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POLICY OPPORTUNITIES XII- 1 Policy Opportunities Jo o N91"33029 I. INTRODUCTION In addition to setting scientific priorities for the discipline, the AASC was charged to assess current policies and practices in the conduct and support of space and ground-based astronomy and to recommend changes that are likely to enhance the productivity of the enterprise. In this Chapter, we consider the relationship and balance between ground-based and space astronomy, strategies for achieving high productivity in both these programs, the support of individual scientists and scientific facilities, international cooperation, the scientific advisory process, and the role of astronomy in education. In §II we describe the context for our recommendations. In subsequent sections we provide the rationale for our recommendations, the major ones of which are listed below. The first set of recommendations, discussed in §III, is directed toward the National Science Foundation Astronomy Division. We recommend: • The NSF should retain primary responsibility for the US ground-based astronomy program, which is a vital component of the nation's overall astronomy effort. • The budget of the NSF Astronomy Division, in constant dollars, should be doubled during the next 5 years in order to recover ground lost during the past decade, to ensure continued US leadership in ground-based astronomy, and to realize the scientific benefits of the space program. • NSF-Astronomy should undertake the construction of new facilities only in the context of a strategic plan in which the university grants program is adequate to support excellent research programs and the most productive and highest quality observational facilities can be supported adequately. Support for other facilities should be terminated. First call on research funds should be on strengthening the base rather than on building large new facilities. • The National Optical Astronomy Observatories (NOAO) should provide leadership by building facilities with unique capabilities that win be used by all optical/IR astronomers. In addition, the NOAO should continue to provide access to first-class observing facilities comparable to those at private or university- owned observatories. Whenever possible, the latter mission should be accomplished by cooperation with private and/or state institutions, with emphasis on cost- and technology sharing and the avoidance of duplication of specialized instruments. The second set of recommendations, discussed in §IV, is directed toward the NASA Space Astrophysics program. We recommend that: • NASA should carry out the program outlined in the OSSA 5-year Strategic Plan, including full XII-2 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS PANEL REPORTS implementation of the Great Observatories program and the deployment of second-generation image- correcting instruments for the Hubble Space Telescope. • In addition to the 5-year plan s NASA should expand its support of moderate and small programs, implemented by a doubling of the Explorer budget and expansion of the suborbital program. • NASA should adopt management strategies for the Explorer program with the aim of developing missions faster and at lower cost. • NASA should support an augmented research and analysis program that is stable and protected against cost overruns of its hardware programs. • The development of astronomical facilities for the Space Exploration Initiative should follow a logically phased approach. Whenever feasible, the technology development program should include testing through actual astronomical research on the ground, on stratospheric platforms, and/or in earth orbit. The greater expenses of astrophysical observatories on the Moon must be fully justified by the greater scientific return that they are expected to provide. In §V, we recommend a program for education in astronomy: • To exploit the unique potential of astronomical and space research to attract young people into scientific and technical careers, astronomers should participate in a broad educational initiative designed to provide more access to the excitement of modern astronomy for students, teachers, and the general public. Finally, in §VI, we address several other policy issues and recommend that: • A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences be established to monitor the overall health of the field and to provide strategic, coordinated advice to all agencies that support research in ground-based and space astronomy. • Astronomical research will advance most rapidly in a climate of open exchange of information and access to all facilities, foreign and domestic, by the best qualified observers. The agencies should support open access to US facilities and data and should expect other countries to reciprocate. • We encourage international cooperation on the construction of facilities when each country or entity brings compIementary-capabi_tles to the project or when the international nature of the project is uniquely valuable to its performance. • National and private observatories should formulate policies and make plans for the entry of astronomical data in standard formats into a national archive to enable access by the broad astronomical community. The agencies should encourage these efforts and support their implementation according to scientific merit as determined by peer review. • NASA and NSF should consider the development ot procedures and facilities to enable the simultaneous multi-wavelength observa{1ons of variable celestial sources. II. THE CONTEXT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS The NSF and NASA provide primary support for US research in astronomy and astrophysics. During the 1980%, these agencies have responded to the advice of the previous NAS Astronomy Survey Committee (ASC) report. The National Science Foundation has implemented, fully or partially, many of the ASC recommendations for new ground-based facilities. For example, construction for the Very Long Baseline Radio Telescope Array (VLBA) is now well-advanced. NSF provided partial support to build new 2 - 4 meter-class telescopes at universities, one of which is already operational, and the NOAO has formed partnerships with private universities to build and operate such telescopes at KPNO and CTIO. NSF financed the construction of a submillimeter telescope on Mauna Kea. The Agency supported several outstanding young astrophysicists through the Presidential Young Investigator program. It provides advanced computing power to astrophysicists through the national supercomputing centers and the national research network. In addition, the NSF Astronomy Division initiated the solar Global Oscillation Network project and responded to the collapse of the Green Bank radio telescope by funding the construction of a modern fully-steerable 100-m radio telescope. The NSF Division of Polar Programs supported the development of astrophysics programs to exploit the unique advantages of the South Pole. POLICY OPPOR_NITIES XII-3 It is also encouraging that the NSF has improved its budgeting for major projects by setting up a separate project line item within the Division of Mathematical and Physical Sciences. After the Challenger accident, NASA recognized a crisis in space science and responded by a commitment to do space science for its own sake, independently of the manned program. The Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) developed a balanced Five Year Strategic Plan that includes an exciting program for astrophysics research. In this plan, NASA recognizes that: (1) the OSSA Budget should be a stable fraction (20%) of the total NASA budget; (2) much of space science can be done best with expendable launch vehicles; and (3/ NASA must provide stable support for a healthy infrastructure of theory, data analysis, and instrument development at universities in order to realize the benefits of its science missions and to ensure the future vitality of space science. The rich scientific yield of the COBE satellite proves NASA's wisdom in re-structuring that mission for launch with an expendable rocket rather than the Space Shuttle. NASA should avoid using the Shuttle to launch free-flying satellites for astrophysics unless its unique capabilities are required for the mission. NASA has steadfastly supported the Great Observatories Strategy recommended by the ASC Report. The first of these, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), has been launched, the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) will launched in early 1991, the Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Observatory (AXAF) has been started, and the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) has a high priority in NASA's five year strategic plan. The budget for Explorer satellites was increased, and the first-ranked intermediate program, the Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE), is under development. Beyond that, the NASA Astrophysics Division launched two astronomical Explorer missions (IRAS and COBE) and sustained a vigorous suborbital program on rockets, balloons, and aircraft. The scientific value of the suborbital program was illustrated by NASA's quick and decisive response to the extraordinary scientific opportunity presented by Supernova 1987A, which yielded irreplaceable data on the infrared and gamma ray emission from this unique event. OSSA initiated a new program for Small Explorers (SMEX). The NASA Astrophysics Division also developed a creative program of international cooperation involving US participation in several European, Japanese, and Soviet astrophysics missions as well as participation by several other countries in NASA missions. NASA's Astrophysics Division has made plans to strengthen the infrastructure of university science in support of its missions. These include support for individual scientists through the Astrophysics Data Program and data analysis programs of individual missions, and a commitment to make space data available to all qualified scientists. Recognizing that scientific insight often comes from integrating data obtained at different wavelengths, NASA-Astrophysics provides science-oriented funding in addition to mission-oriented funding for data analysis. It makes sense for NSF and NASA to work together toward the common goal of understanding of astronomical phenomena. NASA's Planetary Division supports the Infrared Telescope Facility on Mauna Kea. NASA has also cooperated with the NSF to upgrade the Arecibo radio telescope of the National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (NAIC) and the VLA in order to enhance their capabilities for deep space tracking, planetary radar, and astronomical research. NASA and NSF have worked together to distribute advanced detectors, originally developed for space missions, to ground-based observatories, greatly enhancing the power of their optical telescopes. These activities have been carried out in the face of major obstacles. The NSF Astronomy Division has received insufficient funding to respond fully to the ASC recommendations. NASA's space science programs for the 1980's were set back severely by science funding shortfalls, delays in the Shuttle Program, and the Challenger accident. The success of NSF and NASA in implementing part of the recommended program despite these handicaps is a tribute to the hard work by dedicated people at NSF and NASA. We appreciate their service. We commend both NASA and NSF for relying on the peer review process in making decisions for funding. We endorse the agencies' practice of using "rotators," research scientists on temporary leave from universities, on agency staff. We encourage universities to recognize and reward such service and call on the AAS Council to encourage members to participate. The Departments of Defense and Energy have also contributed substantially to astrophysics research and technology development, and we expect this synergism to continue. Between the end of World War II and 1960, DoD support provided the foundation for the great expansion of astronomy that has occurred XII-4 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS PANEL REPORTS since then and for our present preeminence. DoD continues to support research in astrometry and optical interferometry, and technology developments in cryogenics, infrared detectors, adaptive optics, fiber optics, and parallel computer architectures. DoE scientists have been leaders in calculations of gravitational collapse, supernova explosions, nucleosynthesis, and stellar opacity, and in observations of cosmic X-ray and gamma ray sources. The Space Exploration Initiative has the potential to provide new astronomical observing capabilities that can qualitatively improve astronomical resolution and sensitivity. A Presidential Decision of February 16, 1990 enlists the help of the Departments OfDefense and Energy in this initiative. The Smithsonian Institution, through its Astrophysical Observatory, has supported research in astro- physics for a century. The Observatory is now engaged in a broad range of research efforts, including studies of large-scale structure of the universe, high energy phenomena, atomic and molecular interactions, radia- tive transfer, stellar atmospheres, cosmic masers, molecular clouds, star formation, and the solar system. Facilities include a major optical observatory, available in part to visitors. The National Institute of Standards and Technology supported measurement and theoretical calculations of atomic and molecular processes that are fundamental to the understanding of many astronomical observations and phenomena. Although the policies of the 1980's have yielded many successes, our panel has identified several opportunities where the implementation of new policy recommendations would improve the productivity of the enterprise: * Astrophysics suffers because the ground-based astronomy program is too small to yield full scientific value from the nation's investment in space. There has been a serious decline in the infrastructure of ground-based astronomy, including both the support Ofexisting facilities and of individual researchers. We make recommendations to correct this problem in _III. • NASA can improve productivity, stimulate inventiveness, and train a new generation of space scientists and managers by devoting more resources to missions of reduced complexity that can be developed and launched within about three years. These and other issues are discussed in §IV. • The national astrophysics program can attract more talented people into scientific careers. It also can contribute substantially to improving scientific and technical literacy. In §V we give our rationale and present recommendations to accomplish these goals. • We provide some guidelines for the scientific advisory process, international cooperation, archiving of astronomical data, and multi-wavelength observations, in §VI. After this Chapter was nearly completed, we learned that the Hubble Space Telescope was launched with a defective mirror that seriously compromises the present ability of the telescope to do the frontier science for which it was designed. Our Panel cannot assess the specific causes for this problem; that task has been assigned to other Committees specifically charged to do so. There are, however, important lessons to be learned from our experience with the HST that are independent of the specific causes of the mirror problem; we discuss them in §IV(g). III. REVIVING THE NATION'S GROUND-BASED ASTRONOMY PROGRAM Once a star performer among U.S. science programs, ground-based observational and theoretical astronomy is now imperiled by continuing budget cuts, with consequent decay of major facilities and loss of key staff personnel at national observatories. The cause of this decline is twofold - the NSF basic research budget did not keep pace with the scientific needs of the nation and the relative priority for astronomy within the Foundation declined. Ground-based observational astronomy and associated theory are the essential core of astronomy. Without adequate support, the U.S. risks losing the fruits of its entire astronomy program, including the space effort. A modest augmentation of the ground-based effort can strongly enhance the total yield of the space program. Astronomy drives technology and science education; it is appreciated and admired by the general public and provides, for many, their only glimpse into what science is all about. Thus, the current crisis of support for ground-based astronomy is a national problem - for astronomy, for scientific efficiency, for science education, and for scientific prestige. POLICY OPPOR_NITIES XII-5 a) Why Ground-based Astronomy? The number of U.S. ground-oriented observational and theoretical astronomers has doubled since 1970, reflecting the excitement of the subject. Of all recent astronomical papers that refer to observational data, 72% relied mainly on ground-based data, while an overwhelming 83% contained at least some ground-based data. Space observations stimulate ground-based activities rather than replace them. Of the space-oriented papers studied, 39% also utilized ground-based data, and most of these reported new ground-based data acquired specifically to follow up and support the space discoveries. Although these statistics are probably influenced by the lack of launch opportunities for astronomical spacecraft during the 1980's, it is clear that ground-based observations are fundamental to astronomical research. The case for an excellent ground- based observational program is even more compelling in view of the relatively modest cost of ground-based facilities. Clearly, whatever can be done on the ground, should be done on the ground. Without adequate ground-based follow-up to space observations, America risks losing much of the cream of its space science program. Astronomers in other countries have invested heavily in ground equipment. They can easily obtain data from our open space archives and follow up with superior ground-based facilities. The solution is to augment our own ground-based capabilities with comparatively modest expenditures, to a level appropriate to realize the full potential of the space effort. To fail to do so would be a serious mis-allocation of national resources. b) The Unique Role of the National Science Foundation in American Astronomy: The Importance of aStrong NSF Program NSF, the only Federal agency with a mandate to support basic research, has unique responsibilities and abilities. NSF funds many grants and small projects with short lead times and great flexibility. This is especially important for theory, which would become seriously distorted if it were tied too closely to specific missions. NSF should therefore remain the principal custodian of funding for basic theoretical science in the U.S. Averaged over the past decade, the Astronomy Division of the NSF devoted only nine percent of its University budget to theory, a relatively low percentage compared to other Federal offices that support theory. The NSF peer review process is generally perceived to be fair. The Astronomy Program Directors have a good track record of embracing the priorities in the Astronomy Decade Reviews. However, they lack the resources to do the job properly. Astronomical research has historically been centered in university departments, the main source of advanced education and professional training. Combining the roles of basic research, training, and education at public and private universities is the unique property of the US scientific research system. Maintenance of this system, which is the envy of other scientifically advanced nations, is a primary responsibility of the NSF. Finally, astronomy stimulates extraordinary popular interest, and is a major asset to the NSF in its mission to cultivate public awareness of science. c) The Decline in U.S. Ground-based Astronomy The current crisis follows directly from the long-term funding history. New facilities have been constructed and the number of ground-oriented observational astronomers has doubled since 1970, but the budget (in Consumer Price Index-adjusted dollars) to operate facilities and conduct basic research has not increased in the past twenty years, despite a substantial expansion in the scope of the science. NOAO opened two new 4-m optical telescopes and absorbed the operation of Sacramento Peak Solar Observatory within its declining budget. NRAO opened the VLA, staffed a new site in Socorro, NM, and began to operate the VLBA. At the same time, improvements in astronomical instrumentation and data analysis algorithms have increased the power of optical and radio telescopes greatly. The cost of operating the NAIC was transferred from DARPA to the NSF. The number of visiting observers at all national observatories has tripled in the past twenty years. At the same time, their staffs have declined. To expect efficient operation of a larger program with less staff and smaller budgets is unrealistic, and it shows. The decline of the budget is illustrated in Table 1. Corrected for the Consumer Price Indez (CPI), the budget ltas been flat for tvJenty years. Corrected for tl_e actual cost escalation in technical environments of XII-6 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS PANEL REPORTS 8.5_ per year during the decade 1980-1989, the NSF base budget declined in real spending power to only 71_, and the spending per astronomer to 36%, of what they were in 1970. Construction of new facilities and advanced technology development at national observatories was achieved only through a diversion of resources from other critical areas, resulting in deferred maintenance, and deferred purchase of new equipment. Long-term deleterious consequences of these policies, now apparent, are detailed below. The specific effects for the university Grants Program and the National Observatories illustrate the impact (all budgetary figures are expressed in real donars corrected using NSAC [see Table 1] inflation): University Grants Program (36% of base budget). The NSF is the source of almost all grants to support ground-based observational work. Most astronomers have no alternative funding sources for this work. • The purchasing power of an average grant fell by more than a factor of two since 1980. • Available grant funds per U.S. astronomer have been reduced by 1/2 since 1980. • The number of funded postdoctoral fellows fell by 20% since 1980. • The success rate of new proposal applicants, mostly young investigators, fell to 10%. Most new applicants have no alternative sources for funding their research programs. • Many leading researchers had grants delayed, slashed, or cancelled. National Optical Astronomy Observatories (NOAO) (30% of base budget): • Staff level was cut by 15% since 1984, 25% since 1979. • Budget was cut by 21% since 1984. • One heavily utilized telescope was permanently closed, more closures are under review. • Two-thirds of observing requests are now rejected for lack of facilities. • Travel support has been suspended for visiting observers. Many observers now pay travel out of their own pockets for lack of NSF grants (even to CTIO in Chile). • The Advanced Projects Group at NOAO was closed for lack of funds. Group leader was hired away by European Southern Observatory to build world's largest telescope (ESO VLT project). NOAO lost its leadership in optical telescope construction and advanced optics. • Other countries now dominate large-telescope construction. Seven large telescopes were built abroad since 1975. In the same period NSF funds built 1/2 of one telescope in the U.S. Relative decline in forefront optical and electronic technology is comparable. National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) (27% of the current base budget): • Operations staff was cut by 15% in last 5 years. • Operations budget was cut by 30% over last 5 years. • Leadership in millimeter astronomy - developed by the US - was lost to Europeans and Japanese. No major new telescopes were built, despite an elegant proposal. • Deferred maintenance, such as the VLA track system, requires one-time funding of several million dollars. • Cannot operate VLA at full capability or exploit new image processing techniques for lack of modern receivers and adequate computers - despite excellent peer reviews. • Operations funds for the VLBA are ramping up at only half the rate required to put antennae into service. • The world-famous NRAO technical group is threatened due to low salaries and low morale. Director says, "If the core technical team disbands, the Observatory has no future. _ National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (NAIC) (7% of base budget): • Staff was cut by 10% in last five years, 24% since 1979. • Budget was cut by 35% since 1984. • Decaying scientific equipment, some of it 25 years old. POLICY OPPORIUNITIES XII-7 Table 1. Long-Term History of the NSF Astronomy Base Budget 1 Year 1970 1980 1989 Actual-yeardollars $23.8M $52.2M $77,4M CPI adjusted2 1.003 1.03 1.06 NSAC inflation ac]justed4 1.003 1.03 0.71 Per U.S. Mtronomer (CPI) 5 1.003 0.76 0.55 Per U.S. astronomer (NSAC)6 1.003 0.76 0.36 Rcl. to total NSF budget7 1.003 0.96 0.80 Rel. to MPS budgets -- 1.00s 0.78 Rel. to U.S. GNP9 1.003 0.81 0.63 1 The NSF base budget includes the university grants program and funds for the operation and maintenance of the National Observatories. New construction is omitted. 2 Adjusted for increases in the Consumer Price Index. 3 Set to 1.00 in 1970. 4 Adjusted for "technology inflation", as estimated by the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee subcommittee on inflation. We have applied a correction of 4.6% per year to this figure to the period 1980-1989. No adjustment has been applied to the period 1970-1980, for which no comparable data are available. s Adjusted using the increase in total AAS membership and CPI inflation. e Same as the previous row, but with NSAC inflation assumed. 7 Adjusted for increase in the total NSF budget. s Adjusted for increase in the Mathematical and Physical Sciences budget (set to 1.00 in 1980, since MPS did not exist in 1970). 9Adjusted for increase in U.S. national GNP. Shows NSF astronomy as a fraction of national effort. d) Augmenting _heNSF Asironom_ Budget Funding for ground-based astronomy has fallen so far below par that a concerted effort of restoration is required. The figures in Table 1mandate, at minimum, a doubling of the NSF base budget for astronomy during the next five years. Astronomy has not shared in the growth of the NSF budget for many years. Given the situation described above and the spectacular continuing advances possible in this field, a period of above average increases is warranted. e) The Role of NOA 0 in Ground-based Night-time Astronomical Research Astronomers hold conflicting views of the role of NOAO in ground-based, nighttime optical astronomy. On the one hand, the observatories were established and continue to be used to provide night-time facilities that are comparable in aperture to those run by universities or private institutions to which access is usually restricted by affiliation. On the other hand, many astronomers believe that NOAO should focus its efforts on providing unique facilities, such as the European VLT (Very Large Telescope). About 20 percent of NOAO users come from groups planning to construct their own 8-m and 10-m telescopes. The remaining 80 percent typically do not have access to such facilities, and most do not have access even to 1-4 meter class telescopes. Given this situation, there is substantial resistance among the latter group to expenditure of NOAO's budget for building more ambitious, state-of-the-art telescopes if doing so precludes the continued operation and enhancement of the existing telescopes. For long-lived facilities like telescopes, operation costs over their lifetimes exceed initial capital costs. As larger and more modern facilities become more common, smaller and aging telescopes appear less attractive and cost-effective. Changes in scientific emphasis also favor larger aperture. As guidelines towards definition of an achievable mission that will serve a wider segment of the U.S. astronomical community, we recommend: XII-8 ASTRO NO M_FAND ASTROPHYSICS PANEL REPORTS • That NOAO further reduce its support of those telescopes with relatively low oversubscription rates, seeking arrangements, whenever possible, to transfer them to private institutions. • The NOAO should endeavor to increase the time it can make available on 4-m class telescopes by seeking more partnership arrangements like the several emcient cost-sharing arrangements with university consortia that it has recently- un-der-taken. • NSF-astronomy and NOAO should establish provisions for trading or purchasing telescope time from private and university groups operating 8-m and 10-m class telescopes and smaller special-purpose telescopes in order to ensure that the full range of observing facilities is available to the whole community. Astronomy in the U.S. would be well served by a cooperative interdependency of the private and public sector. • By adding 8-m telescopes, NOAO will continue to fulfill its mission of providing access to front-line facilities to all astronomers independent of institutional affiliation. The construction and operation of 8-m telescopes and a 4-m telescope dedicated to fiber optics spectroscopy, and technology development for optical and infrared interferometry, are also important steps for development of a technical base upon which even more ambitious, unique facilities will be built. The development of unique facilities, which are distinguished either by scale or function, is a crucial step by which NOAO can broaden its support of the entire astronomical community. To maintain leadership in optical astronomy, NOAO needs the active involvement of the nation's leading astronomers, including those with access to private 4-m, 8-m and 10-m telescopes. They must be involved in the definition of NOAO projects and their implementation, and most importantly, they must use these facilities. The presently planned 8-m telescopes for NOAO are an important step along the way. A larger world-class, unique facility for optical astronomy will be needed to ensure scientific leadership by NOAO and to exploit fully the U.S. advantage of combining powerful resources in both the private and public sector. • NOAO cannot be the site for all of the necessary technological innovation, but it can play a vital role as a clearinghouse for such technology. To this end, NOAO should encourage outside partnerships in detector and instrument development. The health and success of U.S. optical astronomy has been based on a combination of astrong r_atlonal observatory together with non-federalfunding for private and university facilities that is unique in the world. A partnership that enhances the strengths of these two elements will ensure continued U.S. leadership in optical astronomy. IV. A VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF SPACE ASTROPHYSICS NASA's agenda of unfinished astrophysics missions remains substantial. For example, the HST needs repair, SIRTF has not yet been started, and AXAF and most of the Explorer missions approved during the 1970% and 80's will not be launched until the late 1990%. OSSA's five year strategic plan incorporates this unfinished agenda. We endorse this plan without reservation. In doing so, we recognize that its completion establishes NASA's strategy for most astrophysics missions to be launched until the late 1990%. Therefore, our recommendations cannot affect this plan in a major way. They should, however, affect the process by which NASA will select and implement astrophysics missions to be started during this decade and beyond. a) An E_hanced Ezplorer Program We recommend that NASA develop a more vigorous program of missions with reduced complexity and shorter times from inception to completion. At present, the funding is weighted toward large missions costing more than $300 M, such as HST, GRO, and AXAF. Averaged over 1984 - 1989, the fraction of NASA astrophysics project funding devoted to large missions was 73%, compared to 12% for moderate ($100 - 300 M) missions and 15% for small (< $100 M) missions, including rockets, balloons, and aircraft. Large missions such as the Great Observatories have revolutionary capabilities that cannot be matched by moderate and small missions. The latter, however, can add a dimension to NASA's space science program that is vital and cannot be provided by the large missions: the ability to deploy new instrumental technology into space on a timescale of a few years. The prospect of rapid access to space is a strong POLICY OPPORIUNITIES XII-9 driver of innovation. This opportunity attracts and permits the training of talented young instrumentalists, engineers, and project managers who are essential, not only for the health and future of NASA's space science programs, but also for the nation's future technical competitiveness. Yet, only two Explorer missions devoted to astronomy were launched during the period 1980-89. There are many good ideas for scientific payloads for small and moderate missions to make critical scientific observations that cannot be done with any other planned mission. For example, a 1988 NASA solicitation yielded 27 proposals for Delta-class Explorer missions for astrophysics, 7 of which were ranked with highest (%ategory 1") scientific priority, and a 1989 solicitation yielded 17 proposals for Scout Class Small Explorers (SMEX) for astrophysics, 3 of which were ranked category 1. However, it was only possible for NASA to select one mission for development from each of these competitions owing to the constraints of the Explorer budget. Moreover, some of the most innovative instruments developed by U.S. space scientists are now being flown first on foreign spacecraft for lack of NASA launch opportunities. The present level of the Explorer budget is approximately $60 M/yr for Delta-class missions and $30 M/yr for SMEX. Assuming optimistically that Delta-class missions will cost $120 M each and SMEX $30 M each, the Explorer budget will then permit one Delta-class mission every two years and one SMEX per year. That is approximately the necessary rate for a robust Explorer program for astrophysics alone, but the current Explorer budget must also support missions for several other disciplines of space science. Thus, a doubling of the Explorer budget is the minimum needed to maintain a vigorous program of astrophysics Explorer missions assuming that half the budget will be devoted to astrophysics missions. Presently, the scientific opportunities for small and moderate Explorer missions are constrained by NASA's lack of an expendable rocket with payload intermediate between those of the Scouts and Deltas. Important new opportunities for powerful but relatively inexpensive astrophysics missions will appear when OSSA procures such a vehicle. b) Costs arid Mar_agemer_Z of Small and Moderate Missions Even with a doubling of the Explorer budget, we will be able to achieve rapid and steady access to space only by holding mission development to cost and schedule. The productivity of the Explorer program will be maximized by having more frequent cost- and schedule-constrained missions rather than by maximizing the scientific performance of each individual mission. We have seen examples, such as the Japanese ASTRO program, where this strategy has enabled a robust program of X-ray astronomy missions launched at regular intervals. Cost and schedule control begins with the Explorer selection process. NASA has begun to introduce incentives by supporting a greater number of missions for the definition phase (Phase A) and then conducting a second competition to select missions for development (Phases B,C,D). To ensure that this strategy is successful, NASA should also: (1) include mission costs and their impact on the Explorer program as criteria of the peer review process in both the Phase A and Phase B competitions; (2) hold the management teams to their budgets, even if it becomes r_ecessar_ to scale dovon performance speeificatior_s. It is vital for cost containment that missions have all critical technologies under control before they are selected for development. To meet this requirement, NASA should invest adequately in technology development in its Research and Analysis program and in Phase A. If so, we see no reason that mission development should require more than three years from the beginning of Phase B to launch. To achieve an optimum result within budget and schedule, the project management team must be able to trade off scientific performance and cost, and take risks if necessary. In order to enable this process, NASA should: (1) vest full authority, including control over budget, staff, and procurement in a project management team consisting of the Project Manager and the Principal Scientific Investigator; and (2) provide full funding as planned to support the master schedule. There are necessary risks to such a strategy. If the project management team fails to meet milestones or exceeds costs, NASA must decide whether to stretch the schedule and augment the funding or to cancel the mission. Such decisions should be based on a careful assessment of the options and their impact on the overall Explorer program, with advice from the scientific community. The gains - in technical development, management experience and program discipline - may outweigh the losses if an occasional mission is cancelled. XII-10 ASTRONO MY AND ASTRO PHYSICS PANEL REPORTS c/A Renewed Partnership with Universities and Industry If moderate and small missions can be launched at a healthy rate, we think that NASA can achieve a more productive overall small/moderate mission program by involving project management and systems engineering at universities working With private industry, and/or NASA centers. Universities have unique advantages for attracting and training pe0pIe for Careers in engineering and management as well as in basic science. By providing opportunities to work on all aspects of space missions at universities, NASA can help provide a healthy supp]y of technically proficient and talented people, not only for its own needs but for the nation in general. - The time is ripe for a more vigorous partnership between NASA, universities, and the aerospace industry in space science projects. The aerospace industry has a rich reservoir of management and technical expertise for the building of space hardware, and space science could benefit greatly if more of this capacity became available _...a....r.e..s.uIt of decreased demand _for defense systems. We therefore recommend that NASA carry out its Explorer program in the context of a "mixed economy," in which some missions are developed by NASA centers and others are developed by management teams from universities working with private industry. Within such an economy, NASA should compare cost and productivity and seek an optimum mix. d) Astrophysics within the Space Ezploration Initiative NASA's Space Exploration initiative presents exciting prospects for astronomical observations on the lunar surface. There are, however, great uncertainties about the technical and logistical infrastructure to support such facilities, the timescale for their development, and the cost. It is prudent for astrophysicists to work with NASA to understand better the opportunities and problems of doing astronomy on the Moon. NASA should develop the required technology in logical phases. To ensure that the required technology is effective, NASA should, whenever feasible, test it on the ground, on suborbital platforms, and/or in Earth orbit. The requirement to produce actual scientific results in these tests introduces a technical rigor to the program that paper studies cannot provide. Further, the investment required to test the scientific and technical systems on the ground or in Earth orbit is relatively small. It is the best way to ensure maximum return from the much greater investment that will be required to install and operate an observatory on the Moon. Since the development phase of this initiative will be long, the opportunity to do scientific observations during this phase would help to attract and train the highly talented scientists whose energies and skills would be essential to the success of this initiative. e) A Vigorous Program of Suborbital and Airborne Research Our recommendation that a greater fractio n of NASA's resources be allocated to Explorers is motivated by several important goals: (i)the training of young astronomers and instrumentalists; (2) fast turn-around and frequent opportunities for testing and developing new instrumentation and techniques; and (3) improved cost-risk-benefit ratios to foster innovation. All of these desiderata are met extremely effectively by NASA's suborbital programs of rocket, balloon, and airborne astronomical research. These suborbital platforms play a unique and critical role as test-beds for new instruments. Because of the nature and operating procedures of these programs, astronomers have excellent access for adjustments and modifications to their instruments. In the airborne program, as epitomized by the highly successful Kniper Airborne Observatory (KAO), most groups have continuous access to their instruments during operation and can make minor adjustments even during a research flight. More significant adjustments and modifications can be made between flights on the KAO, or between launch opportunities for rockets and balloons. This "hands-on" mode of operation also provides a special opportunity for the training of young instrumentalists. The pay-off provided by the opportunity to participate directly in instrument development is apparent from the established track records of suborbital programs. Examples include: the explosive growth in our understanding of the interstellar medium due to the development of ultraviolet spectroscopy, initiated through the rocket program; the development of powerful new gamma ray telescopes through the baboon program; and the invaluable role of the KAO in the professional development of most currently active and prominent researchers in infrared and submillimeter astronomy. A recent survey of participants

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