WWaarrffaarree iinn tthhee AAggee ooff NNoonn--SSttaattee AAccttoorrss:: IImmpplliiccaattiioonnss ffoorr tthhee UUSS AArrmmyy The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 22000077 MMiilliittaarryy HHiissttoorryy SSyymmppoossiiuumm KKeennddaallll DD.. GGootttt MMaannaaggiinngg EEddiittoorr MMiicchhaaeell GG.. BBrrooookkss GGeenneerraall EEddiittoorr Combat Studies Institute Press Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors Implications for the U.S. Army The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2007 Military History Symposium Kendall D. Gott Managing Editor Michael G. Brooks General Editor Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Warfare in the age of non-state actors : implications for the US Army / Kendall D. Gott,managing edi­ tor ; Michael G. Brooks, general editor. p. cm. 1. War. 2. Military art and science. I. Gott, Kendall D. II. Brooks, Michael G. U21.W37 2007 355.02--dc22 2007039159 First Printing: December 2007 CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at:http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/ CSIpubs.asp The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s offi cial seal on any republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the Director of CSI. Book Design by Michael G. Brooks ii Contents Foreword ............................................................................................................. vii Keynote Address The Army and the Global War on Terrorism General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey ......................................................... 1 Question and Answer ..................................................................................... 17 Day 1, Panel 1: International Perspectives A French View on the War in French-Algeria by Lieutenant Colonel (FR) Philippe Francois ............................................. 21 Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2006 by Mr. Adam Harmon ................................................................................... 41 Question and Answer .................................................................................... 49 Day 1, Panel 2: The Role of Culture Caliphate and Islamofascism: Two Irrelevant Factors in the Long War by Dr. Michael Scheuer ................................................................................. 59 The American Culture of War by Dr. Adrian Lewis ...................................................................................... 65 Question and Answer .................................................................................... 85 Day 1, Panel 3: Shaping the Battlefield The Policing Paradox: The Dilemma of Colonial Policing and Military Security in the Age of Terrorism by Dr. Derek Catsam ..................................................................................... 93 Shaping the Conditions for a Post Confl ict Environment by Major(P) Douglas Davids. ...................................................................... 103 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 127 Day 2, Featured Speaker Strategic Communications—The Information Battlefield by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV .......................................... 141 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 167 iii Day 2, Panel 4: On the Ground in Iraq The Challenge of Providing Security in the Post-Combat Phase Urban Environment by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Farrell, Ph.D. ............................................... 179 The Baghdad Security Plan and Non-State Actors by Ms. Linda Robinson ............................................................................... 189 Question and Answer .................................................................................. 201 Day 2, Panel 5: Non-State Actors, the US Army, and the Law of War At War with Non-State Entities by Mr. Lee A. Casey ................................................................................... 209 Legal Doctrines for War Among the People by Dr. Michael F. Noone, Jr. ....................................................................... 231 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 241 Day 2, Featured Speaker The Army and the Future of Irregular Conflict Major General (Retired) Robert H. Scales, Jr. ............................................ 249 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 263 Day 3, Leadership Lecture Series Guest Speaker US Representative Ike Skelton, IV (D. MO) Chairman, House Armed Services Committee ........................................... 273 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 281 Day 3, Panel 6: Middle East Perspective Hezbollah as a Non-State Actor in the Second Lebanon War: An Operational Analysis by Lieutenant Colonel Abe Marrero, Ph.D. ................................................ 287 Iraq and Global Insurgency: Dien Bien Phu or Khe Sahn? by Dr. Wm. J. Olson .................................................................................... 297 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 317 Day 3, Featured Speaker The Nature of Irregular Conflict in the 21st Century by Mr. Ralph Peters .................................................................................... 325 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 343 iv Day 3, Featured Speaker Global Security: Continuing Conflict in the Middle East by Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett ........................................................................ 351 Question and Answer ................................................................................... 385 Appendix A: Conference Program ................................................................... 391 Appendix B: About the Presenters ................................................................... 395 v Foreword The annual Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium, now in its fifth year, pro­ vides a forum for the interchange of ideas on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the United States Army. Furthermore, the Symposium solicits input from a diverse group of military personnel, government historians, civilian academicians, journalists and thinkers in a setting that promotes the exchange of ideas and information. With the support of the US Army Command and General Staff School staff, this year’s Symposium was held 11-13 September 2007 at the new Lewis and Clark Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 2007 symposium’s theme, “Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors: Implications for the US Army” explored the challenges associated with conflict between nation states and trans­ national religious, ethnic, or criminal groups. It examined the historical experiences of both the United States and other nations in this most asymmetric of environments in an attempt to distill the insights from the past can provide us guidance into the future. In addition to the many excellent panelists who presented their research, this year we were fortunate again to have a number very distinguished featured speakers. Representative Ike Skel­ ton IV and General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey not only addressed the symposium, but the entire student body of the Command and General Staff College. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth shared his recent experience in Iraq as the Director of Strategic Effects for Multination Forces-Iraq. These proceedings contain the papers and presentations of all the speakers and panelists, as well as the transcriptions of selected question and answer periods following the presentations. These materials are also posted on-line at http://usacac.army.mil/cac/csi/conference07.asp. These annual symposia continue to be an important event, for the past has much to offer in the analysis of contemporary military challenges. The Army also continues to derive many impor­ tant insights from non-military historians and thinkers who add to the Army’s own historical efforts. The phrase “history with a purpose” captures the goal of all Combat Studies Institute publications. We intend for the readers of this volume to find the experience useful in their cur­ rent and future endeavors. CSI - The Past is Prologue. Timothy R. Reese Colonel, Armor Director, Combat Studies Institute vii Day 1—Keynote Speaker (Addressing Symposium Members and the Command and General Staff College Student Body) The Army and the Global War on Terrorism (Transcript of Presentation) General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey Adjunct Professor of International Relations United States Military Academy Thank you all for the invitation to be out here, and I very much appreciate the chance to come here and share some ideas. Let me . . . with your permission, what I’ll do is I’m going to run through some slides. I sort of miss the old place. This is the first year in the new build­ ing. . . there used to be a giant pit right in front of the speakers, and the only way I can get the Infantry officers to pay attention to me, I’d hang my toes right over the edge, and they’d be in just a paroxysm of hope that I’d fall in sometime during the presentation. I never fell in, though I have seen one person go off. There was a net down there. Did you know that? A net for the wayward generals blundering over the edge. You know, some of this, combat leadership, 75% of the officers in CGSC have one or more tours in combat. Some of them have more combat time than anyone in uniform since World War II. We’ve had some fights out there in Iraq, and small unit actions in Afghanistan that are just tough as it gets. Fallujah, Stalingrad, Tarawa, it’s all the same stuff. We’ve been committed now, peacekeeping or war fighting, essentially since the Balkans. Damn near since 1996, 1994, DESERT SHIELD prior to that. It’s continuous operations. We’re pretty experienced. Let me review some of these ideas, then perhaps, we can have an open conversation, and you can table your own thoughts, and I can respond to your own interests. We can talk about whatever you want. You know, I try and use my hat as a professor up at West Point to get non­ partisan, objective engagement in national security and homeland security. I’m in and out of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, the Russian Federation, etcetera, trying to understand the situation and then be supportive of a strong national defense. A lot of times in front of Congressional committees, and then trying to help explain the national security chal­ lenge through the media to the American people. So let me run through some ideas, and then we can have an open conversation. One thing I would underscore, for the American officers in particular, they are part of an organization of 2.4 million men and women, active, guard, reserves, civilian component. A gi­ ant enterprise, enormously sophisticated, spread across the face of the Earth, spending literally hundreds of billions of dollars in a steady cash flow. That war we’re fighting is $12 billion a month. So this immensely complex structure. But at the end of the day, it boils down to we’re fighting battalions, and squadrons, and ships. How do you get them into action, support them? The rest of us are merely supporting that reality. That’s it. Don’t forget that. Understand you’re trying to, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 1 two current, immediate, point of the spear conflicts we’ve got going on, that’s what we’re do­ ing. That’s sort of my own sort of understanding of here’s what we’re trying to do. And by the way, this is a mission. The fact you got it by default . . . you know, some of the most brilliant people in our government, hands down, are foreign service officers. Three, four hundred appli­ cants for each position. But at the end of the day, if you’re dealing in a lawless part of the world, chaotic, dangerous, you have to have people that can go and do projects, spend money, support political, and economic, and military development, we turn around and we ask the armed forces to do it. You’re carrying a nine millimeter pistol, you got a driver, you got a generator, you’ll follow orders. So we’re going to ask you to step in when we have a hurricane, when there’s a mail strike, when there’s a crisis, we’re going to ask you to do it. So a lot of these activities may not have been optimal for the US armed forces, but it’s your job. The Army is also still charged with fighting, with never getting in a fair fight, with destroy­ ing threats to your unit, to your mission. And finally . . . periodically I like to remind people, you’re not only protecting the physical security and reputation of the military units you’re in command of. You’re also protecting our honor. The worst thing that can happen to you in combat is not to get killed, it’s to lose your honor. Occasionally we slip away from that. Sort of the fundamental description, how do you decide those great issues of integrity? Can I tell my mother what I’m about to do and feel proud of it or not? And if the answer is no, don’t do it. Protect the honor of the soldiers under your command. You know all this. You talk about it. You’re exposed to the media. You understand it’s a new reality. We went a long time, we went the better part of three generations where essentially, our entire template of doctrinal design, equipment, training, was governed by counter force de­ terrence to a single, coherent threat. It’s gone, never coming back. Hopefully we’ll never again be in a confrontation with another power block. Now every smart officer out there on the face of the Earth is thinking, “How do I counter US military power, or allied coalition operations?” And the last way to do it is to directly confront a tank/mech infantry unit of the 1st CAV, 3d ID, 1st ID in combat. That’s not the way to go about it. Or an air-to-air direct confrontation with a Navy carrier. So asymmetrical warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counter drug operations to support. You’ve got to take on those missions. That’s part of defending the American people. We are engaged in a global war on terror. I sometimes think we have made a mistake using that metaphor, that organizing conceptual architecture around a war on terror. We’re sort of stuck with the language. We’ve got to understand to some extent that terrorism threat you and I face, and our allies face, is more akin to a cancer affecting the international community than it is to a war fighting operation. The way to deal with the global war on terror, many of us would argue, is more preventative and educational, information warfare, and engaging the other tools of American power, diplomatic covert action, new legal treaties, alliances, than it is in war fighting capabilities. You’re also stuck in this challenge. The United States Army and Marine Corps are too damn small. We’ve got a strategy that probably requires 800,000 plus soldiers, and we’re try­ ing to do it with the smallest Army since 1939. With a pathetic attempt to build that force at 7,000 people a year, and maybe we’ll get it up to 30,000 people a year. This is a country with 2 300 million people in the nation. When my dad sat in here in 1942, we put together a military that went from a quarter of a million to 16 million, and we did it in four years. So I think, to be blunt, we have a mismatch between strategy and resources. And part of that is infrastructure. But that’s something you’ve got to deal with. This is an unending challenge, and a change. And we don’t do it very well in the US armed forces. It seems to me we’ve got to get into a mindset that says this is a permanent reality that you’re going to operate under the scrutiny of digital global communications, and that this is not an anomaly. It’s not an information warfare. It’s your responsibility as a military officer to respond to that scrutiny. This one’s sort of new. This used to be . . . protecting human rights was just a mark of a disciplined military force. Now it may well be the object of a military opera­ tion. And then finally, I don’t want us to walk away from this on a bet. There is a continuing threat of high intensity combat employing nuclear weapons. We’ve got to take that into ac­ count. We have to have the doctrine to deal with it. You’ve got to study it. You’ve got to un­ derstand that at some point, that could be in your future. We’ve seen examples of it, certainly again, Fallujah, Ramadi, some of the 1st Armored Division fighting south of Baghdad. But at some point, there could be a blunder in the international community and we’ve have to take down the North Korean armed forces. And that’s a permanent responsibility to understand how to do it and to organize for that capability. Afghanistan is the non-Iraq. Everything about Afghanistan is different. Bigger country, more people, unbelievably beautiful scene. Many of you have been there. Twenty-five to 50 years from now when we get the mines up, and the war is over, and it’s a thriving economy, it will be a major tourist destination. Tremendous people, survivors, trying to come out of 14th century poverty and constant warfare. Having said that, both Iraq and Afghanistan have elements of bitter sectarian strife, a.k.a. civil war, tribal struggles, ethnic struggles, on top of which there’s . . . you know, the biggest challenge for most societies is how do you deal with criminal behavior, corruption? How do you construct a system of justice, prosecutors, defense attorneys, prisons, police who have integrity and courage? How do you take nice boys who now will be happy to go into the military academy and become a soldier, how do you get the same sense of service to have them go become police of­ ficers? And by the way, it’s harder to produce good policemen than good Marines and soldiers. You’ve got to start at around 21. You don’t want to start at 17 or 18. You want them to get five years of experience before you really start getting a capable law enforcement officer. And if the kid joins a criminal organization in police uniforms, he’ll never get there. So you’ve got a challenge in both of these societies of the lack of an operative police force. And then you’ve got foreign jihadist interventions, hijacked Islam, call it what you will. Is­ lam is a religion of peace and cooperation, hospitality. There’s no reason . . . there’s absolutely no reason why Islam has to be congruent with distrust of foreigners in the West, but that’s there. We’ve got to take into account, and particularly as a secular society in the United States, we have a difficult time talking to that issue and understanding it. Then we’ve got a challenge, you know. None of these things happen in isolation. 3