LJMU Research Online Lui, A Multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/2667/ Article Citation (please note it is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from this work) Lui, A (2011) Multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation. Poznan University of Economic Review, 11 (2). pp. 47-72. LJMU has developed LJMU Research Online for users to access the research output of the University more effectively. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LJMU Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of the record. Please see the repository URL above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. For more information please contact [email protected] http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/ Multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation Alison Lui Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, Merseyside, United Kingdom ABSTRACT Every crisis presents opportunities. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 provides a valuable opportunity to study the corporate governance and regulatory aspects of the banking sector, a hinge point in the development of corporate governance in banks. There is a tremendous amount of academic literature on corporate governance of corporations generally, but not of banks. Banks share many characteristics in common with other corporations but differ in respect of the social costs involved. Banks play a fundamental role in a country’s economy and problems within the banking sector will have an impact on the wider community. The author argues that corporate governance played an important contributing factor to the financial crisis. In particular, the financial crisis has highlighted multiple principal-agent problems within the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model of banking. Multiple principal-agent problems are the direct consequence of financial innovation and regulatory dialectic. The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model relies on securitisation. Academic literature has revealed that securitisation is opaque and complex (Buiter, 2007; Berndt and Gupta, 2008; Fender and Mitchell 2009a). Little research however, has been conducted into why securitisation is opaque and complex from a principal-agent angle. This paper thus provides a new perspective to the literature on principal-agent theory and banking corporate governance. 1 Key words: Financial crisis; corporate governance; banking regulation; separation of ownership and control; principal/agent theory; securitisation JEL classifications: G01, G21, G24, G30 1. Financial Innovation Financial innovation and the financial crisis of 2007-2009 On 7th February 2007, HSBC announced losses linked to US subprime mortgages. Two months later on 3rd April 2007, New Century Financial, which specialised in sub-prime mortgages, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and cut half of its workforce. The sub-prime mortgage crisis had begun. The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States in September 2007 is arguably the catalyst to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. During this period, the world’s financial system has experienced severe challenges since the Second World War. When borrowers of sub-prime mortgages failed to repay their loans, US banks faced a liquidity crisis. Securitisation of loans, increased leverage and the development of complex financial products all contributed to the liquidity problem. Globalisation meant that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected most advanced countries simultaneously. Globalisation acts as a rapid multiplier effect, transmitting the infection instantly across the globe and reveals the fragility of the world’s inter-connected financial market. In the UK, the property market was shaken due to the securitised credit model and liquidity strains. UK banks were exposed when market confidence and asset prices fell. Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley were nationalised. The government’s recapitalisation programme of £850 billion and quantitative easing programme of £200 billion rescued banks such as the 2 Lloyds Banking Group (Lloyds and HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland (NAO, 2009). UK taxpayers now own 43% of Lloyds Banking Group and 84% of Royal Bank of Scotland (UKFI, 2009). Sub-prime mortgages form a component part of securitised assets. Securitisation is the ‘process of converting cash flows arising from underlying assets or debts (receivables) due to the originator (the entity which created the receivables) into a smoothed repayment stream, thus enabling the originator to raise asset-backed finance through a loan or an issue of debt securities - generically known as asset-backed securities or ABS - which is limited recourse in nature to the credit of the receivables rather than that of the originator as a whole, and with the finance being self-liquidating in nature’ (Deacon, 2004 cited in Burns, 2009). Two schools of thought on securitisation have since emerged. According to the first school, securitisation is to be celebrated because it reduces default risk by dispersing risks along the process and thus strengthens the financial system (Greenlaw et al (2008) cited in Shin, 2009). However, Acharya, Philippon and Richardson (2009) rebut this argument and counterclaim that the securitisation market collapsed in early 2007 due to banks ignoring their own model of securitisation and failed to transfer credit risks (Acharya, Philippon and Richardson, (2009). Banks moved from the ‘originate-to-hold’ model to ‘originate-to-distribute’ model because in theory, securitisation would give greater liquidity; more borrowing capacity and ability to transfer credit risks to ultimate investors. In reality, the latter was not achieved (Acharya, Philippon and Richardson, 2009; Goodhart, 2009). Acharya, Philippon and Richardson (2009) believe that between 2003-2007, banks utilised securitisation to avoid Basel II Accord on capital requirements. Regulatory dialectic thus became the aim of banks, not transferring 3 credit risks to investors. The term ‘originate-to-pretend-to-distribute’ model should be more accurate to describe securitisation (Goodhart, 2009). The second school of thought on securitisation is one of misalignment of incentives (Paligorova, 2009) Securitisation contributed to the collapse of the financial system because incentives were distorted in all the stages of the securitisation process. The end result is that the ultimate investors at the end of the process will end up with the ‘hot potato of bad loans’ (Shin, 2009). In Shin’s view, the ultimate investors did not end up with the bad loans. He argues that the financial crisis was severe because the bad loans were not all passed on to final investors. Instead, the bad loans remained in the securitisation process, on the balance sheet of financial intermediaries or special purpose vehicles that sponsored them (Shin, 2009). Misalignment of incentives is the fundamental ground of the principal-agent problem and it is important to study the multiple principal-agent problem in the securitisation process. It is vital to fix the securitisation process because loan securitisation is the main source for producing credit (Pozen, 2009). Pozen states that in the United States, banks accounted for less than 25% of all credit extended. Lenders in the shadow banking industry (insurance companies, hedge funds, credit card companies) provided the majority of loans. These lenders relied heavily on loan securitisation. A similar pattern can be found in the UK, but to a lesser extent (Bank of England, 2009). Nevertheless, heavy reliance on securitisation by UK banks is a contributory factor to the downfall of banks such as Northern Rock. Northern Rock had a very unusual business model. It combined a traditional reliance on illiquid long- term mortgage assets with a reliance on innovative sources such as securitisation and the wholesale market (Milne & Wood, 2009). Mortgages constituted 77% of Northern Rock’s 4 assets. At the end of 2006, Northern Rock issued asset-backed securities through its ‘Granite’ securitisation vehicles and obtained 40% of funding (Milne & Wood, 2009). Wholesale funding constituted 68% of Northern Rock’s liabilities whilst deposits only made up 27% of its liabilities (Goldsmith-Pinkham & Yorulmazer, 2009). Northern Rock experienced a bank run in September 2007 which caused a ripple effect in the UK financial sector. The Bank of England assisted by giving emergency financial aid and later nationalising Northern Rock. Hence, it is important to understand the problems in securitisation and its associated issues. The rest of the paper will consist of the following sections: section 2 of the paper will be a discussion on the theory of the principal-agent problem. Section 3 consists of an analysis of the multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation. Section 4 consists of a discussion on the associated issues (information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection…etc.) created by the multiple principal-agent problems. Finally, section 5 is a concluding remark. 2. The theory of the principal-agent problem Securitisation exacerbates agency conflicts (Gan and Mayer, 2006). Agency conflicts exist when there is a separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932). 68 years ago, Berle and Means published their seminal work ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’. Their work is arguably the birth of contemporary corporate governance thought and still exerts significant influence on modern corporations in the 21st century. As Berle and Means pointed out in 1932, the distinctive feature of the modern public corporation is the separation of ownership and control. This means that modern public corporations are 5 subject to the principal-agent problem as identified by Jensen & Meckling. In modern corporations, the managers decide how a corporation’s capital is spent, how resources are allocated and what endeavours the corporation undertakes. They do not however, own the capital or resources. Those in control of the corporation, “and therefore in a position to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as owners, entitled to the bulk of such profits… The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use.” Berle and Means believed this led to one simple conclusion: “[W]here the bulk of the profits of enterprise are scheduled to go to owners who are individuals other than those in control, the interests of the latter are as likely as not to be at variance with those of ownership and…the controlling group is in a position to serve its own interests.” Thus, the main tenet of Berle and Means’s theory is that capital in the U.S. has become heavily concentrated during the previous few decades. Certain corporations became very powerful. As these corporations grew, it became increasingly difficult for the original owners to maintain their majority shareholdings and shares became dispersed amongst many small shareholders. The consequence of this dispersal, as Berle and Means suggested, was that power became vested in the managers, who run the corporations. These managers have different interests to shareholders. Berle and Means did not foresee the changes that technology and innovation have made to the banking sector. In search of greater yield and liquidity, banks have abandoned the traditional ‘originate-to-hold’ model to the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Securitisation has 6 allowed banks to take on more risks and generate more profits. Ownership and responsibility of risks are lost in the process. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed Berle and Means’s concept of separation of ownership and control further. Under the principle of separation of ownership and control, shareholders own shares in a business whilst managers run a business. The principal-agent theory stems from the concern that managers (agents) will pursue their own interests and indulge in perks whilst bearing only a proportion of the costs. Imperfect information (hidden action) and misaligned incentives (hidden information) between principal and agent are the causes of this fear. Shareholders (principals) find it difficult to monitor the managers because of time and logistical constraints. Monitoring the managers will incur agency costs. To limit agency costs, Jensen and Meckling recommended that incentives should be enhanced whilst restrictions in the market to be removed. In their view, the focus of the principal-agent theory is determining the most efficient contract to align the interests of directors with shareholders’. The firm is regarded as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because stakeholders have contracts between themselves. Once these interests are aligned through contracts, directors should pursue the goal of maximising shareholder value. Jensen and Meckling defined an agency relationship as: ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.5) In modern banking, the contracts of finance include both equity and debt. Equity holders have formal control rights over a bank’s assets and are entitled to residual profits. Debt holders only enjoy control rights when there is a default on the fixed payments. Jensen and Meckling (1976) said that both equity and debt finance create specific 7 general problems. In equity finance, the agency costs are in relation to managerial slack. In debt finance, the agency costs are in relation to risk shifting (asset substitution). According to Keller (2008), managerial slack takes place when a manager ‘fails to maximise the value of a bank or portfolio’. Risk shifting takes place when the manager accepts ‘an inefficient high level of risk in his efforts to maximise the value of a firm or portfolio’ (Keller, 2008). These two problems can happen at the same time. In the next section, the author will discuss the multiple principal-agent problems and its associated issues in securitisation. 3. Multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation Modern banking has created multiple principals and agents in the principal-agent problem. The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model relies on securitisation and it is useful to understand the securitisation process and key players before the multiple principal-agent problems can be discussed. Diagram 1 below illustrates the key players in the securitisation process: 8 Credit Rating Agencies Evaluate credit risk/deal structure, assess third parties and issue ratings Stage 7 Asset Manager Insurer Trades assets Stage 6 insures particular tranches Stage 8 Senior Stage 4 Stage 5 Special Purpose Vehicle Arranger funds funds Mezzanine Assets Liabilities assets Junior Stage 3 Investors funds assets Originator/Seller Stage 9 Stage 10 Stage 2 UKFI Limited collects and makes payments Bank manager of monitors compliance Stage 11 originator Servicer Trustee Stage 1 UK taxpayers Borrower Individual Investors Diagram 1: Key players in the securitisation process Investors Source: Adapted from Fender and Mitchell (2009a) 9