Oxford Bibliographies Online SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY (11/01/11) Alvin I. Goldman and Thomas Blanchard Introduction Until recently the orientation of both historical and contemporary epistemology has been heavily individualistic. The emphasis has been on choices between belief, disbelief, and agnosticism (suspension of judgment) that confront individual epistemic agents. Such agents are assumed to observe the world (or their own minds) and reflect on the resulting evidence via their own cognitive powers. Such a perspective was dramatized by Descartes roughly 350 years ago and it has continued to dominate the epistemological scene. However, a “socializing” movement has recently emerged that seeks to redress the imbalance that results from undue neglect of the social dimensions of knowledge. The movement does not reject a concern for individual epistemic decision-making, but it finds at least equal importance in the study of epistemic decision-making in social contexts. What does this mean? In what sense is social epistemology social? A three-part answer is offered. First, social epistemology continues to reflect on optimal methods for individual belief formation but specifically considers evidential inputs from other people -- their opinions, assertions, and arguments (interpersonal social epistemology). Questions therefore arise as to how epistemic agents should respond to the testimony of others and how they should modify their doxastic attitude toward a given proposition upon learning that others have a different attitude toward it. Second, social epistemology commonly acknowledges the existence of collective doxastic agents such as juries, committees, and other group agents, who make judgments as a function of their members’ judgments (collective social epistemology). Third, social epistemology considers communities and societies as systems and institutions with system-level properties that often influence the intellectual outputs of their members (institutional social epistemology). The ways they organize the epistemic labor, the ways they open or close channels of communication for eager or reluctant speakers, thereby encouraging or discouraging assorted modes of information or disinformation propagation, are enormously significant to the knowledge state of a society. For example, the degree to which laypersons manage (in the maelstrom of conflicting chatter) to learn and understand the current state of science as it bears on public issues is a topic that belongs on the epistemological agenda. The criteria for epistemic assessment in social epistemology need not depart dramatically from individual epistemology. Knowledge, truth, rationality, and justification can remain the benchmarks or standards by which to assess both social and individual methods. But social epistemology introduces a new class of methods and systems to analyze and evaluate in epistemic terms. (1) General Perspectives on Social Epistemology There are two main kinds of approaches to social epistemology – classical and anti-classical approaches. Classical social epistemology retains the focus of traditional epistemology on truth and the normative question of how agents should behave epistemically. It is social in that it focuses on social practices and institutions and their epistemic effects on the pursuit of truth. Goldman 2011 offers a survey and classification of classical social epistemology. Goldman 1999 is a seminal defense and articulation of classical social epistemology. Craig 1990 is an early defense of the importance of taking the social into account for the projects of traditional epistemology. Fricker 1998 insists on the political dimensions of classical social epistemology. Anti-classical social epistemologists, by contrast, reject or ignore traditional epistemology’s concerns with truth, knowledge and justification. Kuhn 1970 had a major influence on the development of anti-classical social epistemology, even though Kuhn himself did not accept such an interpretation of his work. Fuller 1988 is an influential articulation of anti-classical social epistemology which abandons traditional epistemology’s focus on truth. Kusch 2002 offers a 1 version of social epistemology rejecting realist and objectivist stances on truth and justification. Epistemic relativism and social constructivism are species of anti-classical social epistemology. (See *Epistemic Relativism* and *Social Constructivism*). Craig, Edward. Knowledge and the State of Nature . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Argues that understanding our concept of knowledge requires examining how it fulfills fundamental social needs. Argues that our concept of knowledge arises from our need for action-guiding true beliefs, which in turn gives rise to a need for “good informants”. Examines the implications of this hypothesis for familiar themes in traditional epistemology (skepticism, externalism, etc.). Fricker, Miranda. "Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98 (1998): 159- 177. Argues that our need for good informants (see Craig 1990) gives rise to certain norms of credibility. In particular sociopolitical contexts, these norms can give rise to unfair distributions of credibility. Fricker emphasizes the importance of studying this kind of epistemic injustice, and on the consequent political dimension of social epistemology. Fuller, Steve. Social Epistemology . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. An exposition and defense of anti-classical social epistemology, very influential in the social studies of science. Fuller is concerned with the normative question of how the institution of science should be organized, and what scientific strategies best foster knowledge production. However, he parts company with traditional epistemology in rejecting the claim that knowledge is truth-entailing. Goldman, Alvin. Knowledge in a Social World . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. A seminal work arguing that social epistemology should be seen as complementing rather than replacing traditional epistemology: on this view social epistemology retains traditional epistemology’s normative focus on how epistemic practices can foster the production of true beliefs. Examines several social practices and systems in terms of their ability to produce “veritistic value” (the kind of value we place on having true beliefs). Goldman, Alvin. “A Guide to Social Epistemology.” In Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Edited by Alvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb, 11-37. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. A survey of (classical) social epistemology. Distinguishes between three kinds of social epistemology concerned respectively with the social evidence that individuals can acquire, the judgments of collective doxastic agents, and the epistemic effects of certain social systems and institutions. Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970. Kuhn’s work is a major influence on anti-classical social epistemology (although he himself did not accept such a reading of his work). The notion of incommensurability 2 has been used to develop a relativist view of scientific knowledge, and many sociologists of science have relied on the concept of a paradigm shift to insist on the primacy of social factors over the “pure” search for truth in explaining scientific change. Kusch, Martin. Knowledge by Agreement . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. A work in anti-classical social epistemology arguing for a “communitarian epistemology” on which groups are the primary bearers of knowledge. Kusch parts company with traditional epistemology in endorsing a form of relativism about truth and justification. (2) Anthologies Social epistemology is a relatively young field and anthologies (on social epistemology generally or on special topics) have started to appear only in the last two decades. Schmitt 1994 is an early collection of essays in social epistemology. Goldman and Whitcomb 2011 and Haddock, Millar and Pritchard 2010 are two recent collections of papers on a wide variety of topics in social epistemology. Antony and Witt 1993 is an anthology of feminist essays containing several pieces on epistemology. Selinger and Crease 2005 is a collection of papers on expertise. Sosa and Lackey 2006 is an anthology on testimony. Feldman and Warfield 2010 is a collection of essays on the topic of disagreement. Antony, Louise , and Charlotte Witt, eds. A Mind of One’s Own. Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. Boulder, Westview Press: 1993. An anthology of feminist essays; section II focuses on feminist approaches to epistemology. Feldman, Richard and Ted Warfield, eds. Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. A collection of papers on the topic of disagreement. Goldman, Alvin and Dennis Whitcomb, eds. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings . New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. A collection of fifteen essays, many of which are very influential in the field. Contains sections on general approaches to social epistemology, trust in testimony and experts, peer disagreement, judgment aggregation, and the epistemology of epistemic systems. Haddock, Adrian, Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard, eds. Social Epistemology . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. A collection of fifteen new essays on various topics in social epistemology, with particular focus on testimony, peer disagreement and the nature of social epistemology. Lackey, Jennifer and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. A collection of twelve essays on testimony by leading epistemologists. Schmitt, Frederick, ed. Socializing Epistemology . Lanham: Rohman and Littlefield, 1994. 3 The first important collection of essays on social epistemology. The introduction by Frederick Schmitt is a general discussion of the nature and aims of social epistemology. Selinger, Evan and Robert Crease, eds. The Philosophy of Expertise. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. A collection of essays on the nature and epistemology of expertise, by analytic and continental philosophers. (3) Testimony A huge amount of what we believe is based at least partly on a distinctively social kind of evidence, namely the testimonies of other people. Although early epistemologists like Hume or Reid recognized this fact, only recently has testimony as a source of justification and knowledge become a central topic in epistemology. Two main questions in the epistemology of testimony are whether testimonial justification is basic or derived (see *The Reductionism/Non- Reductionism Debate*) and whether testimony can generate or only transmit knowledge from the testifier to her audience (see *The Transmission/Generation Debate*). (3A) General Issues Coady 1992 is a seminal discussion which heavily contributed to the recent wave of interest in testimony among epistemologists. Lackey 2008 and Goldberg 2010 are two recent book-length treatments of testimony. These three books contain discussions of the nature of testimony and its importance for our epistemic lives. Moran 2006 offers a distinctive general perspective on testimony, on which the kind of evidence provided by testimonies is importantly different in nature from the evidence provided by other sources. Lipton 1998 offers a “best explanation” theory of testimony. Coady, C.A.J. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. An important discussion of the nature of testimony, which was influential in making testimony a central topic in contemporary epistemology. Coady defends antireductionism about testimonial justification and knowledge, and offers discussions of the role of testimony in history, law, mathematics and psychology. Goldberg, Sanford. Relying on Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Drawing on anti-individualism in the philosophy of language and mind, argues that a believer’s epistemic justification often depends upon irreducibly social factors. Also contains an important discussion of “coverage” – a distinctive way in which we can acquire knowledge that not-p by recognizing that if p were true we would have heard it by now. Lackey, Jennifer. Learning from Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. An in-depth examination of the nature of testimony and testimonial knowledge. Argues that what makes a testimony a source of knowledge is the reliability of the testifier as a speaker, not her reliability as a believer. Also contains arguments for the view that 4 testimony can generate knowledge, and offers a novel theory of the justification of testimonial beliefs. Lipton, Peter. "The Epistemology of Testimony." Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 29 (1998): 1-31. Offers a “best explanation” theory of testimony, on which we are justified in accepting a testimony as true when the truth of the statement is part of the best explanation for the speaker’s testimony. Moran, Richard. "Getting Told and Being Believed." In The Epistemology of Testimony. Edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, 272-306. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Argues that the kind of epistemic reasons we can have for believing a piece of testimony is essentially different from the kind of epistemic reasons provided by ordinary evidence. On Moran’s view, a speaker constitutes her testimony as a reason for belief by explicitly assuming responsibility for the truth of her statement. (3B) The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate Reductionism is the view that testimony-based justification does not arise from a basic principle of testimonial justification, but from principles involving perception and memory. Hume 1977 is a classic defense of reductionism. Wilson 2010 offers a new interpretation of Hume’s reductionism. Lyons 1997 offers arguments for reductionism. Fricker 1995 makes an important distinction between global and local reductionism, and argues for local reductionism. Non- reductionism, by contrast, holds that there is a basic principle of testimonial justification. Reid 1983 is a classic defense of non-reductionism against Hume. Burge 1993 offers a seminal articulation and defense of non-reductionism which remains very influential in contemporary debates. Faulkner 2000 and Lackey 2006 offer hybrid views of testimonial justification that integrate key insights of both reductionism and non-reductionism. Burge, Tyler. "Content Preservation." Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 457- 488. A seminal defense of non-reductionism. Argues for the existence of an “Acceptance Principle” which entitles us to accept testimonies as true unless there are stronger reasons not to do so. On this view, testimony, just like perception, is a basic source of justification. Faulkner, Paul. "The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 581-601. Contends that Burge 1993’s argument fails to recognize crucial epistemological differences between testimony on the one hand and perception and memory on the other hand. Offers a hybrid theory of testimonial justification combining central elements of reductionism and non-reductionism. Fricker, Elizabeth. "Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony." Mind 104 (1995): 393-411. 5 Introduces a crucial distinction between two forms of reductionism (global and local) and argues against Coady 1992 that while global reductionism is implausible, local reductionism is an attractive position. Hume, David. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by E. Steinberg. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977. A classic defense of reductionism about testimonial justification. Originally published in 1748. Lackey, Jennifer. "It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony." In The Epistemology of Testimony. Edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, 160-191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Argues that both reductionism and non-reductionism face important problems, and offers an alternative view of testimonial justification which integrates key elements of both reductionism and non-reductionism. Lyons, Jack. "Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 163-178. A defense of a Humean reductionist view according to which our justification for believing testimony is inductive: testimonial belief is justified because we have non- testimonial inductive evidence that testifiers are generally reliable. Reid, Thomas. “Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man.” In Thomas Reid’s Inquiry and Essays. Edited by Ronald Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. A classic statement of the non-reductionist view that we are entitled to accept a testimony as true unless we have stronger reasons not to do so. Originally published in 1785. Wilson, Fred. "Hume and the Role of Testimony in Knowledge." Episteme 7 (2010): 58-78. Against Coady 1992, argues that Hume does not claim that our testimonial beliefs can only be justified by non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of testimony in general. Rather, Hume’s account of what Wilson calls the “reasonable knower” recognizes that belief in the general reliability of testimony may be justified by testimonial evidence. (3C) The Transmission/Generation Debate Most writers hold that knowledge and justification are only transmitted, not generated, by testimony. Welbourne 1981 and Audi 1981 offer defenses of the transmission-only thesis. Critics of the transmission-only thesis include Graham 1999 and Lackey 2000. Adler 2006 offers a useful survey of the debate. Adler, Jonathan E: "Epistemological Problems of Testimony." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, 2006.URL = <http: plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/testimony-episprob/>. A thorough survey of the literature on the epistemology of testimony, focusing on the transmission/generation debate (among other topics). 6 Audi, Robert. "The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification." American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 405-422. Argues that for someone to learn a proposition on the basis of a testimony, it is necessary (and sufficient) that the testifier knows the proposition under consideration: testimony can only transmit knowledge, and not generate it. Graham, Peter J. "Transferring Knowledge." Nous 34 (2000) 131-152. An argument against the transmission thesis. Argues that for a subject to learn a proposition on the basis of a testimony, it is not necessary (nor sufficient) that the testifier knows the proposition under consideration. What is necessary is that the subject’s basis for accepting the proposition that p carries the information that p. Lackey, Jennifer. "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission." The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471-490. An influential defense of the view that testimony can generate (not only transmit) knowledge. Welbourne, Michael. "The Community of Knowledge." The Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1981): 302-314. An early defense of the view that for someone to learn a proposition on the basis of a testimony, it is necessary (and sufficient) that the testifier knows the proposition under consideration, and thus that testimony can only transmit knowledge. (4) Learning from Experts In our highly complex and specialized world, we constantly rely on experts to form beliefs on various topics. Expertise, then, is a prime source of social evidence on which individuals rely, and experts are endowed with a special epistemic authority in our society. The social epistemology of expertise examines the nature of this epistemic authority and the epistemic properties of beliefs formed by relying on experts. Hardwig 1985 examines the epistemic nature of our reliance on experts. Conee 2009 examines which attitudes disagreeing experts themselves should adopt. An important epistemological question regarding expertise is the question of how non-experts can distinguish between genuine and fraudulent experts. This is an early question in philosophy which was raised by Plato in the Charmides (see Hardy 2010 for Plato’s view on expertise). Goldman 2001 and Coady 2006 examine this question in the guise of what Goldman 2001 calls the “novice/2-experts problem” in which a novice must decide which of two disagreeing experts to trust. (See also *Evidence in the Law*). Coady, David. "When Experts Disagree." Episteme 3 (2006): 68-79. Argues that Goldman 2001’s argument against “going by the numbers” relies on a “non-independence principle” which is not in general true, and examines the consequences of the failure of this principle for the question of what attitudes novices should adopt when experts disagree. Goldman, Alvin. "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 85-109. Offers a definition of what constitutes an expert and examines the question of what novices should believe regarding a topic on which experts disagree. Rejects the 7 strategy of “going by the numbers” (counting and comparing the numbers of experts who agree on a certain issue) and examines other strategies such as finding the experts’ track records. Hardwig, John. "Epistemic Dependence." Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 335-349. Argues that “blind” reliance on expert authority is a source of knowledge (one, moreover, that plays an essential role in our lives), and examines the consequences of this claim for the nature of knowledge and rationality. Hardy, Joerg. "Seeking the Truth and Taking Care for Common Goods - Plato on Expertise and Recognizing Experts." Episteme 7 (2010): 7-22. Examines Plato’s conception of expertise. Argues that on Plato’s view an expert must have truth and avoidance of error as her main epistemic goals, and caring for the common goods as her overarching goal. Conee, Earl. "Peerage." Episteme 6 (2009): 313-323. Argues that experts involved in a longstanding scholarly disagreement are not epistemically justified in taking sides in the controversy. (5) Peer Disagreement An important way in which we can get social evidence relevant to our beliefs is by learning that other people agree or disagree with us on a certain question. Suppose, in particular, that you form an opinion as to whether p, and then learn that somebody with roughly the same level of cognitive abilities as you and who has been exposed to roughly the same evidence disagrees with you. (Let’s call that person your epistemic peer). When you learn that your peer disagrees with you, should you revise your degree of confidence in p, and if so, by how much? This is the question with which the vast and growing literature on peer disagreement is concerned. The field has been divided primarily between conformist views (*The Conformist (or Equal Weight) View*) and non-conformist views (*The Nonconformist View*). Recently, mixed views and views that examine some of the assumptions and setups of the debate have emerged (*Mixed Views and Complications*). (5A) The Conformist (or Equal Weight) View An influential view in the literature on peer disagreement is the conformist (or equal weight) view. On this view, upon learning that an epistemic peer who has been exposed to the same evidence disagrees with me as to whether p, I am rationally required to substantially revise my degree of confidence in p. Specifically, I should give as much weight to my peer’s view as I give to my own, such that (for example) if I believe that p and my peer believes that not-p, we are both rationally required to suspend judgment about p. On this view, two epistemic peers cannot rationally disagree. Feldman 2010, Elga 2007 and Christensen 2007 are influential defenses of the equal weight view. Elga 2010 revises the equal weight view to exclude from its scope cases where epistemic peers disagree about the epistemic significance of disagreement itself. Jehle and Fitelson 2009 examines and criticizes various precisifications of the equal weight view in a Bayesian framework. Christensen, David. "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." The Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 187-217. 8 A defense of the conformist view, on which when I disagree with a peer who has the same evidence as I have, I should substantially revise my belief in the direction of my peer. Elga, Adam. "Reflection and Disagreement." Nous 41 (2007): 478-502. Defends the Equal Weight View, according to which when somebody whom you take to be your peer disagrees with you about a given proposition, you should give her view the same weight as your own. Elga, Adam. “How to Disagree About How to Disagree.” In Disagreement. Edited by Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Argues for a restricted version of the Equal Weight View, according to which when somebody whom you take to be your peer disagrees with you about a given proposition, you should give her view the same weight as your own, except when the topic is disagreement itself. Feldman, Richard. "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In Philosophers Without Gods. Edited by Louise Antony, 194-214. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. A seminal paper which started the debate about peer disagreement. Argues that a given batch of evidence justifies one and only one doxastic attitude toward a proposition (Uniqueness Thesis), and thus that epistemic peers who have shared their evidence regarding a proposition p cannot reasonably disagree about p. Jehle, David and Branden Fitelson. "What Is the 'Equal Weight View?'" Episteme 6 (2009): 280-293. Examines several precisifications of the Equal Weight View formulated in a Bayesian framework. Argues that many of these versions yield unsatisfactory updating rules and are therefore untenable, and that the tenable versions of the Equal Weight View are not necessarily desirable. (5B) The Nonconformist View According to nonconformist views, peers who disagree as to whether p are not (or not always) rationally required to revise their original degrees of confidence in p. This opens up the possibility that two peers may disagree without both of them (or maybe either of them) being irrational. Rosen 2001 is an early defense of this view. Sosa 2006, Moffett 2007, Wedgewood 2007, Bergmann 2009 offer various arguments for nonconformism. Kelly 2010 provides several influential arguments for a specific version of nonconformism (the Total Evidence View). Bergmann 2009 argues that two peers can rationally disagree while thinking that the other may be rational too. White 2009 argues that treating my and others’ beliefs as more or less reliable indicators is consistent with nonconformism. Bergmann, Michael. "Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure." Episteme 6 (2009): 336-353. Considers whether two disagreeing epistemic peers who have fully disclosed their evidence to one another can rationally continue to disagree while thinking that the other 9 may be rational too. Bergmann distinguishes between an internal and an external kind of rationality and argues that for both kinds the answer to this question is ‘yes’. Kelly, Thomas. "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence." In Disagreement. Edited by Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Provides several influential arguments against the equal weight view, and defends an alternative, the Total Evidence View. According to this view, the rational attitude to adopt in cases of peer disagreement depends on the total evidence possessed by the peers. Moffett, Mark. "Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry." Episteme 4 (2007): 352-367. A defense of the nonconformist view of peer disagreement which appeals to the underdetermination of theory by evidence coupled with a principle of epistemic conservatism, according to which we are justified in holding our beliefs when we become aware of alternative equally well-supported beliefs. Rosen, Gideon. "Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism." Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 69-91. An early defense of the view that epistemic peers who have carefully reviewed their evidence can rationally disagree. Sosa, Ernest. "The Epistemology of Disagreement.” In Social Epistemology. Edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Argues that full disclosure of evidence is uncommon, and thus that cases of disagreement where each peer is rational in sticking to her view are possible. Wedgwood, Ralph. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Argues that it is rational to have an “egocentric epistemic bias” in favor of one’s own intuitions, and thus that in cases of peer disagreement, we are justified in giving our own view more weight than the view of our peers, simply in virtue of the fact that it is our view. White, Roger. "On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers." Episteme 6 (2009): 233-250. Argues that the “thermometer model” (on which my and others’ beliefs are treated as more or less reliable indicators of facts) does not entail conformism about peer disagreement. (5C) Mixed Views and Complications Recently, several theories of peer disagreement have emerged which are not easily classified as either conformist or nonconformist. Lackey 2010 offers such an alternative view. Various complications in the debate on peer disagreement have also begun to be examined. Feldman 2009 examines whether evidentialism is compatible with several principles relied upon in the literature on disagreement, and answers in the positive. Feldman 2009, Roush 2009 and 10