R E R EFLECTIONS OF AN MPIRICAL EADER (O : C F B R T T ?) R OULD LEMING E IGHT HIS IME Boston University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 15-46 September 24, 2015 Gary S. Lawson Boston University School of Law This paper can be downloaded without charge at: http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2015.html REFLECTIONS OF AN EMPIRICAL READER (OR: COULD FLEMING BE RIGHT THIS TIME?)* Gary Lawson** Abstract Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are compatible (spoiler alert: it’s an empirical question), and situate empirical reading within the development of originalist theory. Jim Fleming’s characteristically intriguing new book Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms,1 purports to set up an opposition between originalism(s) and what Professor Fleming calls a “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to interpreting, the Constitution. By a “moral reading” or “philosophic approach,” he refers to “conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles – not codifying concrete historical rules or practices – and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood – not merely historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings.”2 He offers this view as an alternative                                                              * With apologies to Sandy Levinson. * Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. 1 JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015). 2 Id. at 3. 1 most directly to “[c]onventional, strong”3 originalism, which he takes to prescribe that “[t]he only legitimate source of constitutional interpretation is the relatively specific original meanings and original expected applications of the founders.”4 The bane of his existence is what he calls “the originalist premise,” which is [t]he assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best – or indeed the only – conception of constitutional interpretation. Why so? Because originalism, rightly conceived, just has to be. By definition. In the nature of things – in the nature of the Constitution, in the nature of law, in the nature of interpretation, in the nature of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Axiomatically.5 He styles the book “a sustained critique of originalism – whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead.”6 Professor Fleming is right that the term “originalism” now describes so many different approaches that the label may obscure more than it conveys.7 I certainly do not want to be in the position of denying the label “originalist” to anyone who wants to claim it, but when I am supposedly standing shoulder to shoulder as an “originalist” with, inter alia, Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Sam Alito, Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Will Baude, Raoul Berger, and Robert Bork – and those are just the “A’s” and “B’s” that leap immediately to mind                                                              3 Id. at 1. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 7. 6 Id. at xi. 7 Id. at 2-3. As Professor Fleming recognizes, he is far from alone in this observation about originalism’s “balkanization.” See, e.g, Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 2 who are swept in by some currently circulating broad definitions of originalism – it is not clear that the label “originalist” is doing a lot of useful epistemological work. Accordingly, although I consider myself an originalist of sorts, rather than defend originalism here, I instead propose a somewhat different opposition in response to Professor Fleming: empirical readings versus moral readings. Framing the issue that way reveals some very strange bedfellows and points to what I believe is a radically underdeveloped research agenda for constitutional interpretation. By “empirical reading,” I mean nothing more complex than reading the Constitution – or any communicative instrument, such as the Gettysburg Address, the Constitution of the Confederacy, your spouse’s shopping list, or Professor Fleming’s book – for what it says. That is an empirical task, because communicative meaning in a wide range of contexts is a fact to be discovered rather than something to be constructed, invented, or chosen. The factual meaning of the United States Constitution is discovered by ascertaining the original intentions of the document’s author. That is the right way to discover meaning in that context. It just has to be. So stated, this position seems to represent precisely the kind of dogmatically axiomatic, concrete-intentions-based, authoritarian originalism that Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution wants to stamp out. Not so fast. There is both more and less to empirical reading than meets the eye. The subtitle of this Comment is “Could Fleming Be Right This Time”? The answer to that question is yes, and even obviously yes. But, as with “forty two” as the answer to the ultimate question of life, the universe, and everything, 8 the trick is to formulate the question properly. What, exactly, is the ultimate question of meaning, interpretation, and the Constitution to which Professor Fleming has given the right answer? My goals in this brief Comment are to                                                              8 DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 135 (1979).   3 explain the relationship between empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution and to identify precisely what, from the standpoint of an empirical reader, Professor Fleming has right this time. The short answer -- which, out of full context, is about as helpful as “forty two” -- is that Professor Fleming is right that constitutional interpretation requires a philosophic approach; that the old and the new new (though not necessarily the new) originalisms often amount to thinly veiled moral readings; and that originalism, even when properly conceived as empirical reading, is authoritarian. He is wrong about what kind of philosophy one needs for interpretation; wrong that all originalisms, including empirical readings, fall prey to his critique; and wrong about the kind of authoritarianism that originalism, when cast as empirical reading, represents. In order to determine what is right and wrong about Professor Fleming’s account, one must think deeply and carefully about the nature of interpretation. Since the value of scholarship, in my eyes, is measured by how well it prompts deep and careful thought, I am profoundly grateful to Professor Fleming, as we all should be, for his immensely valuable work. I. The Least Dangerous Branch (of Philosophy) Notwithstanding Professor Fleming’s protestations, some form of originalism just has to be the right method for ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution. It just has to be. This is not an axiomatic assertion. It is a demonstrable truth. When faced with a document, one can do any number of things with it. One can read it for aesthetic pleasure. One can use it as a coaster for a cup of tea. One can treat it as a blueprint for social organization (remember “A Piece of the Action” from the original Star Trek series, in 4 which a book on 1920s Chicago gangs became the foundation for an entire alien culture). One can try to dupe low-information or weak-minded people into treating it, or at least one’s propounded version of it, as a blueprint for social organization so that one can more readily impose one’s values on them and steal their wealth. Or one can try to figure out what it actually says. Of course, in doing any of those other activities, one might also try to figure out what it actually says, but one can perform any of those other activities without trying to figure out what it actually says. And one can try to figure out what it actually says without performing any of those other activities. The latter proposition tends to get obscured in the context of the United States Constitution because, as a matter of practice, interpretation of the document is almost always bound up with decisions that implicate the real-world employment of government force. But, conceptually, the meaning of the document and the consequences, if any, of that meaning are quite different things. To keep those very different ideas clear, just imagine that we are interpreting the Constitution of the Confederacy or an old Soviet constitution, so that ascertainment of meaning does not have any political implications and one’s judgment will therefore not be distorted by hopes or wishes about how that meaning will affect people’s behavior. If one genuinely and honestly tries to figure out what the document actually says, then, as a hypothetical imperative, one must be an empirical reader, which means in turn that one must be an originalist. One simply has to be. The conclusions follows from the nature of the Constitution as a communicative instrument and the nature of language as a tool for communication. A. Interpretation and Intention 5 Most documents are human acts of communication. It is possible, to be sure, to imagine a document that has no communicative content, either because it is simply random marks or because it is designed to produce emotive rather than cognitive content. Most of the time, however, documents are constructed in order to convey information – about entities, commands, reactions, or any other aspect of the physical, mental, or moral world -- from one mind to another, even if the respective minds belong to the same person at different points in time. Once one identifies a document as an attempt to communicate cognitive content, it follows ineluctably that the meaning of the document is the content that was intended to be communicated. If you are not trying to figure out what the author of a communication intended to communicate, you are not engaged in the enterprise of communication.  Of course, your efforts to figure out communicative content may fail because you do a bad job of understanding (either on purpose or through lack of skill or attention), the communicator does a bad job of communicating (either on purpose or through lack of skill or attention), the subject matter of the communication is difficult to convey from mind to mind despite everyone’s best efforts, or any or all of the above. To say that interpretation is about communication is not to say that interpretation will always yield an answer that can epistemologically be proclaimed correct.9 But if you are not even trying to ascertain the content of a communication, you are not participating in an activity that can meaningfully be called communication. You may be engaged in some other activity (such as imposing values or stealing wealth), and that other activity may be very important, and perhaps even more important than the communicative enterprise, but it is not communication. I use the                                                              9 The degree to which communication will yield correct answers depends on a wide range of considerations, including the standard of proof that governs the communicative enterprise and the evidence set that is applied to the task. See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (2016) (forthcoming). 6 word “interpretation” to describe the process of ascertaining the meaning of, and therefore the intentions behind, a communicative act.10 Thus, interpretation “just is” the ascertainment of the original intentions of the communicator. When people like Cass Sunstein say that “no approach to interpretation is dictated by the very idea of interpretation,”11 they are simply wrong. But couldn’t one use the word “interpretation” to describe some cognitive activity other than the ascertainment of meaning, such as figuring out the morally best account of communicative marks that somehow stays within certain conventional linguistic parameters? Of course one could.12 Just like in the old joke about baptism, I’ve seen it. Indeed, I have elsewhere identified at least eight functions that Jack Balkin believes that constitutional “interpretation” should try to perform,13 and Jack Balkin is a skilled user of the English language. One can use a word to mean anything that one likes as long as the usage is clearly defined – so that readers and listeners will be able to ascertain the original intentions of, and therefore the communicative content conveyed by, the user of the word. One can even use the word “interpretation” to describe the process of projecting future events from an examination of goat entrails or the process of predicting personality traits from arrangements of stars, and as long as the term’s usage is clearly defined, effective communication can take place. But in any activity other than discerning the original intentions of a communicator, one is not ascertaining                                                              10 This is not an idiosyncratic usage of the term “interpretation.” See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2015) (“I shall use the word ‘interpretation’ to refer to the activity of discovering the communicative content of the constitutional text.”). 11 Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2874 (2007). For a recent (though equally mistaken) elaboration of Professor Sunstein’s position, see Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 193 (2015). 12 Similarly, there are any number of ways in which one can use the word “meaning.” See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal ‘Meaning’ and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U.CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015). See also Solum, supra note 10, at 1116 (discussing different ways of using the term “meaning”).   13 Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (2012). 7 meaning. One is not discovering the content conveyed by an utterance that exists independently of the conscious mind of the specific perceiver. That ascertainment of meaning is the aspect of reality that I mean as the referent for the term “interpretation.” If other people want to use the word “interpretation” to describe different aspects of reality, such as moral readings, Professor Balkin’s eight tasks, or the examination of goat entrails, that is certainly their right, and I could hardly deny them use of the word for that purpose.14 I am not interested in who gets custody of the word “interpretation.” I am interested in the underlying, objectively existing phenomenon that I am using the word to describe: the activity of ascertaining meaning. Empirical reading involves the ascertainment of that meaning. And ascertainment of that meaning requires ascertainment of the communicative intentions behind the utterance whose meaning is being ascertained. Thus, this account of interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning involves, not an axiomatic assertion of linguistic necessity, but a hypothetical imperative: If one wants to understand a communication, then one must employ a methodology of original intentions in order to achieve that goal.15 Whether one ought, in any particular instance, to want to understand                                                              14 If one uses the word “interpretation” to mean something other than the ascertainment of meaning, one must be careful to avoid the fallacy of equivocation by switching meanings in mid-argument or by trying to cash in on implications or assumptions that accompany interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning. By the same token, those of us who use the word “interpretation” to signify the ascertainment of meaning must similarly avoid switching meanings in mid-stream or appealing to implications that accompany other meanings. Where there is a risk that people are using the same word to describe very different aspects of reality, clarity demands that people spell out their word usages with some care. (Of course, if one’s goal is to take advantage of the possibility of equivocation in order to help make the weaker argument defeat the stronger, hiding your meaning or bait-and-switch may be attractive options.)   15 (Unintentional) Accord: Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 11, at 2871 (“We ask about the speaker's intentions because, and to the extent that, the goal of communication will go badly, or at least less well, if we do not.”). Professor Sunstein makes this statement in the context of rejecting the idea that interpretation just is the ascertainment of communicative intentions. See id. at 2870-72. He is right, as I have already noted, that one can attach the word “interpretation” to all sorts of activities that have nothing to do with ascertaining communicative intentions. See Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, supra note 11, at 198-200. I am talking about the activity, not the particular psycho-linguistic symbol used to describe it. 8 a communication is a question of moral theory rather than interpretative or legal theory, and I therefore have nothing useful or interesting to say about it in an academic forum. So, if one is an empirical reader attempting to ascertain meaning, does that establish that one therefore cannot be a moral reader who looks to “conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles – not codifying concrete historical rules or practices – and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood – not merely historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings”?16 No, it does not necessarily establish anything of the kind. From the standpoint of interpretative theory, the extent to which an empirical reader will also be a moral reader is an empirical question. Empirical reading says to look for the intentions of the Constitution’s author. It prejudges nothing about the content of those intentions. Perhaps those intentions will take the form of relatively specific commands and instantiations that require little or nothing by way of moral judgment, but that is hardly foreordained. If the Constitution contained a provision that said, “Interpret everything in this document to approximate as closely as linguistically possible your understanding of the best moral theory at the moment of interpretation,” a good empirical reader would have to be a Flemingian (Flemingal? Flemish?) moral reader, because the clearly expressed empirical intention of that provision is to prescribe a moral reading. The Constitution, of course, contains no such clause. But neither does it contain a clause that says, “Interpret everything in this document in accordance with the concrete and specific expected applications of the author.” In order to determine how specifically or abstractly to interpret the Constitution                                                              16 FLEMING, supra note 1, at 3. 9