J o Objectivity is a key concept both in how we talk about science h n in everyday life and in the philosophy of science. This Element explores various ways in which recent philosophers of science have thought about the nature, value and achievability of objectivity. The first section explains the general trend in recent philosophy of science away from a notion of objectivity as a Philosophy of Science ‘view from nowhere’ to a focus on the relationship between objectivity and trust. Section 2 discusses the relationship between objectivity and recent arguments attacking the viability or desirability of ‘value free’ science. Section 3 outlines Longino’s influential ‘social’ account of objectivity, suggesting some worries about drawing too strong a link between o objectivity in epistemic and ethical virtues. Section 4 turns to the value of b je objectivity, exploring concerns that notions of objectivity are c t iv politically problematic, and cautiously advocating in response a it view of objectivity in terms of invariance. y in Science S c ie n c e About the Series Series Editors This series of Elements in Philosophy of Jacob Stegenga Science provides an extensive overview University of of the themes, topics and debates which Cambridge Stephen John constitute the philosophy of science. Distinguished specialists provide an up-to-date summary of the results of current research on their topics, as well as offering their own take on those topics and drawing original conclusions. Cover image: BSIP / Contributor/ Universal Images Group/Getty Images Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to tIhSeS NCa 2m51b7r-id72g7e3 C (oorneline) terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 ISSN 2517-7265 (print) Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 ElementsinthePhilosophyofScience editedby JacobStegenga UniversityofCambridge OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE Stephen John University of Cambridge Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia 314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi–110025,India 79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906 CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781009065337 DOI:10.1017/9781009063647 ©StephenJohn2021 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2021 AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN978-1-009-06533-7Paperback ISSN2517-7273(online) ISSN2517-7265(print) CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 Objectivity in Science ElementsinthePhilosophyofScience DOI:10.1017/9781009063647 Firstpublishedonline:May2021 StephenJohn UniversityofCambridge Authorforcorrespondence:StephenJohn,[email protected] Abstract:Objectivityisakeyconceptbothinhowwetalkaboutscience ineverydaylifeandinthephilosophyofscience.ThisElementexplores variouswaysinwhichrecentphilosophersofsciencehavethought aboutthenature,valueandachievabilityofobjectivity.Thefirstsection explainsthegeneraltrendinrecentphilosophyofscienceawayfroma notionofobjectivityasa‘viewfromnowhere’toafocusonthe relationshipbetweenobjectivityandtrust.Section2discussesthe relationshipbetweenobjectivityandrecentargumentsattackingthe viabilityordesirabilityof‘valuefree’science.Section3outlines Longino’sinfluential‘social’accountofobjectivity,suggestingsome worriesaboutdrawingtoostrongalinkbetweenepistemicandethical virtues.Section4turnstothevalueofobjectivity,exploringconcerns thatnotionsofobjectivityarepoliticallyproblematic,andcautiously advocatinginresponseaviewofobjectivityintermsofinvariance. Keywords:philosophyofscience,objectivity,bias,trust,valuesinscience ©StephenJohn2021 ISBNs:9781009065337(PB),9781009063647(OC) ISSNs:2517-7273(online),2517-7265(print) Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 Contents 1 Objectivity:ProcessesandProducts 1 2 Values,InterestsandIdeals 13 3 Values,DiversityandDebate 35 4 IsObjectivityJustMaleSubjectivity? 46 References 62 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 ObjectivityinScience 1 1Objectivity:ProcessesandProducts Considersomequotationsfromrecentnewsarticles: [Thecourt’sjudgment]givesjudiciallicenceforwomenandmenwhospeak upforobjectivetruthandcleardebatetobesubjecttoaggression,bullying, no-platformingandeconomicpunishment(Bowcott,2019). Whenpresentedwithliesversustruth,everyjournalistisfacingatestof conscience.Areyoubeingtrulyobjectiveandjustorareyoubeingselective and partial? What does your decision reveal? TRUTH AIN’T LIE! (Kuo, 2019). Teachers,particularlyofthesciences,havesmuggledpoliticalpositions intowhatshouldbefactualandobjectivesubjects(Seaman,2019). All three of these quotes vividly convey a sense that it is important to be ‘objective’–tospeakupforobjectivetruth,toengageinobjectivejournalism ortomaintaintheobjectivityofteaching–but,also,thatobjectivityisfragile, and under attack. In turn, they relate to broader social worries that we are movingintoapost-truthworld,dominatedby‘fakenews’andadisregardfor scienceandrationality.Buttheyarepuzzling:theysuggestthatcertainthings– selectivity,partiality,politicalcommitments–threatenobjectivity,butisthere anythingmoretoobjectivity thantheabsence ofthesefactors? Tocomplicate mattersfurther,allthreequotesariseinthecontextofheatedongoingdebates. The first quoteis a response to a ruling overtransgender rights; the second is fromChina’sMinistryofForeignAffairs,beratingcoverageofChina’sdomes- tic policies; and the third is from a climate sceptic, decrying the teaching of climate science in schools. Can talk of objectivity really resolve politically chargeddebates,orisitjustamaskforsocialandpoliticalagendas? Thereisanobviousresponsetotheseconcerns:toturntothephilosophyof science. After all, many philosophers of science have held that a distinctive feature of scientific inquiry is that it aims at objectivity, and that we should assess and criticise putatively ‘scientific’ practices in terms of whether or not theyareobjective.Unfortunately,theconceptofobjectivityisnotstraightfor- ward. For example, in an influential article questioning the objectivity of the medicalsciences,Stegengadefinesanobjectiveprocessasbeing‘notsensitive toresearchers’personalidiosyncrasiesandbiases’(Stegenga,2011,499).This definition sounds plausible; it seems fairly clear that processes which are affected by biases are not objective. But, on reflection, it raises a series of questions:couldn’tbiasessometimesleadustotrueclaims?Don’twevaluethe insightsofidiosyncraticgeniuses?Wouldourprocessesbeanybetteratknow- ledge production if they were affected by shared, rather than idiosyncratic, biases?Cananyprocessbeentirelyinsensitivetoresearchers’idiosyncrasies? Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 2 PhilosophyofScience In turn, these epistemological problems intersect with broader debates. On theonehand,theyrelatetometaphysicaldebatesoverrealismandrepresenta- tion:inwhatsenseisaqualityliketheefficacyofdrugs‘outthere’,waitingtobe discovered, and to whatextent does it dependon us? On the other hand,they relatetodebatesovertheproperrelationshipbetweenscience,society,politics andeconomics:canmedicalscienceeverbeobjectivewhensomuchisfunded bythepharmaceuticalindustry?Wouldwebebetter-offweremedicalscience nationalised? Wehavenoshortageofreasons,bothpracticalandtheoretical,tounderstand debates overthe nature of scientific objectivity. The aim ofthis Element is to provideanoverviewofsomeofthem.Ofcourse,objectivityisavasttopicfor ashortstudy;assuch,mycoverageispartial.Specifically,Ifocusonfourtopics: the turn to trust in recent work on objectivity (Section 1); the relationship between biases, values and objectivity (Section 2); the relationship between objectivity and social structures (Section 3); and the relationship between objectivity and the notion of epistemic perspectives or situated knowledges (Section4).Inevitably,IdonotdiscussthesetopicsinasmuchdepthasIwould like,andtherearemanytopicsIwouldliketodiscussbutwhichIdonottouch on at all; I warn the reader of any major gaps as I go along. The topic of objectivity is not only vast, but also controversial. I have tried to provide a balanced account of various debates, but I see no point in hiding my own opiniononsomekeydebates.Ido,however,trytowarnthereaderwhereIinsert myself into the text. As we will see in Section 2, though, it is an interesting questionwhetherbeingopenaboutmyownbiasesisenoughformyclaimstobe objective! 1.1ProliferatingSensesofObjectivity Wecanidentifythreeconstraintsonanyplausibleaccountofscientificobject- ivity;itshouldbeconcernedwithrepresentation,pickoutsomethingvaluable anditshouldbeviable.Beforegoingon,Ishallexplainthesedesiderata. First,Itakeitthatanyaccountofobjectivityshouldhavesomefidelitywith oureverydayusesoftheterm.Inturn,Isuggestthatthisimpliesthatobjectivity talkisprimarilyconcernedwithpracticesofrepresentation.Althoughweuse the term objective in a variety of ways – to refer to certain sorts of factual claims, or to certain processes for generating factual claims or to virtues of individual scientists – these uses are united by a sense that objectivity is concerned with representing the world; we care that evidence amalgamation methodsinmedicineareobjectivebecause,iftheyarenot,wedoubtthatthey willbeaccurateguidestofiguringoutwhetherdrugswillworkornot;wecare Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 ObjectivityinScience 3 that journalists are objective because they are supposed to tell us what is actuallyhappening.Ofcourse,insomecases,objectivitymaybetied-upwith virtuesotherthanrepresentationalaccuracy;forexample,youmightthinkitis important that a judge is ‘objective’ in the sense that she is impartial; or we mightthinkitisimportantthatscientistsbuildingaclimatemodelare‘object- ive’,evenifthesenseinwhichamodel‘represents’theworldiscomplex.Still, Isuggestthat,eveninthesetrickiercases,talkofobjectivityisoftenboundup with concerns about representation: the judge should be impartial because partialitygetsinthewayofreachingwhat,accordingtothelaw,wouldbethe ‘right’answer;agoodclimatemodelneednotbeaccurateineveryregard,but itsgoodnessis,atleastinpart,afunctionoftheaccuracyofitspredictions.By contrast,talkofobjectivityseemsalittlestrangeincaseswherethereisnolink to practices of representation. For example, it would seem odd to say that an engineer redesigning a toaster should be ‘objective’ in her work (although, tellingly,itdoesmakesensetosaythatsheshouldbeobjectiveinreportingthe resultsofherwork–say,whetherthetoasterreallyuseslesselectricity).Below, I will return to the obvious worry that notions of accurate representation are metaphysically tricky; still, that worry is separate from whether we think of scientificobjectivityintermsofaccuraterepresentation. Inthissense,scientificobjectivityneedstobedistinguishedfromadifferent ‘purelyprocedural’senseofobjectivity,asfollowinganyoldruleblindly.For example, imagine an examiner who blindly follows the exam marking guide- lines,placingherownsenseofcandidates’abilitytooneside.Wemightsaythat she acts objectively, even if we share her suspicion that those guidelines are fatally flawed as a guide to candidates’ ability. When we talk about scientific processesasobjective,though,wetypicallyimplysomethingmore:thatthese processeshelpusrepresenttheworldwell,ratherthanthattheycanbefollowed inaroboticmanner.(Muchmoreonthisdistinctiontofollow.) Second,objectivityisepistemicallyvaluable;wehavegoodreasontoensure epistemicpracticesareobjectiveandtotrustobjectivepractices.Ofcourse,that isnottosaythatobjectivityisalwaysvaluable;perhapstherearecaseswhere weshouldbendthetruthforthesakeofsomegreatergood.Norisittodenythat thereareimportantcriticismsofobjectivity,forexamplefromfeministcritics (see Section 4). Still, in general, it seems that we value objectivity, and any decentaccountoftheconceptshouldcapturethisthought. Third,theconceptofobjectivityissupposedtobeaction-guiding,inthesense thatitprovidesayardstickforassessingandchangingepistemicpractices.As such,objectivitymustbeviable;evenifitisimpossibleforaperson,processor claim to be fully objective, it must be possible to be more or less objective. A nice question, to which we will return shortly, is how to relate this third Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647 4 PhilosophyofScience desideratum to the first: the stronger our account of what is required for an ‘objective’representationoftheworld,theharderitistoseehowthenotionof objectivitycouldguideaction. Beyond these three desiderata, matters get more complex. Megill (1994) thinksthattherearefourkeysensesofobjectivity;Gaukrogerlistsfivesenses (Gaukroger,2012,chapter1);Douglas(2004)mayseemmoremodest,suggest- ing three ‘modes’ of objectivity (in terms of processes of interaction with the world, features of individuals’ thought processes and social procedures), but thensuggeststhateachmodeisfurthersub-dividedintodifferentforms.Most terrifyingly of all, in an influential article, Marianne Janack lists 13 senses of objectivityshehasfoundintheliterature: (1) objectivityasvalueneutrality; (2) objectivityaslackofbias,withbiasunderstoodasincluding:(a)personal attachment; (b) political aims; (c) ideological commitments; (d) prefer- ences;(e)desires;(f)interests;(g)emotion; (3) objectivityasscientificmethod; (4) objectivityasrationality; (5) objectivityasanattitudeof‘psychologicaldistance’; (6) objectivityas‘world-directedness’; (7) objectivityasimpersonality; (8) objectivityasimpartiality; (9) objectivityashavingtodowithfacts; (10) objectivityashavingtodowiththingsastheyareinthemselves;object- ivityasuniversality; (11) objectivityasdisinterestedness; (12) objectivityascommensurability; (13) objectivityasintersubjectiveagreement(Janack,2002,275). In short, everyone agrees that the term objectivity is used in a lot of ways (eveniftheydisagreeoverhowmany). Ofcourse,itispossiblethatatermisusedinvariousways,butwithashared core meaning. For example, looking at Janack’s list, we might think that the conceptofobjectivityaslackofbias(sense2)stemsfromaconcernthatbias getsinthewayofcreating‘intersubjectiveagreement’(sense13);that‘imper- sonality’(sense7)isimportantformuchthesamereason;andsoon.However, therearereasonstothinkthatobjectivitytalkmightnotjustbecomplex,but,in Douglas’phrase,‘irreduciblycomplex’:thattheremaybenoguaranteethatall ofthedifferentsensesofobjectivitywillcoincide(Douglas,2004). Broadly, these reasons stem from the fact that contemporary notions of objectivity have a complex history. As Loraine Daston and Peter Galison Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. on 15 Feb 2022 at 20:54:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009063647