/316/4 United States General Accounting Office .;, GAO Briefing Report to the Honorable ’ P&e Wilson, U.S. Senate AMMUNITION AND November 1986 EXPLOSIVES * Improved Controls and Accountability at Fort Bragg 131616 Q.g4m GAO/NSIAD-87-44BR GAO United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-225076 November 13, 1986 The Honorable Pete Wilson Chairman, Task Force on DOD Inventory Management Committee on Armed Services United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: On August 18, 1986, you requested that we review the management of ammunition and explosives (A&E) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, one of the Army's largest bases. Specifically, you asked that we follow up on the issues raised in previous reports and report on (1) the impact of the Army's revised regulations on A&E management and (2) the reasons for the continued A&E losses at Fort Bragg. PREVIOUS REPORTS OF ARMY'S LACK OF CONTROL OVER A&E The Army's lack of control over A&E, especially at Fort Bragg, has been the focus of several recent reports. In September 1985, the Army Inspector General reported that the Army was losing accountability over large quantities of A&E. In May and August 1986, the Army Audit Agency reported on specific control problems at Fort Bragg. In May 1986, we also reported on the Army's A&E accountability problems, as part of our overall report on the Department of Defense's (DOD'S) problems in accountability and security of supply inventories. At the request of the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, the Army's Inspector General conducted a special follow-up inspection of A&E accountability at Fort Bragg from August 21 to 28, 1986 ("Special Follow-Up Inspection of Ammunition and Explosives Accountability, Fort Bragg--Actions Memorandum," Sept. 11, 1986). The Inspector General's findings were similar to some of those discussed in this report. The Inspector General recommended to the Army's Vice Chief of Staff that the Inspec- tor General's office conduct an Army-wide assessment of A&E accountability, starting in January 1987. IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE Since your August 1986 request, we have again reviewed A&E accountability at Fort Bragg and found that the Army and Fort Bragg have made or are in the process of making several improvements in control, management, and accountability ~-225076 procedures for A&E. The Army has recently set standards for the type and amount of A&E to be used for training and has improved the management of A&E at the Ammunition Supply Point. Fort Bragg has also increased command awareness of A&E control, especially through updated command regulations and through inspections. The Army's major improvement has been to reduce the amount of A&E used in training. For example, while Fort Bragg used 19,222 fragmentation grenades for training in fiscal year 1985, it has authorized only 5,737 for fiscal year 1987--a 70-percent reduction. This should reduce losses because the smaller the amount issued, the less the opportunity for theft. (The Army Inspector General's September 1985 report concluded that "theft of opportunity" was the main reason A&E was stolen.) A&E CONTINUES TO BE FOUND At Fort Bragg, significant amounts of A&E continue to be found at unauthorized locations. For example, during the first 11 months of fiscal year 1986, 148 pounds of C-4 explosive, 142 pounds of TNT, 1,080 feet of detonating cord, 13 fragmentation hand grenades, and 35 anti-personnel mines were recovered from unauthorized locations. Some of these explosives were recov- ered by local police in private residences and found by chil- dren in residential neighborhoods. In addition to these recoveries, significant amounts of A&E are turned in under the Fort Bragg amnesty program. The quantity of A&E lost or stolen but not recovered or otherwise turned in is unknown. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not question that A&E continues to be found at some unauthorized areas at Fort Bragg, but expressed the view that the amount of A&E being recovered is the result of policies and practices from a period before new policy and procedures were implemented by the Army, and that the new policy and procedures should reduce the problem in the future. DOD also attributes many of the recent recoveries to conscientious inspections and aggressive action by Fort Bragg personnel. DOD said that the additional emphasis it is placing on more unit participation in amnesty programs will probably result in additional turn-ins of A&E in the next few months and reduce incidents where A&E is found in unautho- rized areas. ARMY AND FORT BRAGG ADDRESSING REMAINING PROBLEMS In the draft of this report provided to DOD for comment, we identified control weaknesses and recommended further improve- ments to A&E controls at the unit level. We recognized that training must not be hampered by unnecessary controls; however, due to the potential for great harm, we believed that the Army needed to develop more effective ways to prevent loss and theft of A&E. The weaknesses we identified at the unit level were 2 .’ B-225876 -- limited use of inert training devices instead of live A&E, -- reconciliation procedures which do not provide assurance that A&E authorized for training is actually used, -- lack of compliance with Fort Bragg's policies and regulations, -- inadequate disciplinary action taken against soldiers found to have unauthorized A&E, and -- 1st Special Operations Command's (SOCOM's) insufficient accountability for its A&E. After considering (1) recent data provided to us by DOD and (2) actions the Army is taking on the unit-level weaknesses we identified during our review, we believe that the Army and Fort Bragg have developed a workable framework for addressing A&E control problems. However, whether the Army's new policies and procedures will substantially reduce the amount of A&E lost or stolen remains to be demonstrated. Limited use of inert training devices Although Army regulations authorize the use of inert training devices and state that training standards can be achieved with inert rather than live A&E, the Army and Fort Bragg make limited use of inert devices. In June 1986, the Army evaluated and adjusted live A&E training requirements and concluded that it may not be necessary for every unit to do the same type of training using live explosives. As a result, beginning in fiscal year 1988, the Army is eliminating the use of some live explosives for several types of units--mostly combat support units. According to DOD, the Army believes that the authorization for the continued use of mostly live explosives for training selected types of units and their soldiers must remain to allow those commanders who have mission-oriented critical tasks, and short deployment times, the opportunity to ensure that their soldiers are prepared to execute their missions on the battle- field. We realize that the amount of live explosives used for training and the substitution of inert devices for live A&E is a matter of military judgment. However, where training objectives are achievable with inert devices, as stated in the training stan- dards, inert devices should be used. 3 B-225076 Ineffective reconciliation procedures Fort Bragg's procedures for reconciling the amount of A&E provided for training with that actually used are not an effective control. At present, soldiers are required to turn in -- unused A&E within 24 hours after the training event, or -- the residue of used ammunition (the brass casings), the empty boxes from such explosives as C-4 and detonating cord (since these explosives leave no residue), and the pins from fragmentation grenades, within 5 days after the training event. The amount of A&E and the residue or the empty boxes turned in is then to be reconciled with the amount of A&E issued. Recon- ciliation is a time-consuming task which, according to Fort Bragg officials, soldiers sometimes try to avoid by using all A&E issued. Current methods of reconciling ammunition provide no assurance that the ammunition was actually used in training. For exam- ple, we observed the Ammunition Supply Point accepting corroded brass casings as evidence of the use of recently issued train- ing ammunition. Furthermore, on several Fort Bragg training ranges, we found large quantities of brass casings that could have been turned in as "proof" of training ammunition used. We also found that, about 20 percent of the time, the amount of ammunition issued was reconciled exactly with the residue turned in --a highly suspicious situation since the casings (1) are weighed, using a scale accurate only to within 2 pounds, rather than counted and (2) often contained foreign debris. In addition, more than 60 percent of the combined amount of live ammunition and residue reconciled during the first 10 months of fiscal year 1986 was greater than the amount of ammunition issued. In commenting on the ammunition-reconciliation issue, DOD officials told us that Army headquarters is reviewing new, improved procedures to reduce or eliminate the amount of ammunition residue required for turn-in after a training event. For explosives, too, the evidence of use now required provides no assurance that the explosives were actually detonated. Obviously, turning in the boxes that C-4 explosive and detonat- ing cord come in is no assurance that the explosives were actu- ally detonated during training. Also, since fragmentation grenade pins are the same as those in smoke grenades, the pins provide no evidence that the fragmentation grenades issued were used in training. At the ranges we visited, we easily picked up over a hundred pins which could have been used to reconcile fragmentation grenades issued for training. 4 ‘,, B-225076 To improve the reconciliation process for explosives, the September 1985 report of the Army Inspector General recommended that the Army review and evaluate such explosive items as C-4, TNT, and booby traps to determine more effective methods for verifying their actual use. According to DOD officials, the Army is currently evaluating the design of these explosives to determine whether identifying parts can be added which can be retrieved as proof of consumption during training. The Army is also developing new procedures to ensure explosive consumption by having an officer observe and verify that the explosives were consumed. An additional control to reconcile the number of fragmentation grenades issued with the number used would be to require the return of the safety lever-- that part of the grenade that flips off when the grenade is thrown and identifies the type of gre- nade. Although Army policy requires the return of the safety levers, Fort Bragg has not implemented this requirement because it believes retrieving the levers from the training ranges to be too dangerous. The Army and Fort Bragg need to resolve this issue. Units not complying with policies and regulations for the control of A&E Fort Bragg's security inspections made in 1985 and 1986 found that units were not complying with policies and regulations for the control of A&E. For example, units were not maintaining an audit trail for A&E with the required hand receipts and other forms, and soldiers were found to have unauthorized ammunition in their possession. Initially, Fort Bragg's Physical Security Office told us that security inspections would be discontinued for lack of person- nel. However, when we discussed this with Fort Bragg's deputy commanding general, he informed us that the inspections would continue. We believe it important that they do continue and should even be increased because, at a minimum, they increase command awareness of the importance of A&E controls and accountability. Moreover, increased inspections would help create an environment whereby units and soldiers would be more aware that they faced a greater threat of being caught with unauthorized A&E than they have been in the past. Inadequate disciplinary action taken against soldiers found with unauthorized A&E According to Fort Bragg officials, during the past 2 years, 43 Fort Bragg soldiers have received either court martials or Article 15s (non-court martial punishment administered under the Uniform Code of Military Justice) for serious misappropri- ation or misuse of A&E. However, no disciplinary action is taken against Fort Bragg soldiers for less serious offenses 5 ~-225076 involving the removal of A&E from the training ranges. Although soldiers are given security checks after training events when they leave the ranges and again when they return to their barracks, they receive no disciplinary action when they are found to have A&E. DOD officials said that they were unaware that soldiers were not being disciplined when found with unauthorized A&E after training and would investigate this matter further. We believe that, because the control of A&E is so important, Fort Bragg officials need to immediately institute disciplinary actions against soldiers caught with unauthorized A&E after training. SOCOM's accountability for its A&E During our September visit to Fort Bragg, we found that SOCOM was not being held sufficiently accountable for the A&E it uses for training. For example, SOCOM units were not always recon- ciling the use of A&E with the Ammunition Supply Point. Also, SOCOM had no written procedures for controlling A&E. This command was subject to much less control than other units, and some former command personnel had been arrested and convicted for possessing large quantities of A&E. DOD officials informed us that, as of September 1986, SOCOM units drawing ammunition must now reconcile all A&E. Moreover, on November 1, 1986, SOCOM issued a new regulation on "Ammuni- tion Supply, Accountability and Security." Since this regula- tion was issued after we completed our work at Fort Bragg, we have not evaluated it. Fort Bragg and SOCOM will also continue to pursue initiatives and procedures already in place to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. RECOMMENDATIONS In the draft of this report provided to DOD for its review and comment, we made recommendations to (1) eliminate the Army's reconciliation process for small-arms ammunition residue, (2) improve Fort Bragg's controls over SOCOM's A&E account- ability, and (3) increase the use of inert training devices. The Army and Fort Bragg are implementing our recommendation on the reconciliation process. Furthermore, SOCOM's new regula- tion may correct the deficiencies our recommendation addressed. The Army is also taking steps to use more inert devices for some types of training. However, since our work indicated that it may be possible to further increase the use of inert train- ing devices, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army continue to reevaluate whether Army commands are using inert devices (especially for C-4 explosive and mines) to the maximum extent practical for training purposes. To improve accountability and controls over ammunition and explosives at Fort Bragg, we recommend that Fort Bragg 6 B-225076 -- increase inspections on the fort to instill in personnel the need for strict adherence to Army regulations regarding control and accountability for ammunition and explosives, and -- administer penalties to individuals found to have unauthorized ammunition or explosives immediately after training. As agreed with you office, we did not obtain written official agency comments. However, we provided DOD a copy of a draft of this report and on November 3, 1986, we met with DOD and Army officials and obtained DOD's official oral comments. Some of these comments are discussed in this letter, and others appear in the appendixes to this report. We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the House Com- mittee on Government Operations; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be available to other i*nterested parties upon request. If your have any questions, please call Martin M Ferber, Associate Director for Manpower, Logistics, and Financial and General Management, on 275-8412. Sincerely yours, Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General 7 CONTENTS APPENDIX Page I INTRODUCTION 10 Fort Bragg: An Open Base 11 OVerVieW of Fort Bragg's Management of A&E 11 Objective, Scope, and Methodology 12 II IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO FORT BRAGG'S CONTROL OVER A&E 13 Army-Initiated Changes to A&E Controls 13 Fort Bragg-Initiated Changes to A&E Controls 14 III ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WOULD IMPROVE FORT BRAGG'S CONTROL OVER A&E 19 A&E Is Still Being Found Outside the Army's Control System 19 Improvements Still Needed at Unit Level 24 IV FORT BRAGG USAGE AND AUTHORIZATION FOR SELECTED A&E ITEMS, FISCAL YEAR 1985 TO FISCAL YEAR 1987 32 TABLES II.1 Fort Bragg Usage and Authorizations for Selected A&E Items 14 II.2 Chronology of A&E Control Initiatives at Fort Bragg 15 III.1 Examples of A&E Recovered From Unauthorized Locations in Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986 22 III.2 A&E Returned in Fiscal Year 1986 to Fort Bragg's Ammunition Surveillance Branch Under the Army's Amnesty Program 23 8 .,/