear as the last limits of rational, meaningful experience, but things in- accessible to discursive language have their own forms of conception. Her examination of the logic of signs and symbols, and her account of what constitutes meaning, what characterizes symbols, forms the basis for her fur- ther elaboration of the significance of language, ritual, myth and music, and the integration of all these elements into human mentality. Irwin Edman says: "I suspect Mrs. Langer has estab- lished a key in terms of which a good deal of philosophy these next years may be composed." To ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD my great Teacher and Friend Philosophy in a New Key A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art By SUSANNE K. LANGER A MENTOR BOOK Published by THE NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY FIRST PRINTING, FEBRUARY, 1948 SECOND PRINTING, JULY, 1949 THIRD PRINTING, MARCH, 1951 FOURTH PRINTING, JULY, 1952 FIFTH PRINTING, MAY, 1953 SIXTH PRINTING, JUNE, 1954 CONTENTS 1. THE NEW KEY 1 2. SYMBOLIC TRANSFORMATION 20 3. THE LOGIC OF SIGNS AND SYMBOLS 42 4. DISCURSIVE AND PRESENTATIONAL FORMS 63 5. LANGUAGE 83 6. LIFE-SYMBOLS: THE ROOTS OF SACRAMENT 116 7. LIFE-SYMBOLS: THE ROOTS OF MYTH 138 8. ON SIGNIFICANCE IN Music 165 9. THE GENESIS OF ARTISTIC IMPORT 199 10. THE FABRIC OF MEANING 216 PREFACE THE "new key" in Philosophy is not one which I have struck. Other people have struck it, quite clearly and re- peatedly. This book purports merely to demonstrate the unrecognized fact that it is a new key, and to show how the main themes of our thought tend to be transposed into it. As every shift of tonality gives a new sense to previous passages, so the reorientation of philosophy which is taking place in our age bestows new aspects on the ideas and argu- ments of the past. Our thinking stems from that past, but does not continue it in the ways that were foreseen. Its cleavages cut across the old lines, and suddenly bring out new motifs that were not felt to be implicit in the premises of the schools at all; for it changes the questions of philos- ophy. The universality of the great key-change in our thinking is shown by the fact that its tonic chord could ring true for a mind essentially preoccupied with logic, scientific lan- guage, and empirical fact, although that chord was actually first sounded by thinkers of a very different school. Logic and science had indeed prepared the harmony for it, un- wittingly; for the study of mathematical "transformations" and "projections," the construction of alternative descrip- tive systems, etc., had raised the issue of symbolic modes and of the variable relationship of form and content. But the people who recognized the importance of expressive forms for all human understanding were those who saw that not only science, but myth, analogy, metaphorical thinking, and art are intellectual activities determined by "symbolic modes"; and those people were for the most part of the idealist school. The relation of art to epistemology was first revealed to them through reflection on the phe- nomenal character of experience, in the course of the great transcendentalist "adventure of ideas" launched by Imman- uel Kant. And, even now, practically all serious and pene- trating philosophy of art is related somehow to the ideal- istic tradition. Most studies of artistic significance, of art as a symbolic form and a vehicle of conception, have been made in the spirit of post-Kantian metaphysics. Yet I do not believe an idealistic interpretation of Reality is necessary to the recognition of art as a symbolic form. Professor Urban speaks of "the assumption that the more richly and energetically the human spirit builds its lan- guages and symbolisms, the nearer it comes ... to its ultimate being and reality," as "the idealistic minimum nec- essary for any adequate theory of symbolism." If there be such a "Reality" as the idealists assume, then access to it, as to any other intellectual goal, must be through some ade- quate symbolism; but I cannot see that any access to the source or "principle" of man's being is presupposed in the logical and psychological study of symbolism itself. We need not assume the presence of a transcendental "human spirit," if we recognize, for instance, the function of sym- bolic transformation as a natural activity, a high form of nervous response, characteristic of man among the animals. The study of symbol and meaning is a starting-point of philosophy, not a derivative from Cartesian, Humean, or Kantian premises; and the recognition of its fecundity and depth may be reached from various positions, though it is a historical fact that the idealists reached it first, and have given us the most illuminating literature on non-discursive symbolisms—myth, ritual, and art. Their studies, however, are so intimately linked with their metaphysical speculations that the new key they have struck in philosophy impresses one, at first, as a mere modulation within their old strain. Its real vitality is most evident when one realizes that even studies like the present essay, springing from logical rather than from ethical or metaphysical interests, may be actuated by the same generative idea, the essentially transformational nature of human understanding. The scholars to whom I owe, directly or indirectly, the material of my thoughts represent many schools and even many fields of scholarship; and the final expression of those thoughts does not always give credit to their influence. The writings of the sage to whom this book is dedicated receive but scant explicit mention; the same thing holds for the works of Ernst Cassirer, that pioneer in the philosophy of symbolism, and of Heinrich Schenker, Louis Arnaud Reid, Kurt Goldstein, and many others. Sometimes a mere article or essay, like Max Kraussold's "Musik und Mythus in ihrem Verhältnis" (Die Musik, 1925), Etienne Rabaud's "Les hommes au point de vue biologique" (Journal de Psychol- ogie, 1931), Sir Henry Head's "Disorders of Symbolic Thinking and Expression" (British Journal of Psychology, 1920), or Hermann Nohl's Stil und Weltanschauung, can give one's thinking a new slant or suddenly organize one's scattered knowledge into a significant idea, yet be completely swallowed up in the theories it has influenced so that no specific reference can be made to it at any particular point of their exposition. Inevitably, the philosophical ideas of every thinker stem from all he has read as well as all he has heard and seen, and if consequently little of his material is really original, that only lends his doctrines the continuity of an old intellectual heritage. Respectable ancestors, after all, are never to be despised. Though I cannot acknowledge all my literary debts, I do wish to express my thanks to several friends who have given me the benefit of their judgment or of their aid: to Miss Helen Sewell for the comments of an artist on the whole theory of non-discursive symbolism, and especially on chap- ters VIII and IX; to Mr. Carl Schorske for his literary criti- cism of those same long chapters; to my sister, Mrs. Dunbar, for some valuable suggestions; to Mrs. Dan Fenn for read- ing the page proofs, and to Miss Theodora Long and my son Leonard for their help with the index. Above all I want to thank Mrs. Penfield Roberts, who has read the entire manuscript, even after every extensive revision, and given me not only intellectual help, but the constant moral sup- port of enthusiasm and friendship; confirming for me the truth of what one lover of the arts, J. M. Thorburn, has said—that "all the genuine, deep delight of life is in show- ing people the mud-pies you have made; and life is at its best when we confidingly recommend our mud-pies to each other's sympathetic consideration." S. K. L. Cambridge, 1941 I. The New Key EVERY ACE in the history of philosophy has its own preoccu- pation. Its problems are peculiar to it, not for obvious practical reasons—political or social—but for deeper reasons of intel- lectual growth. If we look back on the slow formation and accumulation of doctrines which mark that history, we may see certain groupings of ideas within, it, not by subject-matter, but by a subtler common factor which may be called their "tech- nique." It is the mode of handling problems, rather than what they are about, that assigns them to an age. Their subject-mat- ter may be fortuitous, and depend on conquests, discoveries, plagues, or governments; their treatment derives from a stead- ier source. The "technique," or treatment, of a problem begins with its first expression as a question. The way a question is asked limits and disposes the ways in which any answer to it—right or wrong—may be given. If we are asked: "Who made the world?" we may answer: "God made it," "Chance made it," "Love and hate made it," or what you will. We may be right or we may be wrong. But if we reply: "Nobody made it," we will be accused of trying to be cryptic, smart, or "unsympa- thetic." For in this last instance, we have only seemingly given an answer; in reality we have rejected the question. The ques- tioner feels called upon to repeat his problem. "Then how did the world become as it is?" If now we answer: "It has not 'become' at all," he will be really disturbed. This "answer" clearly repudiates the very framework of his thinking, the ori- entation of his mind, the basic assumptions he has always entertained as common-sense notions about things in general. Everything has become what it is; everything has a cause; every change must be to some end; the world is a thing, and must have been made by some agency, out of some original stuff, for some reason. These are natural ways of thinking. Such implicit "ways" are not avowed by the average man, but simply followed. He is not conscious of assuming any basic principles. They are what a German would call his "Weltan- schauung," his attitude of mind, rather than specific articles of faith. They constitute his outlook; they are deeper than facts he may note or propositions he may moot. But, though they are not stated, they find expression in the forms of his questions. A question is really an ambiguous 1