NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE 21st CENTURY Williamson Murray Editor October 2003 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Offi ce by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at [email protected] ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http:// www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-141-5 ii CONTENTS Foreword Major General David H. Huntoon, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 1. Transformation and Professional Military Education: Past as Prologue to the Future Dr. Williamson Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. Balancing Tyche: Nonlinearity and Joint Operations Colonel Stuart A. Whitehead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3. The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Preemption, Its Ramifi cations for the Department of Defense Colonel Daniel L. Zajac. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4. U.S. Army Europe 2010: Harnessing the Potential of NATO Enlargement Colonel Peter R. Mansoor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 5. Creating Strategic Agility in Northeast Asia Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan B. Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 6. The War in Afghanistan: A Strategic Analysis Colonel G. K. Herring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 7. Adaptability: A New Principle of War Lieutenant Colonel Brian Dickerson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 8. Direct and Indirect Fires in the 21st Century Colonel Richard C. Longo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 9. Maritime Prepositioning: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow Colonel Carl D. Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 iii 10. Homeland Security: The Department of Defense, The Department of Homeland Security, and Critical Vulnerabilities Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M. Klippstein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 11. Integrated Emergency Management: The Roles of Federal, State, and Local Government with Implications for Homeland Security Captain Albert F. Lord, Jr.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 12. Is There Space for the Objective Force? Colonel Timothy R. Coffi n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 13. Expanding Nuclear Arms Control: DoD Imperatives in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001 Lieutenant Colonel Carlton B. Reid, Jr.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 iv FOREWORD September 11, 2001 changed many things in the United States not the least of which was our national defense policy and military strategy. The challenges facing the defense establishment in the United States at the beginning of the 21st century are daunting indeed; however, the thoughtful essays included in this volume by students at the U.S. Army War College provide insights into those trials that will prove useful to policymakers both in and out of uniform. Offi cers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) during their year at the U.S. Army War College wrote these chapters. The ASAP is a unique program that offers selected students a rigorous course of instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in theory, doctrine, and history, the program provides those students a rich professional experience that includes staff rides, exercises, and the best instructional expertise available. The program is designed to provide the Joint team with the military’s best theater strategists. Our ASAP graduates have already begun to make a difference. They and their fellow graduates of the U.S. Army War College will continue to serve the Army and the nation for many years to come. DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR. Major General, U.S. Army Commandant U.S. Army War College v CHAPTER 1 TRANSFORMATION AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: PAST AS PROLOGUE TO THE FUTURE Dr. Williamson Murray This book represents the third in a series that began in the Army War College’s academic year 2000-01. As in the past, it contains the papers of the students of the Advanced Strategic Arts Program, a special program within the war college dedicated to the study of the strategic and joint environment within which America’s military will fi ght in the 21st century.1 This year’s essays, however, cover a wider variety of subjects than has been the case in the past. The students of the 2002-03 academic year were not asked to address the single theme of army transformation, but rather were allowed to address a wide range of issues and problems confronting the United States in a fractious and diffi cult world.2 Those essays range in subject matter from basing in Europe, to several addressing the critical issues in Homeland Security. All of them raise critical issues with regards to national security and the nature of war itself. One of the essays won a prize at this year’s graduation ceremonies. That honor suggested a great deal about the quality of the students in the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) as well as the importance of intellectual excellence in the curricula of America’s war colleges. The very breadth of the essays, covering topics from the implications of a nonlinear world on the conduct of military operations to close examinations of the strategic framework of U.S. strategic policy in Europe and Asia, underline the character and intellectual breadth of the best students at the Army War College. Now more than ever, it would appear that America needs offi cers who possess a deep understanding of the diffi culties involved in the use of force in the international arena as well as understand the complex problems involved in the political and strategic challenges confronted by the United States in the post-Cold 1 War World. Over the past decade, a number of major study groups in Washington―to include the Defense Science Board, the National Defense Panel, and the Hart Rudman Commission―have all argued that the United States needs offi cers, more widely educated not only in the profession of war, but in understanding foreign cultures, languages, international affairs, and military history. Moreover, a number of senior civilian offi cials in the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as in the Congress have become interested in the subject of professional military education. It would appear then, that an examination of the period when professional military education rendered signal services to the armed forces of the United States in their preparation for war would be useful in thinking about how serious education could contribute to the preparation of offi cers for an uncertain and ambiguous future. That is the subject of this opening chapter. PAST CONTRIBUTIONS Professional military education in the United States appeared in the late 19th century for a number of reasons, quite different from those lying behind its appearance on the European Continent.3 For American military reformers of the late 19th century, education represented a tangible sign that their profession fi t within the larger context of the systemization through education of other professions in the United States. That process included the professions of medicine, law, and even business. If offi cership in either the Navy or the Army were a profession, then the services needed some form of serious professional education. The fact that even the British had seen fi t to establish a staff college in the 1850s to educate their offi cers also suggested to American reformers the need for serious professional military education.4 However, it was not until the 1920s that professional military education came into its own in the United States as a major factor in preparations for war. And because the contribution of professional military education was so signifi cant, it is well worth examining the attitude of the services in the interwar period towards professional military education as well as the nature of that contribution. 2 THE MARITIME SERVICES AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD The Development of the Carrier. Almost from the period immediately after the end of World War II, historians have understood the importance of professional military education in the development of the Wehrmacht’s battlefi eld capabilities.5 What, however, has only become clear in the 1990s, as the result of recent research by scholars, was the extraordinary role that professional military education played in the processes of transformation and innovation that took place within the American armed forces during this period. The most interesting and important case was that of the Naval War College―an institution that provided the intellectual engine for the Navy’s transformation efforts and innovation from the early 1920s through to the start of World War II. In the interwar Navy, not only attendance, but teaching on the faculty, was considered career enhancing for offi cers. Virtually every admiral of note in World War II was a graduate of the college, while the future admiral Raymond Spruance served not one, but two, tours on the faculty.6 The impact of this emphasis on professional military education showed directly in the Navy’s efforts to transform its combat capabilities. If it had had little opportunity to test its battle fl eet in combat during World War I―only one squadron of U.S. battleships made it to Scapa Flow well after the Battle of Jutland―the Navy had at least had the chance to observe what the British were doing. Moreover, the admiral in charge of U.S. naval efforts in European waters, William S. Sims, was one of the most intelligent and innovative offi cers ever to wear the Navy’s uniform. Interestingly in terms of his priorities, Sims chose to return from Europe to the presidency of the Naval War College rather than to a fl eet command.7 There at Newport, he set about adapting the war games at the college to educate naval offi cers not only in current capabilities, but in those that the future might hold. The games provided surrogate decisionmaking experience in naval warfare and examined the operational and strategic possibilities open to the Navy with the 3 advent of signifi cant new technologies. Thus, Newport probed the framework of emerging concepts and technological change. In particular, the games tested the possibilities that aircraft carriers might offer to revolutionizing the conduct of maritime operations.8 Serious honest red teaming lay at the heart of the approach to the wargaming and testing of these new capabilities.9 There was virtually no effort to validate preconceived notions; rather the emphasis was on the testing of ideas and concepts until they failed. The resulting culture of intellectual honesty was to carry over into the Navy’s fl eet exercises throughout the interwar period. The most important operational insight in these wargames was that the dynamics of offensive carrier operations would differ fundamentally from those involved in battleship engagements. When battle lines of dreadnoughts engaged, the fi res from the two sides involved more or less steady streams of shells. Each side could redirect its “streams” of fi re on the enemy’s surviving ships as the engagement progressed. However, the wargaming of the air power assets that carriers would bring to the fi ght suggest a very different picture. The execution of potential carrier operations suggested that air strikes should come in discrete pulses of combat power rather than in continuous streams. Thus, the effectiveness of such strikes on the enemy would be a function of the number of aircraft that the attacking carrier or carriers could launch in a given pulse.10 Crucial to this insight was the fact that those running the war games at Newport were open to new ideas and approaches: As [Captain Harris] Lanning [the director of the Tactics Department at Newport] noted in his memoirs, “a group of the cleverest tacticians among the students came to see me and said that . . . they believed there were better methods and intended to fi nd them.” Instead of being offended Lanning backed them. As he recalled, “In investigating aircraft [in the war games] we gave the offi cers commanding miniature fl eets a rather free hand in the use of aircraft . . . the only restriction being that planes had to operate in accordance with the capabilities and limitations as established by aviators familiar with planes.”11 A game at the end of 1923 suggests the willingness of those designing the fl eet games at Newport to experiment with the possibilities that could come with signifi cant changes to the 4