The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science 84 Leandro Giri Pablo Melogno Hernán Miguel   Editors Perspectives on Kuhn Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields Volume 84 Series Editors Robert Di Salle, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada Stathis Psillios, University of Athens, Athens, Greece Assistant Editors David Devidi, Philosophy of Mathematics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada Wayne Myrvold, Foundations of Physics, University of Western Ontario, Ontario, Canada Editorial Board Members John L. Bell, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada Yemina Ben-Menahem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Jeffrey Bub, University of Maryland, College Park, USA Peter Clark, St. Andrews University, St Andrews, UK Jack Copeland, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand Janet Folina, Macalester College, Saint Paul, USA Michael Friedman, Stanford University, Stanford, USA Christopher A. Fuchs, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA Michael Hallett, McGIll University, Montreal, Canada William Harper, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada Clifford A. Hooker, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, Australia Jürgen Mittelstrass, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany Thomas Uebel, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK A series of books in Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics and Natural Science, History of Science, History of Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Methodology, and Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science is devoted to studies in philosophy of science broadly considered, including work in the philosophy and the foundations of the particular sciences and the history of the conceptual development of science. The Series includes monographs and collections of papers in these fields. Leandro Giri • Pablo Melogno • Hernán Miguel Editors Perspectives on Kuhn Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn Editors Leandro Giri Pablo Melogno Institute of Philosophical University of the Republic Investigations, Argentinian Society Montevideo, Uruguay for Philosophical Analysis National University of Tres de Febrero – CONICET Buenos Aires, Argentina Hernán Miguel Argentinian Society of Philosophical Analysis University of Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, Argentina ISSN 1566-659X ISSN 2215-1974 (electronic) The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ISBN 978-3-031-16370-8 ISBN 978-3-031-16371-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16371-5 This work was supported by School of Information and Communication (FIC) at the University of the Republic (UdelaR) National Agency for Research and Innovation (ANII) Sectorial Commission for Scientific Research (CSIC) National Agency for the Promotion of Science and Technology (ANPCyT) Institute of Philosophical Investigations-Argentinian Society for Philosophical Analysis © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Preface 100 years after Thomas Kuhn’s birth, his work continues to be topical and of inter- est to an important community of researchers interested in the philosophy and history of science. This text is tangible proof of the perennial relevance of the author’s thought. There are many of us who still debate our interpretations and seek to untie the knots of Kuhn’s ideas, and here we take advantage of the excel- lent historical opportunity provided by the author’s centenary to offer the public a state of the art of the most current discussions in the community of researchers on the subject. In 1962, Thomas Kuhn published his celebrated The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where he coined notions such as “paradigm,” “incommensurability,” and “normal science.” These notions—encompassed by an unconventional and newfangled view of science—would change the course of philosophy of science in the second half of the twentieth century. Describing this with one of Kuhn’s most influential concepts, we could say that a new paradigm took over most of the academic work done in professional philosophy of science since then. Moreover, Kuhn’s strong influence contributed to consolidating and stimulating novel research areas outside traditional philosophy of science. For instance, the rise in science accounts based on sociology and anthropology corresponds—at least partially—to the gradual predominance of the Kuhnian program both in philosophy of science and social studies of science. We could open a debate to determine if this is a faithful legacy of the image of science advocated by Kuhn throughout his work. It is a fierce debate, mainly because of the very complexity and evolution of Kuhn’s position. The tension between his notion of incommensurability and his ideas of scientific revolution and scientific progress is useful for framing several issues that still require and deserve a response. In the same vein, the debate on Kuhn’s work should consider the stages of his intellectual evolution, mainly as he devoted much of his later work to refining and clarifying many of his most controversial assertions. Maybe he did so because he was aware of how complex his position was and the misunderstandings that could be created. v vi Preface Notions such as paradigm, normal science, scientific revolution, and incommen- surability have become so popular that they are now part of our more intuitive pic- ture of science and pervade our more specialized conceptual approaches. On the other hand, as criticism and hostile exegesis have gained ground and conceptual density, finding a critical balance in the current state of Kuhnian thought is essential. In this context, we must also consider the projection of several and diverse research programs aiming to understand science and inspired by Kuhn’s ideas. Therefore, it is relevant to have a forum where such an influential picture of science can be discussed in its roots, structure, and consequences. This was the aim of the II Colloquium in the Philosophy and History of Science Río de la Plata 2018 “Kuhnian Studies: Past, Present and Future” held at the Argentinian Society for Philosophical Analysis (SADAF) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and at the University of the Republic in Montevideo, Uruguay. The event brought together four prominent worldwide specialists in Kuhn’s work for the first time: Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Howard Sankey, Eric Oberheim, and Brad Wray. They were joined by Spanish- speaking specialists such as Juan Vicente Mayoral from Spain; Hernán Miguel, Leandro Giri, and Pío García from Argentina; and Jorge Rasner and Pablo Melogno from Uruguay. The Colloquium mainly reflected on Kuhn’s influence from the second half of the twentieth century to this day, both within and outside philosophy of science. In this way, Kuhnian philosophy engaged in dialogue with humanities, social sciences, and history, as well as with experimental sciences: the original realm of Kuhnian thought. This event coincided with the Spanish edition of Scientific Development and Lexical Change—a collection of Kuhn’s unpublished papers—published by Pablo Melogno and Hernán Miguel and translated by Leandro Giri. These writings are the basis of the Thalheimer Lectures delivered by Kuhn at Johns Hopkins University in 1984. They include essential ideas to understand Kuhn’s mature thought. A considerable effort went into bringing these scholars together in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. We had long and intense debates between the guests and the audience. Several topics related to Kuhnian thought were unpacked for critical examination; the aim was to go beyond the mere exegesis and interpretation of the primary source. The event also focused on various philosophical research programs inspired by Kuhn, programs that have evolved in recent years and still pose challenges and hints that pave the way to a more precise picture of science and scientists’ work. Below we present the results of the debates. These texts are a valuable contribution to contemporary philosophy of science, since they show that Kuhn’s thought is still a pillar for issues of fundamental interest. “Kuhn, Coherentism and Perception” is the title of Howard Sankey’s contribution. Sankey explores the compatibility of Kuhn’s epistemological thinking and a coherentist approach, as Jouni-Matti Kuukanen did previously. Sankey takes Kuukanen’s exploration of Kuhn’s allegedly coherentist thinking as interesting but argues that such characterization is not fully addressed. Although Sankey Preface vii understands the lack of evidence about Kuhn’s coherentism, he provides clues as to how Kuhn would deal with one of the most critical issues in coherentism: the “input objection.” Sankey states that Kuhn was not a coherentist tout court but could have been one without resigning any relevant part of his epistemological theory. In “Sankey on Kuhn and Epistemological Coherentism,” Juan Vicente Mayoral’s commentary to Sankey, Mayoral agrees with Sankey and Kuukanen regarding the existence of some coherentist elements in Kuhn’s epistemology. However, a more plausible hypothesis is that Kuhn deliberately avoided being identified with coherentism or foundationalism. This hypothesis is based on Kuhn’s admitted inspiration from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s epistemology (at least as presented in his classical work On Certainty). Mayoral shows that the way in which Wittgenstein and Kuhn view the change of belief (changing the community’s viewpoint by applying value-based criteria) is incompatible with coherentism as it is not based on proving a new core of belief through doxastic justification (or nondoxastic justification as empiricist foundationalism would require). In “A Defense of Structure in Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” K. Brad Wray examines Lorraine Daston’s interpretation of the current value of Kuhn’s work in the history of science. She points out that the notion of structure in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is essential because of how popular the term was in social sciences when Kuhn wrote the book. Daston further states that the ideas of a historical structure and long-term historical regularities have been abandoned, both in history and social sciences. Once Kuhn’s notion of structure is framed in this zeitgeist, it can be rejected and becomes useless for the history of science. Conversely, Wray declares that Structure is not primarily a book on the history of science, so the notion of structure is not a tool for historical narrative. Furthermore, Wray aims to show that Kuhn’s use of “structure” is intensely philosophical rather than historical, making his position immune to Daston’s criticism. This is how Kuhn’s notion of structure retains its philosophical legitimacy and conceptual interest. In “A Vindication of the Structure in Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” his commentary to Wray’s text, Pablo Melogno also aims to vindicate the notion of structure in Kuhn’s work through a discussion with objectives analogous to Wray’s, but with differences in method and scope. Melogno examines some implicit assumptions in Wray’s discussion and tries to discuss the Kuhnian notion of structure in the historiographical realm, and not only within philosophy. In “Reconstructing Structure: the Theoretical Background,” Juan Vicente Mayoral reconstructs and explains (mainly from Kuhn’s viewpoint in The Presence of Past Science, his 1987 Shearman Lectures) Kuhn’s lexicon model, which enhances (and does not leave behind) his position in Structure about the nature of the dynamics of scientific change as an alternative to positivistic, relativistic, or pragmatic models. The connections between The Quest for Physical Theory (Kuhn’s 1951 Lowell Lectures), Structure, and later Kuhn works show continuity in his project (although presented with evolving language). This continuity was forged during Kuhn’s transition from physics to history and philosophy of science in the viii Preface late 1940s and he never cast it aside. On the contrary, it only became more sophisticated as Kuhn achieved maturity. Pío García presents “A Role for Cognitive Agents from a Kuhnian Point of View” as a comment to Mayoral’s work. He complements Mayoral’s view by indicating that it could be fruitful to include an analysis from the individual scientist’s viewpoint as a unit in Kuhnian research programs. One of the most influential dimensions in Kuhn’s philosophy is a shift from the individual researcher’s viewpoint—typical of positivistic and Popperian philosophies—to scientific disciplinary communities. However, García argues that Kuhnian philosophy has room for a “compatibility account,” where important topics like the role of individual learning, the shift from the “rational individual” to the “interpretative subject” (who decides based on community shared values but weighing them independently), and the nature of individual processes in scientific innovation, among other topics, can be followed to enrich and fill some gaps in Kuhn’s program. Eric Oberheim’s “Incommensurability and Metaincommensurability: Kind Change, World Change and Indirect Refutation” includes a detailed and in-depth analysis of the historical roots and fluctuations of the notion of incommensurability in both Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. He argues that discovering incommensurability led both of them (based on Einstein’s philosophical writings) to defend a “Kant-on- Wheels” metaphysical position, where ontology is partly defined by the prevailing theories. This kind of metaphysical position is incompatible with scientific realism, which led Howard Sankey, one of its most tenacious defenders, to attack the very notion of incommensurability as Kuhn and Feyerabend presented it. Oberheim states that Sankey—along with many other scientific realists—is mistaken in his general strategy when arguing against incommensurability. It is impossible to understand both Kuhn and Feyerabend’s frameworks from the viewpoint of a scientific realist. This is because incommensurability occurs at the meta-theory level (where notions like “truth,” “progress,” and others describe the structure and dynamics of scientific theories). This type of meta-level incommensurability is called “meta-incommensurability” and precludes fruitful discussions among people with different metaphysical positions unless they become bilingual. According to Oberheim, Sankey’s sin is not being aware of meta- incommensurability in sustaining the demise of the incommensurability notion from the scientific realist point of view. Finally, Oberheim also argues that meta-level incommensurability is an indirect refutation of scientific realism, as it is a metaphysical position that cannot formulate the very phenomenon of incommensurability coherently. Leandro Giri, in “The Landscape of a Metaphysical Battle,” his reply to Oberheim, analyzes his work in the context of a long controversy between Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey on the interpretation of the notion of incommensurability and the metaphysical consequences of each interpretation. Giri argues that there is no relevant difference between how they hermeneutically interpret Kuhn and Feyerabend’s versions of incommensurability but rather in what they do with that interpretation. Giri acknowledges the incommensurability and Preface ix meta-incommensurability between the contenders. He also supports Oberheim in that endorsing scientific realism is insufficient to show that Kuhn and Feyerabend were wrong about incommensurability. However, Giri defends the plausibility of Sankey’s weakened version of incommensurability, which enables the use of incommensurability to assess the viability of a metaphysical position. Every viable metaphysical framework should be able to explain incommensurability in its terms, a test that both scientific realism and Kant-on-wheels realism easily pass. According to Giri, this shows that a metaphysical plurality is possible. Paul Hoyningen-Huene, in “The Plausibility of Thomas Kuhn’s Metaphysics,” addresses the issue related to taking the term “world change” instead of “change in the worldview.” He reminds us of the comparison between the Gestalt change and the revolutionary change to underline the differences, as pointed out by Kuhn. He also focuses on the fact that scientists have no unconceptualized framework to see the world or talk about it. The position to take—as if there were a change in the worldview without a world change—is based on the view that epistemology and metaphysics are strictly separated. But the “principle of economy” proposed by Kuhn is critical for analyzing the way scientists can refer to the existing things in the world. Hoyningen-Huene also considers the point of view of historians of science and analyzes how plausible the Kuhnian way of talking about world change is. His analysis includes the reasons that scientists have to take something as real, given how they see and detect things or because there is a “considerable number of empirical phenomena that can best be understood as causal effects of existing unobservable objects.” Thus, world change is the result of scientists’ ontological commitment when talking about the world, and this scenario is not completely captured by the term “change in the worldview.” In “Seeing, Talking and Behaving... Ways of Inhabiting the World,” Hernán Miguel presents two concerns regarding the issues addressed by Paul Hoyningen- Huene. First, he focuses on how scientists engage in their research according to the current paradigm. This is how their behavior, and even that of non-scientific people, must be considered to understand that they are in a world and behave in that world, apart from seeing that world and talking about it. In this way, behavior analysis helps support use of the term and understanding the change as a “world change” instead of a “change in a worldview.” Second, Miguel analyzes the preservation of terms after a revolution, although those terms are related to nature in different ways through different paradigms. In this regard, he analyzes the problem of the features associated with the definition and identification of objects as corresponding to a node in the lexical network. Scientists must make decisions when selecting these features and this task is part of the process to obtain a new lexical network used to understand and describe the world. The points made on these two topics help cast light on conversations about world change. We would like to thank the institutions which made all this possible: in Uruguay, the School of Information and Communication (FIC) at the University of the Republic (UdelaR), the National Agency for Research and Innovation (ANII), and the Sectorial Commission for Scientific Research (CSIC). In Argentina, the