PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE Selected and Edited With an Introduction by JUSTUS BUCHLER DOVER PUBLICATIONS, INC., NEW YORK http://avaxhome.ws/blogs/ChrisRedfield This new Doveredition. tinapublishedin 1955.isan unabridged CONTENTS and unalteredrepublicationofthebook tin;t published in 1940 under the title PAGE "The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings." PREFACE vii Itispublishedthroughspecialarrangementwith RoutledgeandKegan PaulLtd. INTRODUCTION IX I. CONCERNING THE AUTHOR I 2. THE FIXATION OF BELIEF 5 3. How TO MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR 23 4. THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE AND FALLIBILISM 42 5. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES; A CLASSIFICATION 60 A THE PRINCIPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGY . 74 V /7. LOGIC AS SEMIOTIC: THE THEORY OF SIGNS 98 8. THE CRITERION OF VALIDITY IN REASONING 120 9. WHAT IS A LEADING PRINCIPLE? 129 10. THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICS 135 II. ABDUCTION AND INDUCTION 15° 12. ONTHEDOCTRINEOFCHANCES,WITHLATERREFLECTIONS 157 13. THE PROBABILITY OF INDUCTION 174 lnternational Standard Book Number: 0-486-20217-8 14. THE GENERAL THEORY OF PROBABLE INFERENCE 19° Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:56-13549 15. UNIFORMITY 218 16. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR INCAPACITIES 228 This edition is manufactured in the United States of America and is for sale only in the 17. THE ESSENTIALS OF PRAGMATISM 251 UnitedStatesofAmerica. 18. PRAGMATISM IN RETROSPECT: A LAST FORMULATION 269 DoverPublications,Inc. 19. CRITICAL COMMON-SENSISM 29° 180VarickStreet New York, N. Y. 10014 20. PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENTS 3°2 21. Two NOTES: ON MOTIVES, ON PERCEPTS 306 v VI THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE PAGE 22. THE ApPROACH TO METAPHYSICS 310 23. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THEORIES 315 24. THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY EXAMINED 324 PREFACE 25. THE LAW OF MIND 339 I HOPE that in accordance with its purpose this volume contains 26. SYNECHISM, FALLIBILISM, AND EVOLUTION 354 Peirce'sbestworkandisat thesametime thoroughlyrepresentative 27. EVOLUTIONARY LOVE . 361 of his philosophy as a whole. Intended both for new readers and those already acquainted with Peirce, it will perhaps, besides 28. THE CONCEPT OF GOD 375 reaching many to whom his work has been inaccessible practically speaking, make possible a perspective of that work which might NOTES 379 not otherwisehave beenattained. Unlike mostimportant thinkers, INDEX 381 Peirce profits from selection. His philosophic writings consist entirely ofessays and manuscripts, many ofthe latter fragmentary, so that the process of selecting is no less one of organizing. There is here naturally a minimum of duplication, and of the digression which sometimes makes a paper of his so difficult to follow. It is, however, neither possible nor desirable wholly to avoid repetition oftheme: his thinking is often so compressed that recurrence of an idea in more than one context is necessary if we are to grasp its full significance. Similarly, an innocuous specimen or two of his digressive habits is necessary in conformity with the purpose" ofthiseditiontorepresent his idiosyncrasies as wellas hisopinions. Omissions, where made, are such as avoid text-chopping. With the exception ofChapter 21 and a short piece in Chapter20 (reprinted for the first time from periodicals), the material has been selectedfrom CollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce (sixvolumes, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Harvard University Press, 1931-35). All of Peirce's footnotes have been omitted in the present volume excepting a few deemed important, and these are indicated in the text bydaggers. Editor'sfootnotes, bracketed and indicated by asterisks, give information concerning original source, date, and location in Collected Papers of the material constituting each chapter. (Collected Papers is abbreviated CP, "CP 6.522-8," for example, denoting Volume 6, paragraphs522 to 528.) Numbers occurring in the text refer to notes in the rear. necessarily few and for the most part of a factual character. Chapter titles and sub headings are the editor's if not otherwise specified. Peirce's capitalization and punctuation have been left intact, and his spelling, though not changed, has been made uniform. Brief minor omissions, indicated in the usual manner by successive vu THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE Vlll periods, are in some cases those of Collected Papers. Of bracketed words in the text, added for the purpose of filling lacunae or providing synonyms, a majority already occur in Collected Papers. The reader is urged to keep an eye on the dates of the various INTRODUCTION selections, in order to more readily understand changes in point of view. One or two cases, where manuscripts of different dates were ONLY recently have we begun to explore the philosophy of Charles printed as one piece in Collected Papers and are similarly printed SandersPeirce, a vastand fecund wealth ofideas. Peircewasboth here, call for a word. On p. 105 a distinction between icon and natural scientist and close student of the history of philosophy hypoicon in the first two paragraphs disappears in succeeding a rare combination. But the significance of this is dwarfed by the paragraphs, because the latter are of an earlier date; and on further fact that he could critically utilize his historical study p. 108a distinctionbetweenindex and subindexlikewise disappears, toward the achievement ofimaginative depth, andhisexperimental for the same reason. The matter is not important, but is less science toward the development of a powerful logic. The striking perplexing to the reader who recalls the explanation. originality of his thought thus grows from a broad and solid The orderofthe chaptershas been determined partly by Peirce's foundation, and it is the product not only of his native intellectual classification of the sciences, but more largely by appropriateness genius but of his moral conviction that philosophy must build in the unfolding of his views (or in baldly subjective terms, by as well as repair. my own sense of consecutiveness). The reader may wish to skip Peirce's literary activity began in 1867 and continued almost around, and needless to say no great harm will result; but he unceasingly until a few years before his death in 1914. From the should bear in mind that later chapters as a rule assume more very beginning his approach was revolutionary and constructive. than earlier ones. It has been unavoidable that some termsshould He could accept none of the current intellectual influences; the appear prior to the places in which they are formally introduced. sensationalism of the followers of Mill; the Scottish philosophy, If a note in the rear does not help, a glance at index or table of inheriting in another guise the Cartesian philosophy of intuition; contentswill. the swelling tide of neo-Hegelianism; Spencerian evolutionism and IwishtothanktheHarvardUniversityDepartmentofPhilosophy, its concomitant dogmatic mechanism. But he could find value in and the Harvard University Press, for permission to reprint from all of these. Upon a synthesis of whatever healthful strains he Collected Papers material previously unpublished. Such permission detectedinsensationalismwiththeolderBritishtradition, Kantism, ofcourseimposesno responsibilityon these bodiesfor the character and the logic of science, he constructed his own empiricism, in of the present edition. which fallibilism replaces scepticism and pragmatism replaces This beingthesecond Peirce book published bythe International positivism. Scottish common-sensism he transformed into critical Librarywithin the last two years, the reader interested in a critical common-sensism. In Hegel he discerned the germ of his principle discussion may bereferred to the other, Charles Peirce's Empiricism of continuity or synechism. And he accepted evolution, not the by the present writer. regnant interpretation but one in which the concepts of chance J. B. and habit playa major r6le. Among thinkers of the first rank, few have in their lifetime addressed so small a public as Peirce. His inability to secure a regular teaching position (no bright page in American academic history) andtohavehisworkpublishedinbookform partlyaccount for this fact, and so does his unwillingness to "water down" ideas forwhateveraudienceshe reached. Buthiseffectonotherthinkers has been great: the philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey would lack some of their most distinctive emphasesif his influence Ix x THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE INTRODUCTION xi were subtracted, and men like Schroeder and Russell learned from idea of philosophic progress, abetting not a little what he has his contribution to logic. If American philosophy began to come eloquently revealed to be a crime as profound as it is subtle, the of age with Peirce's friend and immediate predecessor Chauncey obstruction, of inquiry. Wright, it had not yet freed itself from discipleship to worn If philosophers have indiscriminately claimed to reflect the traditions. In Peirce's first publications it flames into startlingly scientific attitude, they have in an even greater degree claimed sudden distinction, propelled by a force whose full influence has for their opinions the sanction of common sense. In this respect been curiously suspended until the present. too the philosophy of Peirce goes beyond verbalism. His critical The pages of Peirce vibrate with the effort to place philosophy theory of common sense, involving the conception ~f an indubit on a scientific basis. The phrase "scientific philosophy" has ability that is relative to social and biological frameworks-for his acquired a hollow ring in our time. On the one hand, the claim to fallibilism precludes absolute indubitability of any kind-and that have achieved it is notorious among the most widely differing must father all purposive investigation, explains how successful classical philosophers, and on the other, too many contemporary scientific theorizing is possible, and gives the lie to artificial craftsmen have made philosophy scientific by simply dispensing scepticisms which would counsel us to doubt what we cannot help with most of it. To Peirce the phrase has a perfectly literal believing. At the same time, it defines the limits of common sense implication, at once faithful to the method of science and the and is free from the naive extremism shared by the Scottish school scopeofphilosophictradition,namely,thatthebroadestspeculative and various present-day common-sensists. theoriesshould be experimentallyverifiable. Thisattitude rests on Peirce's theory of common sense and science receives logical the conviction that philosophy is a branch of progressive inquiry expression in the most widely heralded but scarcely the best rather than a species of art, and that the scientific method alone understood of his contributions, pragmatism. In the versions of makesprogressiveinquirypossible. ToPeircethescientificmethod James and Schiller, a huge pragmatist offspring flourished early in represents the antithesis of individualism. What distinguishes it this century. But the seeds of confusion and superficiality caused from all other methods of inquiry is its cooperative or public it to die as suddenly as it had been born. The pragmatism character. It conceives of evidence as an objective factor inviting of Peirce, for a time obscured, has now emerged, and the differ universal examination and compelling ultimate unanimity; it con ences are truly impressive. Whereas Popular pragmatism is an ceives of its results as essentially provisional or corrigible; and for anti-intellectualistic revolt, an embrace of the "will to believe" these reasons it ensures measurable progress. pathetic in its methodological feebleness, Peircean pragmatism This attitude is inimical to philosophies in which intuitive (pragmaticism), demonstrating the fatuity of an emphasis on mere cognition is fetish, whether in the form of self-evident a priori volition or sensation, is precisely intellectualistic. Popular prag principles or in that of infallible perceptual apprehension. By the matism is an interesting manifestation of the general empirical queer yet understandable twists of philosophic history such view temper; pragmaticismisastepforwardinthehistoryofempiricism. points have in their different ways purported to be scientific, It differs from the classical British tradition, from Kant's anti apriorism confusing natural science and mathematics-in Peirce a metaphysical scepticism, and from nineteenth-century positivism, fundamentaldistinction-andintuitiveempiricismundulyelevating primarily in that it introduces the concept of meaning into the cognitive value of sense. The result has been an abnormal empiricist methodology. It is the first deliberatetheory ofmeaning venerationofscience-theotherextremeofthependulum. Peirce's inmoderntimes,anditoffersalogicaltechniquefortheclarification actualscientificexperience,hiscomprehensivegraspofthescientific ofideas. Ithas a potential interest far greater than that ofsimilar enterprise, and his analysis of induction, led him to expect no theories current today, for it embodies an analysis of knowledge specific guarantees of unfailing correctness, no royal road, from the with rich implications. Peirce maintains that in so far as thought scientific method, but instead to understand that its power dwells is cognitive it must be linguistic or symbolical in character-that in the capacity, through constant modification of its own con is, it must presupposecommunication. Communication takes place clusions, to approximateindefinitelytothetruth. Most repugnant, by means of signs, and Peirce's theory, in its investigation of the perhaps, to Peirce's viewpoint is one that winks cynically at the nature and conditions of the sign-relation, endows with a new and xii THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE INTRODUCTION xiii at present is the unification of emphases, unfortunately flourishing vital significance the old truth that man is a social animal. His independently, on each of these aspects. Semiotic would appear view differs from others in stressing that pragmatic definition to be the answer. It is perhaps broader and more thoroughgoing cannot be in terms of individual reaction or private sensation, in conception than what is today called the theory of inquiry, which are incommunicable, but of that which is public and general since its analysis would penetrate not only to the standards, pre -ahabitofaction. Ifourlanguageistopossesscognitivemeaning, suppositions, and forms of the problem-solving situation, but to it must be defined bythe waysinwhichit isused communicatively. those implicit in the most rudimentary types of all communication. In opposition to atomistic psychology Peirce demonstrates that no Peirce's explorations in logical theory have a critical aspect neces thought (in so far as it is a mental sign) is perfectly unitary or sarily supplementing his positive opinions. In this direction he simple but is inseparable from interpretation by further thoughts. attacked what was then (and is even at present) a widespread Thought is inferential, expectative, or predictive, and therefore vogue of psychologism, substituting for subjective logical criteria always in some degree general. It is not a granular succession but his doctrine of leading principles or habits of reasoning. It is not a web of continuously related signs. This is really the heart of difficult to see that the divorce of psychology from logic follows fallibilism. All science, all significant inquiry is a web with in from his fundamental philosophic outlook. To found validity in definite frontiers. On Peirce's view even the act of conjecture by reasoning on feeling or instinct is to assign individual judgment which the hypotheses of science are born is a clearly definable a weight which on his view it does not and cannot have. speciesofinference. "Abduction," ashe callsit, connectsscientific In Peirce's labours toward a scientific philosophy, his empirical inquiry with common thought; and to call this logical bridge the phenomenology is an essential factor. By means of this science differentia of his common-sensism would not be far from correct. he discriminates in all experience three basic classes--Firstness, A frequently repeated assertion by Peirce, that pragmaticism is Secondness, Thirdness. Aside from its intrinsic philosophic signi not a metaphysical theory but a logical rule, directs attention to ficance, this phenomenology is methodologically important as another of his path-breaking contributions, the conception of logic supplying, in the three categories, the organized matrix in terms as the philosophy of communication, or theory of signs. Peirce's of which the theories of metaphysics are to be tested. The special work in logic isimmensein scope as wellas in depth. Rare enough sciences, Peirce holds, appeal to special observation for the con is the logician who has made contributions of the first importance firmation of their hypotheses, while those of metaphysics are to the two great movements in the nineteenth-century logical submitted to the general observation accessible to all men but renaissance, the development of deductive systems and the philo for that very reason most difficult to discern and analyze. It is sophy of empirical science. Peirce is among the leaders in yet a a safe guess that many who are repelled by other conceptions of third field, of even smaller company-the philosophy of logic. phenomenologywillberefreshedbytheclear-cutoutlinesofPeirce's, Seldom, in actual practice, does he separate his concern with this whatever their position with respect to his conclusions. from his logical research proper, a policy well illustrated in his Peirce'svigorousoppositiontothefashionablenineteenth-century philosophy ofmathematics, the principal theses of which anticipate tradition of mechanical determinism argues in an altogether in and are interestingly germane to present-day discussion. The dependent manner that absolute conformity of facts to law is an conception of logic as semiotic opens broad, new possibilities, assumption which actuallydoes not rest on any empirical evidence, toward which Peirce himself could barely do more than take the whereas that of chance or spontaneous departures from law does. first long stride. To regard empirical science, mathematics, and The extent of his divergence from the orthodox metaphysics is the whole of human discourse as so many types of domains in revealed, however, hardly by this (tychism) alone but by his which signs operate, both clarifies and fertilizes the range oflogic. evolutionary idealism as a whole, which conceives laws of nature A consideration of the different possible classes of signs and the to be habits of an objective world that is essentially psychical. different possible ways in which they function, adequately com Theexistenceofchanceinpart explainshowthesehabitsoriginated prises the traditional problems and many more besides. In Peirce and develop, that is, how evolution or the progressive growth of we find just recognition alike of the socio-biological and the uniformity takes place. Peirce's fundamental metaphysical hypo- mathematical aspects of logic. The desideratum in logical theory INTRODUCTION XV XIV THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE or habits in contrast to intuitive insight as the foundation of thesissupposes a "lawofmind," a tendency ofall things to acquire reasoning; in his conception of a scientific experiment as no habits. This tendency is the panpsychic counterpart of mental isolated, self-contained process but as indissociable from a complex association, the habit-acquiring tendency of ideas or feelings: they chain of verification; in his identification of pragmatic definition "spread," become increasingly general, and merge in a continuum with habit rather than immediate experience; in his theory of of mind. Peirce is much concerned to validate this cosmological commonsense, theimportantword being"common"; inhistheory principle as experientially verifiable. He justifies it, together with of the generalization or habit-crystallization of feelings; in his hissubsidiarymetaphysicalhypotheses, bya principleofcontinuity emphasis on the reality of law. Especially prominent is the con (synechism), serving in this connection to exclude the dualism of cept of habit and the forms which it assumes. In terms of it he matter and mind as creating and resting content with an in defines cognitive meaning, leading principle, and law of nature. explicability. The principle ofcontinuityhe holds to bea principle But to say that a philosophy is anti-individualistic does not of logic, and it is, in so far, an application of pragmatism to the necessarily mean that it discounts the individual element in hypotheses of philosophy; but from another angle it is seen to experience, as individualistic philosophies do the general. This function as itself a metaphysical hypothesis. Peirce caps the receives its proper attention in Peirce's category of Secondness, exposition of his cosmology by formulating its leading idea as a mirrored ontologically in specific, brute fact, psychologically in lawoflove(agapasticism),afranklyanthropomorphicrepresentation the sense of duality or reaction, and logically in the sign which of the evolutionary or habit-taking process. The continuity of he calls the"index." mind, the spreading of ideas, generates a "sympathy" by means Awarethatrecognitionofhisworkwouldcomelate,Peircesensed of which growth takes place. It is worth noting that Peirce the danger that it might be unaccompanied by rigorous criticism. introduces his agapasticism in an ethical context: the doctrine of To be blinded by the peculiar strength of his thinking into a type love heregards as opposedto theethicalindividualism (the"gospel of reverence that has always been common, would certainly be to ofgreed") springing from nineteenth-centurypoliticaleconomyand violate the very spirit which animated him. First among the givenexpressionbyDarwinism. ButDarwinism,despitetheethical problems that confronts the critical reader is whether the experi interpretation of it to which Peirce falls prey, plays a significant mentalism and the agapastic idealism of Peirce are congruous. part in his evolutionary theory. He generalizes it and translates He must separate and judge independently the arguments for the it metaphysicallyas a recognition ofthe chance-factor inevolution, possibility of a scientific philosophy and the attempt of Peirce to and therefore as a constituent assumption of agapasticism. achieve it. He must determine whether the anthropomorphism of Underlying every phase of Peirce's thought is his realism. The Peirce is a legitimate extension of common sense or whether it supposition that there are real things-the real is "that whose bordersonmythologyandviolatesthepragmaticprincipleofclarity. characters are independent of what anybody may think them to He probably cannot avoid asking himself whether pragmaticism be"-he regards as the"fundamental hypothesis" of science, for it has been formulated too broadly or too narrowly, and whether the alone explains the manner in which minds are compelled to agree statement of the pragmatic criterion in terms of habit (it is not ment. Thisis a realism which, byvirtue of the pragmaticmethod, always so stated by Peirce) is a virtue or a difficulty. In the logic excludes the supposition of any unknowable, and is hostile to of science provocative questions crop up concerning the nature and atomism, individualism, and nominalism in whatever form they interrelationofabduction, induction, and probability; for example, may take. For Peirce the idea of the public, the general, the to what extent Peirce's claim that the success of the inductive communal, is of primary importance in sound philosophizing. procedureisindependent ofgeneral materialassumptionsabout the It is reflected in all of his opinions: in his opposition to methodo universeisjustified-questionsfurtherstimulatedbyPeirce'sability logical individualism, and his social theories of truth, reality, to draw from hismost technicaldiscussionsimplicationsofbroadest knowledge, and meaning; in his view of phenomenology as the philosophic significance. His views on the relation between mathe analysis of common or universal experience; and in a metaphysics matics and deductive logic raise the problem not only of his justice dominated by the ideas of continuity and generality. More to their respective subject-matter but of serious inconsistency in specifically, it is the key to his conception of leading principles xvi THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE his analysis of necessary inference. In phenomenology numerous difficulties emerge, chiefly relating to the delineation of the three categories. That of Firstness suffers from considerable ambiguity, that of Thirdness from obscurity. These are a few of the general I directions in which difficulties suggest themselves. Specific points that raise doubts andspecificopinionsthat require restatement and CONCERNING THE AUTHOR· clarificationareasnumerousastheymustinevitablybeinacreative intellect of Peirce's magnitude. THE reader has a right to know how the author's opinions were To follow Peirce's experiments in the science of philosophy is formed. Not, of course, that he is expected to accept any conclu far less like strolling in green fields than like climbing a rocky sions which are not borne out by argument. But in discussions of slope. Those unafraid of the ascent may expect to breathe a extreme difficulty, like these, when good judgment is a factor, and purer atmosphere, one which discourages complacent slumber and pure ratiocination is not everything, it is prudent to take every the manufactureofneat fictions. Even to the most unsympathetic, element into consideration. From the moment when I could think Peirce's thought cannot fail to convey something of lasting value. at all, until now, about forty years, I have been diligently and in Ithasa peculiarproperty,likethat oftheLernreanhydra: discover cessantlyoccupiedwiththestudyofmethods[of] inquiry, boththose a weak point, and two strong ones spring up beside it. Despite which have been and are pursued and those which ought to be the elaborate architectonic planning of its creator, it is everywhere pursued. Fortenyearsbeforethisstudybegan, I had beenintrain uncompleted, often distressingly so. There are many who have inginthechemicallaboratory. I wasthoroughlygrounded not only small regard for things uncompleted, and no doubt what they inallthat was then knownofphysicsand chemistry, butalso in the value is much to be valued. In his quest for magnificent array, way in which those who were successfully advancing knowledge in his design for a mighty temple that should house his ideas, proceeded. I have paid the most attention to the methods of the Peirce failed. He succeeded only in advancing philosophy. most exact sciences, have intimately communed with some of the J. B. greatest minds of our times in physical science, and have myself made positive contributions-none of them of any very great im portance, perhaps-in mathematics, gravitation, optics, chemistry, astronomy, etc. I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences. I have been a great student of logic, having read everything of any importance on the subject, devotingagreatdealoftimetomedievalthought,withoutneglecting the works ofthe Greeks, the English, the Germans, the French,etc., and have produced systems of my own both in deductive and in inductive logic. In metaphysics my training has been less system atic; yetI havereadanddeeplypondereduponallthemainsystems, never being satisfied until I was able to think about them as their ownadvocates thought. The first strictly philosophical books that I read were of the classicalGermanschools; andI becamesodeeplyimbuedwithmany of their ways of thinking that I have never been able to disabuse myselfofthem. Yet my attitude was always that of a dweller in a laboratory,eageronlytolearnwhatI didnotyetknow, andnotthat • [Ms. c. 1897 (CP 1.3-14).] 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE CONCERNING THE AUTHOR 3 of philosophers bred in theological seminaries, whose ruling impulse gradations, there will remain over no relic of the good old tenth istoteachwhat theyholdtobeinfalliblytrue. I devotedtwohours century infallibilism, except that of the infallible scientists, under a daytothestudyof Kant's Critic ofthe Pure Reasonfor more than which head I include, not merely the kind of characters that manu three years, until I almost knew the whole book by heart, and had facture scientific catechisms and homilies, churches and creeds, and criticallyexaminedevery section ofit. For about two years, I had who are indeed "born missionaries," but all those respectable and long and almost daily discussionswith ChaunceyWright, one ofthe cultivated persons who, having acquired their notions of science most acute ofthe followers ofJ. S. Mill. from reading, and not from research, have the idea that"science" The effect of these studies v:as that I came to hold the classical meansknowledge, while the truth is, it is a misnomerapplied to the German philosophy to be, upon its argumentative side, of little pursuit ofthosewho are devouredbya desire tofind thingsout. ... weight; although I esteem it, perhapsam too partialto it, as a rich Though infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly mineofphilosophical suggestions. The English philosophy, meagre comical, I should bein asadwayifI couldnot retain ahigh respect andcrude, asitis, initsconceptions, proceedsbysurermethodsand for those who lay claim to it, for they comprise the greater part of more accurate logic. The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to the people who have any conversation at all. When I saythey lay mythinking,thefinest pieceofphilosophicalworkoftheprescientific claim to it, I mean they assume the functions of it quite naturally ages. YetI canbut pronounceEnglishsensationalismtobeentirely and unconsciously. The full meaning of the adage Humanum est destituteofanysolid bottom. Fromthe evolutionary philosophers, errare, they have never waked up to. In thosesciences ofmeasure Ihavelearnedlittle; although Iadmit that, howeverhurriedlytheir ment which are the least subject to error-metrology, geodesy, and theories have been knocked together, and however antiquated and metrical astronomy-no man of self-respect ever now states his ignorant Spencer's First Principles and general doctrines, yet they result, without affixing to it its probable error; and if this practice are under the guidance of a great and true idea, and are develop is not followed in other sciences it is because in those the probable ing it by methods that are in their main features sound and errors are too vast to be estimated. scientific. I am a man of whom critics have never found anything good to TheworksofDunsScotushavestronglyinfluencedme. Ifhislogic say. When they could see no opportunity to injure me, they have and metaphysics, not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its heldtheirpeace. ThelittlelaudationI havehadhascomefromsuch medievalism, be adapted to modern culture, under continualwhole sources, that the only satisfaction I have derived from it, has been some reminders of nominalistic criticisms, I am convinced that it from suchslicesofbreadandbutterasit might waftmyway. Only willgofartowardsupplyingthephilosophywhich isbesttoharmon once, asfar as I remember, inallmylifetimehave I experiencedthe ize with physical science. But other conceptions have to be drawn pleasure of praise-not for what it might bring but in itself. That from the history ofscience and from mathematics. pleasure was beatific; and the praise that conferred it was meant Thus, inbrief, my philosophymay bedescribed as the attempt of for blame. It was that a critic saidofme that I did not seem to be a physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the absolutely sure ofmy own conclusions. Never, if I can help it, shall universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that critic's eye ever rest on what I am now writing; for I owe a that has been done by previous philosophers. I shall support my greatpleasuretohim; and,suchwashisevidentanimus,thatshould propositions by such arguments as I can. Demonstrative proof is he find that out, I fear the fires of hell would be fed with new fuel not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians in his breast. are all moonshine. The best that can be done is to supply a hypo My book will have no instruction to impart to anybody. Like a thesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general line of growth of mathematical treatise, it will suggest certain ideas and certain scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future reasonsforholdingthemtrue; but then, ifyou accept them, itmust observers. bebecauseyoulikemyreasons, and theresponsibilitylieswith you. Religious infallibilism, caught in the current of the times, shows Man is essentially a social animal: but to be social is one thing, to symptoms of declaring itself to be only practically speaking in begregariousisanother: I decline toserveasbellwether. My book fallible; and when it has thus once confessed itself subject to is meant for people who want to find out; and people who want