Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense Joint Pub 3-11 10 July 1995 PREFACE i 3. Application a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and guidance ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable. WALTER KROSS Lieutenant General, USAF Director, Joint Staff 1. Scope This publication provides guidelines for the planning and execution of NBC defensive operations. It focuses on the NBC threat; national policy; and strategic, operational, and logistic considerations peculiar to the preparation and conduct of NBC defense. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: ii Preface Joint Pub 3-11 Intentionally Blank TABLE OF CONTENTS iii PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... vii CHAPTER I THREAT AND NBC DEFENSE POLICY • Purpose..................................................................................................................... I-1 • Overview .................................................................................................................. I-1 • Worldwide Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction .................................... I-1 • Threat Employment Concepts ................................................................................. I-1 • Asymmetrical Battlefield......................................................................................... I-3 • National Military Strategic NBC Considerations ................................................... I-3 • Command and Control............................................................................................. I-5 • Basis for US National NBC Policy ......................................................................... I-5 CHAPTER II NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS • Purpose................................................................................................................... II-1 • Overview ................................................................................................................ II-1 • Weapons of Mass Destruction and Agents Effects................................................ II-1 • Operations in an NBC Environment ..................................................................... II-6 • Operations and Sustainment Assessment .............................................................. II-9 CHAPTER III THEATER NBC DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS • Purpose.................................................................................................................. III-1 • Overview ............................................................................................................... III-1 • Theater Strategic Considerations.......................................................................... III-1 • RCAs and Herbicides ........................................................................................... III-5 • Theater Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.................................................................................................. III-7 • NBC Defense Force Assets .................................................................................. III-8 • Multinational Forces Considerations ................................................................... III-9 • Protection of US Civilian Personnel in Theater ................................................... III-9 • Protection of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) ..................................................... III-9 CHAPTER IV LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS • Purpose.................................................................................................................. IV-1 • Overview ............................................................................................................... IV-1 • Logistic Operations............................................................................................... IV-1 iv Table of Contents Joint Pub 3-11 • Services Support ................................................................................................... IV-5 • Supply Support ..................................................................................................... IV-7 • Transportation ....................................................................................................... IV-7 • Host-Nation Support ............................................................................................. IV-7 • Multinational Support and Friendly Forces Considerations ................................ IV-7 • Nuclear Survivability and NBC Contamination Survivability Standard ............. IV-8 • Environmental Considerations ............................................................................. IV-8 CHAPTER V MEDICAL SUPPORT • Purpose................................................................................................................... V-1 • Overview ................................................................................................................ V-1 • Health Service Support (HSS) ............................................................................... V-1 • Medical Intelligence .............................................................................................. V-2 • Preventive Medicine Principles ............................................................................. V-2 • Patient Evacuation ................................................................................................. V-5 • Patient Decontamination and Triage ..................................................................... V-6 • Medical Facilities .................................................................................................. V-6 • Impact on Health Services Support ....................................................................... V-6 • Special Medical Augmentation for Operations in an NBC Contaminated Environment ................................................................................. V-7 CHAPTER VI TRAINING AND READINESS • Purpose.................................................................................................................. VI-1 • Overview ............................................................................................................... VI-1 • Joint NBC Training ............................................................................................... VI-1 • Readiness Reporting ............................................................................................. VI-3 APPENDIX A Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Planning Responsibilities, Guidance, and Operations Appendix to an OPLAN .................................... A-1 ANNEX A Treaty Obligations History ...................................................................... A-A-1 B Responsibilities for NBC Defense Planning ........................................... A-B-1 C Planning Guidance for NBC Defensive Operations ............................... A-C-1 D Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides Appendix to an Operations Annex.................................................................................. A-D-1 B References ....................................................................................................... B-1 C Administrative Instructions ............................................................................ C-1 v Table of Contents GLOSSARY Part I—Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................GL-1 Part II—Terms and Definitions ............................................................................GL-3 FIGURE I-1 Threat Employment Concepts ....................................................................... I-2 I-2 National Military Strategic NBC Considerations.......................................... I-3 II-1 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Agents Effects ...................................... II-1 II-2 Principles of NBC Defense .......................................................................... II-7 III-1 Theater Strategic Considerations ................................................................ III-2 IV-1 Logistic Support for NBC Readiness Considerations ................................ IV-2 VI-1 Joint NBC Training Considerations ........................................................... VI-1 vi Table of Contents Joint Pub 3-11 Intentionally Blank vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW • • • • • Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)-capable nations, including developing nations, may use these weapons to achieve political or military objectives. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. The number of nations capable of developing and possessing WMD is steadily increasing and the potential for their use can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism to conflict or war. Nuclear threats occur within a given theater of war and could proceed without the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. Biological threats can cause lethal, disabling, contagious, or noncontagious type casualties. Chemical warfare achieves surprise and causes mass casualties which hinders the momentum of an opposing force, disrupts command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, and degrades combat potential. An effective orchestration of US strategic and theater nuclear forces and conventional resources must be implemented to provide direction, intelligence, and employment of US forces in countering enemy NBC war making capabilities. This strategy supplements the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy in attaining campaign objectives including interagency coordination, dissemination of information, command and control, and a basis for US national NBC policy. Describes the Threat and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense Policy Covers NBC Defense Operations Fundamentals Provides Theater NBC Defense Considerations Describes Logistic and Medical Support Operations Covers NBC Training and Readiness Considerations National Military Strategic NBC Considerations Threat Overview The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) occurs across the range of military operations. The national military strategy for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations is based on defense and deterrence. viii Executive Summary Joint Pub 3-11 NBC defense operations present many unique challenges to commanders including a clear understanding of the effects of WMD and the implementation of the principles of NBC defense. A capability to defend against NBC attack and to survive and sustain combat operations in an NBC environment requires intelligence forewarning and highly trained, properly equipped forces throughout the theater of operations. NBC defense operations may be required throughout the range of military operations. Effects of a nuclear detonation are primarily in three areas: thermal radiation, blast, and nuclear radiation. Corollary effects, such as electromagnetic pulse, can break down electronics system protection, disrupt communications, and have significant psychological impacts on friendly forces. A biological threat is the capability of an enemy to plan and deploy a biological material, such as a microorganism or toxin, intended to cause disease, injury, or death in people, plants, or animals or deterioration of materiel. Chemical agents and compounds are classified according to physical state, physiological action, and use. The terms persistent and nonpersistent describe the time an agent stays in an area. Threat forces classify chemical agents according to their physiological effect on the body. They identify six major types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, psychochemical, and irritants. US forces must be prepared to conduct operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation. At the theater operational level, NBC defense involves protection for forces and the means to remove or cope with operationally significant hazards, conceal intentions in the area of responsibility, and provide adequate health service support to preserve the fighting capability of the forces. Avoidance; protection (including hardening, protecting personnel, mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), physical defense measures, and reacting after the attack); and decontamination are the primary principles of NBC defense. These are combined with a proactive theater-level program of intelligence, psychological operations, deception, and obscuration. Because of the complexity and potential adverse impact of NBC warfare on US and multinational theater operations, it is imperative that all facets of NBC defense be considered in formulating courses of action. Theater strategic considerations include theater strategy, theater strategic protection, joint operation planning and execution system, force requirements, risk assessment, operation planning guidance, and operational readiness. Weapons of Mass Destruction and Agents Effects Theater Strategic Considerations Operations in an NBC Environment ix Executive Summary An unbroken chain of communications must extend from the National Command Authorities through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders, commanders of Service and functional components, and all subordinate commanders. This is especially critical in a theater where the threat of NBC warfare exists. NBC defense force assets, multinational forces considerations, protection of US civilian personnel in theater, and protection of enemy prisoners of war are also considerations for NBC defense. The geographic combatant commander must plan for logistic support operations for joint NBC defense. Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander exercises directive authority over logistic operations. Adequate logistic support is vital to all combat operations. It must provide for sustainability, anticipation, integration, continuity, improvisation, responsiveness, reconstitution of destroyed units, and stock of NBC equipment. Services support includes ways to cope with decontamination of equipment; clothing exchange and showers; equipment recovery and evacuation, mortuary affairs policy, standards, and procedures; and emergency destruction and evacuation of US nuclear munitions and captured NBC munitions. Supply support includes general supply operations and water production for decontamination. Transportation, host- nation support, multinational support and friendly forces considerations, nuclear survivability and NBC contamination survivability standards, and environmental considerations are also incorporated in logistic support and are imperative to NBC defense. Defensive measures should be included in medical support planning such as military surveillance; protection of personnel at risk against exposure, infection, intoxication, or inhaling a chemical agent; and early detection. The use of NBC weapons can result in a large number of casualties and also require special handling that can drain medical resources. Because of this, the geographic combatant commander must plan to use directive authority Theater Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence are an integral part of all aspects of NBC defense. Logistic support for NBC defense operations is vital throughout the full range of military operations. The geographic combatant commander should plan for medical support in the portions of campaign plans and orders that address NBC defense in the theater. NBC Logistic Support Medical Support x Executive Summary Joint Pub 3-11 Training, readiness reporting, and environmental concerns must be considered when planning for NBC defense support. to ensure the proper coordination of health service to the force, to include adequate shelter, food, medical prophylaxis, and fluids. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center can assist with the theater threat assessment by evaluating the state of a potential adversary’s biological warfare. Patient evacuation within the combat zone is normally the responsibility of the respective component command. Movement of patients within the theater is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander. The management and treatment of contaminated casualties will vary with the tactical situation and the nature of the contaminant. Preventive medicine services help determine the health hazards associated with nuclear fallout and biological contamination. Each medical unit must have a plan that can be put into effect immediately. Decentralization is also necessary and all medical units should have comparable sets of medical items and decontamination equipment. The impact on health services support caused by contaminated battlefields will result in a difficult environment in which to operate. Stress from MOPP, reduced visual and tactile senses from protective equipment, reduced communication capability, and a sense of isolation are all detrimental to military operations. Although individual training and exercises to test proficiency remain under the purview of the Services, NBC defense should be integrated into individual and collective programs at all levels and into higher echelon operational and tactical exercises, command post and other command, control, communications, and computers system exercises, and joint and multinational training exercises. The objectives of this training are to develop and evaluate the readiness of US and multinational military forces and mission-essential civilians to operate in an NBC environment and to ensure proficiency with defensive NBC equipment, materials, and procedures. Joint and multinational exercises include exchange programs, reciprocal unit exchanges, personnel exchange programs, individual exchanges, and combination programs which help prepare personnel and enhance training for NBC defense. The need for readiness reporting is important for the geographic combatant commander to exercise directive authority for logistics or if NBC would materially affect the course of action or organization of the theater. Training and Readiness xi Executive Summary This publication provides guidance for the conduct of NBC defensive operations across the range of military operations. Theater level NBC defense considerations are discussed. The potential threat, logistic and medical support concerns, and NBC training and readiness issues are covered. CONCLUSION xii Executive Summary Joint Pub 3-11 Intentionally Blank CHAPTER I THREAT AND NBC DEFENSE POLICY I-1 1. Purpose This chapter provides a discussion of the potential threat and threat doctrine that should be considered for the planning and conduct of joint nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations. This chapter also recaps the US national policy guidance and objectives for NBC defense that form the basis for NBC doctrinal precepts. 2. Overview The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) occurs across the range of military operations. NBC-capable nations, including developing nations, may use these weapons to achieve political or military objectives. WMD may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. If used, they pose the problem to US forces of creating an asymmetrical battlefield. 3. Worldwide Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction The number of nations capable of developing and possessing WMD is steadily increasing. Developing nations are receiving these weapons or means to develop them through technological transfer, overt or covert direct transfer, or support to belligerent groups or governments. The potential for their use can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism during peace to escalation during conflict or war. a. NBC-Capable Nations. An NBC- capable nation is defined as one that has the capability to produce or acquire and employ one or more types of WMD to achieve political and military objectives. Inherent in this capability are varying degrees of abilities to conduct research and development, improve technology, stockpile, and effectively prosecute a war in an NBC environment. b. Planning Considerations. The implications of proliferation of WMD on planning are significant. The proliferation of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs has been stimulated by perceptions of the political-military utility of CBW weapons. Chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) are perceived as excellent force multipliers. Both are perceived as deterrents to regional aggression. It is projected that there will be an increase in the number of CBW-capable countries, albeit at a slower rate than over the past 20 years, as well as an increase in the number and effectiveness of agents and improved delivery systems available. 4. Threat Employment Concepts The political and military nature of the threat has changed with the end of the Cold War. Many of the former Soviet-influenced doctrinal precepts learned by potential enemies possessing NBC capabilities still “We must also stop the spread of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology. There are few developments more frightening than that of unstable, sometimes irrational . . . regimes being able to press a button and deliver weapons of terror across great distances.” Vice President George Bush August 2, 1988 I-2 Chapter I Joint Pub 3-11 remain. Threat employment concepts are shown in Figure I-1. a. Nuclear: Premise of First Use • Threat doctrine postulates that limited nuclear operations may occur within a given theater of war and that such limited nuclear conditions could proceed without the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. Regardless of changing political conditions, two consequences are possible. First, this premise provides rationale for an enemy to use nuclear weapons. Second, focusing on the potential results of a limited nuclear war that could bring either victory or, at a minimum, result in a stalemate, may provide the enemy with an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. • The operational and tactical use of nuclear weapons would be directed against friendly strong points, air and naval power, and critical centers of gravity. Subsequently, enemy doctrine envisions that large-scale conventional armored and mechanized forces in “nuclear dispersed” formations would strike deep into friendly defenses and pass through nuclear-created gaps to destroy friendly command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) facilities and other critical targets. Once within the friendly operational area, the threat objective would be to split, isolate, and destroy friendly forces. b. Biological: Premise of Selective or Unpredictable Use • Threat doctrine considers biological agents as WMD. Such agents, including infectious microorganisms and toxins, are capable of widespread, mass infection or intoxication. These agents, depending on intended use, can cause lethal, disabling, contagious, or noncontagious type casualties. These agents could be effectively employed against large rear area objectives or against C4I or other critical targets. • Certain factors may significantly increase the probability of use. Should a potential threat consider that initiating BW was worth the risk, the employment of biological agents may provide a way of causing asymmetry on the battlefield. Further, genetic engineering can selectively improve toxicity, lifespans, or dissemination efficiencies; defeat detection and warning systems; or make verification of use virtually impossible. c. Chemical: Premise of Conventional Weapons • It is possible that threat employment doctrine may consider chemical munitions, including riot control agents (RCA), to be conventional weapons. THREAT EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS NUCLEAR: Premise of First Use BIOLOGICAL: Premise of Selective or Unpredictable Use CHEMICAL: Premise of Conventional Weapons Figure I-1. Threat Employment Concepts