IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAR? SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI Michael Pye A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2015 Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9501 This item is protected by original copyright IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAR? SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI CANDIDATE: MICHAEL PYE DEGREE: DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DATE OF SUBMISSION: 26TH OF MAY 2015 1 ABSTRACT The question mark of the project's title alludes to a critical reexamination of Soviet- Iranian relations during the period and aims to offer an original contribution to scholarship in the field by exploring an aspect of Pahlavi foreign relations that lacks any detailed treatment in the literature presently available. In pursuit of this goal, research has been concentrated on recently-released western archival documentation, the Iranian Studies collection held at the University of St Andrews, and similarly materials from the Russian Federal Archive for Foreign Relations, to which the author was granted access, including ambassadorial papers relating to the premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq. As far as can be ascertained, the majority of the Russian archival evidence presented in the dissertation has not been previously been utilised by any Western-based scholar. At core, the thesis argues that the trajectory of Pahlavi foreign relations specifically (and to a certain degree Mohammad Reza's regency more broadly) owed principally to a deeply-rooted belief in, and perceived necessity to guard against, the Soviet Union's (and Russia's) historical 'objectives' vis-à-vis Iran. While the Shah proved himself to be a very effective advocate of this approach, it is suggested that the importance attached to the spectre of Soviet interference cannot solely be explained as a means of leverage in relation to Iran's western allies, although at times it was undoubtedly used in this manner. Rather, the anxieties of Iranian politicians were the genuine consequence of a painfully proximate history, significantly reinforced by the unfortunate disconnect between public Soviet diplomacy towards Iran and the activities of various 'deniable' Communist elements operating both within and outwith Iran‟s borders. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to record my sincere debt of gratitude to three people: to the sponsor of my doctoral studies at the University of St Andrews, Mr. Mahmoud Khayami, whose generous provision of a scholarship has made this project feasible in the first instance; to my supervisor, Professor Ali Ansari, whose kind support and patient encouragement has ensured its completion; and to my very dear friend in Moscow, Tamara Gigolashvili, without whose generosity and kindness what follows would be considerably poorer and quite possibly non-existent. 4 CONTENTS OVERVIEW AND DOCUMENTARY SOURCES P1 ~ AIMS OF THE THESIS ~ RATIONALE FOR CASE STUDY APPROACH ~ NATURE AND EXTENT OF AVAILABLE MATERIALS ~ ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY SOURCES ~ INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK P13 ~ REIFICATION OF THE STATE ~ STRUCTURE AND AGENCY ~ RATIONALITY AND „RATIONAL‟ ACTORS ~ NARRATIVE AND EMOTION IN SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS ~ SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT P31 ~ IRAN‟S RELATIONS WITH TSARIST RUSSIA ~ ~ IRAN‟S RELATIONS WITH POST-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA ~ CHAPTER 1 | FROM MAHABAD TO MOSADDEQ P38 ~ THE ALLIED INVASION OF IRAN AND ITS AFTERMATH ~ A FEBRILE POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT ~ THE FAILED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON THE SHAH ~ ~ DR. MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ AND THE SOVIET UNION ~ CHAPTER 2 | THE SHAH‟S WESTERN PIVOT P77 ~ THE BAGHDAD PACT AND SOVIET RESPONSES ~ THE SHAH'S STATE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION ~ THE COUP IN IRAQ AND THE QARANI AFFAIR ~ SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION ~ CHAPTER 3 | IRAN AND THE SOVIET UNION UNDER DÉTENTE P110 ~ THE STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV TO IRAN ~ SOVIET-IRANIAN ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT AND THE ESFAHAN STEEL MILL ~ A CRISIS OVER SOVIET ARMS ~ THE SOVIET-IRANIAN OIL AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ~ CHAPTER 4 | SEEDS OF A REVOLUTION P143 ~ NARRATIVE OF ENCIRCLEMENT: THE SHAH‟S REGIONAL OUTLOOK ~ ~ IRAN, IRAQ AND THE KURDISH TRUMP CARD ~ ~ CONCERN AND CONCESSION: THE CURIOUS CASE OF LIEUTENANT ZOSIMOV ~ ~ RETICENCE AND REALISATION: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN IN 1979 ~ CONCLUSION P180 ~ THE DEPARTING WEST DID NOT LEAVE BEHIND A SOCIALIST EAST ~ BIBLIOGRAPHY & APPENDICES P193 5 OVERVIEW AND DOCUMENTARY SOURCES The aim of this dissertation is to offer a chronologically-presented, historical analysis of relations between Iran under the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Accordingly, the period of research extends from 1941 – the Allied invasion of Iran and the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza's father – to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The choice of timeframe, coinciding with a defined period of Iranian history as opposed to the lifespan of the Soviet Union, reflects both the supervisory framework for the project (under the auspices of the Institute for Iranian Studies in the University of St Andrews) and therefore the project‟s central concern: to complement existing scholarship on Pahlavi-era foreign policy, to which, it will be argued, elite perceptions of and interactions with Moscow were central. The principal objectives may be stated as follows: 1. To draw together and analyse relevant bodies of documentary and archival evidence, complemented by other primary source materials, with a view to describing and assessing key Soviet-Iranian episodes and encounters during the period, both in their own right and for their relevance to the trajectory of Iran's relations with the other powers; 2. Conversely, using the same methodology, to consider the impact of Western regional interests and broader political considerations on the Iranian leadership's attitudes toward the USSR, and the extent to which those considerations either reinforced, or caused the alteration of, the Iranian leadership‟s policy choices with respect to the USSR and more widely; 3. To highlight, as broader observation, the potency of history, myth and historical consciousness in guiding and informing Iran‟s foreign policy during the period, and to emphasise more specifically that the perceived need to counter or accommodate the Soviet Union had a significant bearing on both the rise and indeed fall of the Pahlavi regime. It is necessary first to concede that a full discussion of the many possible episodes categorisable under the heading „Soviet-Iranian relations‟ over a period of thirty-eight 6 years would pose a significant challenge within the context of a doctoral dissertation. Accordingly, a case study-orientated approach is adopted. Each chapter presents four extended case studies offering an analysis of a particular event (or connected series of events), the selection criteria for which were governed in the first instance by the aims stated above, and in the second by a preference for episodes where the highest-quality documentary or primary source materials could be obtained. The latter criterium proceeds from the observation that existing scholarly literature on Soviet-Iranian relations exhibit a relative paucity of primary sources in addressing the topic; a deficiency by no means due to a lack of diligence on the part of the scholars involved, but rather from the handicap of certain documentary sources not having been available at their time of research.1 By fortunate contrast, this dissertation has benefitted extensively from archival research in a number of areas. First, all of the U.K. Foreign Office records relating to Soviet-Iranian relations during the period under review, with few exceptions, have now been released to the National Archive at Kew.2 Second, there exists a comparable availability of U.S. archival materials covering the majority of the period under study (to 1976), the most recent tranche of which was released in December 2012.3 Third, the author's successful application to the Russian Foreign Ministry for access to its closed Archive, including the opportunity to view papers not previously open to researchers outwith the former Soviet Union, furnished a number of crucial discoveries.4 The thesis makes further use of several political memoirs, in Persian and Russian, that do not previously appear to have attracted scholarly attention. In terms of source content, the core methodological challenges may be stated as, primarily, the need to draw a clear distinction between materials that were broadly private at their point of composition (namely the „closed‟ diplomatic documentary record) and those that were public (press articles, radio broadcasts political memoirs, official governmental communiqués or interviews); and more obviously, to identify and acknowledge the merits and demerits of each source. While separating rhetoric from 1 See for instance Shahram Chubin‟s monograph Soviet policy toward Iran and the Gulf (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), which is principally based on contemporary media materials. 2 The British government operates a thirty-year release policy in the majority of cases. 3 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII: Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976. 4 The folios relating to Mohammad Mosaddeq, for instance, appeared to have only been accessed by Foreign Ministry personnel and a single Azerbaijani scholar, Jamil Hasanli, who made only tangental use of them (referenced where appropriate.) 7 reality in the study of relations between states is a standard task for the historian, it holds particular importance for the present dissertation in approaching a relationship characterised by a significant degree of strain and emotional charge on the part of those involved. A basic distinction is therefore made that, whereas statements in the public arena (being directed towards a wider audience) display a tendency to highlight how actors on both sides desired relations to be perceived by a variety of audiences, the diplomatic record (being intended for an closed audience) may provide a more accurate insight into the actual status of relations. Such a distinction does not seek to imply, however, that „open‟ primary-source materials are inferior. Public rhetoric provides a rich repository of political narrative, and its importance during the period under review was considerable. It is furthermore clear that the vagaries and vicissitudes of private politics bore a strong relation to the character and intent of their public expression, of which broadcast or print media were the most prominent manifestation. It is worth emphasising in this connection that both governments exercised a high degree of control over their respective medias, whose services were frequently employed to send a message to the other side that may otherwise have been inadmissible within the framework of normal diplomatic exchange.5 Indeed, the British Foreign Office dossiers (and no less their Soviet equivalent) contain extensive collections of press clippings and news monitoring materials, which constitute an integral part of their reports on specific incidents.6 In short, while awareness of the distinction between the public and private is crucial, both are of benefit in providing a rounded appreciation of events. Press and Media Materials The greater part of the media evidence employed in this dissertation derives from the corpus of materials offered within the diplomatic records themselves. In terms of physical presence, this applies only to the British and Russian archives; published U.S. diplomatic materials frequently reference media items but do not reproduce them. A further and important difference between the British and Russian archives is that, whereas the British files intersperse press monitoring materials chronologically between diplomatic papers, the Soviet Foreign Ministry made use of a separate organisation 5 For the use of the media as an unofficial diplomatic channel, see: B. Rotheray, A History of BBC Monitoring. http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/about_us/ (accessed 27.02.2013.) 6 See e.g. files on the Niavaran Palace plot of 1965. National Archives, FO248/1608 and FO248/1609. 8 (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union or TASS) to collate and translate relevant materials, which are presented as a separate file series. The Russian system is notably more comprehensive than the British, with a typical year yielding between five to six hundred pages of translations from Iranian newspapers. It was often the case that the Tehran TASS correspondent would sit in the Iranian parliament (Majles) press gallery and translate politicians' speeches verbatim for reference by the Embassy or Soviet Foreign Ministry, a practice that has afforded a number of illuminating insights. In instances where Western or Soviet press articles were identified to be of interest, the British Library's Newspaper Collection and its Russian equivalent (the National Library's Newspaper Division located in the Moscow suburb of Khimki) both proved useful resources.7 Finally, research undertaken in the open-source intelligence archives – namely the BBC's Summary of World Broadcast Service (SWB) and the U.S. Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) – furnished additional translations of radio and television broadcasts, newspapers and periodicals, government statements and speeches by leading figures.8 Despite constituting a useful primary source in their own right however, news materials cannot in themselves provide a comprehensive means for assessing government policy. Even in firmly state-controlled media environment, inferring a particular government's viewpoint through the prism of journalistic selection or interpretation poses two risks. First, it assumes that the viewpoint of the government in question was uniform and coherent. It frequently was not. And secondly, depending on a specific news source's proximity to ruling elites, its content may convey a stronger (or indeed weaker) impression than was in fact the reality. Soviet radio stations are a salient example of the latter challenge. In assessing their output, it is necessary to establish a distinction between „official‟ media outlets operating with official state sanction, whose programming tended toward more restrained rhetoric in reflecting the government line, and „public‟ radio stations (that is, those not ostensibly state-controlled and often operating from the communist periphery), which could afford to be a great deal harsher 7 For instance, the full text of the Soviet government's Note of protest to Iran following the departure of its delegation from Tehran in 1959 was reproduced in the Pravda newspaper (see Appendix.) 8 Both organisations were formed during World War II with the aim of monitoring Japanese radio transmissions and subsequently expanded to serve a broader function. 9