The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity Shelley Weinberg University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming) 1. Introduction1 Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition.2 Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). There are two good reasons why Locke would want a theory of this kind. First, relying on a psychological rather than a substantial condition allows Locke to remain agnostic on the nature of thinking substance. Indeed, having a non-substantial identity condition is consistent with Locke’s claims to know very little at all about the nature of substance. Second, at least by Locke’s lights, the theory is compatible with his theological concerns. A psychological condition allows for some flexibility with regard to the theoretical particularities involved in Locke’s theological commitments to the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body.3 Moreover, both of these reasons are consistent with Locke’s overall task in the Essay of outlining the limits of human understanding. 1 I am enormously grateful to Donald Ainslie. I would also like to thank Paul Franks, Don Garrett, Jennifer Nagel, Marleen Rozemond, Helga Varden, Gideon Yaffe, audiences at the 2008 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association and the 2009 Southwest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, and the anonymous referees for JHP. 2 See Udo Thiel, “Personal Identity”, in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, ed. D. Garber and M. Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 868-912, for a comprehensive discussion of his precursors and the revolutionary nature of Locke’s theory. 3 Thiel, in “Personal Identity”, especially pp. 870-71, and Michael Ayers, Locke, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), II: pp. 205, discuss these issues. See also Edwin McCann, “Locke on Identity: Matter, Life, and 2 But what exactly did Locke mean by having the same consciousness? Let’s take a look at some of the interpretive history. Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self.4 So, as far as we are conscious of our past thoughts and actions we are the same person.5 Locke even seems to confirm this interpretation when he refers to consciousness as that “whereby I am my self to my self,” and then continues by saying, If there be any part of its Existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby I am now my self, it is in that part of its Existence no more my self, than any other immaterial Being. For whatever any Substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being any where existing. (II.xxvii.24) If I am not presently conscious of having done something or I am incapable of ever being able to be conscious of having done it, I am not the same person. Unfortunately, seeing personal identity as the result of being conscious of past thoughts and actions has also led many to interpret Locke to mean by the same consciousness simply having Consciousness”, Archive fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 69 (1987), p. 68, who cites as another reason Locke’s desire to provide a theory that is compatible with Christian doctrine but does not also appeal to substantial forms. Says McCann, “If Locke can account for the identity of persons without calling upon any immaterial principles of unity—souls, substantial forms—then he will have snatched the best case away from the Scholastics”. 4 I will follow the bulk of Locke scholarship by treating ‘self’ and ‘person’ as synonymous. Note, however, that Locke does draw the following distinction: “Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same Person” (II.xxvii.26). I interpret the difference to be that ‘self’ denotes that which we perceive from the subjective (first personal) point of view, where ‘person’ denotes the same thing as referred to from the objective (third personal) point of view. For alternative views, see Thiel, “Personal Identity”, p. 891 who interprets ‘self’ to refer either to the person or to the human being, and John Yolton, The Two Intellectual World’s of John Locke, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 2004, pp. 23-4, for the view that ‘person’ designates a ‘moral self’, while ‘self’ designates a ‘secular self’. 5 Those attributing to Locke the view that the central issue concerns the subjective constitution of the self by means of consciousness of past thoughts and actions include Mackie, Problems From Locke, p. 183; David Behan, “Locke on Persons and Personal Identity,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. ix, no. 1, March 1979, pp. 53-75; Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity”, pp. 153f; Edwin Curley, “Leibniz and Locke on Personal Identity” in ed. M. Hooker, Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 310. S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 3 the same memories.6 But to interpret Locke to have a memory theory of personal identity incurs all kinds of problems as ubiquitously pointed out in Locke scholarship. As early as Joseph Butler, Locke’s theory was accused of circularity, since knowing that one is identical to a past self, namely remembering past thoughts and actions, presupposes that the criterion has already been met; there is already an identical self to know.7 And Reid and Berkeley are famous for having accused Locke’s theory of personal identity of failing transitivity.8 Although attributing an ancestral memory theory to Locke preserves transitivity, it does not solve the problem of circularity. One way to address this problem is to attribute to Locke an “appropriation theory” of personal identity. Passages thought key to supporting this interpretation include Locke’s use of the terms ‘appropriation’, ‘self-attribution’, or the ‘imputing’ of actions to oneself. Kenneth Winkler, whose appropriation theory interpretation of Locke has been highly influential, considers the following to be the most “powerful evidence” supporting his proposal:9 Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Where-ever a man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same Person…This personality extends it self beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it self past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present…And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it can no more be concerned in, than if they had never been done. (II.xxvii.26) 6 See Anthony Flew, “Locke on Personal Identity” in ed. C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, (New York: Anchor Books, 1968), pp. 53-68, reprinted in John Perry ed., Personal Identity, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1975). 7 Joseph Butler, The Works of Joseph Butler, ed. W. E. Gladstone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1896), I: p. 385. 8 George Berkeley, Alciphron in The Works of George Berkeley, ed. T. E. Jessop and A. A. Luce, 9 Vols., (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948-57), 3: p. 299, was the first to lodge the objection, but Thomas Reid’s formulation in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Derek Brookes, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), p. 276, version is the one most often mentioned. 9 Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity”, p. 154. S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 4 The focus is on the way in which the appropriation or self-imputation of thoughts and actions constitutes the extension of “personality” through time. Winkler interprets Locke as saying that the self has a “certain authority over its own constitution”, so that whatever I take myself to include is what my consciousness “reveals to me” as mine in any particular moment.10 But the mere fact that we all experience gaps in memory, namely gaps in the consciousness of our past actions, during which time we would not be the same person, lends a distinct impracticability to the theory, especially since personal identity is essential to Locke’s theory of moral responsibility and divine rectification. Divine rectification is the theological doctrine that we will be judged and then rewarded or punished by God in the next life for what we have done in this life. Such reward and punishment is just only if on the day of judgment the one standing before God is the same person who committed the past act. But if the sole criterion for diachronic identity is a person’s own consciousness of past and present mental states, namely what is revealed to oneself in a conscious act of appropriation, then personal identity seems ill equipped to determine just punishment. After all, we are not presently aware of all we have done.11 So, as long as the identity of the self is determined from a subjective point of view rectification is impossible, for there is nothing objective for God to appeal to in determining whether or not we should be punished.12 Leibniz, though sympathetic to the claim that 10 Ibid. 11 The various problems reduce to these two: first, it seems that we are justly punished for what we mistakenly attribute to ourselves, and second, we are not punished for what we cannot attribute to ourselves. So, we’re either unjustly punished or we unjustly escape punishment. Behan, “Locke on Persons and Personal Identity”, pp.74-5, Flew, “Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity”, p. 164, and Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity”, pp. 168-72, specifically point to the insufficiency of Locke’s theory in this regard. 12 Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity” pp. 170-71, suggests that Locke might think that personal identity consists in something that underlies consciousness as a state of awareness, which “drives a wedge between the real self and the self I take myself to be…There is a suggestion of this kind of view in § 13, where Locke says that we do not S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 5 consciousness is a necessary condition for personal identity argued, in response to Locke in the New Essays, that it was not enough. Leibniz insisted on the necessity of a substantial “real identity” underlying the phenomenal states we subjectively experience.13 There is currently no widely accepted single interpretation of Locke’s theory of personal identity, and those considered most influential are seriously flawed in one way or another. The general problem seems to be that Locke needs an objective criterion for the continued existence of the person in order to avoid circularity and to be sufficient for the theory of divine rectification. Those interpretations that ultimately have substance do this work violate Locke’s explicit intent to provide a theory that need not rely on it. Hence, it seems worth exploring a very different and new interpretation, rather than concluding that Locke’s theory is incoherent. I will argue that Locke’s theory includes a metaphysical fact of a continuing consciousness, which renders it non-circular and sufficient for his theory of divine rectification. Moreover, there is no appeal to a traditional notion of substance to explain the continuity of consciousness.14 At the same time, the interpretation takes account of the importance of memory and the first personal nature of our conscious states. To be clear this is not also an argument that once Locke is know ‘whether the consciousness of past Actions can be transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another’ (E II.xxvii.13: 337), a claim that would be extremely odd if Locke thought that consciousness was something whose nature was transparent, and without a foundation that might be better known by God than by ourselves. The rest of § 13 strongly suggests that consciousness is not transparent—that it has (though this may be misleading) an unknown real essence”. Rather than abandon the appropriation theory, the insufficiency with divine rectification leads Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity”, pp. 164-65, to go beyond Locke yet remain in his words “Lockean” by appealing to substance (“time slices”) to make sure that God has something to look to in determining punishment: “Suppose we allow that substance-stages—temporal slices of the enduring things Locke has in mind when he speaks of substances—can be the subjects of thoughts, feelings, and actions of earlier ones, giving rise to relations of psychological continuity.” But surely Locke himself would not make such an appeal to substance to ground the identity of persons. 13 Leibniz, New Essays, p. 236. See Curley, “Locke and Leibniz on Personal Identity”, pp. 302-26, for an interesting comparison of Locke to Leibniz on this issue. 14 See Mackie, Problems From Locke, p. 200, Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity”, p. 170, McCann, “Locke on Identity” p. 75-6, and Margaret Atherton, “Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 8 (1983) p. 287-89 for different ways of suggesting that consciousness has an underlying substantial real essence. S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 6 rescued from incoherence we should find Locke’s theory of personal identity a convincing one, even though Locke’s contribution to contemporary accounts of personal identity is substantial. The clue to the interpretation is that Locke’s conception of consciousness involves an ambiguity. In the chapter devoted to personal identity, Locke seems to see consciousness as 1.) a mental state inseparable from an act of perception by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceiving, and as 2.) the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states. The first sense of consciousness, which is the one that provokes the objections already mentioned, is a momentary psychological state. This sense of consciousness allows for a momentary subjective experience that the self presently perceiving is the same as the self that remembers having once had a past thought or action. ‘Subjective’, here, is meant to describe something psychological, which is epistemically available only from a first personal point of view. The second sense of consciousness, which is needed to answer the objections, is the objective fact of an ongoing consciousness. ‘Objective’ is meant to describe something that is epistemically available from a third personal (maybe only God’s) point of view. The ongoing self that I am aware of in being conscious of past and present thoughts and actions seems also to have an objective continued temporal existence through any gaps in my successive states of awareness of myself. Disambiguating these two senses of consciousness allows for a metaphysical fact, what I am also calling an ‘objective fact’, of my diachronic existence. Thus, there is no problem of circularity, and there is a metaphysical ground for Locke’s theory of divine rectification. God need only look to all that I, as a continually existing consciousness, have done to determine my just punishment and reward. I will present a textual argument for why Locke thinks there is a metaphysical fact of the continued existence of consciousness that does not appeal to substance. I will also say a little S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 7 something about what that metaphysical fact could consist in. I will then argue that the metaphysical fact is revealed to us as a phenomenological fact. Given the right perceptual situation we will experience ourselves as temporally extended. Finally, I will provide an analysis of memory that helps to support the metaphysical fact of consciousness as well as show why the denial that substance is the criterion for personal identity does not also serve to deny that there can be a metaphysical fact of a continuing consciousness. 2. The Metaphysical Fact of a Continuing Consciousness The problems of circularity or of providing enough by way of consciousness to satisfy the demands of divine rectification seem insurmountable as long as consciousness is interpreted to be merely a momentary psychological state of awareness. There are passages in II.xxvii, however, suggesting that consciousness (the I, self, or person) is something that persists through our momentary conscious states of ourselves.15 For example, Locke sometimes speaks of consciousness not only as a distinct thing, but also as something that continues through time. He talks about there being “two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses” alternating by day and night (II.xxvii.23), “the same consciousness being transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another” (II.xxvii.13), “the same consciousness being continued in a succession of several 15 Aaron, Locke, pp. 150, 152-53, argues that although the “analysis is not satisfactory” Locke’s conception of consciousness is “not merely that we are aware of the passing perceptions, but of an abiding identical I…I am not merely conscious of a series of perceptions, for I am conscious of a permanent self, an I who experiences these perceptions and who is now identical with the I who experienced perceptions yesterday”. Martha Brandt Bolton, “Locke on Identity: The Scheme of Simple and Compound Things”, in Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. K. F. Barber and J. J. E. Gracia, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 116, states “the notion of ‘consciousness extended backward is a well-known locus of difficulty” for the interpretation that Locke has a memory theory. Mackie, Problems From Locke, p. 178, attributes to Locke the use of ‘consciousness’ as both a “a concrete noun” and an “abstract verbal noun” in the sense that there can be “distinct incommunicable consciousnesses” (II.xxvii.23) as well as states of “being conscious”. In addition, in those conscious states we have some awareness of an I or of “perceiving ideas from the inside”. Nevertheless, he cannot find a way to explain how there can be an objective fact of an ongoing consciousness. This is why, I think, Mackie comes to the conclusion that instead of a theory of personal identity, Locke has only a theory of action appropriation. S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 8 Substances” (II.xxvii.10), and in several places, the “same consciousness extended” (II.xxvii.9, 10, 16), “reaching” (II.xxvii.9, 17), and “continued” (II.xxvii.25) into the past or future. Although it is true that Locke more frequently speaks of consciousness as a momentary state of awareness of myself as thinking and acting, we can’t simply ignore these other passages. The difficulty is to see how consciousness can be seen to have a continued metaphysical existence without making some appeal to substance, which Locke has taken extraordinary pains to deny.16 There are two ways, Locke suggests, that we can think about consciousness as having a continuing existence. We can try to explain it insofar as it can be seen to fit with the traditional ontology of substances, modes, and relations or we can try to explain it insofar as it continues to exist as the objective I, self, or person we experience when we are conscious we are perceiving ideas. As for explanation by virtue of the traditional ontology, Locke tells us in II.xxvii.25 that were we to consider consciousness in this way, “the more probable Opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Substance”. Insofar as consciousness could be made to fit into the traditional ontological scheme, Locke’s best guess is that it would be considered a mode of a single individual thinking substance. This view would 16 The only exception I have found is Yaffe, “Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity”, p. 226, who argues that we should attribute to Locke “the susceptibility-to-punishment theory of personal identity”. First, consciousness should be understood as the awareness of pleasure and pain. Second, x and y have the same consciousness “just in case the earlier’s actions are a potential source of pleasure or pain for the later”. Third, to avoid the objection that someone else’s action might be a source of my future pain, Yaffe includes the element of desert. So, whether I am the same person now as I was in the past is determined by the fact that I am susceptible to punishment now for what a past person did. Yaffe (pp. 228-29) then argues that Locke replaces the metaphysical fact of personal identity with the moral fact of just desert: “the metaphysical facts—the facts about who is the same person as whom—just are the moral facts; they are facts about who is appropriately punished or rewarded for whose past acts”. Although I think Yaffe’s interpretation cleverly finds an objective criterion on which to base personal identity, it is not clear that Locke would endorse the priority of the moral fact over the metaphysical fact. Although Locke does say that “almost all” our perceptions of ideas are accompanied by perceptions of ideas of pleasure and pain, not all our thoughts and actions are moral; that is, they do not all involve being compared to laws and deserving of reward or punishment. Therefore, the self does not continue to exist between times of nonmoral actions—or no actions at all. And although persons must be “capable of laws” (II.xxvii.26) they need not always be engaging in moral action to be persons. S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 9 be characteristic of Locke’s time. But this is not the kind of metaphysical explanation Locke is interested in, for in the next sentence he says, “But let Men according to their divers Hypotheses resolve of that as they please” (II.xxvii.25). Since we can’t know the real constitutions of things or the particularities involved in the relations between substances and their modes, Locke means to leave that kind of explanation up to the conjectures of others. Rather, the immediately following passage reveals that Locke is interested in a different kind of explanation for consciousness. He begins by acknowledging the continually existing thing we are conscious of, namely the I, self, or person, when we are conscious we are thinking: This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness and Misery, must grant, that there is something that is himself, that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this self has existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and therefore ‘tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same self, by the same consciousness, continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the same self which did such or such an Action some Years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of the same self, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making the same self: But the same continued consciousness, in which several Substances may have been united, and again separated from it, which whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same self. (II.xxvii.25, my emphasis in boldface) Locke seems to be saying that despite our inability to penetrate to the real metaphysics of the external world or even our own minds, we have experience of a continually existing consciousness. Any being capable of happiness and misery “must grant”, he says, that there is something enduring that he is aware of as himself and there is something for which he is concerned and wants to see happy rather than miserable. How, though, should we understand consciousness as having a continued existence? Locke acknowledges the continued existence of consciousness by telling us that it has a “duration”, which we know from his discussion of time as a technical term standing for the “distance between…the appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds” (II.xiv.3). According to S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming 10 Locke, the duration designated by a single perception of an idea is an “instant”. He says, “Such a part of Duration as this, wherein we perceive no Succession, is that which we may call an Instant; and is that which takes up the time of only one Idea in our Minds, without the Succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession at all” (II.xiv.10). Furthermore, Locke asserts that ‘duration’ is a synonym for ‘continued existence’: “we call the Existence, or the Continuation of the Existence of our selves, or anything else, Commensurate to the succession of any Ideas in our Minds, the Duration of our selves, or any such other thing co-existing with our Thinking” (II.xiv.3). And even though we can have only a momentary idea of our own duration or of the duration of any other thing, Locke seems to be saying that things endure through our successive perceptions of ideas of them. We get an idea of the length of that duration by using the ideas we have as marks for measurement. As Locke says, “Duration in it self is to be considered, as going on in one constant, equal, uniform Course: but none of the measures of it, which we make use of, can be known to do so” (II.xiv.21). Furthermore, God can know the continued existence of things as they persist through those ideas by which we measure them. Locke tells us that “God’s infinite Duration being accompanied with infinite Knowledge, and infinite Power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his Knowledge, no farther removed from his sight, than the present” (II.xv.12). So, even though we cannot perceive the actual duration of things through the gaps in our perceptions of ideas, God can. Also clear from II.xxvii.25 is that Locke understands consciousness as something that has “a continued duration more than one instant”. This confirms that Locke thinks it has an ongoing existence through each instant in which we are conscious of ourselves perceiving ideas. So, duration is the ongoing temporal existence of any thing as measured by a single perception of an S. Weinberg Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness JHP - forthcoming