Cultural Evolution and Memetics Article prepared for the Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Science Francis Heylighen & Klaas Chielens Evolution, Complexity and Cognition group Vrije Universiteit Brussel Article Outline Glossary Definition Introduction Defining the meme Dynamics of meme replication and spread Social structures Computer simulations of cultural evolution Selection criteria for memes Parasitic memes Empirical Tests Future Directions Bibliography Glossary Culture: the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that, for a certain group, define their general way of life and that they have taken over from others. Cultural evolution: the development of culture over time, as conceptualized through the mechanisms of variation and natural selection of cultural elements Replicator: an information pattern that is able to make copies of itself, typically with the help of another system. Examples are genes, memes, and (computer) viruses. Meme: a cultural replicator; a unit of imitation or communication. Memeplex (or meme complex): a collection of mutually supporting memes, which tend to replicate together Memetics: the theoretical and empirical science that studies the replication, spread and evolution of memes 1 Fitness: the overall success rate of a replicator, as determined by its degree of adaptation to its environment, and the three requirements of longevity, fecundity and copying- fidelity. Longevity: the duration that an individual replicator survives. Fecundity: the speed of reproduction of a replicator, as measured by the number of copies made per time unit Copying-fidelity: the degree to which a replicator is accurately reproduced. Vertical transmission: transmission of traits (memes or genes) from parents to offspring Horizontal transmission: transmission of traits between individuals of the same generation Memotype: a meme in the form of information held in an individual’s memory. Mediotype: a meme as expressed in an external medium, such as a text, an artefact, a song, or a behavior. Sociotype: the group or community of individuals who hold a particular meme in their memory. Definition Cultural traits are transmitted from person to person, similarly to genes or viruses. Cultural evolution therefore can be understood through the same basic mechanisms of reproduction, spread, variation, and natural selection that underlie biological evolution. This implies a shift from genes as units of biological information to a new type of units of cultural information: memes. The concept of meme can be defined as an information pattern, held in an individual's memory, which is capable of being copied to another individual's memory. Memetics can then be defined as the theoretical and empirical science that studies the replication, spread and evolution of memes. Memes differ in their degree of fitness, i.e. adaptedness to the socio-cultural environment in which they propagate. Fitter memes will be more successful in being communicated, “infecting” more individuals and thus spreading over a larger population. This biological analogy allows us to apply Darwinian concepts and theories to model cultural evolution. Introduction The transmission of cultural traits is a process that in many ways resembles the spread of an infectious disease: the carrier of a certain idea, behavior or attitude directly or indirectly communicates this idea to another person, who now also becomes a carrier, ready to “infect” further people. For example, after you heard your neighbor whistling a catchy tune a couple of times, you may well start whistling it yourself, thus being ready to infect some more people with the tune. Similarly, after you hear your friends recommend a new electronic tool they have bought, you may well buy one yourself, and, if you like it, start recommending it to those acquaintances who do not know it yet. Thus, cultural traits can be seen as analogous to mind viruses (Dawkins, 1993; Brodie, 1996), idea viruses (Godin, 2002) or thought contagions (Lynch, 1996), which are reproduced from mind to mind via imitation or communication. A truly successful trait is one that spreads like an epidemic, infecting the whole of the population, in order to end up as a 2 stable, endemic component of that population’s culture. For example, the tune may become part of the repertoire of “evergreens” that everyone knows, and the tool may become as widespread as the mobile phone or color television. This virus metaphor is attractive in that it suggests a new perspective and new methods, such as epidemiology (Aunger, 2002), for studying the dynamics of culture. However, in order to turn it into a well-founded scientific theory, we need a deeper understanding of the underlying assumptions and implications of this analogy. For this, we can turn to the science that studies viruses and other self-reproducing systems: biology. It is an old idea to see a correspondence between cultural and biological evolution, with cultural entities undergoing similar processes of variation, reproduction and natural selection as organisms or genes. Around the end of the 18th century Western linguists discovered the similarities between different languages. Sir William Jones gave birth to the field of language evolution studies, more specifically in the search for the origin of languages, and their “common descent” (van Wyhe, 2005). The German linguist August Schleicher attempted to recreate this common ancestor of languages, publishing tree-diagrams of languages as early as 1853, six years before Darwin published his Origin of Species. In an 1870 article one can already read: “How does a new style of architecture prevail? How, again, does fashion change? (…) or take language itself (…) it is the idea of ‘Natural Selection’ that was wanted” (Müller, 1870). The American philosopher and psychologist William James (1880) pointed out in a presentation to the Harvard Natural History Society that: “A remarkable parallel, ..., obtains between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, and of zoölogical evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on the other.” By the end of the 20th century, the parallel study of cultural and biological evolution got a new impetus with the introduction, by Richard Dawkins (1989, first edition 1976), of the concept of meme (for a review see (Aunger, 2004)). A meme, named in analogy with a gene, is defined as a cultural replicator, i.e. an element of culture such as a tradition, belief, idea, melody, or fashion, that can be held in memory and transmitted or copied to the memory of another person. The core idea of memetics is that memes differ in their degree of fitness, i.e. adaptedness to the socio-cultural environment in which they propagate (de Jong, 1999; Heylighen, 1998). Mutations and recombinations of existing ideas will produce a variety of memes that compete with each other for the attention of people. Fitter memes will be more successful in being communicated, “infecting” more individuals and thus spreading over a larger population. The resulting evolutionary dynamics is one of variation creating new meme variants, followed by natural selection retaining only the ones that are most fit. Thus, the Darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest can be seen to underlie cultural evolution as well as biological evolution (Aunger, 2001, 2003; Durham, 1991; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). The memetic perspective on culture is complementary to the traditional social science perspective, which focuses on the characteristics of the individuals and groups communicating rather than on the characteristics of the information being communicated. This does not imply a "memetic reductionism", which would deny individual control over what you communicate. It just notes that in many cases the dynamics of information propagation and the ensuing evolution of culture can be modeled more simply from the 3 "meme's point of view" than by analyzing the conscious or unconscious intentions of the communicating agents. Over the past thirty years, several models of cultural evolution have been proposed that study the propagation of memes or similarly defined cultural traits (e.g. “culturgens” (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981) or “mnemons” (Campbell, 1974)). Most of those models are purely theoretical, proposing various conceptualizations, implications and speculations based on the memetic perspective (e.g. Blackmore, 2000; Dennett, 1995; Flinn & Alexander, 1982; Hull, 1982; Lake, 1998). Some studies are mathematical in nature, applying techniques from mathematical genetics or epidemiology to quantitatively estimate the spread of particular types of memes within a population (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Lynch, 1998). Others are computational, simulating the transmission of knowledge or behaviors between software agents (e.g. Gabora, 1995; Best, 1997; Bull, Holland & Blackmore, 2001). A few are observational case studies, where the spread of a particular cultural phenomenon, such as a chain letter, an urban legend, or a social stereotype, is investigated qualitatively or quantitatively (e.g. Goodenough & Dawkins, 2002; Schaller et al., 2002; Chielens, 2003, Bangerter & Heath, 2004). However, in spite of these advances, the memetic perspective on culture is not very well developed yet, and remains controversial (Aunger, 2001; Atran, 2001; Edmonds, 2002). There are several reasons why memeticists have not yet been able to convince the bulk of social and cultural scientists of the soundness of their approach. First, the analogy with the gene, and its embodiment as DNA, seems to indicate that a meme should have a clear, well-delineated, stable structure. (Although one should note that natural selection was proposed by Darwin well before genes were postulated by Mendel, and a century before their structure was elucidated by Watson and Crick). Cultural entities, such as beliefs, ideas, fashions, and norms, on the other hand are typically ambiguous, difficult to delimit and constantly changing. Memetic models that are based on “hard”, explicitly defined units therefore only seem applicable to a very small subset of cultural phenomena, such as chain letters. However, the biological analogy does not imply such rigidity: unlike higher organisms, the genes of bacteria and viruses too are in a flux, constantly mutating and exchanging bits of DNA with other organisms, but that does not imply that they do not obey evolutionary principles. A second criticism of the memetic approach is that people are not passive “vehicles” or “carriers” of ideas and beliefs, the way they may carry viruses. Individuals actively interpret the information they receive in the light of their existing knowledge and values, and on the basis of that may decide to reject, accept, or modify the information that is communicated to them. In order words, individuals and groups actively intervene in the formulation and propagation of culture. In that sense, cultural evolution is Lamarckian rather than purely Darwinian. A final criticism is that memetic models have not yet been sufficiently subjected to empirical tests (Edmonds, 2002; Chielens & Heylighen, 2005). Part of the reason is that most memetic theories do not make sufficiently concrete predictions to be falsifiable by observation. Most of these theories remain very speculative—often hardly better than a form of “armchair philosophy”. Moreover, until now there simply have been very few empirical studies of how memes propagate, whether in the laboratory (e.g. Lyons & 4 Kashima, 2003) or in real life (e.g. Bangerter & Heath, 2004), and even fewer links have been established between these observations and theoretical or mathematical models. We will try to address these criticisms in the remainder of this article. First, we will discuss the issue of how to define a meme in an as accurate way as possible. Then we will review the process of transmission of memes between individuals, emphasizing the active role played by an individual’s cognitive structure. This will give us a basis to review the dynamics of memetic propagation across a population, and the mathematical and simulation models that have been used to study it. To introduce empirical tests, we will first discuss the criteria that determine the fitness of a meme, specifying which memes are most likely to spread. We will then summarize a few experiments and case studies in which the predictive value of such selection criteria was tested. Finally, we will discuss some potential future applications of memetic research. Defining the meme Replicators The original definition of a meme by Dawkins (1989) was based on the concept of replicator. A replicator is a system that is able to make copies of itself, typically with the help of some other system. Examples include real and computer viruses, which need respectively a cell and a computer processor to make copies of themselves. The fundamental example discussed by Dawkins is the gene, the string of DNA that carries the information on how to make a protein, and that is copied with the help of the cellular machinery whenever a cell divides. A meme too is a replicator, as it is copied whenever information is transmitted from one individual to another via communication or imitation. Because replicators can be reproduced in different quantities, they are subject to natural selection: the one that tends to produce the largest number of replicas over an extended time span will win the competition with less productive replicators. To succeed in this, according to Dawkins (1989), a good replicator should exhibit the following characteristics: • longevity: the longer any instance of the replicating pattern survives, the more copies can be made of it. A drawing made by etching lines in the sand is likely to be erased before anybody could have reproduced it. • fecundity: the faster the rate of copying, the more the replicator will spread. An industrial printing press can churn out many more copies of a pamphlet than an office-copying machine. • copying-fidelity: the more accurate or faithful the copy, the more will remain of the initial pattern after several rounds of copying. If a painting is reproduced by making photocopies from photocopies, the picture will quickly become unrecognizable. Dawkins called memes the “new” replicators, in the sense that they appeared very recently compared to genes. The reason for this evolution is clear: the typically human ability of imitation, i.e. learning new ideas, knowledge or behavior by copying what another individual already learnt, provides a tremendous shortcut for the multiple 5 experiences of trial-and-error that are otherwise necessary to discover a useful new behavior pattern (Campbell, 1974). While some other animals are capable of limited imitation—e.g. songbirds learn songs from each other, and apes can imitate simple behaviors (Bonner, 1980)—this capability is best developed in humans (Blackmore, 2000). This accounts for our ability to develop a culture that is passed on from generation to generation, thus accumulating ever more useful knowledge in the course of its evolution. In that sense, memes can be seen to be responsible for the extremely fast development of human society and its subsequent dominance of the ecosystem. Memes vs. Genes When we compare the two most important replicators, genes and memes, we immediately notice a number of fundamental differences. Genes can only be transmitted from parent to offspring. Memes can in principle be transmitted between any two individuals. For genes to be transmitted, you need one generation. Memes can be transmitted in the span of minutes. Meme propagation is also much faster than gene spreading, because gene replication is restricted by the relatively small number of offspring a single parent can have, whereas the number of individuals that can take over a meme from a single individual is almost unlimited. Moreover, it seems much easier for memes to undergo variation, since the information in the nervous system is more plastic than that in the DNA, and since individuals can come into contact with many more different sources of novel memes. On the other hand, selection processes too are more efficient because of “vicarious” selection (Campbell, 1974): the carrier of a meme does not need to be killed in order to eliminate an inadequate meme; it suffices that he witnesses or hears about the troubles of another individual due to that same meme. The conclusion is that cultural evolution will be several orders of magnitude faster and more efficient than genetic evolution. It should not surprise us then that during the last ten thousand years, humans have hardly changed on the genetic level, whereas their culture has undergone the most radical developments. In practice the superior evolvability of memes also means that in cases where genetic and memetic replicators are in competition, we would expect the memes to win, even though the genes would start with the advantage of a well-established, stable structure (Blackmore, 2000), as we will discuss further when reviewing computer simulations of such dual evolution. While memes have a much higher fecundity than genes, their plasticity implies a much lower copying-fidelity: a message as received and understood by an individual will rarely be identical to the one that was expressed, as illustrated by the many misunderstandings and reinterpretations during communication. Yet, we should not conclude from this that effective communication is impossible: if you believed that, you would not be reading this article, hoping to assimilate the main ideas presented by its authors. The reason for such mixture of accurate transmission with creative reinterpretation is that, most fundamentally, humans are cognitive agents. This means that they process incoming information depending on the knowledge they already have and the computing machinery they are endowed with, selectively retain some of that information in their memory, and selectively express some of that information to other agents. Generally, the transmission of information by an agent will change both the agent, 6 who has learned something new, and the information, which will be affected by the knowledge the agent already had. Therefore, a meme reaching an agent, if it is reproduced at all, will typically be transmitted in a changed form, possibly recombined with other information learned earlier. This explains why it is often so difficult to define or pinpoint an individual meme. In that sense, cultural evolution is Lamarckian: characteristics acquired during the lifetime of the meme’s carrier can be transmitted to later carriers. Lamarckian evolution, while not being Darwinian in the strict sense, is still subject to the principle of natural selection: acquired characteristics too will be passed on selectively, depending on their fitness. Natural selection by definition will pick out the memes who survive this transmission process relatively unchanged. Therefore, the fittest memes, such as certain songs, religious beliefs, scientific laws, or brand names, will have a stable, recognizable identity, even though they may differ in appearance, as exemplified by the many renditions of a song or joke. All such memes together define the culture shared by a community. This identity will be reinforced by positive feedback that characterizes the non- linear interaction between meme and carrier: the more people encounter a particular version of a meme, the more they will tend to adapt their own version to this common prototype, the more commonly they will express this version, and thus the more people will encounter it. In this way, a variety of versions that are constantly being exchanged within the same group will tend to converge to a single, canonical version (Axelrod, 1997). A newcomer to this group with a variant version will be extensively subjected to the accepted version, and is likely to eventually give in to this conformist pressure by adopting the majority version (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). This winner-takes-all dynamics, where the initially most frequent variant comes to dominate all others, is elegantly illustrated by computer simulations of the evolution of language, in which many communicating individuals who use different words for the same concept quickly converge on a single word (Steels, 1997). Similarly, most systems of ethics or religious belief tend to actively suppress any variant from their canonical version. This explains why in spite of the great variability of memes, we generally have no problems determining whether an individual belongs to a certain religious or linguistic group (Heylighen & Campbell, 1995). Note that such non-linear reinforcement does not exist for genes, since genes are transmitted only once, from parent to offspring. Moreover, once a gene is given, it can no longer be affected by the presence of other versions in the population. Another fundamental difference between memes and genes is that for memes there is no equivalent for the traditional distinction between genotype (the information carried by the genes and passed on to the next generation) and phenotype (the specific appearance of an organism as determined by genes and environmental influences). In biological evolution, the genotype is the site of evolutionary variation (since variations in the phenotype are not passed on during reproduction) and the phenotype the site of selection (since it is the organism as a whole that survives and reproduces, or is eliminated). In memetics, we can distinguish three levels: 1) the memotype denotes the information as held in an individual’s memory; 2) the mediotype denotes that information as expressed in an external medium, such as a text, an artefact, a song, or a behavior; 7 3) the sociotype denotes the group or community of individuals who hold that information in their memory (Blackmore, 2000). Variation and selection take place on all three levels. A memotype can vary or be eliminated (forgotten) while residing in an individual’s brain. A mediotype can similarly mutate (e.g. via a printing error) or be lost, and a sociotype can change when new individuals are added to the group, who may introduce different memes, or be eliminated (as when an unsuccessful tribe dies out). In conclusion, the processes of variation and selection, while analogous at the deepest level, are much more complex for memes than for genes. Delimiting the memetic unit What are the elements that make up a meme? In order to analyze meme structure, we can use some concepts from cognitive science, the discipline that studies mental content. Perhaps the most popular unit used to represent knowledge in artificial intelligence is the production rule. It has the form “if condition, then action”. The action leads in general to the activation of another condition or category. A production rule can thus be analyzed as a combination of even more primitive elements: two concepts or categories and a connection (the “then” part, which makes the first category entail the second one). For example, a meme like “God is omnipotent” can be interpreted as “if a phenomenon is God (it belongs to the category of God-like entities), then that phenomenon is omnipotent (it belongs to the category of omnipotent entities)”. Production rules are connected when the output condition (action) of the one matches the input condition of the other. This makes it possible to construct complex cognitive systems on the basis of simple rules. In memetics, such systems are called meme complexes or memeplexes. For example, a scientific theory or a religious system of belief may be represented as a collection of mutually connected propositions or production rules, such as “God is omnipotent”, “God is good”, “God punishes bad people”, “if you steal, you are bad”, etc. This collection of rules together determines a knowledge system that allows making inferences, such as “if you steal, God will punish you”. Even more concrete perceptual or behavioral memes, such as a tune, might be modeled in this way, as concatenations of production rules of the type “if C (musical note distinguished), then E (note produced and subsequently distinguished)”, “if E, then A”, and so on. (In fact, genetic information too can be modeled using networks of “if... then” productions: a DNA string is activated by the presence of certain proteins (condition) to which it responds by producing specific other proteins (action), see (Kauffmann, 1993)). Production rules—or at least a simplified, binary representation of them, called “classifiers”—can be used to build computer simulations of cognitive evolution, using genetic algorithms, i.e. algorithmically applied operators that perform the equivalents of mutation, recombination, and selection on the basis of “fitness” on such strings (Holland et al., 1986). Although classifier models generally do not take into account distinct carriers, this looks like a promising road to study the evolution of memeplexes formally and computationally. As we will see later, though, simulations of cultural evolution are usually limited to the mutation and spread of simple memes, ignoring the cognitive 8 structures and processes that support inferences and that create new meme(plexe)s out of combinations of existing ones. Even if we would model memes as connected sets of production rules, we still have the problem of how many production rules define a single meme(plex). If we call a religion or a scientific theory a meme, it is clear that this will encompass a very large number of interconnected rules. In practice it will be impossible to enumerate all rules, or to define sharp boundaries between the rules that belong to the meme and those that do not. For example, should you believe in the existence of Hell, the creation of the world in seven days, and the virginity of Mary to be called a Catholic? A pragmatic criterion that can be used in this regard is to define a meme or memeplex as the smallest collection of propositions or memory items that tends to replicate as a whole (cf. Wilkins, 1998). For example, a proposition like “God is omnipotent” on its own, without specification of God’s other characteristics, is much too abstract to be clearly understood or applied, and as such is unlikely to replicate well. However, in combination with a number of other propositions, like “God is good”, “God is the creator of the world”, etc., that flesh out, apply, and support this abstract idea, the package will make much more sense, and be more likely to be passed on to other individuals. Similarly, the first three notes of a melody are unlikely to be remembered as a unit, but the first eight, as in the beginning of Beethoven’s fifth symphony, may well be. It remains that often we can add or subtract a few production rules (such as the virginity of Mary) from a memeplex without significantly changing its chances of replication. Therefore, in practice it will rarely be possible to determine the precise boundaries of a meme(plex). However, this should not detract us from considering memes while analyzing cultural evolution. Indeed, the same problem besets genetic models of biological evolution: as yet, it is in practice impossible to specify the exact combination of DNA codons that determine the gene for, say, fair skin, big ears or altruism. The biochemical definition of a gene as a string of DNA that codes for one protein is not very useful when studying evolution, since most practical functions require a combination of proteins, most proteins exhibit a combination of functions, and much of the DNA is non-coding, but therefore not necessarily useless, as it may contain control information that determines the activation of other DNA strings. As Dawkins (1989) notes, we do not need to know the constitutive elements or boundaries of a gene in order to explain the evolution of particular characteristics, such as altruism or fair skin, for which such a gene would be responsible. It is sufficient that we can distinguish the effects of that gene from the effects of its rival genes (alleles). If we can determine the fitness differences resulting from these effects, then we can make predictions about which type of genes will win the competition in a particular situation, and thus which characteristics the species is most likely to evolve. For example, knowing that people with lighter skin need less sunlight to produce sufficient vitamin D, we can predict that in Northern regions natural selection will favor genes for light skin over genes for dark skin—whatever DNA codons make up these respective genes. The same applies to memes. If, for example, we observe that one meme (say Catholicism) induces its carriers to have more children than its competitors (say Anglicanism), and that the children tend to take over their memes from their parents, then, all other things being equal, we can predict that after sufficient time this meme will 9 dominate in the population. This prediction does not require any explicit definition of the meme of Catholicism, but only the ability to distinguish it from its competitors. Of course, in practice it is never the case that all other things are equal, but that is the predicament of all scientific modeling: we must always simplify, and ignore potentially important influences. The question is to do that as wisely as possible, and to maximally include relevant variables without making the model too complex. Dynamics of meme replication and spread To be replicated, a meme must pass successfully through four subsequent stages: 1) assimilation by an individual, who thereby becomes a carrier or host of the meme; 2) retention in that individual's memory; 3) expression by the individual in language, behavior, or another form that can be perceived by others; 4) transmission of the thus created message or mediotype to one or more other individuals. This last stage is followed again by stage 1, thus closing the replication loop. At each stage there is selection, meaning that some memes will be eliminated. Let us look in more detail at the mechanisms governing these four stages. Assimilation A successful meme must be able to “infect” a new host, that is, enter into its memory, and thus acquire its memotype form. Let us assume that a meme is presented to a potential new host. “Presented” means either that the individual encounters an existing mediotype form of a meme, or that he or she independently discovers the meme, by observation of outside phenomena or by thought, i.e. recombination of existing cognitive elements. To be assimilated, the presented meme must be respectively noticed, understood and accepted by the host. Noticing requires that the mediotype be sufficiently salient to attract the host's attention. Understanding means that the host recognizes the meme as something that fits in with his or her cognitive system. The mind is not a blank slate on which any idea can be impressed. To be understood, a new idea or phenomenon must connect to cognitive structures that are already available to the individual. Finally, a host that has understood a new idea must also be willing to believe it or to take it seriously. For example, although you are likely to understand the proposition that your car was built by little green men from Mars, you are unlikely to accept that proposition without very strong evidence. Therefore, you will in general not memorize it, and the meme will not manage to infect you. Retention The second stage of memetic replication is the retention of the meme in memory. The longer the meme stays, the more opportunities it will have to spread further by infecting other hosts. This is Dawkins's (1989) longevity characteristic for replicators. 10