This article was downloaded by: [Oregon State University] On: 16 January 2015, At: 15:15 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrmx20 On Colonial Hegemony: Toward a Critique of Brown Orientalism Ajit Chaudhury Published online: 05 Jan 2009. To cite this article: Ajit Chaudhury (1994) On Colonial Hegemony: Toward a Critique of Brown Orientalism, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 7:4, 44-58, DOI: 10.1080/08935699408658122 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935699408658122 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions 5 1 0 2 y r a u n a J 6 1 5 1 5: 1 at ] y sit r e v ni U e at St n o g e r O [ y b d e d a o nl w o D Rethinking MARXISM Volume 7, Number 4 (Winter 1994) 5 1 0 2 y On Colonial Hegemony: r a u n Toward a Critique of Brown Orientalism a J 6 1 5 1 5: Ajit Chaudhury 1 at ] y sit r e v This essay explores the strategies of the servant (the subaltern) in a world dominated ni U by the master (the elite).’ Specifically, I will examine how a servant-who is e condemned to be ruled by the master+an define a relatively autonomous theoreti- at St cal space for himself. In other words, I will talk about a servant who does not aspire on to be a master. This will be a discourse of the stoic in the context of a (post)modem g e world. A colonial context provides its background. r O The basic presupposition of this essay is that one cannot move outside the [ by complex of master-servant (i.e., power) relations. The analysis begins with a d description of the master’s world-how he rules, what his strategies are, and so on. e d a This paper invokes Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, sharpens it to deal with a o nl (post)colonial situation, and formulates the key concept of this essay, synthetic w o hegemonic power, by elaborating it into a critique df the current discourse on D colonial hegemony. I am not interested here in finding out what Gramsci actually meant by hegemony; the emphasis is on finding out the consequences of a particular (mis)reading of Gramsci in the colonial context.* Althusser’s system, as restructured by Resnick and Wolff (1987), provides the conceptual framework for the essay. In particular, the essay explores the im- plications of the notion of overdetermination in the context of the Third World with incomplete modernization, where both modernism and traditional values coexist and are overdetermined by each other. The basic objective is to formulate a theoretical framework which contests some of the strategies of the servant (Hindu fundamentalism, Muslim fundamentalism) which counterpose tradition to modem- ism to assert the servant’s identity in the postcolonial world without taking into account these overdetermining aspects. On the intellectual plane, this position has Brown Orientalism 45 become very popular in recent years after the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). This essay emphasizes that the notion of tradition itself is overdetermined by modernism; tradition is viewed in the light of modernism. If Orientalism is a discourse of the Orient by the White, there are no a priori reasons to suppose (in view of those overdetermining effects) that its nature will fundamentally change if it is produced by Brown intellectuals. If Said’s position is a critique of “White Orientalism,” then this essay tries to develop a theoretical framework to contest “Brown Orientalism.” In particular, the essay develops a theoretical 5 framework to critique the nationalist discourse during British India and its postcolo- 1 0 nial form in the light of overdetermining aspects of modernism and tradition. The 2 y essay dismisses any strategy that counterposes tradition to modernism and tries to r ua develop some entry-point concepts so that the Third World might inscribe itself on n a the margin of the dominant discourse. The argument rules out the possibility of an J 6 independent discourse for the subordinate sector (the Orient or the Third World). 1 5 The essay distances itself from other work in its formulation of a particular 1 5: strategy of the servant: it points out how the servant can define a relatively 1 at autonomous theoretical space for himself in a world dominated by the master. In y] this context, I invoke Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (1989&particularly, his sit concept of forgetfulness-to locate the limit of power relations (as described by r e v Foucault) and to point out how the servant can deepen this relatively autonomous Uni space by inverting the dominant moral values. One of the distinguishing features of e the essay follows from this inversion-that of making a case for nonviolent political at St movement. However, this also closes the possibility of further dialogue in terms of n academic discourse; I cannot describe, in terms of academic discourse, the interior o g e of the theoretical space following from this in~ersionI.f~ synthetic hegemonic r O power and overdetermining aspects of modernism and tradition are the entry-point [ y concepts of this essay, the concept of forgetfulness provides the exit point. b d e d a Hegemony in a Colonial Context o nl w Let me begin from first principles: the elementary aspects of master-servant o D relationships. The master and the servant, by definition, relate themselves in the 1. The term “master” is to be understood in its broadest sense which includes, among other things, impersonal power relations. Therefore, the word “servant,” in the context of this paper, means the subordinate sector or the subaltern. I choose this particular term because it will help me to relate the essay to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. 2. See Guha (1989). 3. Academic discourse, first of all, requires that its ideas be sufficiently developed and clear to fulfill the criteria of being published in an academic journal. This limits the scope of making experiments (often abortive) with new ideas. Again, academic journals judge an essay by Western categories, creating further problems for the Third World people. Some of the postcolonial experiences of the Third World can certainly be communicated in Western (particularly postmodern) terms, but there always remains a residual that cannot be communicated in terms of current Western categories. For example, whispering and silence are some of the forms of resistance that cannot be sufficiently captured in written terms, particularly by the categories of social sciences. New literary forms (such as mugic reatism) might better illustrate the situation. 46 Chuudhury idiom of power, of dominance and subordination. The master-servant relationship is a complex of dominance and subordination. Dominance subsists in its explicit other: as subordination. Again, dominance itself is a complex of persuasion and coercion. Similarly, the complex of subordination includes as its elements col- laboration and resistance. Therefore, dominance-subordination relations define a complex of complexes. Let us imagine a colonized country facing the colonial power or the periphery facing the (multinational) capitalist center. We assume that from the standpoint of 5 the colonized country, the principles of persuasion constitute a homogeneous field 1 0 given externally. It is important to stress that these persuasive principles follow 2 y from a constructed cultural space (discursive field) overdetermined by many con- r ua tradictions and therefore are continually changing its forms. But from the servant’s n a (here, the colonized people’s) standpoint, these changes-which he does not un- J 6 derstand-are unimportant, so that for all practical purposes we (the critical theo- 1 5 rists) can consider the complex of persuasion to be homogeneous. However, the 1 5: complex of persuasion and that of collaboration do not belong to the same cultural 1 at space; they are qualitatively different. Persuasion and collaboration define an ] exchange relationship: persuasion flows from the master to the servant and col- y sit laboration flows from the servant to the master. If the master and the servant belong r ve to different cultural spaces, it is theoretically necessary to show how signals are Uni transmitted from one space to another. In other words, collaboration is not im- e mediately a negative (mirror image) of persuasion; to persuade it is necessary- at St though not sufficientthat a subject persuades an object who understands the n language of persuasion. Then the question is: How does the master construct a o g e cultural space (a discursive field) in which the communication between the master r O and the servant is possible? In concrete terms, the question is: can a colonial power [ y rule with hegemony (some kind of persuasion) if the colonized subjects do not b d understand its language, its principles of persuasion? e d a It is now a commonplace proposition that the capitalist state is not always o nl coercive: it can persuade its people to collaborate in its rule. In short, the capitalist w o state has its hegemony. But as far as the question of colonial domination is D concerned, the current literature on the subject rules out the possibility of hege- mony: the colonial state is always a coercive state (Guha 1989). Collaboration by the colonized people is viewed either as an aberration (betrayal by the lackeys of colonial power) or as a myth produced by the colonizers. This underestimates the strength of colonial (and imperialist) power and misses how it reaches into the minds of people and (de)forms them, producing the colonial mind. By implication, this also overestimates the strength of our liberated intellectuals. (Those who speak for the masses of the Third World might too cany a colonial mind.) In short, the point is missed that formation of colonial hegemony is an unconscious process that needs to be theoretically analyzed. Such an analysis requires that we break out of the simplistic notion of hegemony Brown Orientalism 47 that prevails in the current discourse on colonial hegemony. This simplistic notion of hegemony presupposes that persuasive and collaborative principles belong to the same homogeneous space. The master persuades; the servant is persuaded and therefore collaborates. If the master fails to communicate persuasive principles that is understood as lack of hegemony. The question is never asked: Why does the colonial power fail to communicate its persuasive principles and how does it overcome this communication problem in order to produce a new kind of hegemony which does not rest entirely on its persuasive principles? How is this transmission 5 possible if the master and the servant-and therefore persuasive principles and 1 0 collaborative principles-belong to different cultural spaces? 2 y We argue that in this case the master needs to construct a synthetic (artificial) r ua cultural space which can include the complex of persuasion and that of collaboration n a (albeit, their modified forms) as its moments. In other words, there exists an J 6 articulated field in which persuasive and collaborative principles emerge as mo- 1 5 ments of the master’s discourse. Synthetic hegemony is defined in this theoretical 1 5: field as a flow of these modified persuasive principles from the master to the 1 at servant, who in turn receives them in terms of the modified collaborative principles. ] Synthetic hegemony, therefore, does not immediately follow from the master’s y sit persuasive principles. It is a product of the master’s appropriation of the principles r ve that constitute the servant as an autonomous force; in other words, it is a displace- Uni ment of the servant’s constitutive principles. More correctly, synthetic hegemony is e a condensation of the modified persuasive principles of the master and the con- at St stitutive (internal) principles of the servant. The master distorts (reforms) the n constitutive principles of the servant, mixes them up with his own persuasive o eg principles, and sends them back to the servant. The servant, then, can read the r O language of persuasion. Synthetic hegemony, therefore, is an ideological practice or [ y articulation on the master’s part, establishing a relation among elements (persua- b d sion and coercion) such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory e ad practice. Synthetic hegemony is to be distinguished from the notion of simple o nl hegemony flowing from the master’s persuasive principles. Simple hegemony w o implies the following: D 1. There is a homogeneous cultural space over which persuasion (by the master) and collaboration (by the servant) can operate. 2. Collaboration (by the servant) is the negative of persuasion (by the mas- ter). 3. There is no element of collaboration in the servant’s consciousness that is autonomous of the persuasive principles of the master. Taken together, these characteristics of simple hegemony mean that the domi- nant ideas propagated by the ruling classes constitute the paradigm (code, language, culture) within which both persuasion and collaboration are practiced. When the subaltern classes collaborate with their rulers they do so because, and only because, they accept as their own the dominant ideas propagated by the latter. Collaboration 48 Chaudhury thus is a mirror image (negative) of persuasion. Of course, since we (the critical theorists) know that this society is class divided, we also know that the persuasive principles of the master only reflect his specific class interests. Hence, what the master projects as generally valid for society as a whole is in actuality valid for his sectional interest as a ruling class. When the subaltern classes collaborate, they do so because they falsely believe that those sectional principles are valid for them as well. Hence, we obtain a simple structure of hegemony where persuasion is only an extension of the coercive powers of the master and collaboration is the result of the 5 false consciousness of the subaltern classes (i.e., of the mirror image of the ruling 1 0 ideas in subaltern consciousness). For example, in the context of capitalism simple 2 y hegemonic power is said to prevail when capital can control labor by principles of r ua persuasion that include capitalism’s own principles (accumulation, democracy, n a freedom). J 6 It is in this context that I develop the concept of synthetic hegemonic power. If 1 5 persuasion by the elite is not able to elicit collaboration from the subaltern classes, it 1 5: must mean that the mirror image is not produced in subaltern consciousness; the 1 at servant fails to understand the language of the master. The master then learns the y] language (code, totem) of the servant, distorts it, and constructs out of it a new code sit to convey the message of his persuasive principles. The servant then starts speak- r e v ing a new language-his master’s language-without being aware of it, thinking ni U that he is speaking in his mother tongue. The servant becomes a refugee in his e homeland. at St The current discourse on colonial hegemony misses this subtle point: it identifies n hegemony with the persuasive principles of the colonial power, does not find it o g e effective in the colonized country, and calls the colonial power coercive, thus r O missing all that is subtle. To make this point, I will focus on Guha’s analysis of [ y colonial hegemony which summarizes others’ positions and finally dismisses col- b d onial hegemony as impossible. I will point out what this analysis misses. e d a The current literature on colonial hegemony opposes modernism to tradition. The o nl colonial power is viewed as both good and evil. Good, because it brings modernism w o (science); evil, for the obvious reason that its presence means lack of freedom for D the colonized people. The degree of modernization in the colonized country is seen as the index of colonial hegemony. That is to say, hegemony in the colonial context is understood as simple hegemony; the colonial power is said to be hegemonic if it can persuade the colonized people, in terms of the principles internal to it (modemism), to col- laborate in its colonial rule. For example, British rule in India is said to have been hegemonic to the extent that it modernized the education system in India; the persons who collaborated with the British in this project (Vidyasagar, Ashutosh Mukherjee) are worshipped as great thinkers and leaders of modem India. Like- wise, economic reforms (bringing railways) opening up the possibilities of mod- ernization in the country are cited as indices of hegemonic rule. Opponents of this view also share this notion of simple hegemony, but argue that the educational and Brown Orientalism 49 economic reforms were quantitatively insignificant and therefore do not signify hegemony. Later discussion on the subject (Cambridge historiography) identifies the roots of British hegemony in India in its system of representation of the colonized subjects in the administrative and legislative set up.4 This inclusion of the colonized subjects in the administration and legislature produced a whole gamut of values constituting modem India. For example, the Cambridge view contends that the nationalist movement in India draws its inspiration from this system of representation; 5 nationalist sentiments are nothing but a quantitative expansion of the urge on the 1 0 part of the colonized subjects to represent themselves on a greater scale in the 2 y administration and legislature. The nationalists in India, of course, would not share r ua this view. They argue that representations were made on a very limited scale which n a cannot produce a distinct value system. J 6 It is interesting to note that both the proponents and the opponents of the notion 1 5 of British hegemony in India share the sense of simple hegemony: the colonial 1 5: power persuading its subjects, in terms of modernism, to collaborate in its rule. An 1 at assimilation of (a compromise with) traditional values is viewed as failure of y] hegemony. sit This is the thrust of Guha’s argument which dismisses the notion of British r e v hegemony in India. Guha shows how (how often) the colonial power (the British) Uni compromised with traditional values in order to get the consent of the colonized e subject in its rule. In this context, he argues that the ordinary colonized subjects in at St British India understood the colonizers’ persuasive principles in a different idiom: in n terms of dharma. Dhurma in India demands that the king (the ruler) ensure that his o eg subjects are not denied certain minimum rights (the right to a bare subsistence, the r O right to pursue their religion, etc.). A dharmic king would also undertake certain [ y programs for economic improvements (providing irrigation facilities, etc.). On the b d other hand, resistance takes on the form of dharmic protest when people are denied e ad those minimum rights. For example, dhurma requires that the king should not o nl indulge in luxury during a period of famine and that, if the king has surplus stocks w o of foodgrains, he will distribute them to the people. Otherwise, people would have D the right to rise in rebellion against the king to take possession of the surplus foodgrains. Guha points out that the British persuasive principles in India were combinations of modernism and dharma. He reads this as a compromise of the colonial power with traditional principles-its failure to impart modem values, that is, its lack of hegemony. I concur with Guha’s view that British persuasive principles in India were combinations of modernism and traditional values. What distances me from Guha is the theoretical understanding of the concrete situation; while Guha reads this as lack of hegemony, I find in it the beginning of a new kind of hegemony-synthetic hegemony-the structure of which I have already described. So what is at issue here 4. I present here the Cambridge position in the light of Guha’s treatment of the subject (1989). 50 Chaudhury is a theoretical question: What does hegemony mean? It is in this context that I develop the concept of synthetic hegemony to have a theoretical understanding of the situation. Both the Cambridge historiography and Guha share a simplistic notion of hegemony and debate over its presence during the British rule in India. I argue that one needs to dismiss this simplistic notion of hegemony to understand the nature of colonial hegemony and its continuity into the present (postcolonial) phase, while preparing the background for what might be a richer analysis of its concrete nature. For example, it is interesting to examine how the colonial power alters 5 (displaces) traditional values in order to combine them with modem values. Per- 1 0 haps, contrary to what Guha argues, we might find that the British did not merely 2 y compromise with traditional values; it altered them, modified them, effaced them, r ua that is, overdetermined them. This alters our sense of time, space, and religion-all n a in the light of modernism. The concrete analysis of this situation is beyond the J 6 scope of the present essay; the objective here is to produce a theoretical break so that 1 5 we can undertake this project. 1 5: 1 at Synthetic Hegemony in Althusser’s Terms ] y sit It is useful, then, to reformulate the problem in terms of the notion of over- r e v determination. The current discourse on colonial hegemony opposes modernism to ni U tradition; the prevalence of the principle of modernism in the colonized country is e understood as an index of hegemony of the colonial power while the appropriation at St of the traditional values on its part is called “spurious hegemony,” that is, it is n understood as a failure of (proper) hegemony (Guha 1989). In this paper, I have o g e argued that such hegemony is not “spurious hegemony” or an index of weakness on r O the part of the colonial power. Quite the contrary, it is a more subtle form of [ by hegemony that needs to be analyzed if we are to understand the strength of d (post)colonial power and the weakness of the colonial mind. So what is involved e d a here is, primarily, a theoretical question. At the level of concrete analysis I concur o nl with the view that simple hegemony has not worked in the colonial context. But w o while Guha equates this absence as an absence of hegemony, I read in it the D presence of a more subtle form of hegemony. The question that intrigues me is: How come that modernism could appropriate, smoothly, the principle of tradition, a dissimilar thing? The idea comes readily enough, then, that modernism and tradi- tion are not two entirely dissimilar or antithetical things, for in that case the appropriation would have not been so smooth. In other words, the notion of tradition itself changes in the presence of modemism. That is to say, modernism displaces tradition: we view tradition in the light (logic) of modernism and therefore as an aspect of modernism. In Althusser’s terms-as restructured by Resnick and Wolff (1987)-this means that tradition is overdetermined by modernism; modern- ism and tradition are not two entirely opposed things that can be divided into separate watertight compartments. Modernism determineskonstitutes (and is de- termined/constituted by) tradition. This overdetermining aspect of modernism (and Brown Orientalism 51 by implication, of tradition) is one of the entry-point concepts of this essay to the current discourse on colonial hegemony. To focus upon this overdetermining aspect, first and foremost it is necessary to modify Althusser’s notion of over- determination in order to locate in it a theoretical space for tradition. Resnick and Wolff‘s treatment of overdetermination provides a convenient point of departure. Resnick and Wolff concur with the general postmodern view that there is no universal theory (as in Kuhn and Rorty); there are many sets of theories contending with one another. They point out the importance of working out the consequences of 5 this co-existence: how theories overdetermine each other. Our project is an im- 1 0 mediate extension of that of Resnick and Wolff. What are the theoretical con- 2 y sequences of the coexistence of modernism and tradition-how do they over- r ua determine each other? To sharpen this question, I emphasize that the different sets n a of theories that prevail at a certain point of time do not have equal status; some J 6 theories are dominant while the others are subject to subordination. A theory of 1 5 (post)colonial hegemony amounts to working out the implications of the over- 1 5: determining aspects of the dominant culture (modernism) and the subordinate 1 at culture (tradition). In what follows, I shall first extend the scope of Althusser’s y] framework to locate in it a theoretical space for tradition and then work out the sit implications of this extension. r e v Althusser calls into question Hegel’s paradigm of simple contradictions in which ni U all contradictions can be reduced to one (the universal) which is the ground (source, e origin) of all other contradictions. Althusser does away with the concept of the at St universal and instead posits a notion of totality (without any implied essence) which n is a complex structure of three structures: the economic, the political, and the o g e ideological. There are contradictions within each structure and also among the r O structures. These contradictions are overdetermined in the sense that contradictions [ y in one structure depend on the contradictions in the others. What is involved is a b d simultaneous process; contradictions in one structure (say, the political or the e d a ideological) cannot be reduced to the contradictions in the economic (as in orthodox o nl Marxism). w o As Resnick and Wolff argue, overdetermination means that each structure not D only determines the others but also constitutes them. Overdetermination involves, among other things, displacement of contradictions from one structure to another; that is to say, contradictions in one structure appear in alteredforms (in disguise) in the contradictions of the other structures. For instance, the economic is over- determined in the sense that it is also the political (or the ideological) because it contains some of the contradictions in the political (or the ideological) in altered forms. This implies that there is an ambiguity in the structures; we cannot give a precise name to a structure. For example, the economic can be called the political and vice versa. Naming a structure involvesforgerfulness: to name a structure, one must forget the moments of the other structures present in it in disguise. In short, the moments of a structure have a symbolic character, which Laclau and Mouffe (1985) talk about. This leads us to the important question: How can one define the social structure as a complex of three structures-the economic, the political, and the