iv MILITARY ADVISORS IN KOREA: KMAG IN PEACE AND WAR by Major Robert K. Sawyer Edited by Walter G. Hermes CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1988 i Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 62–60015 First Printed 1962—CMH Pub 30–3 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 ii Foreword The mid-twentieth century has added new dimensions to the roles and missions long performed by the United States Army. In many lands whose peoples speak alien tongues and observe strange customs, the American soldier is now living and working as ally, friend, and coun- selor. As a representative of the American way of life, as a persuasive advocate of his country’s modern equipment and tactical doctrine, as partner in a global system of achieving security for the entire free world, he is called upon to demonstrate a variety of talents-patience, tact, lin- guistic ability, and superior professional knowledge, among others. In all that he does, he must make a supreme effort to understand people and traditions often vastly different from his own. One of the pioneers in this new type of Army endeavor was the Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, commonly known as KMAG. The men and officers who served in KMAG during the early days came to know all the frustrations and triumphs, the problems and partial solutions, the failures and successes that characterize new ventures. Major Sawyer and Mr. Hermes have vividly recaptured the spirit and actions of the men of both nations whose joint efforts established a remarkable record of achievement. Though this volume describes the Army’s experience in Korea only, the lessons it contains have great value to an officer assigned to advisory group duty in any nation. The book will also introduce the general public to the manner in which the United States soldier can and does meet the ever-changing tasks demanded of him by his countrymen. A professional soldier and a professional military historian pooled their talents to prepare this work. Major Sawyer, presently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, wrote his manuscript while on duty with the Office of the Chief of Mili- tary History from 1951 to 1955. A combat veteran of both World War II and the Korean War, he received a battlefield commission in France in 1945 and fought in Korea in 1950 with the 25th Infantry Division. He holds the Silver Star, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Purple Heart. iii Mr. Hermes, also a World War II veteran, is a graduate of Boston University, where he received an M.A. degree in 1942, and is currently completing requirements for a Ph.D. degree in history at Georgetown University. A staff member of the Office of the Chief of Military History since 1949, he is the author of Truce Tent and Fighting Front, a forthcoming volume in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. Washington, D.C. WILLIAM H. HARRIS 15 December 1961 Brigadier General, U.S.A. Chief of Military History iv Preface In an era when United States military assistance groups are scattered all over the world and probably will be for some time to come, the story of one of the earliest of these groups is of more than passing interest. The U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, or KMAG as it was frequently called, was not only one of the first advisory groups to be formed but also one of the few that had to operate both in peace and war. The problems that KMAG had to face in Korea in organizing and developing native forces differ only in degree from those that confront many American military advisors working in the more recently founded nations of Africa and Asia today. In substance they are essentially the same: the problem of communication between a highly skilled and competent group of technicians on the one hand, and an eager and will- ing yet often uneducated and untrained people on the other; the need to establish a military language comprehensible to both teacher and pupil; and the task of forging a military instrument out of the raw mate- rials at hand under conditions that may be quite primitive by American standards. From the KMAG experience in coping with the questions that arose and the solutions that were devised or sometimes improvised, much can be learned. Some of the pitfalls that marked the path of the KMAG military advisors are bound to be encountered again under similar or varied guises. If this study can illuminate a few of the problems involved and help to lessen or eliminate difficulties that are liable to come up, its purpose will have been accomplished. Although officially KMAG’s history does not begin until 1 July 1949 when the group was formally established, the genesis of its mission can be found in the immediate post-World War II period. During the 1945–48 period, the seeds were planted and the area of development was laid out. Thus, the story of the formation of Republic of Korea’s armed forces must properly start at the close of World War II when the nucleus for the future ROK Army came into being and American military advisors first were assigned to the task of organizing and training security forces. During his assignment to the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1951–55, Captain Sawyer completed a draft manuscript covering the period of origins and carrying the KMAG story through the first year of the war. This was the era of greatest stresses and strains on the advisory group and the ROK Army, since they had first to undergo the pangs of v birth and of growing up and then to be tested in the crucible of war be- fore they were properly prepared. With the initiation of the truce nego- tiations and the slowdown in the action at the front in mid-1951, KMAG entered a more leisurely period and was able to rebuild on a more solid foundation. The groundwork that was laid in the 1951–52 period put KMAG and the ROK forces on a firm footing that continued to the con- clusion of the truce and beyond. Therefore, this work projects itself into the second year of the war insofar as it is necessary to establish the pattern for the future. Since Captain Sawyer was no longer available for the task of revising his manuscript, I undertook to provide a slightly broader framework for the narrative and to furnish the projections into 1952 that were needed to bring the story to a more logical stopping place. In the process, I re- organized and rewrote some of the material to conform with the changes introduced into the text. Otherwise, the account is Sawyer’s, and my ef- forts were confined to the details of polishing up the draft manuscript for publication. One of the great problems in the preparation of a history of KMAG is the dearth and inadequacy of official records. Since it was impossible to fashion a continuous and complete narrative from the extant files, Captain Sawyer had to depend heavily upon the memories of the men who participated in the KMAG experience. He collected their personal accounts through interviews and letters, and, frequently, by viewing their personal papers. On behalf of the author I would like to acknowledge his deep debt to each member of the KMAG team who aided him in this respect. The responsibility for the use of this material and for any errors that may have been made in this book is, of course, the author’s alone. For guidance in the writing of this study, the author has expressed his particular gratitude to Dr. Stetson Corm, now Chief Historian of the Office of the Chief of Military History, as well as to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, the former Chief Historian. Dr. Louis Morton and Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman, both of OCMH, made many helpful suggestions. Mrs. Marion P. Grimes was copy editor for the manuscript. Mrs. Eileen Blandford, Miss Barbara A. Smith, and others helped cheerfully in re- peated typings. Miss Mary Ann Bacon provided many sage comments in the literary editing of the volume; Miss Ruth A. Phillips selected the photographs that brighten its pages. Washington, D.C. WALTER G. HERMES 15 December 1961 vi Contents Chapter Page I. THE BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The First Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Establishment of a National Defense Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Creation of the Korean Constabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Korean Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Department of Internal Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Constabulary as a Police Reserve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 An Army Is Founded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 II. THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP . . . . . 34 Transfer of Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 The Debate Over Withdrawal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 The Infancy of the ROK Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The Expansion of the Advisory Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 III. KMAG: THE INSTRUMENT AND THE CHALLENGE . . . . 46 Command Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Internal Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Operating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Special Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 IV. TRAINING THE ROK FORCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 ROKA Organization and the Adoption of a Training Program . . . 67 Obstacles to Training Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 The School System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Other KMAG Advisory Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 V. STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Military Assistance to the ROK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 The Opposing Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 VI. THE COMING OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 The First Assaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 The Fall of Seoul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Behind the Lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Efforts To Aid Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 VII. THE ROAD BACK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 The Task of Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Replacements and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 The Advisor in Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 VIII.THE TASK AHEAD:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 The Growth of KMAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Improving the ROK Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 vii Chapter Page IX. A FIRM FOUNDATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Strengthening the School System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 The Build-up of ROKA Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 KMAG in Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Charts No. 1. KMAG Table of Distribution, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 2. KMAG Table of Distribution, March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Tables 1. United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea. 50 2. KMAG Strength, July 1950 Through September 1951 . . . . . . . 161 Maps I. The North Korean Invasion, 25–28 June 1950 . . . . . . . faces 115 Illustrations Dr. Rhee, Dr. Kim Koo, and General Hodge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Constabulary Group Training With 81-mm. Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Captain Hausman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 KMAG Signal Advisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Korean Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 General Roberts Inspects Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Korean Police Arrest a Communist Rioter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Col. Min Ki Sik and Major Clark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 38th Parallel in the Kaesong Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Colonel Wright. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 KMAG Group Leaving Seoul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 General Farrell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Recruits for the ROK Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 KMAG G–2 Advisor Briefs ROK Engineer Platoon. . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Colonel Champeny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Korean Students at Fort Benning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 KMAG Artillery Advisor Watches ROK Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 All pictures in this volume are from Department of Defense files. viii