PEASANT WARS of the TWENTIETH CENTURY ERIC B. WOLF PEASANT WARS of the TWENTIETH CENTURY Excerpts quoted from “Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War” by Che Guevaraarereprintedwiththepermission ofMonthly Review Press, NewYork& London, 1968. Excerptstakenfrom“Enquétesurleniveaudeviedespopulationsrurales”byAndre Nouschi weretranslated and are included bypermission ofPresses Universitaires deFrance, Paris, 1961. MapsbyWillowRoberts. LibraryofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wolf, Eric R., 1923- Peasantwarsofthetwentiethcentury/Eric R.Wolf. p. cm. Originallypublished: NewYork: Harper& Row, 1969. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN 0-8061-3196-9(pbk. : alk. paper) 1.History,Modern—20thcentury. 2.Peasantuprisings-——History—20thcentury. I.Title. IT.Title: Peasantwarsofthe20thcentury. D445.W8 1999 99-26445 909.82—dc21 CIP Thepaperinthisbookmeetstheguidelinesforpermanenceanddurabilityofthe CommitteeonProductionGuidelinesforBookLongevityoftheCouncilonLibrary Resources, Inc.© PeasantWarsoftheTwentiethCentury.Copyright© 1969byEricR.Wolf.Preface totheOklahomaEditioncopyright©1999byEricR.Wolf.Allrightsreserved. No partofthisbookmaybeusedorreproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrit- tenpermissionexceptinthecaseofbriefquotationsembodied incritical articles andreviews. ForinformationaddressHarperCollinsPublishers, Inc., 10East53rd Street, NewYork, NY 10022. Oklahoma Paperbacks edition published 1999 by the University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Publishing Division of the University, by arrangement with HarperCollinsPublishers,Inc.ManufacturedintheU.S.A.FirstprintingoftheUni- versityofOklahomaPressedition, 1999. CONTENTS Acknowledgments vii Preface to the Oklahoma Edition ix Preface xvii 1. Mexico 3 2. Russia 51 3. CHINA 103 4. Viet NAM 159 5. ALGERIA 211 6. CuBA 251 Conclusion 276 Bibliography 303 Index 319 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the preparation of this manuscript the author has incurred both intellectual and personal debts. Over the last three years he has presented parts of the argument to manydifferent groups; an out- standing role in this continuing exchange of views-has been played by a discussion group that has met regularly over the years at the University of Michigan which includes among its core members Frithjof Bergmann, David Gutmann, John Higham, Ingo Seidler, and Frederick Wyatt. Angel Palerm, Roy Rappaport, Jane Schnei- der, and Peter Schneider read the entire manuscript and provided excellent detailed criticism. Marshall Sahlins and James Meisel read the manuscript and made general comments. A number of friends and colleagues gave me much needed advice on particular chapters: Friedrich Katz and Frederick Wyatt on Mexico; Arthur Mendel on Russia; Norma Diamond, Albert Feuerwerker, and Frederick Wyatt on China; Aram Yengoyan on Viet Nam; Jeanne Favret, Richard Mitchell, and William Schorger on Algeria; Fried- rich Katz and Julie Nichamin on Cuba. Friedrich Katz also read the conclusions. Theyall saved me from egregiouserrors, but con- tributed even more to my thinking through disagreement with particular formulations and explanations. Their help is acknowl- edged with gratitude; their sustained efforts on my behalf clear them of any guilt through association with particular statements and arguments which the authorhas stubbornly refused to delete. I am also grateful to Michael Maccoby for a particularly valuable referenceonMexico. Finally, theauthorwouldlike togive thankstothe U.S. Public Health Service, which has supported his work on “Social Strategies of Peasant Groups” with a Research Scientist Development Award (5 Ko2 MH25434-05) from the National Institutes of Health. PREFACE TO THE OKLAHOMAEDITION Three decades have passed since Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century first appeared in print. The American war in Viet Nam was then in full swing; when it ended, the greatest superpower intheworld, equippedwiththemostadvancedweaponrythatmod- ern technology had to offer, had to abandonthebattlefield to a raggedy guerrilla army.Yet this was notthefirst time in this cen- tury that seemingly docile “peasant” populations had risen unex- pectedlyto assert theirclaims against societyand to threaten the dominion of their overlords. Scholars and political strategists had for some time concerned themselves with the “Peasant Question”andits possible implications for the workings ofsoci- ety; yet in the revolution-torn twentieth century these academic debates suddenly gained in public relevance. It thus seemed to me useful to look not only at Viet Nam,but also at other major scenariosofviolentrural mobilization in this century to see ifwe could better understand what drove various peasantries to raise the flags ofrebellion. “The Peasant Question” was suggested by the enduring presenceoflarge, agriculturallybasedpopulationswithin societies that were confronting the challenges of change and moderniza- tion posed by the new century. It may now strike us as old- fashioned; yetit referred to three strategic problem areasin the managementofsociallife. Itraised the alarm overthe increasing monopolizationofagriculturalresources bythe ownersoflargees- tates, and the resulting decrease of land holdings held by the peasantry. Thesetrendsgreatlywidened discrepanciesin thelife chancesandrisks ofthese twoagrarian-basedclasses.Itcalledat- tention to the fact that the accumulation of resources in the X PREFACE TO THE OKLAHOMAEDITION handsofa landowningelitealso fastened the grip ofthatclass on government, to the detriment of other contenders for state power. It further posed—especially for liberal reformers and so- cialists—the ever more pressing issue of twentieth-century de- velopment: whether such an agriculture could be madetoyield the surpluses in food and taxes to sustain the prospects ofin- dustrialization. The world has seen major changes since Peasant Wars was first written, changes in the conditions that rendered peasant uprisings ofthis magnitude possible and probable. Oversimplify- ing only a little, until the 1960s each nation-state that con- fronted the “Peasant Question” did so as an internal matter—it would and could manage its own. Indeed, where populations werestill held fast as colonies or dependencies ofsuperordinate powers,nationalist efforts to free themselves from suchtutelage drew their legitimacy from the premise that only national inde- pendence and unity within a state of their own would insure theircapacity to deal with the significant issues that beset them. These issues were commonly phrased as problemsof “de- velopment,” meaning the selection of instrumentalities and modes of organization that would allow each nation to gain strength and enhance its competitive potential. The mode se- lectedwas mostoftenindustrialization, seen as anovel meansfor creating wealth and ending the millennial subservienceto agri- culture. Thus nation after nation tried to construct industry and reorganizeits agrarian structure to provide the funds required to sustain manufacturing. This was not, however, merely a change ofeconomicoptions.Italsoinvitedtherisetopowerofrulingelites committed to the new politics ofindustrial growth and to mobi- lizingsocial labor to meet the demandsofthat growth.It further implied the liquidation ofthe beneficiaries of the existing order. Thepeasantuprisingsofthe twentieth centuryareboth symptoms and modalities ofthese newdemands. Ourcases show how they abrogated older forms ofauthority and powerin the countryside and opened the way to new formsofpolitical association and leadership. PREFACE TO THE OKLAHOMAEDITION Xi This phase of autocentric developmentgroundto halt in the 1960s, roughly at the time when Peasant Wars was written. In the capitalist world the changeover was promptedby a slow- down of the economies and industrial growth, although rising profits and taxes steadily expanded the funds for investment. This then spurred the move towards“globalization” through cap- ital investment in the Third World,initially in raw materials and other primary products, then in the low-wage manufacture of textiles, clothing, andelectronicequipment, andfinally—usingnew electronic and communication technologies—through an expan- sion in banking, finance, and insurance.A parallel slowdown of growth affected the socialist countries, accompanied by the growing realization that development by top-down command wasofteninefficientandsometimesdestructive.Whileacommand economy can set overall goals for society, fulfillment of these goals requires a great many choices and follow-ups of their con- sequences. Henceeven hardened bureaucrats beganto consider the possibility ofintroducingpricing and factorallocation based on market mechanismsinstead ofadministrative decisions. The end ofthe 1980s witnessedthe collapseofthe Soviet system and the polities allied with it.As the CommunistPartylost control of the command economy, membersofthe managerial class moved to secure and privatize economic assets, while thefall ofthe Iron Curtain opened the Soviet sphere to investment from abroad. In this changed scenario of global relations, governments have mutedorabandonedautocentric development. Thepolitics ofautocentric developmentoriginally underwrote the accession to power of new leaders, in alliance with disprivileged social strataagainstpreviousregimesofprivilege.Yet, onceinpower, these new leaders could easily persuade themselves that the infusion of foreign capital and developmentaid offered an acceptable al- ternative, especiallywhensuch assistancealsoyieldedbenefitsfor themselves andtheirclienteles and fortified their standingin the state against potential competitors. At the same time, corporate andindividual investors benefited from allianceswith localpow- erholders, who could mediate relations with individuals and in- Xii PREFACE TO THE OKLAHOMAEDITION stitutions in the receiving countries, and help protect investors against predators andrivals. Hence many“emerging” nations now optfor foreign invest- mentin “light” industries, as well as for developing “tourism.” These endeavors also multiply the spread of petty commodity production through subcontractingordirect competition, which is supported by paying low wagesto participating households oftendrawnfrompeasantbackgrounds.Amoreradicalrolein trans- forming peasant life and agriculture in general, however, has fallen to “agroindustrialization,” in which giant transnational companiesintegratefinancing, technifiedproduction,distribution, marketing, andconsumptionintounitedentities. Suchcompanies, invited bylocal governments, come to manageentire agricultural regions through advances of technological inputs and produc- tion contracts with peasantproducers. Unlike autocentric devel- opment, which hopedto changethe patterns ofowningland and domination through land ownership, the new agrarian managers rule through controls over inputs and outputs.As Michael Kear- neynotes, “The dynamicsofagrarian issues are significantly dis- placed from the national context, in which the state is the main actor, toatransnationalcontext, inwhichcorporationsarethemajor players.”! These worldwide changes in polity, economy, and society profoundly affected the balance ofopportunities and constraints governing the peasant condition created by the revolutionsdis- cussed in Peasant Wars. In Mexico, the Revolution commenced in 1922todistribute haciendalands tocommunalentities (ejidos), which then reapportioned the land in usufruct to households or communities as a whole. In 1936, Mexico nationalized the hold- ings of foreign oil companies. Until the global decline ofoil prices in the 1980s, this major resource yielded the government readyfunds forautocentric developmentprojects andsuitable re- wardsforthe loyalty ofpolitical clients. The land reform based on ejidos, however, offered only temporary solutions; population growth soonstrained available resources, and governmentinsti- tutionsfailed to lend sufficient support. Ejidatarios began to em-