Michael Neumann Motives and Functions of Patenting in Public Basic Science Motives and Functions of Patenting in Public Basic Science Michael Neumann Motives and Functions of Patenting in Public Basic Science MichaelNeumann Bremen,Germany Dissertation,UniversitätBayreuth,2019 ISBN978-3-658-33121-4 ISBN978-3-658-33122-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33122-1 ©TheEditor(s)(ifapplicable)andTheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringer FachmedienWiesbadenGmbH,partofSpringerNature2021 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsaresolelyandexclusivelylicensedbythePublis- her,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation, reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyother physicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computer software,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. 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Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Abraham-Lincoln-Str.46,65189Wiesbaden,Germany Abstract Innovationpolicypromotespatentingbybasicresearchers-Arepatentsprohibitiverights thatcontradicttheidealofopenscience,ordoscientificcommunitiessucceedinadaptingthe functionandeffectofpatentstotheirobjectives?Previoustestsoftheanticommonsthesis didnotfindtheinitiallyassumedimpedimentsofanexpandingintellectualpropertyregime foracademicresearch. Thisthesiscontinuesthisresearchbyreviewing(a)thetheoretical underpinningofearlierconcernsand(b)theimplementationofknowledgeandtechnology transferasthethirdmissionofthescientists,forwhichacademicpatentingissupportedand evaluated.Qualitativeinterviewsareusedtoanalyzehowscientistscomplywithpatentlaw andwhytheyapplyforpatents.Basedontheresults,itisarguedthatacademicscienceisa norms-based,self-governingsystemthatcanrefunctionpatentstopreventharmandtoadapt totheregulatoryenvironment.Potentiallyimpedingpatentrightssuchasexclusionmaybe suspendedtopreventharmtothescientificendeavor.Giventhedependenceofscientistson publicfunding,patentsbecomeameansofcommunicationwithstakeholdersandfunding sourcestosignalthattheirexpectationsarebeingmet.Theseempiricalinsightsexplainthe functionalchangeofpatentlawasbeingdrivenbycontextualfactorssuchasthestrategic acceptanceofintellectualpropertyrightsandcompetingsourcesofregulation. v TableofContents TableofContents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 2.4 UnitsofAnalysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 ListofFigures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 2.4.1 ScientistsinGermany. . . . . . . . . 32 2.4.2 Non-universityresearch . . . . . . . 32 ListofTables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 2.4.3 Publicbasicscience . . . . . . . . . . 33 Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 2.4.4 Technologicallyrelevantdisciplines 33 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii 2.5 DataCollectionandProcessing. . . . . . . . 34 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix 2.5.1 Interviewdesign . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.5.2 Interviewselection . . . . . . . . . . 34 1 Introduction 1 2.5.3 Interviewprocess . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.5.4 Transcription. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.1 PatentsinRegulatoryComplexity . . . . . . 3 2.5.5 Translation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.2 DefiningPublicBasicScience. . . . . . . . . 5 2.6 InterviewAnalysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 1.2.1 Thelinearmodel:Anoldbutsur- 2.6.1 Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 vivingapproach. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.6.2 Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1.2.2 Thequadrantmodel . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.3 Thesocialsystemmodel . . . . . . . 7 2.7 QualityCriteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.2.4 Socialnormsinscience. . . . . . . . 8 3 Theory:CommunityGovernanceandPatent- 1.3 ShiftsinResearchPolicy-TheRiseofthe inginScience 41 ThirdMission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1 CommonsGovernanceasaResearchPer- 1.4 APrimeronPatentsinScience . . . . . . . . 12 spective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 1.4.1 Patentsasregulatoryinstruments. . 12 3.1.1 Defaultneutralitytowardsmarkets, 1.4.2 Patentablebasicscience?. . . . . . . 12 authority,andcommunitymanage- 1.4.3 Academicpatentsasserviceinven- ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.2 Understanding institutional diver- 1.4.4 Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 sityandcomplexity. . . . . . . . . . 47 1.4.5 Exclusiverightsandtheirexemptions 13 3.2 AnalyticalToolsoftheCommonsPerspective 48 1.4.6 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2.1 TheIADframework . . . . . . . . . 49 1.5 TheResultingFriction:PrivateOwnership 3.2.2 Multiplesourcesofrule-making . . 54 andBasicScience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2.3 Multiplelevelsofrule-making . . . 56 1.5.1 Theoreticalconcerns . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2.4 AGrammarofInstitutions. . . . . . 58 1.5.2 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2.5 Dissecting Rules-in-Use of the 1.6 ResearchQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 PatentSystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.2.6 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 1.7 MethodologicalConsiderations . . . . . . . 20 1.7.1 Contextanddata . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3 CommonsGovernanceasaResearchObject 64 1.7.2 Analysis of individual attitudes 3.3.1 Commons-Adisambiguation. . . . 65 andstrategiestowardpatenting. . . 22 3.3.2 Common-property regimes: Legal variablesofcommunitygovernance 66 1.8 ThesisStructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.3.3 Common-pool resources - Eco- 2 Methodology 25 nomicvariablesincommunitygov- ernance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2.1 ResearchDesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.1.1 WhyaCaseStudy? . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.4 Cultural Variables in Community Gover- nance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2.1.2 Whatisthe“case?” . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.4.1 “Culture”asacategoryofinformal 2.1.3 Choiceofcasestudytype . . . . . . 29 institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2.2 ResearchQuestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4.2 Interplayofinformalandformalin- 2.3 PriorInformationandTheoreticalProposi- stitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 tions:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.4.3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 vii TableofContents 3.5 CommunityGovernanceasSelf-Regulation 79 4.4.5 Regulatory indetermination of 3.5.1 Mainelementsofcommonsgover- polycentricenvironments . . . . . .132 nance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.5 Summary:PatentsasaProxyforthe“Third 3.5.2 Opennessasanimportantproperty Mission”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133 ofcommonsgovernance . . . . . . . 81 4.5.1 Embeddedness of patents in the 3.5.3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 governanceofscience. . . . . . . . .134 3.6 PeculiaritiesofKnowledgeCommons. . . . 83 4.5.2 Exogenous Third-Mission regula- 3.6.1 Theinterdependencyofeconomic tionsintheIADframework . . . . .135 variablesandrules-in-use . . . . . . 83 3.6.2 Theneedforknowledgetobecreated 83 5 Empirics:PatentingMotivesinBasicScience 137 3.6.3 Specifictypesofgovernancefailures 85 3.6.4 Summary:Complexityinthegover- 5.1 BasicScienceDefinedbyBasicScientists . .139 nanceofknowledgecommons . . . 86 5.1.1 Institutional environment - Basic scienceasamission. . . . . . . . . .139 3.7 UnderstandingScienceasaCommons . . . 88 3.7.1 Whatmakescommons“scientific”?. 89 5.1.2 Personal motives: Individual 3.7.2 Whatmakesscienceacommons? . . 91 questsforunderstanding. . . . . . .140 3.7.3 Nestednessofscientificcommons. . 95 5.1.3 Researchactivities. . . . . . . . . . . 141 3.7.4 Commonsgovernanceinscience . . 96 5.1.4 Researchresults . . . . . . . . . . . .142 3.7.5 Summary:Scienceasacommonsvs. 5.1.5 Sourcesofinnovation:Fourdimen- scientificcommons . . . . . . . . . .100 sionsofbasicresearch . . . . . . . .144 3.8 Two Explanations for Overvaluations of 5.2 How are Scientists Affected by Existing AnticommonsinScience . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Patents? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 3.8.1 InstrumentalismI: Patent instru- 5.2.1 Passiveignoranceofpatents. . . . .146 mentalismonresearchinstruments.102 5.2.2 Assessingpatentcontent. . . . . . . 147 3.8.2 InstrumentalismII: Exogenous 5.2.3 Activeignoranceofpatents . . . . .148 patents versus endogenous self- 5.2.4 Twosidesoftheignore-patentsnorm148 governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 5.3 MentalModelsofIntellectualPropertyand 3.8.3 Anticommons effects in institu- theThirdMission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 tionalcomplexity . . . . . . . . . . .106 5.3.1 ThetraditionalFirstMissionversus 3.9 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 thenewThirdMission . . . . . . . . 151 5.3.2 Mentalmodelsofpatentsandintel- 4 PolicyAnalysis:PatentingfortheThirdMission109 lectualproperty . . . . . . . . . . . .154 4.1 TheRiseoftheThirdMission. . . . . . . . .110 5.3.3 Mertoniannorms:Idealsandreality 158 4.1.1 Historicalperspective . . . . . . . .110 5.3.4 Summary:PragmatismaboutMer- 4.1.2 Conceptualperspective . . . . . . .112 toniannorms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 4.1.3 Theregulatoryperspective. . . . . .116 5.4 ResultingMotivesnottoPatent . . . . . . .162 4.1.4 RegulatoryOverlapsfortheThird 5.4.1 Academicculture . . . . . . . . . . .162 Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 5.4.2 Improvingviasharing . . . . . . . .163 4.2 ExpectationsandMissionFormulation . . .119 5.4.3 Priorityforscienceandcost-benefit 4.2.1 Europeanlevel. . . . . . . . . . . . .119 considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . .163 4.2.2 Nationallevel . . . . . . . . . . . . .120 4.2.3 Organizationallevel . . . . . . . . . 121 5.5 MotivesforPatenting . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 5.5.1 Privateincome-ornot? . . . . . . .164 4.3 ThirdMission-DirectedResources . . . . . .122 5.5.2 Protectionfordiffusionintoappli- 4.3.1 Europeanlevel. . . . . . . . . . . . .123 cation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166 4.3.2 Nationallevel . . . . . . . . . . . . .124 4.3.3 Organizationallevel . . . . . . . . .125 5.5.3 Accesstofunding. . . . . . . . . . .169 5.5.4 Patentsusedasacertificateandsignal170 4.4 Mission-DirectedEvaluation . . . . . . . . .126 5.5.5 Individualsignaling . . . . . . . . . 171 4.4.1 Europeanlevel. . . . . . . . . . . . .126 5.5.6 Organizationalsignaling. . . . . . .174 4.4.2 Nationallevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 4.4.3 Organizationallevel . . . . . . . . .128 5.5.7 Patentingmotives:Conclusion . . . 177 4.4.4 Propertiesofpolycentrism. . . . . .130 5.6 ScientificFormsofStrategicPatenting. . . .179 viii TableofContents 5.6.1 Patenting motives between exter- 6.4.6 Individualsignaling . . . . . . . . .224 nalincentivesandintrinsicmotiva- 6.4.7 Complexity:Emergingpatentfunc- tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179 tionsaspatternsofinteraction. . . .226 5.6.2 Patenting motives and self- 6.4.8 Evaluatingnewpatentfunctions . . 227 determination theory in the IAD 6.4.9 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229 framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 6.5 PatentsasSignals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 5.6.3 Patentingstrategiesinscienceand 6.5.1 Patent signals in legal and eco- industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184 nomicresearch . . . . . . . . . . . .230 5.7 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 6.5.2 PatentsignalsintheTripleHelix . .232 6.5.3 Summaryandimplications . . . . .234 6 Synthesis:ContextualPatentFunctions 189 6.6 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235 6.1 Disambiguating Legitimation, Purpose, 6.6.1 Contextual rules-in-use and func- andFunctionofPatents . . . . . . . . . . . .190 tionsofpatenting . . . . . . . . . . .236 6.1.1 Aninstrumentalistviewonpatents.190 6.6.2 Symbolicpatentinginscience . . . . 237 6.1.2 Alookback . . . . . . . . . . . . . .192 7 Summary 239 6.1.3 Fencing a moving target: Dis- tinguishing micro-functions and 7.1 RecapitulatingtheArgument. . . . . . . . .240 macro-purposes . . . . . . . . . . . .195 7.1.1 Initialconsiderations . . . . . . . . . 241 6.1.4 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196 7.1.2 Theory:Commonsgovernanceand theabsenceofanticommonseffects.242 6.2 Functions as Contextual Action-Outcome 7.1.3 Policyanalysis:Patentsinpolycen- Links. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 tricregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . .243 6.2.1 Shortcomingsinthepreviousview. 197 7.1.4 Empirics: Strategic patenting mo- 6.2.2 Theanalyticalalternative:Contex- tivesinscience. . . . . . . . . . . . .244 tualfunctionsofpatents . . . . . . . 201 7.1.5 Synthesis: From motives to func- 6.2.3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 tions–Signalingasacontextually 6.3 ContextualEfficacyofPatentLaw . . . . . .208 emergingpatentfunction . . . . . .245 6.3.1 Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 7.2 The Big Picture: Understanding Institu- 6.3.2 Exclusivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 tionalComplexityofPatenting. . . . . . . .246 6.3.3 Licensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 7.3 ImplicationsforExistingDiscussions . . . .248 6.3.4 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .212 7.3.1 Incentives and motives for aca- 6.4 ContextuallyEmergingPatentFunctions . .213 demicpatenting. . . . . . . . . . . .248 6.4.1 Linking motives and contextual 7.3.2 Acceptanceandfunctionalchange regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 ofpatentlaw. . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 6.4.2 “Traditional”functions. . . . . . . .216 7.3.3 Governingknowledgecommons . .249 6.4.3 Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .218 7.3.4 Exploringconceptualbridges . . . .249 6.4.4 Qualitativeorganizationalsignaling 220 6.4.5 Quantitativeorganizationalsignaling222 Bibliography 251 ix MotivesandFunctionsofPatentinginPublicBasicScience ListofFigures 0.1 KTT-pathsbetweenScienceandIndustry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii 1.1 OverlappingSourcesofRegulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Stokes’QuadrantModelofResearchOrientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3 MertonianNormsinaRegulatoryOverlap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4 ResearchPolicyInstrumentalizingPatents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.5 PatentsinPotentialConflictwithAcademicSelf-Regulation . . . . . . 14 1.6 ReflexiveRegulatoryRelationsinTheIAD-Framework . . . . . . . . . 22 2.1 IterativeResearchStrategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.2 BasicTypesofCaseStudyDesigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.3 ResearchquestionsintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1 DefaultNormativeNeutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.2 ComplementaryUnderstandingofModesdifferentGovernanceModes 46 3.3 TheIADframeworkinitsadaptedformforknowledgeresources . . . 49 3.4 MultipleLevelsofRule-Making. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.5 ConnotationsoftheTerm“Commons” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 3.6 PropertyasaBundleofRights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3.7 Rules-in-useintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 3.8 EconomicResourceProperties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 3.9 EconomicvariablesintheIADframework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 3.10 CulturalVariablesintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 3.11 CommonsastheInstitutionalArrangementofSharedResourceSystems 82 3.12 Economiccharacteristicsofknowledgeaffectedbylegalnorms . . . . 84 3.13 InterdependentLegalandEconomicVariables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 3.14 CommonsGovernanceembodyingMixturesofInstitutionalDevices . 87 3.15 MultiplelevelsofAcademicSelf-Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 3.16 Changesinthemodesofgovernanceofuniversitiesbetweenthe1980s and2000s,GermanyandGreatBritainincomparison. . . . . . . . . . . 97 3.17 Property-focusedandGovernance-focusedConceptionsof“Commons” 101 xi ListofFigures 3.18 Legalrulesthatregulateeconomicresourcecharacteristics . . . . . . . 103 3.19 SocialNormsoverruleLegalRules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 4.1 RegulatoryoverlapsintheTriple-Helixmodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 4.2 PublicMissionsandExpectationsForScientists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 4.3 PatentsinResearchResourceAllocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 4.4 Patentsinresearchevaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 4.5 ResearchPolicyInstrumentalizingPatents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 4.6 PatentsEmbeddedintotheGovernanceofScience . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 4.7 ExogenousThird-MissionRegulationsseenintheIADFramework . . 135 5.1 Fourdimensionsofbasicresearch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 5.2 AcademicNormsinOppositiontoExternalRegulation . . . . . . . . . 150 5.3 PatentingmotivesintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 5.4 Self-determinationTheoryintheMetatheoreticalIADFramework. . . 183 6.1 Macro-,Meso-,andMicro-LevelofPatentRegulation . . . . . . . . . . 199 6.3 PatentFunctionsasAction-Outcome-Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 6.4 Patenting:MatchingOutcomeswithIntentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 6.5 Rules-in-Useofthepatentsystemlinkingactionandoutcome. . . . . . 205 6.6 Rules-in-UseDefiningContextualPatentFunctions . . . . . . . . . . . 206 6.7 EfficacyofPatentDisclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 6.8 ContextualEfficiencyofPatentExclusivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 6.9 ContextualRelevanceofPatentLicensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 6.10 EmergingPatentFunction:PatentsusedforAllocatingFunding . . . . 219 6.11 Qualitativesymbolicpatenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 6.12 Quantitativesymbolicpatenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 6.13 IndividualSignalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 6.14 Patentfunctionsasemergingpatternsofinteraction . . . . . . . . . . . 226 6.15 Evaluatingpatentfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 6.16 FormsofsignalingintheTripleHelix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 6.17 ContextualRules-In-UseandPatentingFunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 7.1 ResearchQuestionsintheIADFramework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 7.2 ResearchStructureintheIAD-Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 xii