NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 76|Number 4 Article 8 4-1-1998 Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State William Kent Packard Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of theLaw Commons Recommended Citation William K. Packard,Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State, 76N.C. L. Rev.1481 (1998). Available at:http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol76/iss4/8 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please [email protected]. A Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State "Is it not almost a self-evident axiom that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen?"' This question, posed by John Stuart Mill in his influential work On Liberty, intrinsically accepts that all children should not only be required to receive an education,' but also that each child should obtain a minimum qualitative level of education. Although education has long been recognized as one of the most important functions of the state by Americans4 and North Carolinians,5 compulsory schooling did not gain general acceptance until the end of the nineteenth century.6 However, Mill's belief that each child should obtain a certain standard of education has only 1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 128 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1987). 2. Mill did not endorse state establishment and control of education, but recognized that government-organized and controlled education, if it existed at all, would force other educators "up to a certain standard of excellence." Id. at 129. 3. See id. at 128. 4. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,221 (1982) ("We have recognized 'the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government,' and as the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society rests.'" (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963); Ambach v. Norwick, 411 U.S. 68, 76 (1979))); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments .... [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." (citations omitted)). 5. See, e.g., City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 106 N.C. 182, 185-86, 11 S.E. 586, 587 (1890) (noting education's prime importance in the state constitution and arguing that education should be forever encouraged); Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153, 157 (1871) (finding education to be a "great governmental consideration" in the first case interpreting the educational provision of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868); Introduction to 2 EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at viii (Sol Cohen ed., 1974) (recognizing that North Carolina's public school system was the best in the antebellum South); Margaret Rose Westbrook, Comment, School FinanceR eform Comes to North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2135 (1995) (noting that North Carolina was only one of six of the original 13 colonies to include an education article in its first constitution and was the second state to establish a state public school system). 6. See MARK G. YODOLF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 14 (3d ed. 1992). North Carolina's first compulsory school law was passed in 1923. See Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 397-98, 329 S.E.2d 636, 645 (1985) (citing Public Laws 1923, ch. 136 § 347). For a discussion of the evolution of North Carolina's compulsory school laws, see id. at 397-99, 329 S.E.2d at 645-46. 1482 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 recently begun to manifest itself.7 Because education plays such a vital role in the lives of Americans, school finance systems that create significant funding disparities among the various school districts within a state have come under attack.8 Since the late 1960s, over sixty lawsuits have been initiated nationwide in efforts to reform state public school funding schemes.9 In Leandro v. State,10 North Carolina joined the states that have held that all children are entitled to the same minimum qualitative level of education, regardless of which schools the children attend." In Leandro, representatives from poor, rural school districts and relatively wealthy urban school districts sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that North Carolina and the North Carolina State Board of Education failed to provide all of their students with adequate and equal educational opportunities under the North Carolina Constitution.12 On an appeal from a dismissal of the school districts' claims, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the children of North Carolina are entitled to a "sound basic education" under the North Carolina Constitution. 3 7. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions,S chool Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave". From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1153 (1995) (noting that recent litigation challenging state school systems concentrates on ensuring a certain minimum quality standard of education). For a discussion on the history of school finance litigation, see infra notes 122-28. 8. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation,2 8 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1991). 9. See Heise, supra note 7, at 1151. 10. 346 N.C. 336,488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). 11. See id. at 350-51, 488 S.E.2d at 255; see also, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 110-11 (Ala. 1993) (upholding a lower court ruling that invalidated the school finance system on both adequacy and equality grounds); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the state's entire education system failed to meet both equality and adequacy standards); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 553-54 (Mass. 1993) (invalidating school finance system on adequacy grounds); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-52 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that an adequacy standard exists, but failing to define such a standard and instead invalidating the school finance system on equal protection grounds); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (holding that the state constitution demands that each child receive a basic education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877-78 (W. Va. 1979) (invalidating the school finance system because the ambitious adequacy standards of the state constitution were violated). 12. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252; see also N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) (requiring the General Assembly to provide funding and support for "a general and uniform system of free public schools ...w herein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students"). 13. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to determine if the State is providing a sound, basic education. See id. at 358, 488 S.E.2d at 261. 1998] CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION RIGHTS 1483 For the first time, the children of North Carolina have a recognized right to an opportunity to receive an education that will allow them to become productive citizens.4 However, the real test of this constitutional right will be determined on remand, when the trial court decides whether the children in the plaintiffs' districts are receiving a sound, basic education.'" This Note first reviews the facts of Leandro and discusses the North Carolina Supreme Court's reasoning.'6 After examining North Carolina's current school finance system, 7 the Note traces the history of school finance litigation in the United States.'8 The Note then examines the supreme court's opinion in Leandro using a three-step analysis. First, it analyzes the supreme court's finding that the North Carolina Constitution guarantees a minimum substantive level of education.'9 Second, it examines the supreme court's definition of a "sound basic education" by comparison with similar definitions from other states granting the right to an adequate education' Third, it uses a two-step analysis to explore whether a constitutional violation has occurred by studying the three factors to be used on remand by the trial court.2' The Note concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of Leandro for the future of education in North Carolina.' On May 25, 1994, five boards of education representing poor, rural North Carolina school districts' joined with twenty individuals in those districts ("the plaintiffs") and filed suit against the State of North Carolina and the State Board of Education (collectively "the State")2. 4 On October 17, 1994, the trial court permitted six boards of education, representing relatively wealthy, urban North Carolina school districts,' and twelve individuals from those districts ("the 14. See id.a t 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254. 15. See id. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 259. 16. See infra notes 23-105 and accompanying text. 17. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text. 18. See infra notes 122-38 and accompanying text. 19. See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text. 20. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text. 21. See infra notes 182-260 and accompanying text. 22. See infra notes 261-77 and accompanying text. 23. The poor school districts were Cumberland, Halifax, Hoke, Robeson, and Vance Counties. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252. 24. See Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 3,468 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1996), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). The suit was filed in Halifax County. See id. 25. The urban school districts were those in Buncombe, Durham, Forsyth, Mecklenburg, and Wake Counties and the City of Asheville. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. 1484 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 plaintiff-intervenors") to intervene in the suit.26 The rural and urban districts (collectively referred to as "the plaintiff-parties") contended that the North Carolina Constitution guarantees two educational rights.27 First, the plaintiff-parties alleged that all North Carolina children are entitled to an adequate education.8 This claim posited that every child is guaranteed the opportunity to receive a certain minimum qualitative level of education.29 Second, the plaintiff-parties alleged that all North Carolina children are entitled to "equal educational opportunities."'30 The equal opportunities claim is based on the theory that each child should receive substantially the same level of funding and educational opportunities.31 Both rural and urban districts claimed that the State had denied them these rights under the current state educational system.3z As a result of the vastly disparate value of taxable property 26. See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 3-4, 468 S.E.2d at 546. 27. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. Specifically, the plaintiff-parties relied on Article I, § 15 and Article IX, § 2 of the North Carolina Constitution. See id. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 (providing that North Carolinians have a right to education and the State must guard and maintain that right); id. art. IX, § 2 (providing that the state shall provide a free system of public schools). The plaintiff- parties also alleged statutory violations under Chapter 115C of the North Carolina General Statutes. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115C (1997) (providing the statutory scheme for elementary and secondary education in North Carolina). Specifically, the plaintiff-parties alleged that the State violated: (1) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 requiring a "general and uniform system of free public schools... throughout the State, wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students"; (2) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(al) requiring that the state provide "every student in the State equal access to a Basic Education Program"; (3) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-122(3) requiring the state to "prevent denial of equal educational ... opportunity on the basis of ... economic status.., in the provision of services to any child"; and (4) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(b) requiring that the state "assure that the necessary resources are provided ... from State revenue sources [for] the instructional expenses for current operations of the public school system as defined in the standard course of study." Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353-54, 488 S.E.2d at 258-59 (alterations in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-1, -81, -122(3), -408(b)). However, the supreme court "found it unnecessary to dwell at length on these arguments by plaintiff-parties, as ... the statutes they rely upon do little more than codify a fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution." Id. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258. Thus, this Note does not discuss these claims in depth. 28. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252. 29. See id. at 344,488 S.E.2d at 254. 30. Id. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. 31. See id. at 348,488 S.E.2d at 255. 32. See id. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252. 1998] CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION RIGHTS 1485 between the rural and urban school districts, the claims of these districts were fundamentally different. Because of low property values prevalent in rural areas, the rural districts claimed that they were unable to meet the funding burden imposed upon them under the state's current funding system.33 The rural districts alleged that the state funding scheme requires local governments to provide funding for most of the districts' capital expenditures and for twenty- five percent of current school expenses.M3 Despite local tax rates that are often higher than those of many wealthy districts, as well as supplemental funding from the state,35 the rural districts alleged that they could not raise sufficient funds to provide a constitutionally adequate education.36 The poor districts complained that their 33. See id The basic statutory source of school funding is the ad valorem property tax. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 46, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). In this sense, the term "poor" refers to counties or school districts where the value of taxable property is low. See PUBLIC SCH. FORUM OF N.C., NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY 1994, at 20 (1994) [hereinafter LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY]. Thus, even with high property tax rates, which are set by individual counties, "poor" counties receive a lower yield of tax revenue. See id. In 1994, the plaintiff-intervenors' urban counties had an average property tax base of' $386,007 per student, and the rural plaintiffs' counties had an average property tax base of $148,209. See id Many poor counties are approaching the upper limit of property tax rates, and one study has suggested that the state supplement low-wealth counties' revenues to meet state- mandated expenditures. See PUBLIC SCH. FORUM OF N.C., ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 16-17 (1990) [hereinafter ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM]. 34. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252 (noting the plaintiffs' allegation that the local school districts are responsible for 25% of current school expenses); NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOLS STATISTICAL PROFILE 1997, at 49 (1997) [hereinafter STATISTICAL PROFILE 1997] (noting that local school districts pay 23.1% of total expenses); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2138 (noting that local governments are responsible for approximately 25% of school expenditures). For a detailed discussion on the statutory funding scheme, see infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text. 35. See Act of July 9, 1993, ch. 321, § 138, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 649, 789-94 (providing supplemental funds to low-wealth school districts), amended by Act of July 16, 1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70; id. § 138.1, at 794-96 (providing supplemental funds to school districts with enrollment under a certain level), amended by Act of July 16, 1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70. In 1993, the North Carolina General Assembly appropriated supplemental funding to poor and small school districts to help equalize educational expenditures among the state's school districts. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 2. 36. In 1994, the 10 poorest counties had an effective tax rate of $0.75 per $100 valuation, while the 10 wealthiest counties had an effective tax rate of $0.52 per $100 valuation. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 5. The state average is $0.60 per $100 valuation. See id. The disparity in property values between the poor and wealthy counties can create vast differences in ability to raise revenue for education. For instance, a one-cent property tax increase generates over $100 of revenue in the wealthiest county in North Carolina but generates only $11 of revenue in the poorest county. See id. 1486 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 children suffer from "dilapidated school facilities, [a] short supply of textbooks, and limited curricula, among other things, all leading to difficulty in attracting and attaining qualified teachers. '37 The rural districts further alleged that their children were not receiving the education required under the Basic Education Program.38 Finally, the rural districts argued that a lack of resources resulted in an inadequate education for their school children, as reflected by their poor standardized test scores.9 The rural districts relied on the disparity in local funding between the wealthy and poor districts to illustrate their allegations.40 Due to a highly valued property tax base, the urban districts did not claim that they were unable to raise revenue.41 Rather, the urban districts claimed they were unable to sufficiently support the regular 37. Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 4, 468 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1996), rev'd in part and affd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). Under the current system, school districts may use local funds to supplement teacher salaries and hire teachers for programs not offered by the state. See Charles D. Liner, Financing North Carolina's Public Schools, ScH. L. BULL., Summer 1987, at 29. However, low property values fail to provide sufficient funds to hire supplemental teachers. In 1992-93, the five rural counties involved in the suit funded, on average, 0.74% of the teachers locally as opposed to a state average of 5.2%. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supran ote 33, at 3. 38. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252. The Basic Education Program is the state education program intended to define and fund a comprehensive educational program for North Carolina students. For an in-depth discussion of the Basic Education Program, see infra notes 111-14, 190-92 and accompanying text. 39. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 343, 488 S.E.2d at 252. These districts submitted evidence that the majority of their students were failing end-of-grade examinations and that these students performed well below the average Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") score. See id. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252; Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 4, 468 S.E.2d at 546. In 1994,37.3% of students statewide performed at or above the proficient level on the end- of-grade tests for the core courses in high school. See STATE BD. OF EDUC., 1994 REPORT CARD: THE STATE OF SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN NORTH CAROLINA 5 (1995) [hereinafter REPORT CARD]. Only 19.2% of students were at or above the proficient level in the rural school districts. See id. at 75, 111, 125, 193, 227. Even more dramatic are the results from Halifax County in 1993, reporting the following failure rates in the end-of-course proficiency exams: 79% in physical science, 90% in biology, 86% in chemistry, 79% in physics, 88% in algebra I, 82% in geometry, 90% in algebra II, 83% in economic, legal, and political systems, 89% in U.S. history, and 82% in English I. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 76, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). In 1994, the average SAT score for all North Carolina students was 835 out of a possible 1600. See REPORT CARD, supra, at 6. The average SAT score in the rural districts was 765.6. See id. at 76, 112,1 26, 194,228. 40. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258. The gap in local per-pupil funding has increased in the recent past, and the supplemental funds provided by the state to small and poor districts is only slowing down the growing disparity. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 4-5. A 1994 study found the gap between the counties with the highest and lowest local funding to be $1943 per pupil, or a $971,500 difference in a school of 500 children. See id. at 2. 41. See supra notes 33-36. 1998] CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION RIGHTS 1487 education programs with local revenues because the funds were necessarily diverted to three costs especially associated with urban areas.42 First, the urban districts claimed that they serve "a large number of students who require special education services, special English instruction, and academically gifted programs. 43 Second,t he urban districts maintained that their school facilities were inadequate due to the enormous growth in North Carolina's urban student population.44 Third, the urban districts claimed that the state failed to account for the high costs associated with "municipal overburden."'4 The theory of municipal overburden maintains that a disproportionate share of urban tax receipts must be allocated to other needs acutely present in urban areas, such as "high levels of poverty, homelessness, crime, unmet health care needs, and 46 unemployment. The urban districts also asserted that test scores, particularly those of economically at-risk students, reflected the inadequate education their students were receiving.' The urban districts did not submit any test scores to the court to substantiate these claims,48 probably because those claims focused on the test results of particular schools rather than the entire district.49 42. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 343,488 S.E.2d at 252. 43. Id. 44. See id. at 343, 488 S.E.2d at 253; see also LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 7 (recognizing that several wealthy counties are "severely pressed to keep up with the building facility demands placed on them by an exploding student population"); Charles D. Liner, Update: School Enrollment Projections,S CH. L. BULL., Winter 1997, at 10-12 (projecting the increase in average daily enrollment in the decade from 1995 to 2005 in the six urban districts to be 16.1%, and projecting the increase for the five rural districts to be 6.38%). 45. Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 5, 468 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1996), rev'd in part and affd in part,3 46 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). 46. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344,488 S.E.2d at 253. 47. See Intervening Complaint at 142, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). The urban districts' complaint noted that "approximately 64 schools in the urban school districts had greater than 50% of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches" and that in "approximately 22 of those 64 schools, the percentage of such poor students is at least 80%." Id. 55. 48. The urban districts did submit reports showing that less than 60% of their high school graduates completed the minimum courses required for admission to the University of North Carolina system in 1993. See id. 48. However, this statistic is not very remarkable in light of the fact that the state average for high school graduates completing the required courses was 48.5% in 1994. See REPORT CARD, supra note 39, at 6. 49. See Intervening Complaint at 55-56, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520) (noting that the urban districts have a high concentration of poor schools and finding that the children in those schools generally perform very poorly on standardized tests); Plaintiff- Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief at 29-30, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96) (noting that poor 1488 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 The urban districts also alleged that the state supplemental funds allocated to poor and small school districts denied the children in urban districts equal protection of the laws under the North Carolina Constitution.50 The urban districts claimed that the supplemental state funding, earmarked only for poor and small school districts, was arbitrary and capricious because the legislature established those programs without regard for the actual needs of other school districts.' In response to the allegations of the plaintiff-parties, the State moved to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff-parties failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.52 The State contended that the claim for adequate educational opportunities was unfounded because "the Constitution is silent on the issue of 'adequate education[]' and ... [provides] no such constitutional right. '53 The State interpreted the constitutional silence as leaving all determinations of adequacy to the legislature.54 After reviewing the parties' positions, the trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.5 The State filed a timely notice of appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, after which the parties filed a joint petition to the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review prior to a determination by the court of appeals.6 Following a denial by the supreme court,57 the State filed an alternative petition for writ of certiorari with the court of appeals, which was allowed.58 Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that the lawsuit should be dismissed on the grounds that "the [fundamental] right to education guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution is limited or at-risk students require extra attention to receive an adequate education). 50. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258; see also N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19 (guaranteeing every person equal protection of the laws). 51. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353-54,488 S.E.2d at 258. 52. See Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 5, 468 S.E.2d 543,547 (1996), rev'd in part and affd in part,3 46 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). The State also claimed that Halifax County was an improper venue for an action against public officers. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 341-42, 488 S.E.2d at 251. The trial court granted the State's petition for transfer of venue and ordered the suit moved to Wake County because Wake County was the only proper venue for an action against public officers. See id. at 341-42, 488 S.E.2d at 251-52. 53. Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 11, 468 S.E.2d at 550. 54. See New Brief for Defendants at 18, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96). 55. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344, 488 S.E.2d at 253. The motion to dismiss was denied on January 10, 1995. See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 5, 468 S.E.2d at 547. 56. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344,488 S.E.2d at 253. 57. See Leandro v. State, 455 S.E.2d 662 (N.C. 1995). 58. See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 5,468 S.E.2d at 547. 1998] CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION RIGHTS 1489 to one of equal access to ...e ducation, and [it] does not embrace a qualitative standard. '59 The plaintiff-parties once again petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review,' and the supreme court allowed those petitions.61 After determining that the case raised justiciable questions,6' Chief Justice Mitchell, writing for the majority of the court, proceeded to analyze the plaintiff-parties' adequacy claims.63 The supreme court began by identifying two provisions of the North Carolina Constitution that could be interpreted as recognizing such a right.64 Article I, § 15 provides: "The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.'65 Article IX, § 2 provides: "The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.166 Reversing the court of appeals, the court held that these constitutional provisions guarantee every child in North Carolina the opportunity to receive what it called "a sound basic education."'67 59. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344, 468 S.E.2d at 253 (citing Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432 (1987)). The court of appeals found the plaintiff-parties' claims to be indistinguishable from the claims in Britt. See id. The plaintiffs in Britt challenged the educational finance system on an equal educational opportunity theory, but the court concluded that the constitutional provisions requiring equal opportunities only guaranteed "equal access to our public schools-that is, every child has a fundamental right to [receive] an education in our public schools." Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 283, 289, 357 S.E.2d at 432-33, 436 (citing Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609,264 S.E.2d 106 (1980)). 60. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344,468 S.E.2d at 253. 61. See Leandro v. State, 343 N.C. 512, 472 S.E.2d 11, 12, 13, 15 (1996) (granting the State's, the plaintiffs', and the plaintiff-intervenors' petitions for review). 62. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344-45, 488 S.E.2d at 253-54. In its original motion to dismiss, the State alternatively argued that the plaintiff-parties' claims were "nonjusticiable political questions." See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 12, 468 S.E.2d at 550. The court of appeals never reached this question. See id. at 11-12, 468 S.E.2d at 550-51. Thus, the State contended that this "threshold question" should be addressed. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 253-54. The supreme court disposed of this claim by finding a judicial duty to determine whether the State's actions exceeded constitutional limits. See id. (citing Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 716, 467 S.E.2d 615, 620 (1996)). 63. See Leandro,3 46 N.C. at 345,488 S.E.2d at 254. 64. See id. 65. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15. 66. Id. art. IX, § 2(1). 67. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. The court was careful to distinguish between the opportunity to receive an adequate education and the actual receipt of an adequate education, and to limit the right to the former. See id at 350, 488 S.E.2d at 257.