P -B R AKISTAN ANGLADESH ELATIONS A S SHISH HUKLA Introduction Due to a number of reasons Pakistanís relations with many countries of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) do not get proper attention at home and abroad. Besides, politico-diplomatic establishment and academic community, national and international media too do not give due importance to Pakistanís relations with other South Asian countries namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Discussion of Pakistan-Bangladesh relations in the media is often prompted by some unhappy and negative developments. In recent past Bangladeshís decision to go ahead with the execution of Jamaat-e-Islami leader Abdul Quader Molla, for his involvement in war crimes of 1971, vitiated the environment. Arrested in August 2010, Molla was tried in a special court known as the International Crimes Tribunals (ICT) which found him guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.1 On prosecutionís appeal, Supreme Court of Bangladesh overruled ICTís decision and awarded death sentence to Molla who was later sent to gallows and hanged till death on 12 December 2013 in Dhaka Central Jail.2 There was hue and cry in Pakistan over his hanging. Pakistanís National Assembly on 16 December 2013 passed a resolution condemning the execution of Molla.3 Speaking in the National Assembly, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chairman Imran Khan said that Molla was innocent and charges against him were false,4 while the Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan stated that ìthe whole nation is feeling sad over this tragic incident. A person who was the flagbearer of a united Pakistan was executed through judicial murder.î5 On 17 December 2013, Bangladesh summoned Pakistanís High Commissioner in Dhaka and sought an Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 211 ASHISH SHUKLA explanation from him. Bangladeshís foreign ministry strongly protested against the resolution and issued a statement saying that Mollaís trial and punishment was an internal affair of Bangladesh and the resolution adopted by National Assembly of Pakistan was uncalled for.6 This explains that even after more than four decades, the ghost of 1971 Liberation War still haunts the relationship between the two countries. Pakistanís relations with Bangladesh4 are important and deserve an in-depth analysis. Scholarship, though thin and dated, on Pakistan- Bangladesh relations suggests that there exists a large amount of goodwill for each other among the people on either side which could possibly be used to develop a multifaceted and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. The absence of major conflict, in post-1971 period, between the two seems to validate the contention. However, past four decades of history provide a bleak picture. Ever since 1971, Bangladesh has been constantly raising three key issues; firstly, offer of an unconditional apology for the crime committed by Pakistan Army against the innocent East Pakistani citizens; secondly, provide Bangladesh its due share in assets; and thirdly, take back Pakistani citizens stranded in Bangladesh. Despite a number of high-profile meetings and assurances, Pakistan could not resolve these issues to the satisfaction of Bangladesh. In order to fully understand the nitty-gritty of this relationship, it is necessary to look into the history and various important developments after Bangladeshís emergence in 1971. The Birth of Bangladesh Many in undivided India had precisely predicted the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a legendary figure of Indian independence movement, in an interview given to Lahoreís Chattan magazine had categorically predicted that ìThe moment the creative warmth of Pakistan cools down, the contradictions will emerge and will acquire assertive overtones. These will be fuelled by the clash of interests of international powers and consequently both wings will separate.î8 This happened within twenty five years from the emergence of Pakistan itself. The birth of Bangladesh was unique in the sense that in the history of international relations, possibly for the first time an oppressed numerical majority, pushed between rock and a hard place, waged a successful armed struggle against West Pakistan to get independence.9 Apologists in Pakistan, while analysing the event, either exclusively 212 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS blame the policies of West Pakistani rulers towards East Pakistan or accuse India of first creating a rift between both the wings of Pakistan and then exploiting the differences and in the end pushing for secession of East Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal, an eminent Pakistani historian, while accepting the inadequacy of religion to forge a long lasting unity between the two wings,10 forcefully argues that ìthe breakup of Pakistan was the result of the autocratic policies of its state managers rather than the inherent difficulties involved in welding together linguistically and culturally diverse constituent units.î11 Javed Jabbar, a Pakistani Senator and former Federal Minister, sees Indian conspiracy behind the birth of Bangladesh. He argues that elements from India, soon after August 14, 1947, began to stoke sentiments among the people of East Pakistan against West Pakistan.12 However, many in Pakistan, barring a few exceptions, refrain from addressing the larger and more important question of incoherent national ideology. There has been very little or no debate in Pakistan over the most important historical questions such as what factors were responsible for the creation of Pakistan? And what is the raison díetre of Pakistan? Pakistani students from the very beginning, through their history textbooks, learn that Muhammad Ali Jinnah created Pakistan. Class one text book Jadid Muíashrati Ulum offers students a one line answer to the question that ìThe Quaid-i-Azam created Pakistan.î13 Same is true about the question of Pakistanís ideology. Husain Haqqani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, claims that it has become so common today that even an elementary school student would tell anyone and everyone that Pakistan is an ìideological stateî and Islam is its ideology.14 Leaders of the ìPakistan movementî including Jinnah on the basis of a communal ìTwo Nation Theoryî demanded and got a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. Analysing the question as to who created Pakistan, Mani Shankar Aiyar concludes that ìIt was not the Muslims but the Muslim League who won Pakistan. The Muslim elite may have voted with their hands for Pakistan. But the Muslim masses voted with their feet to stay on in India.î15 Thus, Islam and ìTwo Nation Theoryî were supposed to give Pakistan a unique identity and ideology through which the nation building project was taken up and completed. However, the ìTwo Nation Theoryî collapsed, in principle, on 14 August 1947 when a large number of Muslim populace preferred to live in India instead of migrating to the newly created homeland. Soon, it became clear that Islam would not be able to work as Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 213 ASHISH SHUKLA a unifying force to bind all the communities together, yet devoid of political legitimacy at home the ruling class kept invoking Islam and ìIndia Threatî to keep the country together. As far as the two wings of Pakistan were concerned, there were only three things in common ñ Islam, English language, and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). In popular jokes, the PIA connection was the strongest among the three. Besides the absence of geographical connect, there were a lot of striking and unbridgeable differences between East and West Pakistan. Whereas West Pakistan was multi-ethnic and multi-lingual, East Pakistan had one dominant Bengali language and Bangla culture of which every East Pakistani was proud of. On top of that West Pakistani politico-security elite, which came to dominate the state of Pakistan soon after 1947, never ever considered Bengalis equal partner and ridiculed them as ìweak and un-martial.î Due to irrational attitude and discriminatory policies of West Pakistani establishment towards East Pakistan, the ethno-linguistic and cultural differences were soon compounded by genuine politico-economic grievances. With the passage of time these unaddressed grievances alienated East Pakistan from West Pakistan and former came to believe that the latter is using it as its colony. The situation got complicated after first general elections in Pakistan in December 1970. The election results confirmed a wide gap between both the wings of Pakistan. Out of a total 313 seats (300 general seats + 13 uncontested reserved seats for women), Mujib-ur-Rahman led Awami League got 167 (160 general seats + 7 uncontested reserved seats for women) while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto led Pakistan Peopleís Party (PPP) secured 85 seats (81 general seats + 4 uncontested reserved seats for women). Usually looking into these figures, one would logically assume that Awami League won a landslide victory and was entitled to rule over Pakistan. A close look into the matter made it amply clear that Awami League won 160 out of 162 directly contested seats in East Pakistan, while PPP won 81 out of 138 directly contested seats in West Pakistan. Both the parties could not open their account in the other wing meaning that PPP did not get a single seat in East Pakistan and Awami League could not open its account in West Pakistan. In a parliamentary system, numbers matter the most and in this case Awami League had the required numbers with itself. However, the politico-security establishment did not want to hand over power to a Bengali. Military regime of Yahya Khan deliberately delayed the process by not inviting Mujib-ur-Rahman to form the next government which brought Bengalis on the streets for protest demonstrations. Talks after talks failed to resolve 214 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS the deadlock and Yahya Khan ordered a military crackdown on the protesting Bengalis in East Pakistan. Militaryís crackdown on innocent Bengalis was very brutal and horrifying. Archer Blood, then US Consulate General in Dacca, wrote detailed account, known as ìBlood Telegram,î of bloodshed in East Pakistan. In one of the telegrams on 31 March 1971, Blood noted that:16 Disturbing aspect of current situation is that wanton acts of violence by military are continuing in Dacca. As case previous nights, scattered firing heard throughout night from various parts of city. Hindus undeniably special focus of military brutality...atrocity tales rampant, including those of reliable eye- witnesses. Bengali businessman not all supporter saw six naked female bodies at Rokeya Hall, Dacca U. Feet tied together. Bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans. Apparently raped, shot and hung by heels from fans. Workmen who forced dig one of the two mass graves at Dacca U. report 140 buried within. Other grave equally as large...Army broadcasts monitored here indicated one unit in desperate situation near Pabna on March 30. Low on ammunition. Called for help, including air strikes. Told to hold out ìat all costs.î Told helicopter dispatched to drop fresh arms and ammo. Justice Hamdoor Rahman Commission report in its finding too confirmed brutalities by the Pakistani military. Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi himself testified before the commission on the role of his predecessor Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan in continuing the crackdown on the innocent citizens. He categorically stated that:17 Military action was based on the use of force primarily, and at many places indiscriminate use of force was resorted to, which alienated the public against the Army. Damage done during those early days of the military action could never be repaired, and earned for the military leaders names such as ìChangez Khanî and ìButcher of East Pakistanî...On the assumption of command I was very much concerned with the discipline of troops, and on 15th of April, 1971, that is within four days of my command, I addressed a letter to all formations located in the area and insisted that loot, rape, arson, killing of people at random must stop and a high standard of discipline should be maintained. I had come to know that looted material had been sent to West Pakistan which included cars, refrigerators and air conditioners etc. The commission recommended trials for senior officers found guilty by the commission. In its supplementary report the commission noted that:18 There is consensus on the imperative need to bringing to book those senior Army Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 215 ASHISH SHUKLA neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nationís demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during 1971. Then the commission recommended:19 That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj. Gen. Mitha should be publically tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and dismemberment of Pakistan. Such brutal crackdown led millions of Bengalis to flee into the Indian Territory. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accused Pakistani establishment of settling its internal problem with the use of brutal force and appealed the international community for help. She was very categorical in saying that ìThe regions which the refugees are entering are over-crowded and politically the most sensitive parts of India. The situation in these areas can very easily become explosive. The influx of refugees thus constitutes a grave security risk which no responsible government can allow to develop.î20 With no meaningful attempts by the international community to intervene and resolve the issue, India prepared itself to take some risk. In April 1971, India allowed East Pakistani leaders to set up Awami League headquarters in Calcutta (Now Kolkata). Soon Awami League declared independence and established a government in exile. It is no secret that India provided help and training to Mukti Bahini but had been quite careful in monitoring and supervising their activities. It never allowed radical and extremist elements to take charge of the force and ensured that moderate faction of Awami League led the movement. Indiaís support proved to be crucial and direct Indian intervention in East Pakistan, which resulted in the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani personnel and paved the way for an independent Bangladesh. Many in Pakistan, even today, blame India exclusively for breaking up 216 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS the country. However, the reality is different and very few Pakistanis accept that. For example Husain Haqqani agrees that ìAlthough there is no doubt that India encouraged Bengali nationalism and supported the creation of an independent Bangladesh with arms once civil war started, the slide into civil war in erstwhile East Pakistan was primarily the result of a Pakistani internal power play.î21 With the creation of Bangladesh, the ìTwo Nation Theoryî was declared dead. Indira Gandhi famously declared that ìWe have avenged a thousand years history and thrown the two-nation theory into the Indian Ocean.î22 Initial Contacts and Mutual Recognition Given the brutal violence and bloodshed which preceded the creation of Bangladesh, it was not easy for Pakistan and Bangladesh to normalise their relationship. For Pakistan, the loss of half of the territory and population was like a trauma that posed a big question mark on its national identity and ideology. Bangladesh too was in no position to forget the sufferings easily. However, as the popular saying goes ìlife doesnít stopî, so both the countries had to move on. The problem was that the two leaders, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rahman set conditions for talking to each other. Mujib-ur-Rahman ruled out any discussion with Bhutto until Pakistan recognised Bangladesh, while the latter linked the recognition of Bangladesh with the resolution of all major issues, especially the repatriation of Prisoners of War (PoWs). The most complicated issues, immediately after the end of war, were: 1. Recognition of Bangladesh. 2. Repatriation of about 90,000 Prisoners of War (PoWs), held in India, to Pakistan. 3. Division of Assets between Pakistan and Bangladesh. 4. Repatriation of Pakistanis, commonly referred as Biharis, stranded in Bangladesh. 5. Repatriation of Bengalis from Pakistan to Bangladesh. These issues were not easy to resolve. Bangladesh wanted to try at least 195 PoWs on charges of genocide while Pakistan wanted all the PoWs back as soon as possible. As per Geneva Convention 1949, PoWs were required to be released unconditionally soon after the cessation of hostilities. In case of India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, United Nation Security Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 217 ASHISH SHUKLA Council passed Resolution 307 on 21 December 1971. Article 3 of the Resolution called upon ìto take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection of the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population.î23 Meanwhile Bangladesh in August 1972 moved an application to the UN for membership which was vetoed by China on behalf of Pakistan. Pakistan wanted all issues to be resolved before settling the issue of recognition. Bangladesh too was in no mood to be soft on the issue. With the passage of time, international pressure grew on India to resolve the PoWs and other issues that came to the fore because of the 1971 war with Pakistan. In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed Simla Accord which provided a set of mutually agreed guiding principles that were to be followed by both countries in their future relationship. The most important point of this agreement was that both parties agreed ìto settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.î24 However, there was no agreement over the repatriation of PoWs to Pakistan, as India on Bangladeshís insistence, linked the issue with the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. Later India persuaded Bangladesh to de-link the repatriation and recognition issue. A joint declaration, issued on 17 April 1973 at the end of Bangladeshi Foreign Ministerís visit to New Delhi, set the stage for repatriation of all PoWs, except 195 PoWs detained by Bangladesh for trial, and stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh to Pakistan and detained Bangladeshis in Pakistan to Bangladesh. This joint declaration was followed by a formal agreement between India and Pakistan in New Delhi on 28 August 1973 which devised a three-way repatriation scheme. The agreement required:25 1. Repatriation of all PoWs, except 195 held by Bangladesh for trial, and civil internees held in India to Pakistan. 2. Repatriation of all Bengalis in Pakistan to Bangladesh. 3. Repatriation of all non-Bengalis, who opted for Pakistan, stranded in Bangladesh to Pakistan. Pakistan, however, agreed to take only four categories of Pakistanis;26 A. Persons of West Pakistan domicile. B. Central government employees and their family irrespective of their domicile. 218 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS C. Members of divided families irrespective of domicile. D. And some hardship cases. The question of recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan could not be resolved even after this agreement because the former wanted to try 195 PoWs on the charges of war crime, but the latter wanted all of them back unhurt before settling the recognition question. With Bangladeshís continued insistence to try 195 PoWs, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto got infuriated and at one point of time even threatened to try Bengalis held in Pakistan. Amir Mir in an article refers to an interview of Bhutto on 27 May 1973 in which he had stated that ìPublic opinion will demand trials of Bangladeshis here. We know that the Bengalis passed on information during the war. There will be specific charges. How many will be tried, I cannot say.î27 To make Bangladesh believe that he was serious, Bhutto decided to detain 203 Bengalis against the 195 soldiers held by Bangladesh.28 The hardening of positions and tough statements from both sides did not produce any tangible result. Finally, a visible change was noticed in Pakistanís attitude in early 1974 which later led to a thaw in the relationship. In February 1974, Pakistan was to host International Islamic Summit and Bangladesh being a Muslim country was supposed to be invited. In late January 1974, Bhutto, while addressing a public meeting in Sukkur, stated that ìWhen we have invited Muslims from all corners of the world, how can we keep our door closed to seven crore Muslims of East Pakistan who lived with us for 26 years.î29 With this he extended an informal invitation to Mujib-ur-Rahman. Initially there was no enthusiasm on the part of Bangladesh but Shaikh Sabah Al-ahmad al Jaber, Foreign Minister of Kuwait who led a seven member delegation to Bangladesh, persuaded Mujib to participate in the summit. Possibly, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister conveyed Bhuttoís message of recognising Bangladesh on the occasion which changed Mujib-ur-Rahmanís mind. Bhutto used the occasion of summit to officially recognise Bangladesh. In return, Bangladesh accepted Pakistanís demand to stop the trial of 195 PoWs while Pakistan agreed to take back all the four categories of non- Bengalis stranded in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, with the help of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Bangladesh was able to repatriate, between 1973 to April 1974, around 170,000 Biharis to Pakistan.30 Finally, after the mutual recognition, Bangladesh got UN membership on 10 June 1974. In the same month Bhutto visited Dhaka and even went Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015 219 ASHISH SHUKLA to National Memorial at Savar but his behaviour was not very appropriate. He did not doff his cap and refused to register his comments in the visitorís book. In his first visit to independent Bangladesh, he held discussions with Mujib-ur-Rhaman on a range of issues which resulted in signing of two agreements to resume trade relations and stop hostile propaganda against each other. However, nothing tangible could come out on the more complicated issues such as division of assets and repatriation of stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh which gave an impression of failure of these talks. In response to Mujib-ur-Rahmanís request to take back all the stranded Pakistanis, Bhutto stated that ìI have not come to Bangladesh with a blank cheque.î31 He later argued that while demanding a share in assets, Bangladesh was not interested in liabilities. On the question of repatriation, Bhutto was of the view that since Biharis, as the stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh are called, had originally migrated to East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, why should Pakistan take them back. Despite mutual recognition in February 1974, Mujib-ur-Rahmanís tough stand on some of the complicated issues and Pakistanís insistence to resolve those issues on her own terms did not allow the two countries to overcome the trauma of 1971 and develop a healthy relationship. Since Mujib-ur-Rahman had linked the division of assets and repatriation of Biharis with establishing formal diplomatic relations, the two countries could not move forward to establish resident diplomatic missions. Mujib- ur-Rahman tried hard diplomatically and raised the issue at various international fora, including United Nations and Commonwealth, to push Pakistan but with no success. In a tragic event on 15 August 1975 Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman along with his family members, except his two daughters Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Sheikh Rehana, was assassinated. The military coup, conducted by junior officers, brought Khundkar Moshtaq to power. Islamabad without any delay recognised the military regime and Prime Minister Bhutto dispatched, as a friendly gesture, 50,000 tons of rice for the ìbrotherly people of Bangladesh.32 President Khundkar Moshtaq appreciated Pakistanís goodwill gesture and expressed hope of normalisation of relations. Some scholars suggest that the donation of 50,000 tons of rice and 15 million yards of cloth by Pakistan to Bangladesh was because Pakistan wanted Bangladesh to adopt some Islamic nomenclature.33 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto even appealed to other Islamic countries to recognise the new government in Bangladesh.34 By October 1975 both countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations. The Moshtaq regime could not 220 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, January-June 2015