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. (h y S. Hrg. 103-568 OPERATIONAL TESTING: ENSURING BETTER WEAPONS FOR OUR TROOPS 4. G 74/9: S. HRG, 103-568 »rational Testing: Ensuring Bette. . HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SERVICES, POST OFFICE, AND CIVIL SERVICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 22, 1994 Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs AUG 4 1994 78-061cc WASHINGTON : 1994 ForsalebytheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice SuperintendentofDocuments,CongressionalSalesOffice,Washington,DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-044450-0 y \ S. Hrg. 103-568 ^ OPERATIONAL TESTING: ENSURING BEnER WEAPONS FOR OUR TROOPS 4. G 74/9: S. HRG. 103-568 rational Testing: Ensuring Bette... HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SERVICES, POST OFFICE, AND CML SERVICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION « MARCH 22, 1994 Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs AUG 4 1994 GovEm^MEm'^AlmG%^m^'^'^^^miim U.S. 7&-061CC WASHINGTON : 1994 ForsalebytheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice SuperintendentofDocuments,CongressionalSalesOffice,Washington,DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-044450-0 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOHN GLENN, Ohio, Chairman SAM NUNN, Georgia WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware CARL LEVIN, Michigan TED STEVENS, Alaska JIM SASSER, Tennessee WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine DAVID PRYOR. Arkansas THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota Leonard Weiss, StaffDirector Franklin G. Polk, Minority StaffDirector and ChiefCounsel Michal Sue Prosser, ChiefClerk SUBCOMMTITEE ON FEDERAL SERVICES, POST OFFICE, AND CiVIL SERVICE DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman JIM SASSER, Tennessee TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi Edward J. Gleiman, StaffDirector Patricia A. Ra3rmond, Minority StaffDirector Nancy Langley, ChiefClerk (II) CONTENTS Openingstatements: Page SenatorPryor 1 SenatorRoth 5 WITNESSES Tuesday, March 22, 1994 Colleen A. Preston, Deputy Under Secreteiry of Defense Acquisition Reform, DepartmentofDefense 6 Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Systems Development and Production Issues, National Security and InternationalAffairs Division, U.S. GeneralAccount- ingOffice 20 Russell Murray, formerAssistantSecretaryofDefense 27 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Murray, Russell: Testimony 27 Prepared statement 45 Preston, ColleenA.: Testimony 6 Prepared statement 35 Rodrigues, Louis J.: Testimony 20 Prepared statement 39 APPENDDC Prepared statements ofwitnesses in order ofappearance 35 Charts: Is Operational Testing—TooExpensive? 49 Fly Before You Buy Percentage of Weapons Produced Before Oper- ational Testing 50 APentagon Priority? 51 (III) OPERATIONAL TESTING: ENSURING BETTER WEAPONS FOR OUR TROOPS TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1994 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursu£int to notice, at 10:41 a.m. in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Pryor, Chair- man ofthe Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Pryor and Roth, OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR Senator Pryor. Ladies and gentlemen, our meeting will come to order. We waint to welcome each ofour witnesses this morning and our colleague. Senator Roth. I have a statement that I am not going to take the time to read in its entirety. By the way, I do apologize for my lateness this morning. Another meeting was called and I had to attend it, I would like to say that for about 10 years my colleague. Senator Roth of Delaware, and myself have been involved in promoting a concept ofoperational testing, testing weapons before we buy them. We call this fly before you buy, I would like to also state th—at since we have been involved on this issue for the past 10 years I can't speak for Senator Roth, but I will speak for myself—I have yet during this decade ofworking on the issue ofoperation—al testing, making sure that weapons work before we buy them I have yet to have one lobbyist come into my office or to meet me in the hall to say we need to make sure that our weapons work. There has not been one, I have had lobbyists on the acquisition side of our economy rep- resenting the Department of Defense and contractors, who con- stantly come to my office and say, we want a certain weapon to be built in a certain town or in a certain State, We all know those forces; Senator Roth knows those forces. No one has come to say let us make sure they work before we buy them, I think that the forces of acquisition and procurement are very strong today, strong enough that operational testing, even in this administration, has become a very low priority, I hate to say that; I truly hate to see it. (1) I would like to point to the charti we have showing. During the decade since this office has been created, an office designed to prevent a student from grading their own exam papers, this office has been without a director 30 percent of the time. That is abysmal. Even in this administration, this office has yet to be filled with a Director of Operational Testing. This, to me, is a sad admission, a sad statement, but it is true. In 1983, when Senator Roth and I began this process we felt truly that the Pentagon was allowing the students to grade their own exams, so to speak, by allowing the acquisition community to oversee operational testing. This was a deplorable practice, a practice that contributed to the waste of billions and bilUons of dollars on weapons that did not work, that today are in warehouses or have beenjunked. Even worse, many, many faulty weapons were being sent to our troops for use in combat. Senator Roth and I are going to continue lobbying for those troops and ensuring that the weapons that go to them work and do not endanger their lives. The primary accomplishment of this 1983 testing legislation was the removal of on-going and potential conflicts of interest in weapons testing. We did this by requiring by law that the Department ofDefense practice and promote greater independence when testing the weapons we provide for our troops. Unfortunately, Senator Roth and I had a wish for a strong, independent testing office. It was not granted overnight; it was not easy. For the first 18 months, this office went without a director. Even after the position was filled, continuing Pentagon animosity toward this office severely inhibited it's abihty to get involved early and often in the acquisition process. Senator Roth and I envisioned an independent testing office that would work together with top acquisition decisionmakers to identify problems early in the life of a weapons system. Let me, if I might, allude to this chart here. The ASPJ Jammer, a radar jammer which is today being installed on our F-14 fight- ers, which is today being sold to our alUes, has never passed operational testing. It is incredible. Ninety-five ofthe 376 systems have already been completed, and the system has never passed operational testing. — On the C-17 40 out of the 120 aircraft, 33 percent were produced before being operationally tested. What happens? We have seen massive cost overruns, and the C-17 does not meet aU of its requirements. The B-IB bomber—100 percent of these bombers were produced without any operationally testing. Well, we know the story. The first B-IB bomber, I think, that was tested hit a pel- ican and crashed. The rest ofthem, I think, are in cold storage. In the past 10 years we have frequently heard complaints from the acquisition community £ind the forces that say buy, buy, buy, that testing is more trouble than it is worth, is too expensive, slows DOD down the process, and is inconsistent with acquisition strate- gies. We will show you another chart later in the hearing that will demonstrate how very Uttle ofthe overall costs ofthe weapons system is used in operational testing. 1Seepage51. This office has been isolated, and the lack of the support that it has been given in the past is disturbing. Unfortunately, the past 14 months, I must admit to you, have been less then encouraging. The Pentagon's slowness in naming a testing czar is really taking the life out ofour independent testers and has relegated this agen- cy to almost a lame duck status. What is most disturbing is that without a forceful champion for independent operational testing, very important policy decisions are taking place every day in the Pentagon without the benefit ofthis office's input. We are at a crossi:oads, I think, today in the way we use operational testing. The challenge that we face, and the reason for this hearing today is to see what we have done for the last decade, to see what we are doing now, and to see what we have to do to ensure that these weapons that we purchase and that we send to the field actually work and do not endanger the lives of our fighting men and women. I am going to put my entire statement in the record. PREPARED STATEMENTOFSENATORPRYOR This year the Congress is once again taking on the difficult task ofreforming the massive acquisition system within the Department ofDefense, as part ofa broader effort to streamUne Federal procurement. As a member ofthe Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, I have been closely monitoring this important issue. Thanks to the leade—rship ofthe ClintonAdministration and my distinguished colleagues in the Congress Senators Nunn, Glenn, Levin and others who have sponsored S. 1587, we are about to provide many needed and long awaited reforms that will significantly change the way ourgovernment does business. While I support this important initiative, myselfand others have expressed strong reservations about enactingthe provisions ofS. 1587 that deal with the Department ofDefense's vital responsibility oftesting weapons. As a result, today's hearing has been called to focus our attention on the importance ofupholdingindependentweap- onstestingin the Department ofDefense. Independent operational testing is the crucial step in the high stakes, high dollar world ofmilitary procurement that our troops simply cannot live without. In 1983, Senator Roth and I became fed up with the Defense Department's continuing oppo- sition to making operational tesing fully independent ofthe DOD acquisition community. Despite the Pentagon's objections. Senator Roth and I successfully passed legislation in Congress creating the Pentagon's first independent operational testing office, known as the DOT&E. This office was designed to be located in the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense and to remain independent fi:om the intense pressures thatwere often applied bythe acquisition community. In 1983, Senator Roth and I found that the DOD's process for acquiring weapons was hopelessly riddled with conflicts ofinterest. We felt the Pentagon was "allowing the students to grade their own exams" by allowing the acquisition community to oversee operational testing. This deplorable practice contributed to the waste ofbil- lions of dollars on weapons that did not work. Even worse, faulty weapons were beingsentto ourtroops foruse in combat. The primary accomplishment of our 1983 testing legislation was the removal of on going and potential conflicts of interest in weapons testing. We did this by requiring by law that the Department ofDefense practice and promote greater independence when testingthe weapons we provide forourtroops. Unfortunately, our wish for strong, independent testing was not granted overnight. The Pentagon leadership opposed our legislation and then took 19 months to appoint a testing director. Even after the personnel were finally hired, continuing Pentagon animosity toward operational testing severely inhibited the DOT&E's ability to get involved early and often in the acquisition process. Senator Roth and I envisioned an independent testing office that would work together with top acquisition decision makers to identify problems early in the life of a weapon system. We hoped that such practices would enable us to keep bad weapons away from ourtroops, and ofcourse, prevent us firom spendingbilUons ofdollars on bad weapons. Unfortunately, the DOT&E is currently isolated on the acquisition perimeter as the "final exam" for weapons. As a result, the DOT&E is often forced to either"stop the show" orfeebly objectasfaultyweapons areforced intoproduction. I can assure everyone in this hearingroom that we did notintend forthe DOT&E to be either a "final exam" or a "show stopper". However, over the past 10 years, two key factors have contributed to the isolation ofthe DOT&E andthe limits on this office's abiUtyto positively impactthewaythe Pentagon builds weapons. The first factor is the intolerance of many in the acquisition community for the existence and involvement of independent operational testing. It is widely known that the developers and advocates of new weapons prefer little or no interference by operationaltesters, especiallywhen performance problems exist. This adversarial relationship between the operational testingand acquisition com- munities will always exist to some degree. However, the past 10 years have taught us that when operational testing is neglected, the delicate balance ofthis adversar- inailtyr—eltahtuisonjsehoipparbdeiczoimnegsthdeanvgeerryoeuxsilsytetnicleteodfiinndtehpeenfdaveonrtoOfTt&hEe.acquisition commu- In the past 10 years, we have fi-equently heard complaints firom the acquisition cdoomwmnuntihetyprtohcaetss,teisstionfgteins imnocroensitsrtoeunbtlewitthhanDOitDisacwqouritshi,tiiosntsotorateexgpieenss.ivHeo,wesvleorw,s it has been proven that operational testing, when fully integrated in the acquisition process, saves time, money, and most importantly, the lives of our fighting forces. It has also been argued that the contractors should be allowed more involvement in operational testing. However, independent testing is built on a solid foundation twheaatpoisnsdebseiignngeddteovelliompietd.thWeerolceanonfoctonrtervaecrttorbsawckhotoartehefindaanycsialwlhveantttahcehesdtutdoetnhtes graded their own exams. Unfortunately, the testing provisions of S. 1587 represent these misguided criti- cisms ofindependent testing. I am strongly opposed to these provisions, and I hope this hearing will shed light on the need to strengthen, not weaken, independent tesTthiengsienctohnedPfeancttoargocno.ntributing to the isolation of the ^D^OrT„&„E„ i.s t,he dji—s.t.urib.-ing lack of support for independent testing by the leadership of the Pentagon dating back to the creation ofthe DOT&E in 1983. In the absence ofstrong Pentagon support, we have jeopardized our independent testers' ability to ensure that the tax- payers get what they pay for and that our troops get weapons they can rely on in combat. Our operational testers must receive strong support fi-om the highest levels ofthe Pentagon. Although past administrations failed to provide independent testers witDhOtDhe nec- essary support, I must admit that I had very high hopes for the current leadership. Unfortunately, the past 14monthshave been less than encouraging. The Pentagon's slowness in naming a testing czar has taken the life out of our independenttesters and relegated the DOT&E officeto a"lame duck" status. I am alarmed by the Pentagon's inability to take operational weapons testing off the back-burner. What is most disturbing is that without a forceful champion for independent operational testing, important policy decisions are taking place every day in the Pentagon without the benefit on the DOT&E's input and guidance. For example, had a test director been at the table during critical discussions on how to resolve the ASPJ radarjammer disaster, I am certain thatthe situation would have been handled differently, and we would not be installing faulty systems on our F- 14 aircraftorsellingthemto ourallies. In addition, had a test director been at the table lastyear, the operational testing office probably would not have received a demotion. In last year's Defense Author- ization bill, the DOT&E was stripped ofits authority to report directly to the Sec- retary ofDefense, thus sending a dangerous signal thatindependent testing had de- creased in importance. Finally, and perhaps most importantlv, had a test director been at the table during discussions on acquisition reform, the legislation currently circulating probably would not have surfaced. This legislation is designed to undermine independent testingand should notbe enacted. These are all examples ofwhat happens when the Pentagon operates wi.thout the benefit ofa test director's input and guidance. I am afraid thatwe might soon learn of other expensive lessons that could have been avoided if an honest, aggressive, and independent test director had been confirmed and at the table during the past 14 months. After ten years of hard fought survival, the concept of independent operational testinghas reached thecrossrwids this vear. The direction we choose for this important function will s—ignificantly impact the way weapons are built in the future. The choices are simple we can either weaken operational testing or we can work to